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
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



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


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LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY.

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HERMATHENA.

NOTES ON VOPISCUS.

THE following are a few notes on one of the writers of the Augustan History, suggested partly by the interesting article of Professor Ellis in the 1906 issue of *HERMATHENA*, and partly by a study of the author, prosecuted from a desire to gain some slight knowledge of the state of the Roman world immediately prior to the sweeping changes effected by Diocletian. Any such effort must make as its basis some investigation into the work of Vopiscus. First, there are some emendations on the text of that author; and then an attempted estimate of the charge laid against him that he forged all the documents which he has quoted in his *Lives*. The most important matter—the estimate we are to place on the historical value of the several documents—cannot be dealt with in this paper.

I.

Aurelian 1. 4.

dolorem gemitus sui vir sanctus per haec verba profundit.

Peter alters *gemitus sui* into *ingemiscens*, which he reads in the text, offering *gemitu is* as a conjecture in the notes. But these words of the MSS. may mean ‘the sorrow which his groan evinced.’ This section and the next are quoted by Grote (i. p. 437, ed. 1869) to show “the undiminished popularity of the Grecian myths, to the exclusion even

of recent history" (*Ergo Thersitem, Sinonem, &c.*). It is noticeable in the poets that they consider mythical characters to be as real as historical personages: e.g. when Ovid (*Pont.* 1. 3. 63 ff.) is referring to exiles whose lot was happier than his own, he mentions one after the other Rutilius Rufus, Diogenes, Themistocles, Aristides, Patroclus, Jason, Cadmus, Tydeus.

Aurelian 1. 10.

tu velim meo munere boni consulas.

The old editors altered to *meum munus*: so far rightly, inasmuch as *boni consulere* must have an accusative, not an ablative or dative, after it: accordingly, Peter is not right in altering to *muneri*. The simplest alteration is *mea munera*, as *a* is at times found corrupted into *e*: e.g. 23. 2 *negaret* of the MSS. should certainly be *negarat*; *Car.* 1. 2 *mensura* for *mansura*. But it is just possible that *meo munere* should be retained as ablative absolute, and that some participle, such as *completo* or *accepto* or *misso*, has fallen out after *meo*: cp. *Trig. Tyr.* 31. 8 *quaeso, qui expletum iam librum acceperas, boni consulas*. Vopiscus was an admirer and imitator of Trebellius (cp. c. 2).

Aurelian 6. 5.

refert Theoclius . . . Aurelianum manu sua bello Sarmatico una die quadraginta et octo interfecisse, plurimis autem et diversis diebus ultra nongentos quinquaginta adeo ut etiam ballistia pueri et saltatiunculas in Aurelianum tales <componerent> quibus diebus festis militariter saltitarent :

Mille mille mille decollavimus

Unus homo ! mille decollavimus

Mille vivat qui mille occidit

Tantum vini nemo habet quantum fudit sanguinis.

It is in this way that the MSS. give this soldiers' song; and so it is retained by Peter, Bährens, and Peiper, except

that Bährens adopts <ille> *mille vivat*, which addition is due to O. Ribbeck. The third hands of P and M (neither of which is to be regarded as anything more than an emendator) give *mille* five times in l. 1, and three times in l. 2, plainly in an endeavour to make the verses regular trochaic tetrameters. But they do not aspire to extending the third line so that a similar verse may be attained.

The military songs in this chapter are, according to some critics, the only quotations made by Vopiscus which can be considered as having any authenticity. Groag (in Pauly-Wissowa, v., p. 1353) considers that they are genuine soldiers' songs, but that the evidence which refers them to Aurelian is insufficient. As regards metre they undoubtedly have the ring of trochaic tetrameters—a metre apparently much favoured by camp minstrelsy. Salmasius thinks that we should be content with the indication of rhythm, and not endeavour to force the effusions of these 'vulgares ac de trivio poetae, si poetae vocandi sunt,' into regular metre, though he allows their special trochaic lilt (p. 431 b). This is possible; but surely it is more probable that they were corrupted in transmission than that they were at once trochaic and yet so very irregular as they appear in the MSS.: especially as such *versus populares* elsewhere found, which are quoted by Corssen, are fairly metrical, e.g.:

Suet. Caes. 51 :¹

Urbani, servate uxores, moechum calvum adducimus.
Aurum in Gallia effutuisti : hic sumpsisti mutuum.

Suet. Calig. 6 :

Salva Roma, salva patria, salvus est Germanicus.

¹ Cp. also Suet. Caes. 49 : 80.

Suet. Galb. 6 :

Disce, miles, militare, Galba est, non Gaetulicus.

Schol. on Juv. 5. 3 :

Aliud scriptum habet Sarmentus, aliud populus voluerat :

Digna dignis : sic Sarmentus habeat crassas compedes.

Rustici ne nil agatis, aliquis Sarmentum alliget.

Add to these the verse quoted in Marius Plotius, 461 (Keil) :

Postquam Crassus carbo factus, Carbo crassus factus est.

Also Velleius 2. 67 :

De germanis, non de Gallis, duo triumphant consules.

Corssen (Vokalismus, ii. 958, ed. 2) arranges our verses thus to make them regular :

Mille, mille, mille, mille, mille decollavimus.

Unus homo, mille, mille, mille decollavimus.

Mille, mille, mille, mille vivat qui mille occidit.

Tantum vini nemo habet quantum fudit sanguinis.

He notices how these lines exhibit a stage in the gradual supersession of quantity by accent: thus we have *homo* in l. 2 and *habet* in l. 4; also that arsis and accent coincide, except (he says) in one case—apparently *occidit*, where the accent is *occidit* and the syllable *occ-* is the arsis. Yet even allowing these irregularities, which are certainly questionable, difficulties remain as to the sense. After the introduction of *Unus homo*, referring to Aurelian's prowess, there is no proper place for a repetition of *mille decollavimus*. Also that we should read *bibat* for *vivat* (with Bücheler) seems to me certain, though *mille bibat* for *mille cyathos bibat* cannot, as far as I know, be exactly paralleled; though *cyathos* can be omitted in some phrases: see Hor. Carm. 3. 21. 9, compared with 3. 8. 13.

¹ The omission of the word with numerals is admissible in Greek: cp. the drinking-song quoted in Plautus

Stich. 707 (Lindsay), ἡ πέντε ἡ τετρα πῖν' ἢ μὴ τέτταρα.

But the same objection would apply to *mille vivat* for *mille annos vivat*. The fourth line makes the change to *bibat* necessary. The first line as arranged by Corssen¹ seems right. In the second line, I think, *mille decollavimus* is a mere dittography of part of the first line; and perhaps the second and third lines may form a single line, and run something like this:

Mille bibat qui mille occidit, unus homo mille eibat;²

and the last line should in any case run:

Tantum vini nemo *habebit* quantum fudit sanguinis,

as has been suggested by Gruter. The word *habebit* probably means 'will be able to hold.' Peiper ingeniously suggests *avebit*, as *avere* and *habere* are so often confused; but it weakens the sense.

In c. 7.1 we have: idem (Aurelianus) Francos inruentes . . . sic adfixit ut trecentos ex his captos septingentis interemptis sub corona vendiderit: unde iterum de eo facta est cantilena:

Mille Sarmatas, mille Francos semel et semel occidimus
Mille Persas quaerimus.

So Peter, Corssen, and Bährens. I presume they take *semel et semel* as meaning 'once and for all.' This meaning is found for *semel* in Virg. Aen. 11, 418 (see Conington); and we have *semel et in perpetuum* in Florus (i. 41. 7); but the latter rather militates against our supposing that *semel et semel* was an ordinary collocation.

It may be suggested as probable that the sense of these lines was that, as the soldiers had slain their thousands of

¹ It had been so arranged by P³M.

² If it is felt that three instances in this line of the accent not coinciding with the arsis render this verse improbable in the third century, we might

read *unus homo mille bibat*, and scan *mill'*: cp. Lindsay's Plautus, Bacch. 272; also his Introduction to the *Captivi*, § 14, p. 26.

Sarmatians and Franks, they now looked to slaying their thousands of Persians. Thus, in point of sense—for it would be impossible to be sure of the actual words—the lines may have been like these:

Mille Sármatas sémel et mílle Fráncos sémel occídimus
 <Mílle ut núnc semel òccidámus> mílle Pérsas quaérimus.

The effect of the accent may perhaps shorten the final syllable of *Sarmatas*.¹

Casaubon well refers to 1 Samuel 18. 6, 7, "And it came to pass as they came, when David returned from the slaughter of the Philistine, that the women came out of all the cities of Israel, *singing and dancing*, to meet king Saul, with timbrels, with joy, and with instruments of music. And the women *sang one to another in their play*, and said, Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands": cp. 21. 11 : 29. 5.

Aurelian 7. 5.

de praeda hostis non de lacrimis provincialium *habeant*.

Peter reads *uiuant* needlessly, and Bährens *tabeant* improbably: for *habere* can be used absolutely in the sense of 'having possessions,' e.g. Cic. Verr. 3. 199 *habet* idem in nummis, *habet* idem in urbanis praediis: Senec. De Vita Beat. 26. 1 'quid ergo inter me stultum et te sapientem interest si uterque *habere* volumus?' 'Plurimum; *divitiae* enim apud sapientem virum in servitute sunt, apud stultum in imperio'; and Horace's amore senescit *habendi* (Epp. i. 7. 85), and Juvenal's (14. 207) unde *habeas* quaerit nemo, sed oportet *habere*. Other examples in a note on Cic. Fam. xvi. 21. 7.

¹ Corssen refers to two places in the Augustan History where the supersession of quantity by accent is apparent: Alex. Sev. 38. 4 Pulchrum quod *vidēs* esse nostrum regem: cp. 6 Pul-

chrum quod *putās* esse nostrum regem, and si verum *putās* esse, non irascor: Pesc. Nig. 12. 6 Hunc reges, hunc *gentēs* amant, hunc aurea Roma.

Aurelian 7. 6.

Stipendium in balteo, non in popina *habeat*.

Salmasius reads *abeat*, no doubt rightly; but I do not feel so sure about his alteration to *balteum* and *popinam*. I should prefer to add *sit* (or *stet*) before *stipendium*, and retain the ablatives. The belt in its use as a purse was usually styled *zona*, not *balteus*: cp. Hor. Epp. ii. 2. 40; Liv. xxxiii. 29. 4. It would be tempting to conjecture *habeat* stipendium in balteo, non in popina *abeat*, introducing a natural form of assonance in such an antithetical sentence: but, though *habeat* might have dropped out after *excludat*, this addition would be rather bold.

Aurelian 7. 8.

alter alteri quasi ~~in~~ nemo quasi servus obsequatur.

in seems to be the remnant of *ingenuus*. For *ingenuus* (*servus* cp. Lamp. Alex. Sev. 27. 1 ne *servi ingenuis* miscerentur).

Aurelian, 9. 4.

ille dux magni totius exempli.

Peter alters to *totus*; and Lessing, in his Dictionary, adopts this reading, taking it in an adverbial sense 'wholly.' I should prefer to read *magni<et> totius exempli* 'of great and perfect example.' This usage of *totius* is not infrequent in inscriptions, as Casaubon has pointed out; cp. C. I. L. vi. 32041 mirae bonitatis *totiusque* integritatis x. 4538 Hic est posita Ursa virgo *totius* bonitatis. For the omission of *et*, which is quite common in B P, cp. Aur. 46. 4: Tac. 6. 8: Prob. 21. 2: 23. 5: Car. 5. 4: Firm. 3. 6.

Aurelian 11. 10.

His quoque litteris indicatur quantus fuerit Aurelianus *et re vera*.

So the MSS. Peter alters to *a puero*, a violent change. We should press the force of the perfect subjunctive *fuerit*, 'how great A. *was* (even then), and the indication was true.'

It would be simpler if we could suppose *erat* to have dropped out after *re vera*: but that is not absolutely necessary.

Aurelian 17. 2.

Flavius Claudius Valeriano Aureliano suo salutem.

The old editors appear to have altered this reading of the principal MSS. to *Valerio Aureliano*. There does not seem to be any evidence that the Emperor was ever called *Valerianus* or *Valerius*. The probability is that the original scribe confused the arrangement of letters in *Aureliano*, and, noticing his error, then wrote the name correctly, and omitted to erase the erroneous form. The same kind of mistake appears to occur in Prob. 11. 5. In Carus 4. 6 the scribe seems also to have written *Valerius* for *Aurelius*.

Another example of the misplacement of letters is Probus 19. 4 *paruit* plainly for *rapuit*; cp. also Aur. 30. 4 *caprorum* for *Carporum*: Tac. 11. 2 *horelibus* (in B) for *holeribus*: 12. 1 *imitandum* for *intimandum*: Proc. 13. 1 *regeret* for *gereret*: Bonos. 14. 2 *militis* for *limitis*: Car. 8. 3 *examinati* (in B) for *exanimati*.

Aurelian 24. 1.

Cum Heraclammon locum ostendisset aggeris naturali specie tumentem qua posset Aurelianus *cultus* ascendere, ille conscendit atque *elata* purpurea clamide intus civibus, foris militibus se ostendit, et ita civitas capta est, quasi totus in muris Aureliani fuisset exercitus.

The ordinary reading is *occultus*. Bährens gives *tutus*, Petschenig *altius*, which are unlikely. Rather transpose *elata* and *cultus*. For *elatus* in this sense cp. Prob. 21. 3 turrem ferratam quam ipse speculae causa *elatissimam* exaedificaverat: and also Prob. 9. 2 according to the emendation of Peter (after Salmasius) quod (sepulchrum) adhuc extat tumulo usque ad ducentos pedes *terra elatum* (*terrae latum* BP¹: *terra elato* Salm.).

Aurelian 26. 5.

timet quasi femina, pugnat quasi poenam timentes: sed credo adiuturos Romanam remp. *veros* (so Salmasius: *vir* MSS.) deos.

Editors generally alter *timentes* into *timens*. But I think in that clause we require a word for 'man' to form the antithesis to *femina*. As *veros deos* introduces an unnecessary and un-Roman idea of true and false gods, Gruter seems right in transposing *vir* to follow *quasi* and precede *poenam*; or perhaps we might (with Casaubon) read *virī*, and so avoid having to make the considerable alteration of *timentes* into *timens*. There is a somewhat similar corruption in 24. 3, Apollonium Thyaneum . . . amicum *verum* (*vir* P¹B¹: *virum* P³M) deorum, where I think *verum* introduces a needless emphasis; while *virum* indicates that Apollonius (who never laid claim to being other than human), though a man, was on terms of friendship with the gods. We shall thus, too, be freed from a surfeit of the word *verum* and its cognates.

Aurelian 28. 5.

Tunc illae vestes quas in templo Solis videmus.

Peter has virtually emended this passage by reading *allatae* for *illae*. Perhaps the corruption would be best explained by *ill<atae ill>ae*, 'brought into the country' (or the temple). Petschenig wishes to read *Hinc* illae; but then we shall have to read *hinc* (*tunc* MSS.) Persici dracones et tiarae, *hinc* (*tunc* MSS.) genus purpurae.

Aurelian 35. 3.

Sacerdotia composuit, templum Solis fundavit et pontifices roboravit.

So the MSS. Scaliger altered to *porticibus roboravit*, which seems very gratuitous and material: and would porticoes strengthen a building? Mommsen reads *pontifice*;—but it is probable that, for a foundation in honour of

the god to whom Aurelian from his earliest years (cp. 4. 2) had been devoted, he would have given more than one pontifex; and we find plenty of Inscriptions¹ referring to the *Pontifices Dei Solis* (C. I. L. vi. 1397, 1418, 1673) and *Pontifices Solis* (ib. 1742). The title *pontifex* does not belong to the worship of Mithra. The *pontifices Solis* were so well known in the time of Vopiscus that there was no necessity for him, when speaking of *pontifices* in connexion with the worship of the Sun, to indicate that they were the ministers of that divinity, and not the *pontifices* of the old religion. The text appears to me sound: 'gave the god a well-organized (strong) priesthood'; lit. 'strengthened his (i.e. the Sun's) priests.' Doubtless Aurelian gave the priests privileges and honours, and probably salaries, too.

Aurelian 36. 4.

ut Mnesteum quendam . . . infensiozem sibi minando redderet quod nescio quid de quo suspicatus esset.

Peter alters to *eo*; but may not *quo* of the MSS. be right, if taken indefinitely, 'because he had some suspicion about something'? *Nescio quid* is virtually a simple indefinite; and *quid* indefinite is often used when a second indefinite has to be expressed, e.g. Alex. Sev. 45. 6 ut si quis *quid* haberet criminis. This latter is, of course, quite normal: Caes. B.G. 6. 20. 1; Hor. Sat. 2. 1. 82. The older editors altered to *quodam*.

Aurelian 37. 6.

Quintillum . . . incisis sibimet venis die *vicesimo* imperii sui perisse.

There are two statements as to the length of the reign of Quintillus—one that he reigned seventeen days (Trebell. Pollio, Claud. 12. 5: cp. Zonaras xii. 2. 6); the other (that of

¹ They are collected by Cumont in his great work on Mithra, vol. ii., pp. 109 ff.

the chronographer of 354) that he reigned seventy-seven days : cp. Zosimus 1. 47 ὀλίγους . . . μῆνας. On this passage of Zosimus Mendelssohn shows that the latter view is correct, owing to the number of coins of Quintillus still extant. But the former, which seems to rest ultimately on Dexippus, was naturally the one which Vopiscus, the follower of Trebellius Pollio (cp. Claud. 12. 6), would adopt. If so, he may have simply given a round number, or we might read *die <duode>vicesimo*, in order to approach greater accuracy. The discrepancy between seventeen and seventy-seven days is explained by supposing that Aurelian was proclaimed emperor on the seventeenth day of the reign of Quintillus, but that the death of the latter did not occur until sixty days later.

Aurelian 39. 7.

provinciam Transdanubianam Daciam a Traiano . . . constitutam . . . reliquit . . . abductosque ex ea populos in Moesia collocavit appellavitque *suam* Daciam.

This is, as far as I know, the only evidence that the Dacia on the right bank of the Danube was called *Dacia Aureliani*, as some maps give it. It may be due, as Brunner¹ (p. 44) suggests, to the fact that, as Aurelian was born there or near it (cp. Aur. Victor Epit. 35. 1 *inter Daciam et Macedoniam*), the province was for some little time called after him: for Dacia mediterranea seems to have been in Diocletian's time the official name of the province which bordered on Macedonia. But Eutropius (9. 13) says Aurelian was born in Dacia ripensis, which lay along the Danube north-east of Dacia mediterranea; while others say he was born at Sirmium (Vopisc. Aur. 3. 1). Eutropius (9. 15) seems to suggest the right

¹ Vopiscus Lebensbeschreibungen, röm. Kaisergeschichte, vol. ii., kritisch geprüft von Julius Brunner, pp. 1-111.
in Büdinger's 'Untersuchungen zur

reading of our passage, viz. *eam* for *suam*. His words are appellavitque *eam* Daciam. But it is deserving of remark that Lactantius (De Morte Persec. 9. 2) appears to call the province *Dacia nova*. He says: Cum mater eius (sc. Maximini) Transdanuviana infestantibus Carpis in *Daciam novam* transiecto amne confugerat. Still it is most likely that *nova* was not an official name: and we need not suppose more than that Aurelian used to speak familiarly of the region he came from, and the new province he had established as 'my Dacia,' without such title having had any official recognition. M. Homo ('Essai sur le règne de l'empereur Aurélien,' p. 318, note) says that the trans-Danubian province used to be called in unofficial language 'Trajan's Dacia,' and in a similar way the cis-Danubian province was called 'Aurelian's Dacia.' This is likely; but I do not know if his statement about 'Trajan's Dacia' rests on any evidence. The Greek version of Eutropius by Paeanius (μετέφκισε γοῦν τοὺς κατοικισθέντας ἐκτὶ Ρωμαίους ἐς μέσσην τὴν Μυσῶν γῆν προσαγορεύσας τὸν συνοικισμὸν Δακίαν) forbids us to assume that *eam Daciam* in Eutropius could possibly be a corruption of *meam Daciam*; and the official name was doubtless nothing more than 'Dacia,' until the partition under Diocletian.

Aurelian 41. 2.

de his qui vel errarunt qui vel male fecerunt.

Editors usually omit *qui* before *vel male*. Perhaps we should read *quive* errarunt *quive* male facerunt.

Aurelian, 42. 2.

Aurelianus filiam solam reliquit cuius posteri etiam nunc Romae sunt. Aurelianus namque proconsule *Ciliciae* . . . qui nunc in *Sicilia* vitam agit eius est nepos.

There does not seem to be any evidence that Cilicia was governed by proconsuls after Republican times.¹

¹ The right reading in Cod. Just. 9. 43. 1 is *Lyciae*.

Possibly *Ciliciae* is a mistake for *Siciliae*: the words are easily confused. A line or two lower the Bamberg MS. gives *silicia* for *Sicilia*; and we find in some MSS. of Cicero's Epistles occasionally *Sicilia* for *Cilicia*, e.g. in GR in Fam. ii. 10. 3. Sicily was governed by proconsuls up to the time of Diocletian.

A difficulty has been raised that this Aurelianus could not, about 306, when Vopiscus was writing, have been of an age which admitted of his being styled *vitae venerabilis*. But this goes on the assumption that *eius* must refer to Aurelian's daughter, and cannot refer to Aurelian himself. But it surely can; and it is Aurelian himself, and not Aurelian's daughter, who is prominently before the mind of Vopiscus in the sentence. Now Aurelian was born about 214, and so may have had a daughter in 236, who again may have borne this Aurelianus in 256, which would admit of the latter being 50 in 306—a fairly ripe age for that period of storm and stress.

Aurelian 47. 3.

Perennitati vota constitui.

This goddess is not mentioned elsewhere, and appears to have escaped the notice of both Preller and Roscher. She is evidence of the persistence, even unto the last days of Paganism, of the ancient Roman principle of worshipping divinities created by abstraction.

Tacitus 10. 3.

Cornelium Tacitum, scriptorem historiae Augustae, quod parentem suum eundem diceret, in omnibus bibliothecis conlocari iussit, *neve* lectorum incuria deperiret, librum per annos singulos decies scribi publicitus *euicos archis* iussit et in bybliotheccis poni.

Neve is the emendation of Peter. BP give *nec*, and M *ne*. The ordinary correction is *et ne*; but *ac ne* will account better for the corruption. If in an early copy *ne* had been

originally omitted, and then written over *ac*—thus, ^{ne}*ac*—what appears in BP and M might naturally result; besides, *ac ne* is a very common collocation at the beginning of a statement: see Lessing's Dictionary, p. 3.

Archis is by all editors rightly altered to *archiis*. But what lurks in *euicos*? Casaubon suggested *in cunctis*, which seems unlikely, and is far from the tradition, as may also be said of Mommsen's *a praefectis*. Other conjectures, widely diverging from *euicos*, are to be found in Peter. Perhaps I may add one which adheres very closely to the letters of the manuscripts: *et in consularibus* (or *consulum*) *archiis*; the word *consularibus* or *consulum* might readily have been written *cos*. I cannot adduce an example of *archiva* of the consuls; but we find *archiva proconsularia* in St. Augustine (Cresc. 3. 61. 67 = Migne 43. 533. 6), (see Thesaurus s.v. *archium*).

Tacitus 11. 4.

Fabricarum peritissimus fuit, marmorum cupidus, nitoris *senatorii*, uenationum studiosus.

We must add, I think, <et> before *nitoris*. The taste for marbles was one element of that senatorial elegance which Tacitus displayed, and was quite different from his tastes for buildings and hunting. For *et* omitted in BPM, cp. Aur. 46. 4, Tac. 6. 8, and often: cp. above note on 9. 4 (p. 7). Mommsen (Herm. 25. 292) suggests *cenatorii* 'dining-room' for *senatorii*, which is most brilliant, but a little too special. It is not to be adopted, as the MSS. reading gives such a good sense. It is unlikely that Tacitus would be desirous of especial elegance in his dining-room above the other rooms in his house.

Tacitus 16. 7, 8.

Haec ego in aliorum vita de Probo credidi praelibanda ne dies, hora, momentum aliquid sibi vindicaret in me necessitate fatali ac Probo indicto deperirem. Nunc †*quoniam interi meo studio*† satisfactum arbitrans studio et cupiditati meae.

The first sentence would run better and be more rhythmical if we put a comma at *me*, and then added <*ne*> before *necessitate*. For the next corrupt passage, Peter gives *quiescam interim meo stilo*, which is a rather strange expression and does not seem to suit the sense: why, if Vopiscus was in a hurry to write the Life of Probus, should he rest on his oars? It is noticeable that for the corrupt passage M (the editio princeps of Milan) reads *quo claudium volumen*. M is much interpolated; but here is a variant that makes no sense. Possibly we have again (see above, p. 14) some words written originally, then omitted, and finally written in *over* some words that had preceded; so that by adding together the deliverances of BP and M we may arrive at something like this:—

Nunc quoniam *intersum in eo studio* (or perhaps *interirem in eo studio*) *hoc claudam volumen*, satisfactum arbitrans studio et cupiditati meae (or *tuae*, as Peter suggests). ‘Now, since I am wrapped up in this desire (or “would fain perish in this pursuit”—i.e. writing the Life of Probus), I shall end this volume about Tacitus and Florianus, thinking I have satisfied my (or “your”) interest in these emperors.’

Tacitus 15. 2.

responsum est ab haruspibus quandocunque ex eorum familia imperatorem Romanum futurum . . . qui Taprobanis praesidem imponat, qui ad *Romanam* insulam proconsulem mittat.

For *Romanam* many suggestions have been made. Casaubon gives *Britanniam*; and Salmasius *magnam*,

saying that Britain was κατ' ἐξοχήν, the 'great' island, and that this emendation is 'indubitata.' Mommsen (in *Hermes* 25. 292) suggests *Mona* (*Mona* is Anglesey),¹ which is, I think, certainly wrong. My patriotism declares for *Iernam* (or *Iuvernam*), Ireland. If the first two letters of *Iernam* had been lost, *rnam* would readily have been altered into *Romanam*; and we want some place to be indicated which the Roman arms had not reached; and they certainly had reached to Britain, even unto Anglesey (*Tac. Agric.* 14). Juvenal's statement (2. 159) *Arma quidem ultra Litora Iuvernæ promovimus* is mere rhetoric. The conquest of Ireland always hovered in some measure before the minds of those Romans who were in favour of the forward policy—and perhaps rightly (*cp. Mommsen, Provinces* i. 178, 182), *Eng. Trans.*); but it was never effected. In another author the British isles, Albion and Hibernia, are mentioned in connexion with Taprobane (Ceylon) as islands which are like jewels or flowers in the circlet of the world at the extreme West and the extreme East: *cp. Apuleius De Mundo*, 7, *Sed in altera parte orbis iacent insularum aggeres maximarum, Britanniae duae et Albion et Hibernia, quam quas supra diximus maiores. Verum hae in Celtarum finibus sitae sunt. Minores vero ultra Indos Taprobane atque Loxe¹ multaeque*

¹ The Isle of Man was called Monapia: see *Pliny, H. N.* 4. 103. Caesar has confused the two islands in *Bell. Gall.* 5. 13. 3.

² Where was Loxe? The answer is 'nowhere.' The passage in the *περί κόσμου* 393. 14-18 is as follows:—*τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττους ἢ τε Ταπροβάνη πέραν Ἰνδῶν, λοξὴ πρὸς τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ ἡ Φεβὼ καλουμένη κατὰ τὸν Ἀραβικὸν κειμένη κόλπον.* Apuleius (for there is no good reason to think that he was not responsible for the translation) leaves out all about Φεβὼλ, and

turns λοξὴ into an island. He probably had a ms. before him which, like Bekker's O, read καλουμένη for πρὸς τὴν οἰκουμένην. If so, we cannot think much of Apuleius' knowledge of Greek; for λοξὴ καλουμένη should point to an epithet of Taprobane 'which is called the Slanting Island.' Neither does one know where Phebol was. It can hardly be, as *Salmasius* thinks, a mistake for *Psebo*, of which *Strabo* 822 says: *ὑπέρεται δὲ τῆς Μερῆς ἡ Ψεβὼ λίμνη μεγάλη νῆσον ἔχουσα οἰκουμένην ἱκανῶς.*

aliae orbis ad modum sparsae hanc nostram insulam, id est hunc terrarum orbem, quam maximam diximus, ornamentis suis pingunt et continuatione ut quibusdam sertis coronant.

For letters omitted at the beginning of words in the archetype I select the following dozen from Vopiscus:—
 Aur. 4. 3 *cesse* for *scisse*: 24. 6 *idem* for *eidem*: 38. 4 *facultatae* for *difficultate*: 42. 4 *paruit* for *separavit*: 44. 5 *sponsa* for *responsa*: Tac. 17. 2 *citus* for *Tacitus*: Prob. 11. 2 *ementiaor* for *clementia orbi*: 12. 1 *teris* for *ceteris*: 16, 6 *quam* for *umquam*: 17. 5 *seum* for *Narseum*: 18. 1 *asternarum* for *Basternarum*: Procul. 12. 7 *armatia* for *Sarmatia*.

Probus 2. 7.

et mihi quidem id animi fuit ut . . . imitarer . . .⁴. Marium Maximum . . . ceterosque qui haec et talia non tam diserte quam vere memoriae tradiderunt. Sum enim unus ex curiosis quod *infinitas ire* non possum, incenditibus vobis qui cum multa sciatis scire multo plura cupitis.

So Peter, excellently, for *infinitas ire* of PB: *infinitas* is just the sort of word that would puzzle a copyist. The reading of Salmasius (after P³M), *infinita sciri non possunt*, seems to me to introduce a more violent change, and to give a less satisfactory sense. But Peter's reading would perhaps be improved by deleting the full stop after *tradiderunt*, and putting *sum . . . possum* in a parenthesis. My intention was to ascertain accurately and state facts plainly (for such is my nature), as you urge me to this task, you who are desirous of increasing your stores of knowledge, and not being merely gratified for the moment by rhetoric and eloquence of language: *incendentibus vobis* gives rather the reason why Vopiscus followed Marius Maximus than the reason that Vopiscus was by nature eager for (if I may so say) informing and accurate knowledge. This seems to be the meaning of *curiosus*. Brunner (op. cit.,

p. 26) and Peter ('Die Script. H. A.,' pp. 17 ff.) discuss this 'curiositas': the latter writer has many good remarks on it in his great work 'Die geschichtliche Literatur über die röm. Kaiserzeit,' i., chapter 3.

Probus 4. 7.

huic igitur dari iubebis . . . cum larido, *bobulaci* salis olerum lignorum quantum sat est.

For the corrupt word the old editors give *bubulino*. Peter reads *pabuli*, *aceti*. But the new Thesaurus (s.v. *bobulaci*) seems to give the right emendation, *bucellati* 'biscuit': cp. Av. Cass. 5. 3, et praeter laridum ac *bucellatum* atque acetum militem in expeditione portare prohibuit. The word also occurs in Pesc. Nig. 10. 4; but in both these cases it appears to be uncorrupted by the copyists.

Probus 6. 6.

quadam felicitatis *prærogativa*.

In the time of Vopiscus this word seems to have had the sense of 'pre-eminence': cp. 12. 2, where Manlius Statianus says that Probus possessed everything, military skill, kindly disposition, respectability of life, exemplary gifts of rule, and pre-eminence in all the virtues (*omnium prærogativa virtutum*). Carus 5. 1 iudicat et oratio eius . . . istam generis *praerogativam*, i.e. that he was a Roman. In Lampridius, Alex. Sev. 15. 2 qui militaribus nituntur *praerogativis*, the word has the ordinary meaning of 'privileges.'

Probus 8. 2.

ille singulos *manipulos* adiit, *vestes* et calciamenta perspexit.

B¹P¹ give *manipu*, P³ *manipulos*: but B³ has *manipulares*. This latter seems more likely.¹ To inspect the

¹ The most ordinary omission of a final letter in these MSS. is that of *s*. Examples occur everywhere. For the omission of more letters than one, the following instances may be noted:—
Aur. 26. 5 *tim* for *timet*: 31. 4

eatenus P, *ea* B: Tacit. 2. 5 *impero* P¹ for *imperatorem*: 14. 4 *usquequae* for *usquequaque*: 16. 6 *tunc* for *iuncta*: Prob. 8. 5 *pro* for *Probi*: 9. 2 *ingen* for *ingentem*: 11. 2 *or* for *orbi*.

soldiers separately marks the carefulness of Probus more emphatically than merely to visit the companies.

For *vestes*, B has *vestar*, P *vestes*, with -es in an erasure. At first I thought we should read *vestimenta*: cp. Av. Cass. 6. 2 arma militum septima die semper respexit, *vestimenta* etiam et calciamenta et ocreas. The contraction for *vestimenta* would have been *vesti*^a: see Chassant, p. 102. But I now think the correction in P, *vestes*, right. The number of times we find *r* final in B for *s* seems decisive on the point.¹

Probus 8. 6.

cumque tertio et quarto fecisset, quarto Probi nomen emersit.

We should probably add <et> before the second *quarto*: 'even (or "also") on the fourth occasion.' For *et* omitted, see on Aur. 9. 4 above, p. 7.

Probus 11. 4.

quaeso ut de meis meritis †*facturus*† quicquid iusserit vestra clementia.

The ordinary reading is *faciatis*, which would hardly have been corrupted into *facturus*. Peter supposes a lacuna after *meritis*. If this is so, the omission may have been something like <*iudicium sitis*> *facturi*.

Probus 11. 5.

Aurelii Valerii Probi.

The name Valerius is nowhere else applied to Probus. It would appear to be due to the same kind of mistake that corrupted *Aureliano* into *Valeriano* in Aur. 17. 2: see above, p. 8.

¹ E.g. Prob. 10. 2 *exercitur* for *exercitus* (also in P): 10. 7 *commeatur* for *commeatus*: 24. 5 *senatur* for *senatus*: Firm. 3. 1 *incitatur* for *incitatus*: Prob. 7. 3 *quantur* for *quantus*. It is also quite common to find *a* for *e*,

e.g. Aurel. 12. 1 *paupartatem* B: 41. 5 *recta* for *recte* BP: Prob. 6. 3 *parare* for *parere* B¹P: Saturn. 8. 3 *aliptas* for *aliptes* BP: Car. 18. 5 *a mare* for *a me rem* BP.

Probus 13. 1.

permisit patribus ut . . . legatos *consulibus* darent . . . leges quas *Probus* ederet, senatus consultis proprii consecrarent.

Salmasius, to whose genius and learning the Augustan History owes so much, has shown that we must add <ex> before *consulibus*; and that in these writers *ex consulibus* is used for *consularis*. Unfortunately he has not referred from one passage to the other; but Lessing has collected them in his Dictionary, two of which may be quoted: Gordian 7. 2 <filio> iam *ex consulibus* sibimet legato a senatu dato: 22. 8 a Gallicano *ex consulibus* et Maecenate ex ducibus interempti sunt: cp. below note on Saturnin. 8. 1, p. 29.

This use of *Probus* is peculiar. Possibly Vopiscus is quoting in the Emperor's own words some document or oration which *Probus* sent to the Senate. In this the Emperor may have used his own name to show that *he*, *Probus*, at least, was ready to allow senatorial claims. In an Epistle of Valerian there is something similar (Aurel. 11. 8) consulum . . . a die xi Kal. Iuniarum in locum Gallieni et *Valeriani* sperare te oportet. Whether the documents are forgeries or not, the usage is still peculiar. It would be easy (but too easy) to suppose that *Probus* was a gloss on some word like *princeps*.

Probus 16. 5.

barbarorum qui apud Isauros sunt vel per terrorem vel *urbanitatem* loca ingressus est.

On this passage Prof. Ellis says (HERMATHENA, 1906, p. 15): "Salmasius explained *per urbanitatem* as 'non invitis barbaris, de gré et de courtoisie'; an older reading was *per voluntatem*. It may have been *per vanitatem* 'to show off.'"

It is hazardous to disagree in anything with Prof. Ellis; but I cannot help believing that the text is sound. In

these Augustan History writers, as is pointed out by Klebs, *urbane* seems to be used in the sense of 'cleverly,' verging towards 'astutely,' 'craftily'—e.g. Comm. 4. 5 *urbane* Saoterum eductum a palatio sacrorum causa . . . per frumentarios occiderunt: Alex. Sev. 29. 6 quem si aliquis *urbane* temptare voluit, intellectus tulit poenas: Gord. 1. 5 ne ego qui longitudinem librorum fugi . . . in eam incurrisse videar quam me *urbane* ('artfully') declinare confingo; Gallien. 14. 4 fuit isdem socius in appetendo imperio quidam Ceronius sive Cecropius . . . qui eos et *urbanissime* et prudentissime adiuvit. That being so, *per urbanitatem* here would seem to mean 'by cleverness' or 'craft,' which forms a good antithesis to *per terrorem*. Similarly, in Tacit. 15. 4 Vopiscus says, 'it showed no great cleverness or astuteness (*urbanitas*) on the part of the haruspices to say that a descendant of Tacitus would be emperor in a thousand years.' Anyone could do that: it would have been different if they had said a hundred, for then their prophecies (or lies—*mendacia*, as Vopiscus called them) could have been tested; but a story of the kind could hardly remain in human memory so long as a thousand years.¹ The word *pollicentes* in Tacit. 15. 4 appears to be out of place: it should probably follow *praedicerent*.

¹ I think Gibbon (i., p. 326, note 25, ed. Bury) is in error when he says: "Such a history as mine (says Vopiscus, with proper modesty) will not subsist a thousand years to expose or justify the prediction." The words *talis historia* refer to the prediction, 'a story of this kind,' not to Vopiscus'

own writings. I do not know of any other place in the Augustan History where *historia* approaches so near the sense of 'fable.' It generally means 'true narrative'; but it is a somewhat neutral word, like our 'story,' which in dignified language means 'history,' and in familiar language 'fiction.'

Probus 19. 6.

leones . . . qui omnes *posticis* interempti sunt, non magnum praebentes spectaculum quo occidebantur. Neque enim erat bestiarum impetus ille qui esse e caveis egredientibus solet. Occisi sunt praeterea multi qui *dirigere* nolebant sagittis.

Salmasius is doubtless right in adding <e> before *posticis*, as he did at 13. 1 before *consulibus*. But we must take into account a strangely corrupt reading of M which appears in place of *posticis*, viz. *contisfisciis*. Here, perhaps, the original reading was, as in Tac. 16. 7, 8, a combination of the traditions of BP and M, *contis fixi* (or *transfixi* or *infixi*) *e posticis interempti sunt*. But what were the *posticae*? There appear to have been barriers behind which the beasts were detained until they were let loose in the arena through openings. These openings were the *posticae*, which were probably of a temporary nature: cp. Amm. Marc. 28. 1. 10 ut saepe faciunt amphitheatrales ferae diffractis tandem solutae *posticis*. On this sentence Valesius quotes a passage from the *Acta Martyrum*—Quae (leaena) provocata cum magno rugitu *posticam* confregit, ut omnis populus cum timore clamaret ‘Aperiatur leaenae.’ I cannot believe that the *posticae* were passages leading to the amphitheatre from *subterranean* dens, as Salmasius seems to hold. I think Vopiscus means to say that men stood behind the *posticae* with *conti* fixed and projecting out into the arena. Against these the beasts, who were let loose into the arena (probably from underground dens), charged, and were spitted on the *conti*. But their rush was not as vehement as that of beasts who were kept in cages in the upper air, and not in subterranean darkness: ‘nihil est’ (says Salmasius) ‘quod aequae faciat domandis feris ac tenebrae.’ Many would make no charge at all, and had to be despatched with arrows. For *conti* used in the arena, cp. Comm. 13. 3 Virium ad conficiendas feras tantarum

fuit ut elephantum *conto* transfigeret. For *dirigere* 'to charge,' we may compare Liv. 37. 23. 9 (naves) . . . in frontem *derigere* iubet: cp. § 11, and the military metaphor in Apul. Met. 2. 17 *comminus in aspectum, si vir es, derige et grassare naviter et occide moriturus*—both passages given by Wölfflin in the Archiv x., pp. 3, 4.

Probus 20. 4.

nonne omnes barbaras gentes *subierat pedibusque* totum mundum fecerat iam Romanum? 'Brevi' inquit 'milites necessarios non habebimus.'

The old editors corrected to *subiecerat pedibus?* *Quia* (the word *quia* being taken from M) *totum mundum fecerat iam Romanum, 'Brevi' inquit* &c. Peter and Lessing (in his Dictionary) adopt Kellerbauer's emendation *penitusque*. But it is difficult to think that *pedibus* does not go with *subicere*; and probably the old editors are right. If any different emendation were necessary, we would suggest *pedibus <at>que* or *<quom>que*. Note the omission of *-ce-* in the middle of the word *subiecerat*, and compare below, p. 29.

Probus 21. 2.

ingentem parans fossam qua deiectis in *saltum* (so BP: *allum* M) *naribus* loca Sirmiensibus profutura siccaret.

The correction of Closs to *Savum* is certain. Salmasius, in his suggestion *salum*, pays no regard to the geographical position of Sirmium. But a difficulty remains as to *naribus*, which, no doubt, can mean 'vent-holes,' or 'outlets,' when applied to a pipe or water-passage. Vitruv. 7. 4. 1 *sin autem aliqui paries perpetuos habuerit umores, paululum ab eo recedatur et struatur alter tenuis distans ab eo quantum res patietur, et inter duos parietes canalis ducatur inferior quam libramentum conclavis fuerit, habens naves ad locum patentem. Item*

cum in altitudinem perstructus fuerit, relinquuntur spiramenta. Si enim non per *nares* umor et in imo et in summo habuerit exitus, non minus in nova structura se dissipabit. But Madvig (*Adversaria*, ii., p. 649) has raised weighty objections to the application of this meaning of *nares* to the passage of Vopiscus, which could not be better stated than in his own words: "Sed restant nares illae, quas si quis foramina et spiramenta intelliget, primum eluvies et humores eiusmodi non per foramina tenuia sed plenis fossarum alveis egeruntur, deinde nares et foramina non in flumen deiciuntur"; and he continues, with his usual acuteness: 'Scribendum sine dubio est geminatis duabus litteris: *deiectis in Savum umoribus*.' One can hardly do better; but when it is remembered that the writer of the archetype of our codices seems to have been prone to omit letters at the beginning of words (cp. p. 17), it may be suggested as a possibility that <lacu>*naribus* was the word written by Vopiscus. In the Glosses (*Index*, p. 619) we find *lacunar* explained by βόθρος, lacus aquarum, locus aquarum.

Probus 24. 1.

Posterii Probi vel odio vel invidiae timore Romanam *refugerunt* et in Italia circa Veronam ac Benacum (*acunacum* BP: corr. vett.) et Larium atque in his regionibus larem locaverunt. Sane, quod praeterire non potui, cum imago Probi in Veronensis ita fulmine *iecta* (B¹P: *iacta* B²) esset &c.

The usual alteration of *re* is into *rem*: but the *Romana res* comprised the whole Roman Empire. Rather, I think, it is a contraction for *regionem*, and that the reference is to the *regio urbicaria* or *suburbicaria* (opposed to *regio annonaria*), which extended to 100 miles from Rome. Thus we find Etruria (Tuscia) and Picenum divided into two divisions *urbicaria* and *annonaria*: see Valesius on *Amm. Marc.* 27. 3. 1. This is virtually the interpretation of *Salmasius* (cp. also his note on *Tyr.* 24), except that he holds that *Romana*

can stand for *Romana regio*, as (he says) *Veronensis* for *Veronensis regio*; but is not the word understood with such adjectives of place, not the feminine *regio*, but the masculine *ager*? For *Veronensis ita* Salmasius read *Veronensi ita*, which Peter alters to *Veronensi sita*, which is possible, the word *situs* being often used of statues: e.g. Pliny H. N. 36. 39. M has *Veronensis fritorii situ*, which looks like a gloss of *territorii* on *Veronensis*. Juretus read *in Veronensi praetorio*.

The editors alter *iecta* into *icta*. Rather read *deiecta*: cp. Vopisc. Tac. 15. 1 *Horum statuæ fuerunt . . . sed deiectæ fulmine ita contritæ sunt ut membratim iaceant dissipatæ*.

I do not know of any other example of the phrase *larem locare*, on which the censurers of Vopiscan alliteration lay some stress; but *larem collocare*, which is nearly as alliterative, is a regular phrase: cp. Digest 25. 3. 1. 2; Code 12. 59 (60). 3 pr.

Firmus 1. 4.¹

Quare *etiam* quoque *etiamsi* non tamen minima fuerit cura ut . . . de Saturnino . . . non taceremus.

For *etiam* M gives *nobis*; which seems right, as Vopiscus is associating himself with his model Trebellius Pollio in writing *briefly* the lives of the minor tyrants. The *etiam* of *etiamsi*, if written over the line or added from the margin in the wrong place, might have led to the ejection of *nobis*. That *etiamsi* is right is proved by *tamen*. That being so, some word or words must have been lost—probably *breviter* (cp. Gord. 2. 1 *qui etiamsi breviter, ad fidem tamen omnia*

¹Lessing quotes this book of Vopiscus, which treats of Firmus, Saturninus, Bonosus, and Proculus, by the title "Quadrigæ" tyrannorum. The title is suggested by Vopiscus himself: cp. Prob. 24. 8 non enim dignum

fuit ut *quadrigæ tyrannorum* bono principi miscerentur. But as this is rather affected, I have retained the ordinary designation, quoting each portion under the name of the 'tyrannus' of whom it treats.

persecuti sunt); or *brevissime*: cp. below 2. 4 sed ne volumini, quod *brevissimum* promisi, multa conectam, veniamus ad Firmum.

Firmus 4. 2.

(Fuit Firmus) nervis robustissimus ita ut *Tritanum* vinceret, cuius Varro meminit.

This *Tritanus* (or *Tritannus*: so Mommsen reads in Solinus 1. 75) is mentioned in the famous passage of Lucilius quoted by Cicero Fin. 1. 9 Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum Municipem Ponti, *Tritani*, centurionum, Maluisti dici: and his marvellous muscles are spoken of by Pliny H. N. 7. 81 and Solinus 1. 75 on the authority of Varro. These authors say that Tritanus was a gladiator: he could not then have been a centurion, according to Madvig. Hübner (Eph. Epigr. ii. 48) thinks he may have been allowed to enlist, though he had been a gladiator; and this permission may have been granted owing to his great and exceptional strength and prowess. Marx on Lucilius (l. 89) supposes that he may have originally been a soldier, and after service retired to a country town (cp. Hor. Sat. 1. 6. 72), and there either became bankrupt or, unable to endure the tedium of the provincial town, was (or got himself) cashiered, and joined the gladiatorial school; and Marx quotes Manilius 4. 225 nunc caput in mortem vendunt et funus harenae Atque hostem sibi quisque parat cum bella quiescunt. All this is somewhat problematical; but both scholars consider that the Tritanus in Varro is the same person as the Tritanus in Lucilius.

After Varro in Vopiscus M adds *Aelius*. But Varro's gentile name was Terentius. Possibly *Aelius* is what remains of a gloss *et Lucilius*. The fact that we find in an inscription the name Publius Aellius Varro is a

mere coincidence, and affords no support to *Aelius* of M.¹

Firmus 5. 1.

Hic (Firmus) ergo contra Aurelianum sumpsit imperium ad defendendas partes quae supererant Zenobiae. Sed Aureliano de *Thraciis* redeunte superatus est.

For *Thraciis* M gives the strange reading *Carris*. Oberdick (Die r  merfeindlichen Bewegungen im Orient, p. 161) thinks this reading right, and that it points to a Persian campaign after the destruction of Palmyra. But Zosimus (I. 61) says that Aurelian went with speed (σὸν τάχει) from Palmyra to Alexandria, whose inhabitants were distracted by faction and meditating revolt. Vopiscus is undoubtedly in error² in supposing that, after the second Palmyrene campaign, Aurelian again returned to Europe, and that res per Thracias *Europamque* (Oberdick ingeniously conjectures *Rhodopenque*) omnem Aureliano ingentes agente, Firmus quidam extitit (Aurel. 32. 2). His return from the Balkan States to take vengeance on Palmyra is sufficiently wonderful as an exhibition of decision and energy on the part of Aurelian, and of discipline and endurance on the part of the army, without supposing a third gigantic march of the kind. Besides, it would not admit of being fitted into the short reign of Aurelian. The army would probably have obeyed such an order. Indeed the Roman army was perhaps never a finer instrument than it was under these able Illyrian Emperors. I think that *Carris* in M is a

¹ The inscription is given in the Revue Arch  ologique, xxxix. (1901), p. 470 Dis Manibus, Dartoni matri et Pailioni sorori Publius Aellius Varro pientissimis posuit.

² This view, viz. that Vopiscus is in error, is also held by Groag in his masterly, exhaustive, and syste-

matic treatise on Aurelian in Pauly-Wissowa, v., p. 1390. This great work (pp. 1347-1419), along with M. Homo's *Essai*, supersedes all previous treatises on Aurelian, so far as the systematic and judicious marshalling of the materials is concerned.

corruption of *Carpis*, and that this is a gloss on *Thraciis*. That this latter (*Thraciis*) is the right reading may be considered proved by the passage quoted from the Life of Aurelian, 32. 2.

Saturninus 7. 4.

Sunt enim Aegyptii, ut satis nosti, *venti*, ventosi, furibundi, iactantes, iniuriosi, atque adeo *uasi*, *liberi*, novarum rerum usque ad cantilenas publicas cupientes, versificatores, epigrammatarii, mathematici, haruspices, medici.

This celebrated description of the Egyptians (which applies especially to the Alexandrines) seems to fall into two divisions—one series of epithets referring to the tumultuous and feather-headed character of the population, and the other to their satirical and generally sharp-witted gifts; the division is marked by *atque adeo*. For *venti* the old editors read *viri*. It is surely more likely to have been a dittography of the first part of *ventosi*, and, if so, should be ejected, as Eyssenhardt has suggested; but it might well be a corruption of *vani*, owing to the proximity of *ventosi*. This, I think, is the more probable suggestion, as we must have *vani* somewhere among the epithets. *Ventosi* is certainly sound: cp. Plin. Paneg. 31 *superbiebat ventosa et insolens natio* (of the Egyptians).

For *uasi* all editors read *uani*. That *vani* must have occurred somewhere in this enumeration I fully allow (cp. c. 8. 5); but it comes into the first division of epithets rather than into the second. I suggest *nas<ut>i*. That is just the word to express the sarcastic wit of the Alexandrines. The word is used four times by Martial (e.g. 2. 54. 5¹ *nil nasutius hac maligniusque*): cp. also 1. 41. 18 *non cuicunque datum est habere nasum*. The Alexandrines were especially bold in lampooning those in authority: cp. Suet. Vesp. 19; Seneca Cons. ad Helv.

¹ Also 12. 37. 1, 2; 13. 2. 1.

19. 6 loquax et in contumelias praefectorum ingeniosa provincia in qua etiam qui vitaverunt culpam non effugerunt infamiam. See also Friedländer i^e. p. 87.

For *liberi* M has *avidi*, a most improbable emendation. Bährens reads *vafri*, equally improbably. I suggest *lividi*; jealousy engenders sarcasm. This jealousy is noticed by Philo in Flacc. (p. 521, ed. Mangey) βάσκανον φύσει τὸ Αἰγυπτιακὸν καὶ τὰς ἐτέρων εὐπραγίας ἰδίας ὑπολαμβάνον εἶναι κακοπραγίας. Once *v* became *δ*, the change from *libidi* to *liberi* would soon follow.

In defence of the emendation *nasuti*, it should be observed that there is no error more common in (as would appear) the archetype of B and P than the omission of letters in the middle of words. I will quote a dozen examples from Vopiscus alone, which could be easily supplemented: Aur. 2. 1 *treuio* for *Trebellio* (cp. also Firm. 1. 3): Aur. 7. 1 *montiacum* for *Moguntiacum*: Aur. 16. 1 *enuit* for *enituit*: 31. 4 *zobia* for *Zenobia*: 39. 4 *anthsensium* for *Atheniensium*: 45. 1 *ubi* for *urbi*: Tacit 1. 1 *reliosoque* for *religiosoque*: 9. 1 *verum* for *vestrum*: 9. 6 *nundia* for *nundinia*: 19. 3 *optimus* for *optinuimus*: Prob. 2. 3 *Africum* for *Africanum*: 4. 1 *cohorbus* for *cohortibus*: 16. 2 *condit* for *contudit*: Saturn. 8. 7 *funditate* for *fecunditate*: Car. 16. 5 *stuprum* for *stuprorum*.

Saturninus 8. 1.

Hadrianus Augustus Serviano consuli salutem.

There is a difficulty about the date. Verus was not adopted until 136, and the consulship of Servianus was in 134. Hadrian's visit to Egypt was in 130. Possibly we should read *consulari* or *ex consule*: cp. Spartian Hadr. 8. 11 Serviano . . . tertium consulatum, nec secum tamen, cum ille bis <ante> Hadrianum fuisset, ne esset secundae sententiae, non petenti ac sine precatione

concessit. For the omission of *ex* in the MSS. cp. note above on Prob. 13. 1, p. 20. For omission of letters in the middle of a word (if we read *consulari*) cp. p. 29.

Saturninus 8. 7.

Unus illis deus *nummus* est. Hunc Christiani, hunc Iudaei, hunc omnes venerantur et gentes.

Nummus is the brilliant emendation of Voss for *nullus* of the MSS. The words *et gentes* certainly look as if they were to be taken in the ecclesiastical sense of Gentiles as opposed to Jews and Christians. However, the word *gentes* is also used for 'foreigners,' the people to whom they are opposed being fixed by the context. Thus, in Tac. Germ. 33 fin. *gentibus* is in opposition to the Romans. Hence I think *et Aegyptii* has dropped out before *et gentes*. But the whole document is justly regarded with suspicion—not that Vopiscus forged it himself; but he may have accepted as genuine a forged or interpolated document which had been interpolated in Phlegon's collection. There is too much about Jews, and especially Christians, who would have been unlikely to impress themselves so forcibly on Hadrian's attention as this letter would seem to indicate.

Saturninus 8. 10.

Calices tibi allassontes versicolores transmissi.

Editors either eject *versicolores* as a gloss, or add *id est*: the latter seems the more probable. But *sive* would more readily have fallen out between the two words. Casaubon conjectures *tres misi* for *transmissi*; and this is approved by Salmasius. The cups seem to have been made of opaline: cp. Marquardt-Mau 'Privatleben der Römer,' p. 751. 5.

Saturninus 9. 3.

ibi (sc. in Palaestina) tamen cum cogitare coepisset tutum sibi non esse, si privatus viveret, deposita purpura ex simulacro Veneris cyclade uxoriam militibus circumstantibus amictus et adoratus est.

This passage is given as punctuated by Peter and the older editors. It seems modelled on Probus 10. 5, 6. If so, I cannot help believing that *deposita* here has the same meaning as *deponere* there, viz. 'to lay down,' 'to put aside,' 'to resign' the purple, which had been practically given him by the acclamations of the people—the word 'purple' being virtually equivalent to 'imperial power'; and that it does not mean, as Salmasius and Casaubon hold, 'taken down from' (*depositum sive detractum*, as Salmasius says). If so, I should punctuate

tutum sibi non esse si privatus viveret deposita purpura, ex simulacro Veneris cyclade uxoriam . . . amictus et adoratus est :

'as it would not be safe for him if he retired into private life after putting aside the purple, he was clothed in a state-robe of his wife, taken from the shrine of Venus.' The wife of Saturninus had dedicated one of her own state-robcs, and this was taken to effect her husband's inauguration. If a parallel could be got for *uxorius* = *muliebris*, 'belonging to a matron,' the passage would perhaps be simpler: but I cannot find a certain example of any such usage. The passage from the Life of Probus 10. 5, 6, runs as follows:—*ornatus etiam pallio purpureo quod de statua templi oblatum est. . . . Deponere mihi rem invidiosissimam non licet. In this sense deponere is opposed to sumere purpuram: cp. Capitol. Max. 14. 3 et primo quidem invitatus Gordianus purpuram sumpserat, postea vero, cum vidit neque filio neque familiae suae tutum id esse, volens suscepit imperium.*

Saturninus 10. 1.

Et cum eum animarent . . . qui *amugierunt* purpuram.

M gives *induerunt*, which seems a plain gloss or correction. Casaubon altered to *amicuerunt*, and this is adopted by most editors. But I can find no example of *amicire* with the construction of *induere*, that is, with an accusative of the thing with which a person is clothed. So it would seem that Kellerbauer's emendation *purpura* must be adopted. He reads also *amicuerant*, and the pluperfect is more strictly accurate, but not necessary. Though *eum* is expressed with *animarent*, I think it must be expressed also with *amicuerunt*. Note the transposition of letters *-ugi-* for *-icu-*.

At the beginning of the next chapter, *ut* ne longius progredior, read *set* for *ut*. The *s* was lost, owing to *magistrales*, the last word of c. 10.

Proculus 12. 1.

Domi nobilis sed maioribus latrocinantibus atque *adeo* pecore et servis et iis rebus quas *abduxerat* satis dives.

Bährens would seem to have been right in altering to *ideo* and *abduxerant*. There seems elsewhere also (Aurel. 31. 3) a fairly certain corruption of *ideo* into *adeo*; and *atque adeo* generally means 'and what is more' (Anton. Pius, 1. 9; Alex. Sev. 18. 2; Saturn. 7. 4). But there are two passages in the 'Thirty Tyrants' which look as if *atque adeo* meant 'and on that account': 12. 9 intellexit eum Ballista sic agere ut de filiis suis videretur cogitare, *atque adeo* sic aggressus est, though here it might be taken 'and went on to address him'; 29. 3 septimo imperii die interemptus est *atque adeo* etiam inter obscuros principes vix relatus est. In Tac. 11. 3 balneis raro usus est *atque adeo* validior fuit in senectute, the meaning is plainly causal; but some MSS. appear to have *ideo*. The

collocation *atque ideo* is quite common, eleven passages from the Aug. Hist. being quoted by Lessing in his Dictionary, p. 249a. I confess that I should be inclined to read *ideo* in the two passages from the Thirty Tyrants, and in those from Tacitus and Proculus.

If this is adopted, we must read *abduxerant* with Bährens. If we adhere to *atque adeo* and *abduxerat*, it will be necessary to add *ipse* before the latter word, in order to mark a contrast with *maioribus*.

The word lost after *potest* a few lines down may have been *potens*, or *potentissimus*, a word very frequently used by these historians.

Bonosus 15. 6.

decretis salariis non ut singulae acciperent, sed ut septem simul unum *conuium* haberent.

The obvious correction is to *convivium*; but the passage appears to mean that the Gothic ladies boarded together generally, and not merely had a single meal in common. The former meaning is rather expressed by *convictum*; and this word is used by Vopiscus later (Car. 14. 2) for board, cum rationem *convictus* sui cotidiani faceret. There are many examples in the MSS. of letters lost in the middle of words; see p. 29.

Bonosus 15. 8.

tunicam auro clavatam subsericam *libilem* unam.

Peter conjectures *muliebrem*; but silk seems to have been valued by weight: cp. Aurel. 45. 5 et cum ab eo uxor sua peteret ut unico pallio blatteo serico uteretur, ille respondit, 'Absit ut auro fila pensentur.' *Libra enim auri* tunc *libra serici* fuit.

Carus 3. 6.

invidit Claudio longinquitatem imperii amans varietatum *prope et semper* inimica fortuna iustitiae.

Peter alters to *semper et prope*: Eyssenhardt gives *et prope semper*: Petschenig *improba et semper*. Perhaps the original reading was *semper, et prope semper*.

Carus 8. 5.

The letter of Julius Calpurnius, the Emperor's secretary, on the death of Carus, runs as follows:—

Cum Carus, princeps noster vere carus, aegrotaret <et in tentorio iaceret> [added by Kellerbauer from § 3], tanti turbinis subito exorta tempestas est ut caligarent omnia neque *alterutrum nosceret*: coruscationum deinde ac tonitruum in modum *fulgurum* igniti sideris continuata vibratio omnibus nobis veritatis scientiam sustulit. Subito enim conclamatum est imperatorem mortuum, et post illud praecipue tonitrum *quo* cuncta (P²: contra P¹) terruerat (PM: terraverat B). His accessit quod cubicularii dolentes principis mortem incenderunt tentorium. Unde *fuit* fama emersit fulmine interemptum eum, quem, quantum scire possimus, aegritudine constat absumptum.

This is an interesting letter, and probably gives the true version of the death of Carus, though all the other authorities ascribe his death to lightning (cp. Gibbon i., p. 341, note 82, ed. Bury).

The use of *alterutrum* seems to be that adverbial usage so frequent in the ecclesiastical writings: cp. the new Thesaurus, p. 1760, 18 ff. We should then read the plural *noscerent* 'so that men did not know one another.'¹ For examples of this adverbial use of *alterutrum* cp. Fulgent.

¹ It is no doubt a little awkward that the subject has to be changed from that of *caligarent*: but the sense

is so obvious that no confusion could possibly arise.

Myth., p. 6. 5 (ed. Helm) Sed Troadum in morem ostentabamus *alterutrum* loca. St. Jerome, Epist. 54. 3 exceptis epistolis ignorabamus *alterutrum*. Thielmann, in his elaborate paper in the Archiv (vii. 342-388) on the expression of reciprocity in Latin, considers (p. 377) that nothing definite can be said about this passage of Vopiscus.

Madvig (Adv. Crit. ii., p. 650) deletes *fulgurum*. It would be simpler to suppose that *vel* had dropped out.

The form *tonitrum* (neut.) cannot be justified: the editors have rightly altered to *tonitruum*, the form which appears in the MSS. in § 3, and also in Gallien. 5. 3. For other examples, see the passages quoted by Neue-Wagener i³. 534.

The old correction *quod* cuncta terruerat seems to be much better than the violent alteration of Peter *quo* cuncta *terrata erant*.

Nor is it easy to agree with him in altering *fuit* into *subito*. Rather read *unde unde fuit*, 'from whatever source it was, a rumour got out'; though I confess to being unable to produce any example of *unde unde* used except indefinitely (Hor. Sat. i. 3. 88); for the reading of Statius in Catull. 67. 27 is quite doubtful. Yet we find *ubi ubi essent* in Livy 42. 57. 12, as well as in the comic writers, Ter. Eun. 1042.

Carus 6. 3.

addito eo ut publico sumptu *vel* eidem exaedificetur domus marmoreis a me delatis.

Casaubon ejected *vel*, which makes no sense; and he is followed by Peter. More probably it is a corruption for *belle*, 'nicely,' 'tastefully.'

Numerianus 12. 1.

Hic patri comes fuit bello Persico. Quo mortuo, cum oculos dolere coepisset *quod illud aegritudinis genus †nimia* utpote confecto familiarissimum (-us BPM: corr. Gruter) fuit, ac lectica portaretur, factione Apri . . . occisus est.

Gruter says that in the Palatinus 'a manu recenti adscriptum *vigilia* circa vocem *confecto*; quam si admittimus, omnia belle se habebunt dummodo rescribamus *quod illi aegritudinis genus nimia*¹ utpote confecto *vigilia familiarissimum fuit*. This is no doubt attractive; but the manner in which *vigilia* is written gives it the appearance of a gloss. Rather, I think, the lost word is *insomnia*: and that we should either add it after *nimia* (the similarity of the termination of the two words might have led to its omission) or suppose that *nimia* is a corruption of it: but the former view seems to me the more probable. The word *insomnia* may have been taken from Suetonius (Cal. 50), to whom these writers of the Augustan History looked up as their master. The word was probably common enough, though in classical authors it is mostly used in the plural, e.g., Cic. De Sen. 44. I should read the whole passage thus:—cum oculos dolere coepisset, quod ('because') illud aegritudinis genus *nimia* <*insomnia*> utpote confecto familiarissimum fuit. Or just possibly *quod* is a corruption of *quoi* (*cui*).

Numerianus 13. 1.

Diocletianum . . . consilii semper alti nonnumquam tamen †*froncis* (B¹: *frontis* P: *fortis* B³: *ferocis* dett.) sed prudentiae nimia pervicacia motus inquieti pectoris comprimendis.

The usual reading is *effrontis*, which is not found elsewhere, and is uncertain in meaning. Madvig gives

¹ Gruter omits *nimia*; but why?

frontis et prudentiae nimia pervicacia. A simple emendation would be *ferventis* (or *furentis*) *sed prudentiae*. It is difficult to believe that *sed* is wrong. Also it would seem that *prudentiae* is right, and should not be altered to *prudencia et*: for it was not the *consilium* but the *prudencia* which curbed his passion.

Carinus 16. 3.

pessimum quemque elegit aut tenuit, praef. urbi unum ex *cancellariis* suis fecit quo foedius nec cogitari potuit aliquando nec dici.

This seems to be the earliest occurrence of the word *cancellarius*. It plainly means 'doorkeeper,' 'porter.' This use is very rare; and the only other examples quoted of it are Not. Dig. ix. 15, where the *cancellarii* appear after the *ammissionales*, and in the somewhat illiterate inscription C. I. L. vi. 9226 of a woman to her husband who for twenty-six years was '*cancellarus* [sic] primi loci campi Boari.' There are elaborate discussions on the word in Salmasius' note on our passage, and in Gothofredus on Cod. Theod. i. 12. 3 (vol. i. 80 ff.). Seeck seems to have misread our passage when he says (Pauly-Wissowa iii. 1457. 28): "Wenn die Fälscher der Hist. Aug. Car. 16. 3 schon unter Carinus kaiserliche Cancellarii erwähnen, so ist dies nur ein weiterer Beweis für die späte Entstehung des Buches." Surely these were not especially imperial menials, any more than other *ostiarii* or porters. All men of any considerable position in society would keep porters. Such menials seem to have been among the lowest of slaves: cp. Suet. Rhet. 3 Pilutus servisse dicitur atque etiam ostiarius vetere more in catena esse. If Vopiscus had written at a time when imperial cancellarii were officials as opposed to menials—even officials of trifling importance—he would

not have spoken with such vigour as he has spoken in this passage of the conduct of Carinus.

Carinus 20. 4.

matris tunicam dedit mimae, lacernam patris mimo †*et* recte si aviae pallio aurato atque purpureo pro syrmate tragoedus uteretur.

The simplest emendation is to read *nec* for *et*, or to add *nec* before *recte*; and take *nec recte* = *ne recte quidem*. For this use of *nec* in the Augustan History, cp. Capit. Ver. 11. 4 *nec* adulatio videatur potuisse confingere, and often: see Lessing's Dictionary, p. 375*b*. Messala gave his mother's tunic to a low actress; while he would not have done right if he had lent his grandmother's cloak to a tragedian. The sentence is elaborately antithetical. The *tunica* was worn closer to the person than the *pallium*, as the proverb *tunica proprior pallio* (Plaut. Trin. 1154).

II.

Vopiscus is not a great writer—far from it. One cannot but echo the regret expressed by Grote (i. 437 note, ed. 1869), who, after quoting a portion of the first chapter of the Life of Aurelian, says: "This impressive remonstrance produced the Life of Aurelian by Vopiscus. The materials seem to have been ample and authentic: it is to be regretted that they did not fall into the hands of an author qualified to turn them to better account." But Vopiscus was very conscious of his limitations. He makes no pretence to be an eloquent historian (Prob. 2. 7); he is 'unus ex curiosis,' and aims at adding to the information already to hand about those whose Lives he has written. His books are but *ministri eloquii*, supplying material which may be worked up by writers with gifts of picturesque and eloquent style (Car. 21. 2). In furtherance of this aim he has, or professes to have, made

researches in the Roman libraries, and a very large portion of his *Lives* consists of copies of documents which he would have us believe that he transcribed verbatim, and he adds more or less definite statements of the authority on which they are based.

Modern criticism will, however, tolerate none of these documents¹: and it is not merely that they are all considered to be forgeries and unauthentic, but they are held to be forgeries by Vopiscus himself. Now, he would indeed be a bold man who would maintain that all the documents quoted by Vopiscus were what they pretend to be: but it appears to me that very cogent proof would be required to establish that a writer, who plainly expected criticism, and who is so particular in stating frequently the exact source of his information—not merely (as in many cases) the Roman Library and the book in which the documents are to be found (e.g. *Aur.* 8. 1 in *Ulpia bibliotheca inter linteos libros*: cp. 1. 7; 12. 4 *ex libris Acholii qui magister admissionum Valeriani principis fuit, libro actorum eius nono*), but even the actual classing of the book in the Library (*Tac.* 8. 1, *ac ne quis me temere Graecorum alicui Latinorumve aestimet credidisse, habet in bibliotheca Ulpia in armario sexto librum elephantinum in quo hoc senatus consultum perscriptum est cui Tacitus ipse manu sua subscripsit*)—should have been guilty of such bare-faced and impudent forgery with all the means at hand for the detection of his fraud.²

¹ Peter, 'Die Scriptores Hist. Aug.' (1892), pp. 164–189; Lécivain, 'Etudes sur l'Histoire Auguste,' pp. 58–72.

² Here it may be allowed to deprecate any argument adduced from the jocular conversation of Tiberianus and Vopiscus recorded in *Aur.* 2. The former had said that Trebellius Pollio had made many careless statements;

and Vopiscus, who was an ardent admirer of Trebellius, replied that no writer 'quantum ad historiam pertinet non aliquid esse mentitum'; that Livy, Sallust, Tacitus, and even Trogus are incontestably convicted of false statements. Tiberianus gave up the argument with a joke (*iocando*). 'Propterea scribe,' says he 'ut libet: securus quod velis dices, habiturus

That there was a good deal of historical criticism at Rome in the time of Vopiscus¹ may perhaps be shown by two examples. Trebellius Pollio, in an affected and absurd manner, enumerated exactly thirty pretenders in the reign of Gallienus, to make the number tally with the Athenian so-called Thirty Tyrants. In that list appeared two women Victoria and Zenobia. He was ridiculed for this; and in a subsequent edition added two men, so that his number thirty might not be spoiled, and adds (Tyr. 31. 10): *nemo in templo Pacis* ('the rendezvous of the critics' says Teuffel, § 397. 7: cp. O. Hirschfeld, 'Verwaltungs-geschichte,' p. 188, n. 3. It was the *bibliotheca Pacis*, established by Vespasian, which is alluded to by Gellius 5. 21. 9: 16. 8. 1) *dicturus est me feminas inter tyrannos, tyrannas videlicet vel tyrannides, ut ipsi de me solent cum risu et ioco iactitare, posuisse.*' Their point appears to have been—how can Victoria and Zenobia (feminine) be

mendaciorum comites quos historicae eloquentiae miramur auctores.' The whole reply is jocular. Vopiscus had used *mentitum esse* in the sense of making false (i.e. inaccurate—not necessarily consciously inaccurate: cp. *ψευδεσθαι*) statements (cp. Plaut. Trin. 362); and Tiberianus, who appears to have been a genial old man, says jokingly, "Yes, yes: all historians are liars; you may say what you please, as you hold you can fall back on the fallibility of Sallust and Tacitus"—a pleasant way, too, of intimating to his younger friend that the fallibility of great writers was no excuse for carelessness on his part. Jocular sentences of this kind are to be taken in the opposite signification to that which the words literally express; and if Vopiscus wished to indicate that his deviations from accuracy of fact were deliberate (which would indeed have been remarkable in such a votary of

'curiositas': cp. Prob. 2. 8, Car. 21. 2), he would surely have expressed himself more explicitly and not through the medium of a joke. He did not want to say that the older historians, or his model Trebellius Pollio, were conscious perverters of truth, or that their errors were due to anything but the ordinary fallibility of human nature. I should not have mentioned this passage were it not that Mommsen says (Hermes 25. 257): "Man sollte . . . hier nicht vergessen dass Vopiscus in der Einleitung sich den Freibrief geben lässt es mit der Wahrheit nicht *genauer* zu nehmen als seine Vorgänge, *habebis mendaciorum comites*. Indess hier beschäftigt uns nicht die Abgrenzung seiner Fälschungen," &c.

¹ I feel quite convinced with Mommsen, Peter, and Lécrivain, that Vopiscus wrote his first two books about 305 and 306, and his other books shortly after.

correctly deemed tyranni (masculine)—a kind of criticism which is absurd, but galling. Another example may be taken from Vopiscus himself. The question seems to have been considerably debated whether Firmus was a mere rebel or an emperor (Firm. 2. 1). Aurelian had called him a 'latrunculus' in an edict; but Vopiscus, quite in modern style, appeals to certain authorities (and he names them) who stated that Firmus wore the purple, and struck coins, and styled himself *αὐτοκράτωρ* in his proclamations; and Vopiscus continues very frankly 'ipse ego in Aureliani vita, priusquam de Firmo cuncta cognoscerem, Firmum non inter purpuratos habui, sed quasi quendam latronem: quod idcirco dixi ne quis me oblitum aestimaret mei.' This seems a very frank confession of an error he considered he had made in saying (Aur. 32. 2) 'Firmus quidam extitit qui sibi Aegyptum sine insignibus imperii, quasi ut esset civitas libera, vindicavit'; and it does not seem to have been in the manner of one who was conscious that he was a wholesale forger and liar, such as the critics make him out to be.¹ If he had been such, he would have been compelled, I fancy, to defend himself against more serious charges from his contemporaries.

The arguments which are adduced to prove that Vopiscus himself forged all the elaborate documents which he adduced are necessarily linguistic: the documents (it is held) reproduce turns and expressions specially affected by Vopiscus. Of course, this line of argument must be used with discretion; for it is only natural that an historian

¹ M. Homo (*Essai*, p. 113, note 2) seems to think that we should not pay any attention to this correction. He says: 'Il n'y a pas à hésiter entre les deux textes: la Vita Firmi, comme valeur historique, est très inférieure à la Vita Aureliani, et le texte de la Vita Aureliani relatif à l'usurpation de

Firmus est très précis.' Vopiscus may have been mistaken as to the genuineness of the coins (for the coins with the name of Firmus are judged by specialists like Eckhel and Sallet to be false); but his method is that of a serious investigator.

should incorporate in his narrative much of the language of his authorities, supposing them to be genuine. This is allowed by Peter (p. 166); but he proceeds to adduce a number of expressions which, as he considers, betray the dishonesty.

The seizing of the throne by Quintillus on the death of Claudius was very similar to that by Florianus on the death of Tacitus: both were brothers of the late Emperor, and failed to establish their claim. In an account of the former, Trebellius¹ had said (Claud. 12. 3) '*suscepit imperium non hereditarium sed merito virtutum, qui factus esset imperator etiamsi frater Claudii principis non fuisset.*' In the account of Florianus, Vopiscus said (Tacit. 14. 1) '*qui post fratrem arripuit imperium, non senatus auctoritate sed suo motu, quasi hereditarium esset imperium, cum sciret adiuratum esse in senatu Tacitum, ut, cum mori coepisset, non liberos suos sed optimum aliquem principem faceret: cp. Tacit. 6.* In what purports to be the first official document sent by Probus to the Senate—in which Probus seems to desire to enlist the favour of the Senate, whether it was that the followers of Florianus were not at that time powerless (for indeed Florianus may have been still alive: cp. Brunner op. cit., pp. 86, 87), or from a natural instinct of courtesy—he says 'Atque utinam id etiam Florianus exspectare voluisset nec *velut hereditarium* sibi vindicasset imperium, vel illum vel alium quempiam maiestas vestra fecisset . . . nunc quoniam ille *imperium arripuit* &c. It is argued, accordingly, that this document is the composition of Vopiscus. But both the words *arripere* (with *imperium*) and *hereditarium* are quite common²: they are the natural words to express the

¹ Peter (p. 166) makes a slight slip. He says these words are in a letter of Claudius. They are in the narrative of Trebellius.

² *Arripere* in this sense is found from

Cicero to Justinian: see the *Thesaurus* 642. 38. The same could be proved, if necessary, of *hereditarius*. One has only to look at an index to the *Corpus Iuris*, to see how common the word was.

idea, and formed probably one of the political phrases of the day; for we know that it was an article of the senatorial creed that the best man should be made Emperor, and that a dynasty should not be formed.

In a letter of Valerian in praise of Aurelian (Aur. 9. 4), he is represented as saying *Quid enim in illo non clarum? Quid non Corvinis et Scipionibus conferendum?* In speaking of Claudius, Trebellius said (Claud. 2. 2) *Quid enim in illo non mirabile? Quid non conspicuum? Quid non triumphalibus vetustissimis praeferendum?* Vopiscus was an imitator of Trebellius; and thus it is supposed that we can see that the whole letter of Valerian is really due to the rhetoric of Vopiscus. But Valerian had been *princeps senatus*, and was a man of culture (cp. Gibbon, ed. Bury, i. 253), and so doubtless equal to that not very original flight of eloquence, which must have been many a time attained by every Roman schoolboy. I rather think, too, if Vopiscus had been composing this letter of Valerian with the passage of Trebellius before him, he would have said, '*Quid non Camillis et Scipionibus conferendum?* not *Corvinis*: cp. Claud. i. 3 fin. *qui si diutius in hac esset commoratus rep. Scipiones nobis et Camillos omnesque illos veteres suis virtutibus, suis consiliis, sua providentia reddidisset* (cp. too Pliny's Panegyricus 13, and the Second Panegyric 14).

Again, in a public letter to the Roman people, Aurelian says (Firm. 5. 3) *Pacato undique gentium toto qua late patet orbe*; and Probus also in a despatch to the Senate (Prob. 15. 2) *subacta est omnis qua tenditur late Germania*. This cannot, says Peter, be accident: it must be due to the rhetoric of an individual. In public documents describing such really great exploits as those of Aurelian and Probus 'the whole wide extent of' does not seem a very unnatural expression, and might readily have occurred to two different conquerors or their secretaries.

And if the phrase is specially Vopiscan, it is curious that in none of the places where Vopiscus speaks in his own person of the great exploits of those two heroes of his does he ever make use of the phrase (cp., for example, Aur. 1. 5: 32. 4, etc.: Prob. 1. 3: 22. 2, etc.).

As to the repetition of the phrases in the letters which appear in Tacit. 18, 19, it must be remembered that these letters all apply to the one event, the unexpected revival of senatorial authority. It is accordingly natural that they should contain many collocations of words (*facimus imperatores: nuncupamus Augustos*) which were probably stock phrases of senatorial pretensions.

No one will deny that Vopiscus has something of the rhetorician about him: not that his writing is good or even fluent; but it evinces a certain amount of rhetorical training and floridness of style. His prefaces display these qualities, especially those that treat in a large way of periods of Roman history. Many of the speeches which are quoted in his works also show some influence of the rhetorical school; but why should not the senators and others to whom they are attributed have possessed the same abilities, and been able to make practical use of the same kind of instruction which Vopiscus and doubtless all educated Romans obtained?¹ But it has been contended that, because minute inspection can find some phrases in Vopiscus which have been tabulated as rhetorical devices, and some similar phrases appear in the documents he quotes, therefore Vopiscus must be the author of the latter. Of course, if these similarities were very striking or very unusual or very numerous, a *prima facie* case might be

¹ The late Professor Bigg, at the beginning of his second Lecture on 'The Church's Task under the Roman Empire,' said: "Under the Empire Education, we may say, was the One, Religion was the Many. In the first we

find a uniform system, which extends unchanged from farthest East to farthest West" (this the Professor had shown in his first lecture). "In the second we find a sea of confusion."

made out; but they are neither striking nor unusual nor numerous.

Klebs (Rh. Mus., 1892, pp. 44 ff.) enumerates some fifty or sixty cases of alliteration in Vopiscus. Among these we find cases like *late longeque* (Prob. 19. 3); *fatigatus* et prope malis *fessus* (Aur. 26. 6); *miro modo* (Aur. 24. 1); *venerabilis viri* (Aur. 24. 2); *avertat hanc amentiam* (Aur. 1. 6); *remp. regi* (Car. 1. 1); *pacemque poscentes* (Prob. 17. 4). The three most striking that appear in his list are *semper securus et sobrius* (Bonos 14. 4); *miro modo mimis* delectabatur (Aur. 50. 4); *diversis vicibus variisque victoriis* (Prob. 18. 3). On the strength of such alliterations we are to attribute to Vopiscus a letter of a senator (Tacit. 19. 3), because that opens with this alliteration, *Optinuimus*, pater sancte, quod semper *optavimus*. Again, a letter from the army to the senate is suspected because its superscription is alliterative. It ran *Felices ac fortes* exercitus Senatui P. Q. R. But that collocation was in a measure the usual one: cp. Pesc. Nig. 12. 2 dixisse fertur *felices* illos (Scipiones) fuisse magis quam *fortes*—a passage, by the way, which no doubt a follower of Klebs would consider glaringly alliterative. A speech purporting to be by Tacitus (Aur. 41. 9) went so far in alliteration as to say that Aurelian Persas . . . *fudit fugavit* oppressit. Yet the collocation is a common one: cp. Alex. Sev. 55. 2, 56. 7. Manlius Statianus, a senator, spoke of Probus as *vita venerabilis*; yet it is assumed that such alliteration betrays Vopiscus; but it is used also by Capitolinus (Gord. 7. 1). Nor is it easy to see anything intentional or specially rhetorical about the alliteration *Vos sanctissimi* milites et *sacratissimi* vos Quirites (in a speech of a praefectus urbis, Tac. 7. 3).¹ No doubt *felicitatis praerogativa praesules* nisi futuros *principes* (in a letter of

¹ In Gord. 14. 1 we find *sacratissimi* Aurelian (Firm. 5. 6) *sanctissimi commilitones*, and in an epistle of *Quirites*.

Aurelian Prob. 6. 6) looks artificial; and the peculiar use of *praerogativa*, 'pre-eminence' (also found in the speech of Statianus (Prob. 12. 2) and in Vopiscus (Carus 5. 1) himself), looks as if it might have come from the one hand. But that suspicion is to be distrusted when we consider that so many of the unusual words affected by Vopiscus alone among the Scriptores Hist. Aug. do not appear in any of the documents: e.g. the following rare uses referred to by Klebs (p. 42):—*a dorso* (Aur. 18. 3); *mortalitas* (Car. 1. 2, 2. 6); *praecordia* (Car. 2. 6); *praepollens* (Car. 11. 1); *ostiatim* (Car. 17. 7), in the sense of 'in detail': the prepositions *absque*¹ (Aur. 33. 1), and *penes* (which only occurs in Tac. 1. 1 in the Aug. Hist.). Nor is it easy to see rhetorical artifice beyond Aurelian's (or his secretary's) powers in his remark about Zenobia *timet quasi femina, pugnat quasi (vir) poenam timens*; nor in the antithesis attributed to Tacitus (Aur. 41. 14) *nisi fiat quod dicitur, et electi periculum erit et eligentis invidia*. The whole speech of Saturninus (10. 2) is no doubt rhetorical from first to last; and Vopiscus says expressly (10. 4) that Saturninus was a diligent student at the rhetorical schools. But Klebs (p. 45, note 2) seems to think that the statement is made merely to draw attention to, and recommend, a little bit of rhetorical composition of Vopiscus himself, of which he was proud. Truly, if so, Vopiscus combined subtlety and simplicity in a remarkable degree; for he quotes Marcus Salvidienus to vouch for the fact that this speech was delivered by Saturninus. But the critics say

¹ The phrase *ab re* = ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, 'irrelevant,' is common from the time of Plautus: e.g. Capt. 338. The only example of *absque* which is quoted besides this one from Vopiscus is St. Jerome, Epist. 121. 8 *non absque re arbitror si requiram*. In that passage it is a v. l. for *abs*; and in the

passage of Vopiscus M gives *ab*. In an enactment of Diocletian (Code 7. 43. 8), we have *abs re*; but there, too, several MSS. give *ab*. So the few variations from the usual phrase *ab re* do not, it must be confessed, rest on very strong support.

that Salvidienus is a myth, invented by Vopiscus. If this is so, Vopiscus would seem to have laid to heart Cicero's saying (Fam. v. 12. 3) 'sed tamen qui semel verecundiae fines transierit eum bene et naviter oportet esse impudentem,' and to have displayed his impudence in inventing gratuitous lies which might tell against his own purpose.

Vopiscus is supposed to have been a great Ciceronian. I put side by side passages wherein Vopiscus is held to copy Cicero:—

CICERO.

Brut. 281 maxima cum gratia et gloria ad summam amplitudinem pervenisset, ascendens gradibus magistratum.

Arch. 24 Atque is tamen (Alexander) cum in Sigeo ad Achilli tumulum adstitisset, 'O fortunate inquit adolescens qui tuae virtutis praeconem inveneris.'

Pis. 17 Omitto enim illud consulem edicere ut senatus senatusconsulto ne obtemperet: quo foedius nec fieri nec cogitari quidquam potest.

VOPISCUS.

Aurel. 11. 10 neque enim quisquam aliquando ad summam rerum pervenit qui non a prima aetate gradibus virtutis ascenderit.¹

Prob. 1.¹ 2 Inde est quod Alexander Magnus Macedo, cum ad Achillis sepulcrum venisset, graviter ingemescens 'Felicem te inquit iuvenis qui talem praeconem tuarum virtutum reperisti.'

Carin. 16. 3 praefectum urbi unum ex cancellariis suis fecit, quo foedius nec cogitari potuit aliquando nec dici.

In the first of these examples both writers express, indeed, the same trite idea, but there seems no necessary borrowing of language; the words are the simple words which anyone would use. The second tells a story

¹ Another version in *Prob.* 3. 7 ex quo apparet neminem umquam pervenisse ad virtutum summam iam

maturum nisi qui puer seminario virtutum generosiore concretus aliquid inclitum designasset.

which was surely familiar to all (cp. Plutarch Alex. 15 : Arrian i. 12), though probably all Latin-speaking people derived it ultimately from the Ciceronian passage. The last may be a clausula learned in the rhetorical school : and even if it was obtained from Cicero's *In Pisonem*, it does not prove very extensive obligations. If Vopiscus chose, he might have taken much from that abusive speech to heighten his condemnation of Carinus ; for he certainly knew the speech : cp. Tacit. 13. 4. M. Tullius dicit magnificentius esse dicere quemadmodum <gesserit quam quemadmodum> ceperit consulatum (Pis. 3). Elsewhere, too, Vopiscus (Aur. 39. 4) refers to Cicero's Philippics (1. 1). But all educated Romans had read, and were more or less familiar with, Cicero's writings : we have only to look at Peter's Index to see references to him in the other writers of the Augustan History : and Ammianus, about a century later, often quotes him. So it need not be considered strange if we find in any of the writings of these ages Ciceronian turns. Thus Klebs appeals to the collocation *solutus ac liber* (Aur. 1. 2) as specially Ciceronian. But Dr. Reid, on Acad. ii. 105, quotes other Latin writers (Sallust, Livy, Pliny's Epistles and Paneg., Ammianus) who have used the collocation. Nor can *esto* (Prob. 6. 5) = 'be it so, be regarded as especially Ciceronian ; for that concessive usage is often found in other writers—Virgil, Horace, Quintilian : nor *quorsum* (Prob. 1. 3 : Car. 3. 8), which occurs in Plautus, Terence, and Horace at all events, and doubtless in many other writers, though not elsewhere in the Augustan History. Phrases like *Quousque ultra progredimur* (Tac. 17. 5) are stock rhetorical tags learned in the schools (perhaps ultimately derived from Cicero's usage),¹ but showing no exceptional acquaintance with or partiality for Cicero's writings.

¹ Though I am not convinced by 41 : 5. 174 : Phil. 12. 26. Klebs' examples, Q. Rosc. 2 : Verr. 4.

Yet on the strength of these passages it is argued that Vopiscus must have composed the speech of Manlius Statianus (Prob. 12), because there is in it what seems an imitation of Cicero's speech, De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 29. The imitation appears to me entirely to rest on the repetition of *testis*. Manlius says that Probus has left memorials of his victories all over the world. *Testes* sunt Marmaridae . . . *testes* Franci . . . *testes* Germani; as Cicero had said of Pompey *Testis* est Italia . . . *testis* est Sicilia . . . *testis* est Africa . . . *testis* est Gallia, and so on. That the end of the speech of Manlius appeals to the Capitoline triad of divinities, Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, as does Cicero in the De Domo 144, is no proof of imitation. Those divinities are appealed to by others also: e.g. Eumenes in Panegyri. 4. 10 (= 123. 30 Bährens): and why might not Manlius have had as good a rhetorical education as Vopiscus? That the speech of Ulpian in Aur. 19. 3 betrays the influence of the Third Philippic, because the former begins with *Sero* and the latter with *Serius*, and both refer to public affairs; and because the former has *utendum Apollinis beneficiis*, and Cicero, ib. 32, has *deorum immortalium beneficio utemini*, I altogether deny. This is mere accident. How more naturally would the very simple ideas be expressed? Are we to suppose that Horace was influenced by anyone when he wrote *rectius occupet Nomen beati qui deorum Muneribus sapienter uti*? As to the story of Damocles told in the very rhetorical speech of Saturninus (10. 2), no doubt it came originally from Cicero's version in Tusc. 5. 62. But it was common property. Ammianus (29. 2. 4), Sidonius (2. 13. 7), and the Scholiast on Persius (3. 40) all reproduce the language more or less closely—all have the word *saeta* (like Saturninus); and all have *laqueariis* (or *lacunaribus*), which is in Cicero, but not in Saturninus.

As to peculiarities of Vopiscus' language which

Peter finds in the inserted documents, it can, I think, be shown that many of these peculiarities are only peculiarities in the sense that the other writers of the Augustan History do not use the words or phrases in question—not that they are rare or non-existent elsewhere in Latin literature. We must remember that Vopiscus (and his documents) comprise nearly one-fifth of the Augustan History, so that it is only natural that certain turns of expression or construction should be found, by microscopic investigation, within these limits only. But none are at all so peculiar as to make it seem strange that both the ostensible authors of the several documents and Vopiscus should have used them; and certainly not so peculiar, considering the extent of the work of Vopiscus, as to induce us to believe that he would engage in such barefaced and extensive forgery—forgery, too, which could be so easily detected by his contemporaries—as the critics hold he committed.

The instances of correspondence between Vopiscus and the documents given by Peter (*Die Script. Hist. Aug.*, pp. 169–171) are as follows:—*Exempli* as genit. of quality; ille dux *magni totius exempli*, in a letter of Valerian (*Aur.* 9. 4); and in Vopiscus (*Bonos.* 15. 4) femina *singularis exempli*. But it occurs more than once in Suetonius (e.g. *Aug.* 32 : *Vitell.* 10), and in Pliny *Ep.* 3. 1. 5 adsumit uxorem *singularis exempli*. The addition of *salutare* in *Quod bonum faustum felix salutareque sit*, found in a letter of the Senate, *Tac.* 18. 2, and in an acclamatio, *Tac.* 4. 4, need not be attributed to Vopiscus because he says (*Prob.* 20. 3) his addidit dictum . . . *salutare* reip.; for the word *salutare* is part of the original formula: cp. Varro *L. L.* 6. 86 *Quod bonum fortunatum felixque salutareque siet populo Romano Quiritium*; which seems confirmed by Apuleius *Met.* 2. 6 *Quod bonum felix et faustum itaque, licet salutare non erit, Fotis illa temptetur*, to which Klebs

refers. *Romanae leges*, for 'Roman dominion,' is certainly unusual; *Romanum imperium* is the usual phrase; but *Romanae leges* is found twice in a document quoted by Capitolinus (Max. et Balb. 17. 2. 4). *Pro pudor* in the speech of a consul (Aur. 41. 9), and in one of the rhetorical prefaces of Vopiscus (Prob. 1. 4) is fairly common: cp. Petron. 81, Panegy. 9. 14; and in verse, Petron. 123 v. 243: Stat. Theb. 10. 874: Mart. 10. 68. 6. *Nihil est quod* is certainly found in Plautus and in Cicero (see Dictionaries), and presents nothing unusual except the accident that the collocation seems to occur in the Aug. Hist. only in an edict of Aurelian (Firm. 5. 4), and in the warning of Apollonius of Tyana to Aurelian (Aur. 24. 4), which is said to have been given 'Latine ut homo Pannonius intellegeret.'

Pudet dicere seems an ordinary phrase often used by Cicero De Dom. 117: Fin. 5. 93: N. D. 1. 109; but not specially Ciceronian: cp. Apul. Flor. 16. 1. *Fecundare* is an unusual word, no doubt; and we can readily believe Wöfflin that it is not found in historians. But the idea of 'impregnating,' 'fertilizing,' is not one that historians would be likely to need; and it does not occur in Vopiscus himself, but in two letters quoted by him (Saturn. 8. 9: Prob. 15. 6); though *effecundare* does occur (Prob. 21. 5). It is hardly necessary to say that *Quid plura?* and *Quid multa?* are among the commonest phrases of rhetoric. No point can be made out of the use of *dii boni*, as being archaic and so unusual; Neue-Wagener i³. 161 justly say: "*dii*, welches in unseren Büchern sehr gewöhnlich ist, soll vielleicht nur die Länge des i ausdrücken." If *meministis enim* occurs once in a document (Aur. 19. 4), and once in Vopiscus (Aur. 29. 1), and not elsewhere in the Augustan Hist., I can see nothing in this but accident. *Ad pedes iacere* may not be found in the Aug. Hist. outside the volume of Vopiscus; but it occurs in Panegy. 8. 9. The same may be

said of *qua . . . qua*, which is common in Cicero's Epistles and other writers, and is found in Panegyri. 11. 19. *Virtutibus fulgere* (Prob. 5. 7) can be paralleled, as Klebs has pointed out, by *moribus fulgens* in Tacitus' Histories 4. 42. *Simul quia* for the very common *simul quod* is a variety of expression which betokens nothing. Klebs notices the variation in Capitolinus, Pertinax 6. 3. The use of *penitus* in such a phrase as *toto penitus orbe*, which occurs in the speech of a senator (Aur. 41. 7), is no doubt affected by both Trebellius and Vopiscus: but it is also found in Lampridius, Heliog. 8. 7 *ex tota penitus urbe*. The collocation *barbarae gentes* seems to occur in all ages from Cicero to Cassiodorus (cp. the Thesaurus ii. 1735. 70 ff.). The vague appellation *magister* or *magisterium* applied in three documents to a military command (Aur. 11. 2 : 17. 2 : Prob. 11. 7), no doubt, renders those documents suspicious; but the fact that the city-man Vopiscus uses¹ (Aur. 18. 1) *magistri* 'commanders' vaguely and not technically goes a small way towards proving that he composed the whole of the document immediately preceding. We find *magister peditum* in Amm. 21. 12. 16. Vopiscus uses the word *nuncupare* always with some word connoting 'emperor'; and it is used in a similar manner in two of the circular letters quoted at the end of his Life of Tacitus. It is natural that the word should be used in these letters, as it has a flavour of formality about it.² *Solum* in the sense of 'land' occurs in all the writers of the Aug. Hist.,

¹ If the passage is not a later addition. It runs: 'Equites sane omnes ante imperium sub Claudio Aurelianus gubernavit, cum offensam *magistri* eorum incurrissent quod temere Claudio non iubente pugnassent.'

² If I am not in error, *nuncupare* is used twenty-eight times in the Hist. Aug. In seventeen of these it is applied to some word connoting emperor (in

Capitolinus, four times; Lampridius, twice; Trebellius, four times; and Vopiscus, five times: and twice it appears in documents in Vopiscus). The eleven instances of its usage with other words are thus distributed: Spartianus, twice; Lampridius, twice; Capitolinus, five times; and Trebellius, twice.

except Spartianus and the author of the Life of Avidius Cassius. It is hardly necessary to defend *attamen*. It occurs in Capitolinus twice and in Panegy. 2. 10, and doubtless elsewhere in contemporary writers. *Profecto* 'assuredly' occurs in Panegy. 2. 1: 10. 14. It is curious that it does not occur elsewhere in the Hist. Aug., except twice in letters quoted by Vopiscus (Aur. 27. 5: and Saturn. 8. 7), and once in a rhetorical passage of Vopiscus himself (Prob. 23. 2). It is also certainly curious that we do not find *culpare* used in any writer of the Aug. Hist., except twice in Vopiscus, once in a letter of Valerianus (Aur. 8. 2), and once by Vopiscus himself (Car. 20. 4). Yet it occurs at least three times in Suetonius, and fairly often in Pliny, Tacitus, and Apuleius. The reading *Eurodam* in Aur. 17. 2 is probably a mistake for the rare *Rhodopam*, as Oberdick has seen. *Strati* in the sense of soldiers being overthrown is found in prose in Livy (e.g. 4. 29. 1) and Tacitus (Agric. 36): and in the sense of suppliants lying prostrate also in Tacitus (Hist. 1. 63: 3. 10). The address *incundissime* is confessedly found in Pliny H. N. 1. 1 init., as it is in letters of Valerian and Aurelian (Aur. 11. 1: 47. 4). As to the phrase *recte atque ordine*, though it does not occur in the Aug. Hist., except in two documents quoted by Vopiscus (Aur. 41. 5: Prob. 11. 2), it is the usual expression for formal approval of an action, especially (in the time of the Republic) for formal approval by the Senate of the action of commanders in the field: cp. Weissenborn on Livy 24. 31. 7.

The coincidence of the partiality which Vopiscus shows for references to the power of Fate, and of the number of times similar references appear in the documents which he cites, has been advanced as an argument for identity of authorship. As far as I can ascertain, the documents have seven such references, in three of which the application is to the Sibylline books (Aur. 19. 1: 19. 3: 19. 6), a very constant

usage: cp. Weissenborn on Livy 5. 14. 14, and Suet. Caes. 79. The remaining four are (1) Tacit. 6. 8 (si te citius *fata* praevenierint), where the word is purely conventional, as it or its derivatives are in Vopiscus himself (Tacit. 16. 7: Prob. 10. 1: 21. 1); (2) Aur. 38. 3 quasi *fatale* quiddam mihi sit ut . . . omnes motus ingravescant, in a somewhat querulous letter of Aurelian, 'it seems to be my luck'; (3) Car. 15. 4, where Diocletian says, Tandem occidi Aprum *fatalem* (cp. 14. 3); (4) in a letter of Gallienus (Prob. 6. 2) Etiam si patrem meum *fatalis* belli Persici necessitas tenuit, where a euphemistic phrase is necessary to express the capture of Valerian by the Persians. Nowhere in these documents is emphasis laid on the power of Fate as it is by Vopiscus himself in Car. 1 init.: Aur. 36. 4: Car. 1. 3. In Car. 9. 1 Vopiscus seems to have little belief in what were regarded as the laws of Fate.¹ No special emphasis is laid on the power of Fate when it is said that Aurelian's mother scisse *fatalia* (Aur. 4. 3); nor in any of the four passages quoted above, except perhaps (3), which is due to Diocletian and not to Vopiscus. In the other writers the idea is, I think, expressed eight times, of which four are the conventional applications to death. The remaining four are Heliog. 34. 5: Avid. Cass. 2. 2: Tyr. 10. 15: Val. 7. 1, the latter also a euphemistic phrase referring to Valerian's capture 'qui *fatali* quadam necessitate superatus est.'

The conclusion is that the evidence of coincidences between the language of Vopiscus and that of the documents is too slight to justify the charge of wholesale forgery. These coincidences may be considered due to the

¹ Hanc ego epistolam idcirco indidi quod plerique dicunt vim *fati* quandam esse ut Romanus princeps Ctesifontem transire non possit, ideoque

Carum fulmine absumptum, quod eos fines transgredi cuperet, qui *fataliter* constituti sunt. Sed sibi habeat artes suas timiditas, calcanda virtutibus.

uniform nature of the training in rhetoric to which most educated Romans were subjected, and the rest may be fairly attributed to accident; as such coincidences might be found by minute investigators to exist between the language of any two cultivated Romans. And we must remember, on the one hand, that Vopiscus had plainly a taste for rhetoric, though he disclaims all pretension to literary style; and, on the other, that the greater part of the documents are speeches on important occasions, and so were naturally studied efforts of rhetoric.

But while it is difficult to think that Vopiscus was a conscious deceiver, it is most probable that he was often very egregiously deceived, and that he accepted as genuine many documents which were either not genuine or which were considerably touched up and interpolated. But this article has extended so far that this most important question—viz., how far the documents can be regarded as having historical value—cannot be discussed here.

L. C. PURSER.

COLLATION OF TWO IRISH VERSIONS OF THE BOOK OF PSALMS.

THE two versions here collated are: that in the Old Testament of 1685, and that in the Book of Common Prayer of 1712. As to the former, it may suffice to remind the reader that the Old Testament (including the Apocrypha) was first translated into Irish about 1640 by the care of William Bedell, Bishop of Kilmore, and previously Provost of Trinity College. It was not found possible to print it at the time; and it remained in MS. until 1685, when Dr. Narcissus Marsh, Provost of Trinity College, undertook a revision of the translation, by comparison with versions in other languages, the Irish being orally translated to him, as he was not a Gaelic scholar. The generous aid of Robert Boyle made the publication possible, but he made it a condition that the Apocrypha should not be included. With later editions I am not now concerned.

The English Book of Common Prayer was translated into Irish in 1608 by W. Daniel (or O'Donnell), Archbishop of Tuam, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, who had published the translation of the New Testament in 1602. His Prayer Book, however, does not include the Psalter, nor is any printed edition of the Psalms older than the Old Testament of 1685 known to exist, with the exception, of course, of the few Psalms in the Occasional Services in the Prayer Book.

Yet in a letter of Dr. Andrew Sall to Robert Boyle, dated Dec. 17, 1678, we find the following:—"I do not remember to have seen more of the Scriptures printed in Irish [i.e. more than the New Testament] but the Psalms

with our Common Prayer Book, in handsome folios for quire, of which I discovered a set to the Archbishop of Cashell, and his Grace appointed a reading of them in his cathedral" (Boyle's *Works*, vol. vi., p. 572).

These words of Dr. Sall seem very explicit, but there is no trace of any such Psalter now existing. There is no copy at Cashel or Armagh. Moreover, it appears from a letter of Bishop Henry Jones (of Meath) to Boyle, dated Sept. 3, 1681, and from Boyle's reply, that they were both unacquainted with any such book.* The first Prayer Book in which the Psalter is included is that issued in 1712, the translator being the Rev. John Richardson, formerly Scholar of Trinity College, and subsequently Dean of Kilmacduagh. The version of the Psalter contained in this Prayer Book is based on that in the Old Testament of 1685, some of the Psalms being, indeed, unaltered. But on the whole the changes are not unimportant; and they are all in the direction of making the version correspond more closely with that in the English Book of Common Prayer, which, as is generally known, is taken from that in the Great Bible of 1539.

In the following collation those readings in the book of 1712 which differ both from the text of 1685 and from the A.V., but agree with the version in the English Prayer Book, are marked with a star:—

PSALM I.

1685.	1712.
1. $\eta\acute{\alpha}\check{\varsigma}$ $\eta\upsilon\beta\lambda\iota\varsigma\iota\omicron\eta\eta$.	* $\eta\acute{\alpha}\eta$ $\eta\upsilon\beta\upsilon\iota\iota$.
$\eta\acute{\alpha}\check{\varsigma}$ $\eta\epsilon\Delta\eta\eta$.	* $\eta\acute{\alpha}\eta$ $\eta\epsilon\Delta\eta$.
$\eta\acute{\alpha}\check{\varsigma}$ $\eta\iota\varsigma\iota\omicron\eta\eta$.	* $\eta\acute{\alpha}\eta$ $\eta\iota\varsigma$.
2. $\eta\mu\upsilon\Delta\iota\eta\epsilon\Delta\eta\eta$.	$\eta\mu\upsilon\Delta\iota\eta\epsilon\Delta\eta$.
3. $\eta\iota\theta$.	(4) $\eta\iota$.
5. $\eta\epsilon\Delta\epsilon\iota\theta$.	(6) $\eta\epsilon\Delta\epsilon\check{\tau}\epsilon\iota\theta$.

These are mentioned merely to illustrate the differences in spelling.

* Boyle's *Works*, vol. i., pp. clxxviii, clxxix.

PSALM II.

- | | |
|------------|-------|
| 1685. | 1712. |
| 2. ΔΣ ράθ. | om. |

PSALM III.

- | | |
|--------|-----|
| 2. ιρ. | om. |
|--------|-----|

PSALM IV.

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------|
| 3. Δέτ. | *om. |
| 7. ní ιρ mo ná Δ nuάιρ. | (8) ο nuάιρ. |
| <i>Fin.</i> | *add Δσυρ Δ hoΔ. |

PSALM V.

- | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| 5. ράδτιυγιονν. | ράδτιυγħ. |
| 11. ccúmσουγ. | (12) ccúmσουγιονν. |

PSALM VI.

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| 3. <i>Fin.</i> | *add. ριανραιρ μέ. |
| 7. mo ριυł. | *mo ργέιħ. |
| ρεαννοΔ. | ρεΔη. |
| 10. βισίρ (<i>bis</i>). | *béio. |

PSALM VII.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 5. [é]. | *mé. |
| 7. <i>Inil.</i> | *add Δσυρ. |
| 11. Όο ní Όια βρεϊτεΔħνυρ Δι
Δη βριμευν, Δσυρ bí Όια
ρεΔργΔέ [ιυρ Δη ccιονη-
τΔέ] γΔέ εΔηłΔ. | (12) *ΔτΔ Όια ηΔ βρεϊτεΔħ
ριέυντΔ łάισιρ Δσυρ
ροιγίνοεΔέ: Δσυρ κυρτεΔρ
ρεΔργ Διρ γΔέ έΔηłΔ. |

PSALM VIII.

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. οΔ βροιλλργεΔηη tú. | έυρΔ οροιλλργħ. |
| 3. όρσουγιρ. | όρσουγħ tú. |

PSALM IX.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 6. Δσυρ οο ρειυορυρ Δαιτ-
ρεΔΔ. | *μαρ ηΔ ΔαιτρεΔΔ οο
ργριορ tú. |
| 12. ηΔ númΔł. | *ηΔ mbocto. |
| 15. οο ρολυγεΔοΔρ. | οο έολυγεΔοΔρ (?). |

PSALM X.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 9. λυίγυó ρέ Δ βρεϊτεΔħ cum
βειρτε Διρ ηο βοctoυιβ. | *cum γο οτιυβηΔó έιγεΔη
Δι βοctoυιβ. |
| βειρυó ρέ Δρ. | *(10) bheir ρέ έιγεΔη. |

PSALM X.—*continued*.

1685.

10. $\epsilon\rho\omicron\mu\upsilon\iota\theta$ $\rho\acute{\epsilon}$. $\epsilon\sigma\iota$ $\zeta\omicron$ $\tau\tau\upsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\alpha\theta$ $\Delta\eta$ $\beta\omicron\epsilon\theta$
 $\lambda\epsilon$ ne $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha\nu\iota\theta$.

1712.

(11) $\tau\upsilon\iota\tau\iota\theta$ $\rho\acute{\epsilon}$ $\rho\iota\omicron\rho$. $\epsilon\upsilon\mu$ $\zeta\omicron$ $\tau\tau\upsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\alpha\theta$ $\epsilon\omicron\iota\eta$ -
 $\epsilon\iota\omicron\eta\omicron\lambda$ na $m\beta\omicron\epsilon\theta$ Δ $\lambda\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\iota\theta$
 Δ $\epsilon\alpha\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\epsilon\alpha\theta$.15. $\lambda\omicron\rho\zeta$ ("seek out" A. V.).*(17) $\tau\omicron\zeta$ ("take away"
P.B.).

PSALM XI.

3. $m\acute{\alpha}$ $\rho\epsilon\rho\iota\omicron\rho\tau\alpha\rho$ na $\beta\upsilon\eta\delta\iota\tau\epsilon$,
 $\epsilon\rho\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\sigma$ $\iota\rho$ $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\iota\rho$ $\lambda\epsilon\iota\rho$ na
 $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\upsilon\nu\upsilon\iota\theta$ $\upsilon\omicron$ $\theta\epsilon\alpha\eta\Delta\eta$.* $\omicron\iota\eta$ $\tau\epsilon\iota\lambda\zeta\rho\iota\omicron\rho$ na $\beta\upsilon\eta\eta\delta\iota\tau\epsilon$:
 $\Delta\zeta\upsilon\rho$ $\epsilon\rho\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\sigma$ $\upsilon\omicron$ $\mu\iota\eta\eta\epsilon$ $\Delta\eta$
 $\rho\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\upsilon\nu$.4. After $\Delta\iota\eta\epsilon$.*(5) add $\upsilon\omicron$ na $\beta\omicron\iota\omicron\epsilon\omicron$.6. $\epsilon\iota\eta\eta\tau\iota\theta\epsilon$.*(7) $\Delta\zeta\upsilon\rho$ $\rho\omicron\sigma\iota\eta\mu$.

PSALM XII.

1. $\rho\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\iota\theta$ $\Delta\eta$ $\upsilon\iota\eta\epsilon$ $\upsilon\iota\Delta\theta\Delta$.* $\eta\iota$ $\beta\mu\iota\lambda$ $\upsilon\iota\eta\epsilon$ $\upsilon\iota\Delta\theta\Delta$.5. $\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ $\upsilon\epsilon$ $\epsilon\upsilon\iota\eta\tau\epsilon\alpha\theta$ Δ $\eta\zeta\Delta\iota\tau\epsilon$
 $\acute{\epsilon}$ (A. V. marg.).*(6) $\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\Delta\zeta$ $\beta\omicron\rho\eta\eta\tau\alpha\theta$
 $na\zeta\Delta\iota\theta$.

PSALM XIV.

After 3.

*add three verses, as in
P. B., after the Latin
Vulgate, being Ps. v. 9
(clause 2), cxi. 3, x. 7;
Is. lix. 7, 8 (part); Ps.
xxxvi. 1. These passages
are brought together by
St. Paul in Rom. iii. 13-
18, after (free) citation of
xiv. 3. From St. Paul
they were introduced into
the Septuagint, as if the
copyist thought that the
whole of his quotation
was continuous. From
the Septuagint they got
into the Vulgate, and
then into the Great Bible
of 1539 and the P. B.

PSALM XIV.—*continued.*

1685.

4. an bfuil eolur air bít aš
 a nuile úaine oibnišior
 éaicceairt? nó íťior
 rúar mo róbalra mar
 íťio ríao arán, ašur šan
 šairm air an Tíšearna.

5. After móir.

6. vo náirígeabair cómaidile
 an bóico vo bnišh šur
 bé an Tíšearna a úain-
 šin.

7. O nać ttiš.

The A. V. is idiomatic; the P. B. V. literal.

1712.

*(8) an bfuiluo šon [*sic*] řior
 air bít, šon lúeo oile vo
 úeana íao úile; aš íte
 mo róbalíe ruar mar íťio
 arán, ašur nać šairmíio
 air an Tíšearna.

*(9) add mur nać ruib fóe
 cíóineasla.

*(10) air buri řanra, vo ríonn
 eamhair řšíše air chomh-
 airle an bóico: vo bnišh
 šur (annra tíšearna)
 chuiríor a úóish.

(11) cia bheáir.

PSALM XVI.

2. mo Tíšearna.

*mo Óia.

PSALM XVII.

3. After einní

*add oíc ionnum.

PSALM XVIII.

6. The verbs past.

*The verbs future.

24. ašur.

*uine řin.

48. íreao.

*(49) om.

PSALM XX.

2. an řanctóia.

an ionao naomíao.

A. V. and P. B. both have "sanctuary."

3. šo niompóiš čiošbairt loi-
 říte a luáit (A. V.
 marg.).

šabao čiošbairt loiřete.

4. huile cómaidile.

*huile mian.

PSALM XX.—*continued.*

1885.

7. [cuimniḡiṭ] ὅρονς ἀνέδρ-
βασυῖν. (The verb is
borrowed from the next
clause. A. V. supplies
“trust,” as P. B.)

9. Ο Δ ἔζεαρνα, cluineḡ an
Riḡ rinn Δ nuḡiri ḡoir-
peam.

1712.

- *cuirio ὅρονς Δ νοόῖς Δ
ccarbasuῖν.

- *Sábasil, Δ ἔζεαρνα, Δsur
eirṭ inn, ó Δ riḡ neime;
antān vo nímiṭ ḡairim
oirṭ.

PSALM XXI.

10. Δῶδιῖν.

να ὠδοῖνεḡο.

12. cuirrior tú rómhḡo iḡo mair
buṭa me ccairṭear ḡoiḡoe
cuirri tú vo ḡoiḡoe air
vo ḡranḡuῖb ar coinne Δ
néḡoḡoin. (A. V. marg.
“set them as a butt”).

- *cuirrior tú cuin teiteim
iḡo: Δsur uḡlḡmóḡair
ḡranḡa vo ḡoḡa na naḡh-
aiṭh.

PSALM XXII.

20. mo ḡon (A. V. marg.).

mo ḡuirniṇ (A. V. text).

30. ḡliḡḡo.

*(31) mo ḡliḡḡo.

PSALM XXVIII.

8. Δ neairṭan.

*(9) mo neairṭ.

PSALM XXIX.

4. Δ mórhḡḡṭ (A. V. marg.).

lḡn vo mhórhḡḡṭ. (Also
A. V. text.)

PSALM XXXII.

8. vo ḡear cómhairle ḡuit mé
mo ḡúil vo ḡeir oirṭ.
(A. V. marg.).

ṭreorócuṭ tú mé mo ḡúil.
(Also = A. V. text.)

PSALM XXXIII.

1686.

12. After ΔΑΔ

(and is in A. V.)

1712.

add ΔΣΥΡ.

PSALM XXXVII.

7. bi ΔΟ εὐεὐε von ("Be silent *κοῖναιὸ ἀνητὰ ("hold to," A. V. marg. The thee still," P. B.). text has, "Rest in").

25. ἀρῶν ἀρ ὀειρε.

ὀειρε ἀρῶν.

35. Ἰαταρ ὑαὸ ρεῖν (A. V. marg.). (36) βάιθε (A. V. text).

PSALM XXXIX.

5. υἱά ῥεαβυρ υἱά μβία ρταῖο. *(6) om.

PSALM XL.

8. After Δ Ὀε.

*(10) add ταῖμ ῥάρτα Δ υέανδῃ ("volui," Vulg.).

PSALM XLI.

7. Τιαξαιὸ Δ κοζαρι πῆ ἐεῖτε κοζηαιὸ (omitting "together against me").

PSALM XLII.

8. υρηαιξ.

(10) *ΔΣΥΡ υρηαιξίμ.

PSALM XLIV.

2. υο μυννιρ ολε υο να υάοιν- om.
ιβ.

16. ἀν ἐλιντεορὰ ΔΣΥΡ ἀν *(17) ἀν ρκαννλνῖξτέορὰ
ρκαννλνῖξέορὰ. ΔΣΥΡ ἀν αἰτιρῖξοιρ.

PSALM XLV.

5. Δ κοριουτε ναῖμθε ἀν Ριξ. *Δ μεαδον ναῖμας ἀν Ριξ.

PSALM XLVI.

5. πῆ ἡέιρῖγhe ἀμας να μαῖο- ΔΣΥΡ ρῖν ῖο πῶ ἡόε.
ne (A. V. marg.).

PSALM XLVII.

1685.

I. CΔΙΤΗΕΙΜΕ.

1712.

*ceol.

PSALM XLIX.

13. ro Δ rliže ré.

ré (r'é ed. 1861).

PSALM LIII.

3. το ní μαίετ, ní βρῦλ φορ (4) om. (prob. from homœot.).
ἀορῦνε.

PSALM LIV.

7. After run,

add α mḥiān αḥ. (In A. V.
'his desire' is in italics
 as not being in the
 Hebrew).

PSALM LXII.

3. \acute{o} $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\iota\omicron\tau\epsilon$ (perhaps a scribal error). * $\mu\iota\epsilon\iota\omicron\tau\epsilon$.

PSALM LXIII.

7. Δξυγ το ὕδατι.

(8) *uime jin so óéna mé.*

After 7 a verse is om.; but in the ed. of 1827 it reads thus: ἀτὰ μαναν ἡραμιῖτε ἀν ὁιοῖς κατ-
οοῦρὸ νο λαῖν θέαρ ρύαρ μέ ("followeth hard after thee," A. V.).

*7 Լսիցիօ մանամ օրտ, շինն-
իցե ոօ Լամ Ծեար լսար մե
("hangeth upon thee,"
P. B.).

PSALM LXIV.

2. ό όοζΔπ.

ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

6. րրօնսւո ճմած Ելցեալի,
 Երկնիւնսւո Եւսարցնած
 յիշեօլեաճօ մար ձօն ձ
 մեծօն ճճ յօսնե ձր
 Լեւ; ճչար յե քրօնե
 յճմն.

*Իրմանուցիս օժ, ճշար ռո՛-
նութ: օոցճճիս րեքբնո-
ւած է Եատորրմ րբն ճճ
ձոն ձ ոսոմնն ձ իրօմն.

PSALM LXXIV.

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| 1885. | 1712. |
| 6. <i>Init.</i> | (7) add ἀὐτῷ. |
| 8. κοιμήτιονόλ. | ῥιοναζός. |

PSALM LXXVI.

- | | |
|-----------------|-----------|
| 6. ἰομαῖτῃδαρῶ. | ἰμ ὀδαρῶ. |
|-----------------|-----------|

PSALM LXXVII.

10. ἀνοίρ τιονῖγοναυ; ἀζ ρο ἡρ ρο μο λαιζε; ἀὐτ κοιμή-
 κλαοὺλό νεαρῖλαίμε ἀν τε νεόταυ βλιαζῆα λαιμε
 ἡρ ρο ἀίρσε. (Agrees with the Vulg. Bedell's
 MS. corresponds with
 the A. V. See HERMA-
 THENA, vol. xxxi., p.
 338.)

PSALM LXXVIII.

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 14. ἀ νευλλ. | (15) ῖε νευλλ. |
| 25. ἀράν. | (26) βεαῖα. |
| 33. <i>Init.</i> ἀζυρ. | υίμε ῖιν. |
| 39. ἀνάλ. | ζαότ. |
| 43. ἀ νυάιρ ὀό. | (44) κιοννορ. |
| 53. ὀο ἐύαλαῖο. | (60) ἀν ταν ἐύαλαῖο. |

In the above six instances the English P. B. V.
 = the A. V., and is more correctly represented by the
 Irish P. B. version.

53. μολαυῖ. (A. V. marg. (54) πόραο.
 Bedell's MS. has a mar-
 ginal note on μολαυῖ:
 .i. le moltaibh pora.)

PSALM LXXX.

10. After βα,
 add μυρ. (A. V. has 'like'
 in italics.)

PSALM LXXXII.

1685.

1712.

1. Δ ζκομὸάιλ Ὁέ. (Seems Δ ζκομὸαιλ να ζκομὰςτοδᾶ.
to be taken from Dio-
dati. Some modern
scholars translate simi-
larly: the Vulg. has
'deorum.')
5. Δρ να σσορηυζαὺ (A. V. Δρ ορηυζα.
marg.).

PSALM LXXXIII.

3. υάιζνεαὶ το σσομὰιρλε. om. (i.e. from κομὰιρλε to
κομὰιρλε by homœot.).

PSALM LXXXVI.

9. Δζυρ νο θέσνηαισ το Τηιζ- om. (i.e. from the first Δζυρ
εαρνα. νο θέσνηαισ to the second;
compare the preceding
note).

PSALM LXXXVII.

4. παλερτίν. φιλιρτίν.

PSALM LXXXVIII.

5. λε νο λάιμρε (A. V. marg.). (4) ό νο λάιμρε (A. V. text).
9. βυάιθεαρτᾶ. τρισ βυάιθεαρτᾶ (A. V.).

PSALM LXXXIX.

47. ραο. (46) ζιοιρηα.

PSALM XC.

6. κλάοχλοισθ. (The Heb. ράραιθ.
verb is the same as in
5, where A. V. marg.
has "is changed," which
the Irish follows.)

PSALM XCV.

1886.

8. մար ըօ րոննեծար ձ մե-
րոծահ, ձմսւլ ր ձ Լօ
Մարթահ. (So Diodati,
treating the words as
proper names. So also
in the Order for Morn-
ing Prayer in the 1712
Prayer Book—not in
Daniell's.)

1712.

մար ձ Լձ ձն ձձձիցէ.
The copyist seems to
have had before him a
text like that of the 1861
ed., and to have omitted
ձ Լձ ձձ ուօօբրիցէ, i.e.
from ձ Լձ to ձ Լձ.

PSALM XCVI.

8. ջլօր. (A. V. marg. has ձն ջլօր ր տսւ.
“glory of his name”).

PSALM XCVII.

8. ըօ րոննեծար րոնոն ձմ.
Լսոն րոնծար.

PSALM CI.

2. տւցր մէ ձ րլից րոմլն *օ Բիօձ տւցր ձցւ: ձ
ձձ հսւր ձուգր տ րլից ձձ տսւծո.
ձցւ: րոնծոն ձ (3) ձձ հսւր ձուգր տ
րոնցրուր մօ ձրօն ձ ձցւ: րոնծոն ձն մօ
մեծոն մօ ձցէ. ձց Լէ ձրօն րոմ Լն.

PSALM CIV.

3. ձ յեօրուօն ձձձձձձձ յալձեձձ ձ յեօրուօն.
(τὰ ὑπερῶα αὐτοῦ LXX,
‘layeth the beams’ re-
presents a single word
in the Heb.).
14. ձրն.
(15) Բեձ.
15. ուօ ըօ ջհւրուցիօր ձրօն ձսր րն ուօ ջհւրուց-
ն տւն յէ րն, Բիւ ձսր րն ուօ ջհւրուց-
ն ձսւ, ձսր յարւուցիօր ձսւ ուօ Բիւ ձսր
ձսւ, ձսր ձրն յարւուցիօր ձսւ ուօ
հարն. (A. V.).

PSALM CXLVI.

1685.

I. μαλινοῦ ἐν Τίγερτι.

1712.

om.

(*Ἀλληλούια* seems to be treated by the LXX as part of the title. But so it is in the following Psalms. A similar omission at the end of cxlvii., cxlviii.)

T. K. ABBOTT.

NOTES ON THE 'ACHARNEIS.'

- 1-6. ΔΙΚ. ὅσα δὴ δέδηγμαι τὴν ἑμαντοῦ καρδίαν,
 ἦσθην δὲ βαιά, πάνυ γε βαιά,—τέτταρα·
 ἃ δ' ὠδυνήθην, ψαμμακοσιογαργαρά.
 φέρ' ἰδῶ· τί δ' ἦσθην ἄξιον χαιρηδόνος;
 ἐγὼ δ'—ἐφ' ὧ γε τὸ κέαρ ἠὺφράνθην ἰδὼν,
 τοῖς πέντε ταλάντοις οἷς Κλέων ἐξήμεσεν.

DICAEOPOLIS: "How many times have I eaten out my very heart! and pleasures have I had but few—very few—[*he counts on his fingers*]*—precisely four. But of smarts, 'sums and heaps,' as many as the sea has sands. Let me see, what delights had I 'worthy of pleasanee'?* I know—[*he claps his hands*]: ay, there was one spectacle which 'joyed my spirit'—Cleon disgorging those five talents."

1. δέδηγμαι must be used in a middle sense, as the reflexive ἑμαντοῦ shows: cp. *se ronger le cœur* (v. Herwerden, *Vindiciae*, p. 1). 2. On account of the difficulty of τέτταρα, which cannot here, after βαιά, mean 'a few' (as in *Vesp.* 260 n: *Eq.* 442: *Pax* 1150: *Ran.* 915), v. Herw. proposes ἦσθην δὲ βαιὰ πάνυ (τρί ἄττ' ἢ) τέτταρα (*Mnem.* x. p. 95); but this is a rewriting of the text: Bachmann's βαί' εἰ ταῦτ' ἄρα is excellent if καί can be omitted (cp. *Ran.* 74): van Leeuwen βαί' ἄττ' ἐνθάδ' εἰ καὶ ταῦτ' ἄρα, which, if written in minuscules, is not so unlike the *ductus*, as it might seem at first sight. It is possible that τέτταρα is quite right, since it may be borrowed from the Euripidean original which Aristophanes seems to be parodying throughout the whole play.

The monologue of Dicaeopolis (1-43) may be a parody of a scene at the beginning of the *Telephus*, in which the hero recites his sufferings to the public, analysing them with that frosty precision which is so noticeable in some of Euripides' plays. Aristophanes may be here ridiculing the poet's 'arithmétique des plaisirs et des peines' (cp. Mazon, *Comp. d. com. d'Ar.*, p. 15). 5. γε: acc. to Blaydes *inepta*: but, perhaps, a punctuation mark should be placed after ἐγῶδα, so that γε would mark an ellipse of the main verb: 'I have it—it was a thing at which,' &c. (cp. *Vesp.* 88 n).

5. πέντε ταλάντοις: for the division of the anapaest, cp. Bernhardt, *de incis. anap.* p. 258, *Vesp.* p. xxxvii. (b): the numeral is so closely connected with the subst. that the incision is not more noticeable than in *Nub.* 774 ὅτι πεντετάλαντος διαγέγραπται μοι δίκη.

τοῖς πέντε ταλάντοις: 1. ἀπλήστως ἀλλότρια καταφαγὼν, ἐξήμεσεν αὐτά: R. // ἀντὶ τοῦ κλέψας καὶ καταπιὼν ἀπέδωκεν. ἐξημιώθη γὰρ ὁ Κλέων πέντε τέλαντα διὰ τὸ ὑβρίζειν τοὺς ἱππεάς. 2. παρὰ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἔλαβεν τέλαντα ὁ Κλέων, ἵνα πείσῃ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κουφίσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς εἰσφορᾶς· αἰσθόμενοι δὲ οἱ ἱππεῖς ἀντέλεγον καὶ ἀπήτησαν αὐτόν: R. // μέμνηται Θεόπομπος. Such are the inconsistent scholia on this passage, which has not yet been elucidated so as to silence all dispute. The most satisfactory explanation is that of Lübke, which, however, receives no support from the scholia. According to this scholar, the connexion is as follows:—Dicaeopolis mentions four incidents which excited his feelings—pleasurable or painful: (1) Chæris' performance; (2) Dexitheus' music; (3) Theognis' appearance with a tragedy (τραγωδικόν). As these joys and sorrows are excited by incidents on the stage, it follows that the fourth must have had the same source. 'My supreme joy was when I saw (ιδὼν) Cleon disgorging five talents.' The scene referred to was probably in the *Babyloniæ*, in

which the poet may have represented the demagogue as begging five talents from the allies as a bribe to lighten their tribute, and being compelled by the Knights to disgorge them. It appears from schol. *Ach.* 378 that Cleon was principally attacked in this play, and that he showed his resentment against the poet by prosecuting him before the Senate (cp. Anon. *de Arist. Vita* δεύτερον δὲ καὶ τρίτον συκοφαντηθεὶς ἀπέφυγεν).

Van Leeuwen accepts this explanation, and quotes Gregor. Cor. *Rhet. Graec.* vii. 1345 W., who seems to have understood the passage in the same sense: viz.: χαίρειν οὖν ἔφη ὅτι ὁ Κλέων εἰσέχθη ἀπαιτούμενος <τὰ> παρὰ τῶν νησιωτῶν (Codd. στρατιωτῶν) πέντε τάλαντα, where εἰσέχθη is significant, as it means 'was produced on the stage.' A parallel expression is found in 302, where the Coryphaeus says he will cut Cleon into 'shoe-leathers,' not in actual life, but in the theatre—viz., in the play subsequently called the *Knights*. The mention of Theopompus, apparently in support of the second explanation of the scholiast, may be held to create a difficulty; but it is not certain that originally it was attached to this note. Rutherford holds that the reference is to the 10th or 11th Bk. of the *Philippica* of Theopompus [see Schol. v. *Eq.* 226 Θεόπομπος ἐν δεκάτῳ Φιλιππικῶν φησὶν ὅτι οἱ ἱππεῖς ἐμίσουν αὐτὸν. προπηλακισθεὶς γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ παροξυνθεὶς ἐπετέθη τῇ πολιτείᾳ ('became a minister,' viz., a senator in 427 B.C.) καὶ διετέλεσεν εἰς αὐτοὺς κακὰ μηχανώμενος. κατηγορήσῃ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὡς λειποστρατούντων]. On the other hand, Müller-Strübing and Gilbert place μεμν. Θεοπ. after δια τὸ ὑβρίζ. τοὺς ἰ.: Theopompus may have known of many private quarrels between Cleon and the Knights, as may be inferred from Schol. *Eq.* 226 (quoted above).

Having given what I consider to be the most satisfactory explanation of this obscure allusion, I will now set down the views of other writers, whose theories I arrange in the order

of their probability : (1) Gilbert bases his explanation on the quotation in Schol. *Eq.* 1.c. from the *Philippica* of Theopompus (*F. H. G.* ii. 294, *Fr.* 100, Müller). Cleon, as senator, may have accused the Knights of *λειποσπαρία*, in not vigorously attacking the light-armed Peloponnesian troops in 427 B.C., during the severe invasion of that year. Cleon may have proposed to the senate that the *κατάστασις* ('support of a citizen-soldier') of five talents should not be granted to them (for a similar case, cp. *Lys.* xvi. 6 : *Xen. Hipp.* 1. 19). The proposal may have taken the form of a *προβούλευμα*, which, however, was rejected by the Senate (Gilbert), or the Assembly (Beloch). Hence Cleon—very unnaturally, I must say—is said 'to disgorge five talents.' For the activity or inactivity of the Knights during the invasions, cp. *Thuc.* ii. 19. 22. iii. 1 : vii. 27 ; *Xen. Hipp.* 7. 4. For the calamitous invasion of 427 B.C., cp. *Thuc.* iii. 26 : *Diod. Sic.* xii. 55.

From this circumstance, according to Gilbert, Cleon is called *ταραξιππόστρατος* *Eq.* 247.

If Gilbert's theory is correct, the Schol. on *Arist.* is an *autoschediasma*, inferred from the passage in the text, taken in conjunction with a recollection of the numerous passages in *Aristoph.* which refer to bribery by the allied states (e.g. *Vesp.* 669, *Pax.* 644). (2) Previously to Lübke and Gilbert, the statements in the scholia were accepted without question : all commentators (Müller, Ribbeck, Boeckh, C. F. Hermann, Ranke, Wachsmuth, Meier, Droysen, Merry) were agreed that Cleon had been accused of *δωροδοκία*, and condemned, at the instance of the Knights, although it is difficult to understand what rôle they played in such a trial. Again : *Aristoph.* says nothing of a trial, either here, or in the *Parabasis* of the *Equites*, or in the *Nubes* ; nor is it easy to see how Cleon could have been chosen as a general against Sphacteria if he had been found guilty of an offence for which the penalty was death (Meier ü.

Schöm. *Att. Proc.* p. 352), the forfeiture of twice the value of the property taken, or exile with ἀριπύλα. Ribbeck thinks the Knights were the accusers; Ranke (*Vita A.*, p. 355) that they were judges! But C. F. Hermann proves that the Knights, as a corps, could appear neither in the one capacity nor in the other, but thinks that they were rich people who could get what they wanted done in the Assembly, 'etiam nullo iure legitimo adiuti': but Müller-Strübing pertinently says, "How could they be so powerful when the voting was secret?" "If the Knights had such influence, Cleon would have been overwhelmed, and the comedy of the *Knights* would never have been written." (3) Müller-Strübing's own theory is that Cleon, shortly before the *Acharneis*, had proposed the lightening of the tribute in the case of some of the islands, but that the proposal fell through on account of the opposition of the Knights. But this would be to reverse the rôles of the aristocratic and democratic parties at Athens, as it is well known that it was a principle of the Athenian democracy to increase the burdens of the allies (Gilbert, l.c., p. 139). Müller-Strübing is certainly wrong in suggesting that ἐξήμεσεν means 'replaced in the budget,' with an insinuation that a portion of the five talents passed into Cleon's pocket; such an interpretation is based on the erroneous view that Cleon was, at this time, προστάτης τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου, a post-Euclidean office (cp. *Vesp.* 242 n).

In itself, there is nothing strange in the charge of bribery against a demagogue, as such accusations are regularly bandied about in a society such as existed at Athens during the war: cp. *Eq.* 438 seq., where Cleon is accused of receiving ten talents from Potidaea. Such accusations were not taken seriously, and did not affect his popularity, as Thucydides spoke of him, in 427 B.C., as being 'by far the most influential Athenian in the popular assembly' (iii. 36). Indeed, it is significant that they

emanated from the aristocratic Knights, who were reported to be oligarchs, Laconizers, the enemies of the people, 'the nursery of the thirty tyrants' (Curtius). The demagogues had really a reputation for purity in such matters: cp. Lys. xix., pp. 47 sqq.

It may be said, in conclusion, that if Lübke's explanation, which I have accepted, is correct, Theopompus may be accused of basing an historical statement of fact upon a line in a comedy not referring to a fact, but to a familiar scene in a recent play. It may be replied that it is not certain that *μεμν. Θεοπ.* alludes to anything in the present note: and, even if it does, Theopompus has been known to make similar blunders. Cobet (*Obs. Crit.*, pp. 87 sqq.) thinks that a similar literary reference was transformed into an historical fact, in the case of *Pax* 700, but his interpretation of that passage, though ingenious, is hardly sustainable. [On this line, see Gilbert, *Beiträge*, p. 134: Beloch, *Att. Pol. s. Pericles*, pp. 33-4: Müller-Strübing, *Hist. Krit.*, pp. 119 sqq., 132: Meyer, *de Ar. fab. commissionibus*, p. 20: Lübke, *Obser. Crit.*, p. 17.]

13-4: ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἦσθην, ἡνίκ' "ἐπὶ μόσχῳ ποτὲ"
Δεξιθέος εἰσῆλθ' ᾧσόμενος Βοιώτιον.

"But I had a second treat when Dexitheus came on to troll the Gothic catch 'riding a calf one day.'" There is no doubt a play between *μόσχος* and *Βο—ιώτιον*, which I have translated with the help of a jest of Touchstone's (Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, III. iii. 10). The difficulty in this passage is as to the meaning of 'the calf.' If he was a person—a poet or musician—the preposition *ἐπὶ*, in the sense of 'after,' is unexampled in Aristoph. (but cp. Eur. *Or.* 878: Sobolewski, *Praep.*, p. 159: Michael, *d. Praep. ἐπὶ b. Aristoph.*, pp. 25, 30: Vogelreuter, *Praep.*, p. 15: Iltz., *Praep.*, p. 22). The scholiasts were divided as to the meaning of the line:

viz., (1) ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὸν Μόσχον· ἦν δὲ οὗτος φαῦλος κιθαρῳδός, πολλὰ ἀπνευστὶ ᾄδων. (2) ὁ Μ. κιθαρῳδὸς Ἀκραγαντῖνος. (3) τινὲς οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ νικήσας ἄθλον ἐλάβανε. (3) seems to be an *autoschediasma* of Didymus (as is shown by the use of οὕτως, cp. *Vesp.*, p. lxii); but it received the emphatic support of Bentley: there is, however, no discoverable evidence of such a prize (cp. Mommsen, *Heortol.*, pp. 139 sqq.).

The arguments in favour of (1) and (2) are as follows:—
 (a) the schol. could not have invented the failings of this musician, which are not an inference from the text (Rutherford, however, thinks πολλ' ἀπ. ᾄδ. may be a note on Chaeris.): nor could he have improvised the place of his birth: (b) the proverb Μ. ᾄδων Βοιώτιον was current (Apost. ii. 74) [but this may have been derived from the present passage; Aristophanes was a fruitful source of proverbs]. (c) This explanation suits the context. As Dic. had been irritated at a bad poet's being substituted for Aeschylus, so now he was delighted when an excellent musician succeeded Moschus. (d) Professor Smyly has supplied me with a passage from an unpublished papyrus, found in a mummy-case belonging to the reign of Epiphanes, in which the name occurs, viz. (Col. II.)
 Ἀμνυαν | Σικνω[νιος οὗτος ἐποίησε] τραγωιδίας εἰκοσιν [
 Μοσχὸς Λαμψακηνὸς οὐ[τος ἐποίησε] τραγωιδίας τριακοντ[α].
 But it seems to me that this must have been a different person: he was a tragic poet, and not a musician, as the context requires: and he came from Lampsacus, and not from Acragas, as the schol. says. Such are the arguments for the traditional explanation, which cannot be disproved. But I strongly suspect that in ἐπὶ μόσχῳ ποτὲ (which may have been originally ἐπὶ μόσχῳ ποκά) we have the opening words of a ballad which was known, as ballads often were, by its beginning: cp. 863 τοῖς ὀστίνοις φυσιῇτε τὸν πρωκτὸν κυνός, "squeak on the bones, 'the dog's catastrophe'":

1093 ὀρχηστρίδες δ' αἱ "φίλταθ' Ἀρμόδι' οὐ," καλαί, "fair dancing girls who are dogs at the 'dearest Harmodius' catch.": *Eg.* 406: *Nub.* 967. Schneider ingeniously suggested that Dexitheus may have said ἐπὶ Μόσχῳ ἐσέρχομαι | ἄσόμενος Βοιώτιον, which the audience may have maliciously interpreted as ἐπὶ μόσχῳ (*vitulo insidens*) ἐσ., cp. Hegelochus' blunder γαλῆν ὀρῶ (*Ran.* 304).

21-6. οἱ δ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ λαλοῦσι κᾶν καὶ κάτω
τὸ σχοινίον φεύγουσι τὸ μεμιλτωμένον'
οὐδ' οἱ Πρυτάνεις ἤκουσιν· ἀλλ' ἄωριαν 23
ἤκοντες, εἴθ' ὥδ' ὥστιοῦνται πῶς δοκεῖς
ἔλκοντες ἀλλήλους περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ξύλον
ἄθροι κατάρρεοντες.

"But they are chattering in the market-place, and up and down they scamper from the ruddled rope. Even the Presidents are not here, but all too late they will arrive: you can't imagine how they will tug and scramble hither, when they come, in the region of the front seat—streaming down *en masse*."

23: ἤκουσιν: Vollgraf πάρεισιν (with ἤξουσιν in 24): Ribbeck places a full stop after ἤκουσιν, so that 'the Athenians' may be the subject of ὥστ.

24: ἤκοντες: Haupt, ἤξουσιν: R. J. Wagner, εὔδουσιν: Bachmann, ἐλθόντες εἴθ' οἶδε (οἶδε from Su.) . . . taking ἐλθ. as a *nomin. pendens* (cp. *Conj.* p. 5), and οἶδε as meaning 'the Athenians': but this constr. is quite inconceivable, and οἶδε cannot refer to persons who are not yet in sight.

εἴτα δέ Codd.: εἴθ' οἶδε Su.: elsewhere Aristoph. does not use εἴτα δέ after a particip., except when another particip. follows (as in *Eg.* 377: cp. *Vesp.* 49. n).

ὥστιοῦνται: Dobree διωστιοῦνται; but this compound is not found; and it produces an illicit division of the anap. (cp. *Vesp.*, p. xxxviii).

25. ἐλθόντες: Bachmann ἔλκοντες ἀλλήλους, which is probable; ἐλθόντες is certainly corrupt.

πρώτου ξύλου: codd.: τοῦ πρ. ξ. Su.: the article cannot be omitted, as it is by all codd.; and it is given by Suidas 2798 C: again, the gen. is questionable, as it would mean 'for the front seat'; and it is improbable that there was any struggle among the Presidents for the προεδρία, since reserved seats were provided for them; and the rest of the audience sat *accroupi*, on the ground. That the acc. is more natural is shown by Telecl. i., p. 210 K (ii., p. 362 M) τῶν . . . πλακούντων ὥστιζομένων περὶ τὴν γνάθον ἦν ἀλαλητός. Such are the views of scholars upon this difficult passage, which R. J. Wagner (*Rhein. Mus.* 1905, p. 448) calls *conclamatus et fere desperatus*. But it seems to me that the remedy is easy and almost certain. The crucial fact is that, although all the codd. give εἴτα δὲ in 24, Suidas (whose authority is equal to that of the consensus of all the codd.) gives εἰθ' οἶδε: οἶδε cannot be right; but it leads to the original reading, which, as I believe, was ὧδε, 'hither,' a common Aristophanic meaning of the word (cp. 1063, &c.). In R, α and ω are frequently indistinguishable (e.g. 957 R reads ἄγαν for ἄγων): Suidas's οἶδε is due to a substitution of long for short o, as was constantly done in pronunciation, esp. in modern Greek (cp. *Vesp.*, p. liv, iii), and *iota* to the constant blunder of ὦιδε for ὧδε. In R *iota* is often wrongly inserted, e.g. 2 ἥισθην.

68-76 ΠΡ. καὶ δῆτ' ἐτρυχόμεσθα διὰ Καῦστρίων
 πεδίων ὁδοιπλανοῦντες ἐσκηνημένοι,
 ἐφ' ἄρμαξων μαλθακῶς κατακείμενοι,
 ἀπολλύμενοι. ΔΙΚ. σφόδρα γὰρ ἐσφζόμεν ἐγὼ 71
 παρὰ τὴν ἔπαλξιν ἐν φορυτῷ κατακείμενος.
 ΠΡ. ξενιζόμενοι δὲ πρὸς βίαν ἐπίνομεν
 ἐξ ὑαλίνων ἐκπωμάτων καὶ χρυσίδων
 ἄκρατον οἶνον ἡδύν. ΔΙΚ. ὦ Κραναὰ πόλις,
 ἄρ' αἰσθάνῃ τὸν κατάγελων τῶν πρίσβειων;

AMB. [*in a slow and weary voice, dropping his words one by one*]. 'And, indeed, *entre nous* [cp. *Vesp.*, 11 n], we

underwent much teen, as we sauntered through Caÿstrian plains,—under canopies—reclining softly in litters—dying by inches. DIC. [*aside*] And I—God save the mark—kept hale and hearty by the ramparts, reclining in—litter. AMB. [*continuing*] Then, at our receptions, we were simply forced to drink, from cups of crystal and gold, sweet untempered wine. DIC. [*aside*]. O city of Thé—seus! are you blind to the mockery of these envoys?'

68. *παρὰ τῶν* R. (perhaps from 72): *διὰ τῶν* ABΓMΘ: *Κασπίων* C. The article, which is often wrongly inserted in MSS. (cp. Ijzeren, *de Vitiis etc.*, p. 49), must be omitted: the plur. *πεδίων* is used generically (cp. 603, 605, 1071: Catull. xlv. 22 *Syriae Britanniaeque*).

71. *γὰρ*: altered by Mehler (and most edd.) to *τᾶρ*'; but *τοί* has no meaning here: and *γάρ* is ironical, cp. S. *El.* 393 *καλὸς γὰρ οὐμὸς βίोटος ὥστε θαυμάσαι*.

72. *φορυντῶ*: it has not been observed that there is a jest here, viz., a reference to *φέρω* (cp. Eur. *Bacch.* 966 *φερόμενος ἤξεις*, 'in a litter'); thus there is a humorous allusion to the *ἀρμάμαξαι* of the ambassador.

75. *Κραναά*: the jest here has been missed by all scholars: e.g. an editor translates 'O city stern and wild.' But *Κραναὰ πόλις* certainly means 'O city of water-drinkers,' where wine was unprocurable on account of the destruction of the vines. According to Greek ideas, *κρήνη* was derived from *κεράννυμι*: hence Dic. jestingly uses the tragic word *κραναός* in a sense which was not tragic, with reference to its etymology (for such jests, cp. *Vesp.* 588 n), which some modern scholars also connect with *κρήνη* (Paris, *Elat.*, p. 86). Probably *κρ.* was really connected with *✓καρ*, 'a head' (cp. *Acria*, *Acrisia*, *Crisa*), and thus became an epithet of Athena, whose rock was called *Κρανααί* from her (cp. Gruppe, *Gr. Mythol.*, page 1195. n. 8).

- 94-108. KHP. ὁ βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός. ΔΙΚ. ὄναξ Ἡράκλεις·
 πρὸς τῶν θεῶν; ἄνθρωπε, ναύφρακτον βλέπεις·
 ἢ περὶ ἄκραν κάμπτων νεώσοικον σκοπεῖς;
 ἄσκωμ' ἔχεις που περὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν κάτω.
 ΠΡ. ἄγε δὴ σύ, βασιλεὺς ἅττα σ' ἀπέπεμψεν φράσον
 λέξοντ' Ἀθηναίοισιν, ὦ Ψευδαρτάβα.
 ΨΕΥ. ἱαρταμὰν ἐξαρξα ναπισσόναι σάτρα. 100
 ΠΡ. ξυνήκας ὁ λέγει; ΔΙΚ. μὰ τὸν Ἀπολλῶ, γὰρ μὲν οὐ.
 ΠΡ. πέμψειν βασιλέα φησὶν ὑμῖν χρυσίον·
 λέγε δὴ σὺ μείζον καὶ σαφῶς τὸ χρυσίον.
 ΨΕΥ. οὐ λῆψι χρῦσο, χαυνόπρωκτ' Ἰαοναῦ.
 ΔΙΚ. οἴμοι· κακοδαίμων, ὡς σαφῶς. ΠΡ. τί δαὶ λέγει;
 ΔΙΚ. ὁ τι; χαυνοπρώκτους τοὺς Ἰάονας λέγει,
 εἰ προσδοκῶσι χρυσίον ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων.
 ΠΡ. οὐκ ἄλλ' ἀχάνας ὅδε γε χρυσίου λέγει. 108

HERACLES [*in a loud voice*]. 'The King's eye! [*A man in Persian attire is introduced. He wears an enormous eye, like that of the Cyclops, in the centre of his face, and a long black flap beneath it.*] DICAEOPOUS [*with a scream*]: O merciful Heracles! in the name of the gods? [*Recovering himself, and, tragically, in a confidential voice.*] Sir, thou show'st a noble vessel. Are you rounding a point, and on the look-out for a dock-yard? I suppose that is an oar-flap about your eye. AMB. [*to Shamartabas, in a threatening tone*] Come, now, Shamartabas, announce what the Sophy despatched you to tell to the Athenians.

SHAM. [*haltingly, as if repeating a lesson*]. 'Iartaman—exarxa—napissonai—satra. AMB. [*to the Chairman*]. Do you grasp his meaning? DIC. [*interrupting*]. I'faith, not I. AMB. He says the king will send you gold. [*In a thrilling aside to Shamartabas.*] Speak louder, and clearly, about—the gold. SHAM. [*Desperately dropping into undeniably vulgar Greek, but endeavouring to maintain unintelligibility by means of a foreign accent*]. You get no moe gold, vain rump-fed, Bez-ianion fool. DIC. Zounds! that's distinct enough.

AMB. What does he say? DIC. What! He calls the Ionians 'vain fools' if they expect 'gold' from the orientals. AMB. Not so! he's telling you of wains full of gold moys."

95. This line has been much 'solicited.' V. Herwerden (*Mnem.* xxx., p. 36) proposes ναῦς "Ἀρκτον βλέπεις, which should be εἰς "Α.: in *Vind.*, p. 3, he proposes ναῦς "Ἀρκτον <σύγε> *ceu navis in alto sidera servas*, but γε is surplusage: van Leeuwen τί πρ. θεῶν . . . ν. βλέπεις; v. Wilamowitz (*Hermes*, xiv., pp. 183-5) rejects 95-7 altogether.

The real difficulty is in πρὸς θεῶν, which is used only in a question, or in a request: hence there must be an interrogation here. Most commentators apply it to the whole line: but it would be impossible to say "have you an embattled look?" as the speaker could judge this for himself. My suggestion is that the interrogation is confined to πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, and was conveyed by the tone of the voice, as in *Lys.* 852, KIN. ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν; 'Mon Dieu (you don't say so?). For the nautical comparison, cp. Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, iv. iv. 67 (Aufidius to Coriolanus) 'Though thy tackle's torn, Thou show'st a noble vessel.'

100: According to van Leeuwen, *Verba vere Persica inde efficere inque integram sententiam coniungere velle, id cum ratione insanire est profecto*: and there is no doubt that, on an English or a French stage, an author would not take the trouble to make a Persian speak real Persian. Thus, in *All's Well*, iv. i. 70, the soldiers who waylaid Parolles, 'spoke what terrible language they willed, though they understood it not themselves'; and in *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme* (iv. 4) the following does duty for Turkish:—*Ambonsahim oqui boraf, Iordina salamalequi.* On the other hand, neither Shakespeare nor any other English dramatist of his time would have ventured to put gibberish into the mouth of a Frenchman: and Persian was as

familiar to the Athenians at this time as French was to Englishmen in the time of Elizabeth. Iphicrates found it necessary to produce real Persian speakers when he practised the trick—borrowed from Aristophanes—upon his soldiers, which is narrated in Polyænus, iii. 9, § 59. It is quite natural that the Persian, who was really a disguised Athenian, should have broken down in l. 104, when he had to face a situation which he had not rehearsed. Elsewhere (*Av.* 1678 sq.: *Thesm.* 1082 sq.), in the case of barbarians, Aristophanes supplies them with vulgar, ungrammatical Greek, which is quite intelligible, and indeed probably differed little from the dialect heard in the streets (even at the present day) in the mouths of slaves and uneducated people, but nowhere with mere gibberish such as the commentators believe the present line to be. The line is really good old Persian, which, after the manner of the cuneiform inscriptions, would appear as follows:—*Hy. Artman. khyarsa. nipistniy. khstr*: as transliterated by Aristophanes, as follows:—*Hy Artaman Xarxa nipistanai satra*: the further changes are mainly for the sake of euphony as understood by the Greeks, e.g., H, the strong aspirate, was dropped as unfamiliar: ε was inserted before ξ, as Theopompus wrote ξξαρπάπην for σατράρην: *va* for *vi* follows the analogy of similar barbaric words, e.g., *vaβαισαρπεῦ* *Av.* 1615: *σσ* for *st* may be due to the analogy of the many Greek words which end in -σόναι. The sentence is an indirect interrog., with an interrog. particle, such as was much affected in Old Persian: it may be translated 'Lui, le magnifique Xerxès écrire à votre gouvernement?' *Hy* = *hic*: *Art* = 'high-thinking.' As Artaxerxes would not fit the line, Aristoph., or his Persian friend, showed his familiarity with the language by dividing the word into its elements, viz., 'the magnificent Xerxes': the name really means *grand monarque* (Herod. vi. 98 translates it by μέγας ἀρχός).

Nipistniy = 'to write': *khstr* = 'government.' Such is the analysis of L. Chodzkicwicz, *Un Vers d'Aristophane*, a work published in 1876, but neglected by all editors.

As to 'moys' in my translation of 108, I am indebted to Shakespeare, *Henry V*, IV. iv. 14 sq. "FR. SOLDIER. O, prenez miséricorde! ayez pitié de moi! PIST. Moy shall not serve; I will have forty moys. FR. SOLD. O pardonnez moi! PIST. Sayst thou me so? is that a ton of moys?"—*moy* being Latin *modius*.

146 sq. ὁ δ' υἱὸς δὲν Ἀθηναίων ἐπεποιήμεθα
ἦρα φαγεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐξ Ἀπατουρίων.

'His son—lately honoured with the freedom of our town—had a passion to eat some sausages from the Gossips' feast.' It has not been generally observed that there is a jest in Ἀπατ. on ἀπάτη, from which the schol. here derives the name of the festival. The insinuation is that Sitalces was deceiving the Athenians, as indeed he was. I have attempted to convey the idea of 'goose' in 'Gossips' feast,' for which cp. Shakespeare, *Comedy of Errors*, v. 405.

150. ὅσον τὸ χρῆμα παρνόπων προσέρχεται.

'What a power of Loc—usts is coming!': a surprise for Locrians. Blaydes reads εἰσέρχεται τῶν παρνόπων on the quite correct ground that the article is necessary to this idiom; but his line is a bad one, and he has not noticed that the article is omitted because πάρνοπες is a surprise for the name of some tribe; with names of peoples, the article is regularly omitted (cp. 156: *Vesp.* 800 n).

196-8.

ΔΙΚ. ὦ Διονύσια

αὐται μὲν ὄζουσ' ἀμβροσίας καὶ νέκταρος,
καὶ μὴ 'πιτηρεῖν "σίτι' ἡμερῶν τριῶν"
κὰν τῷ στόματι λέγουσι. "Βαῖν' ὅπη' θέλεις."

DIC. [*tasting the flagon, in an ecstasy*]. "O feast of Dionysus! This sample breathes ambrosia and nectar, and never-looking-out-for-the-order 'three days' rations': the taste is on my palate, and—cries aloud, 'go where thou wouldst.'"

197-8. This passage has been much 'solicited,' but without reason: Reisig transposes the lines; but the order in the codd. is more humorous, as ἐπιτ. is a surprise: Burges ἐπιτήρει: Berk μὴ 'παγείρειν: van Leeuwen κοὺ μὴ 'πιταχθῆς: van Herwerden μηκέτ' αἵρου (*portanda suscipe*): all these alterations only corrupt the text, which is difficult solely on account of the absence of inverted commas in Greek codd. ἐπιτηρεῖν cannot mean 'to provide,' as most edd. think: nor (as Schoeman holds) 'to keep an eye on the rations' (so that they may not fail). Its invariable signification is shown in the following parallels:—ἐπ. νύκτα (Hom. *Dem.* 245), βορέαν (*Ach.* 922), τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπιόντας (Thuc. v. 37. 2): τὸ βλάβος (*Ran.* 1151), Eubul. ii., p. 192 K; (iii., p. 245 M) ἐνταῦθ' ἐπετήρουν τὴν τροφὴν τῆς παρθένου | κερύσαι κελεύσας τὴν καπηλὸν μοι χοῶ | ὀβολοῦ.

347 sq. ἐμέλλετ' ἄρ' ἅπαντες ἀνασεύειν—βοήν,
ὀλίγου τ' ἀπέθανον ἄνθρακες αἱ Παρήγησσοι.

DIC. [*to the chorus, triumphantly*]. 'I thought you'd all shake—a cry: and the coals of Parnes have almost tasted of death.'

347. βοῆς R: βοῆς cett.: Dobree's em., ἄρα πάντως ἀνήσειν τῆς βοῆς, has been accepted by most recent editors: indeed

Cobet (*NL.*, p. 240) calls the text *plane sensu vacuum et absurdum*: and van Leeuwen (*Proleg. ad Aristoph.*, p. 344) thinks Dobree's suggestion *unice comico dignum*. And yet with this emendation, 348 has no connexion with 347, whether *τε* or *γε* is read; and, furthermore, it seems to me to abolish a characteristic piece of Aristophanic humour. *βοήν* is not a surprise for *χείρας* (viz., 'to throw up your—cries for quarter,' cp. Thuc. iv. 37. 2), since this rendering would require *τὴν βοήν* or *τὰς βοάς*, but for *λίθους*. *ἀνασείειν* is an obvious allusion to *σειόμενον*, *ἐκσείσεται*, and *σειστός*, which immediately precede. *ἀνασείειν βοήν* may also imply 'to menace with a shout': cp. Dem. 784. 22 *τὴν κατὰ Δημοκλέους εἰσαγγελίαν ἀνασείσας ποῖ ἔτρεψεν*; 'what became of the accusation which he brandished?' In *ἀνα-* there may be a reference to *ἀναβοᾶν*. The schol. is very far-to-see on this passage, viz., *ἡθικώτατα* ('most expressively') *καὶ ἥδιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἐν λάρκῳ ἄνθρακας διαλέγεται, λέγων ὅτι ἐμέλλετε μετὰ βοῆς ἀνασείειν [ὡς τῆς τοῦ λάρκον ῥήξεως μετὰ βοῆς μελλούσης γίγνεσθαι]*. The last words are quite unintelligible: Rutherford (*A Chapter*, etc., p. 149) accepts the schol.'s rendering, viz., 'and were you all prepared to move them with your cry' (he reads *τῆς βοῆς*): his reading is open to the objection that it is unmetrical (viz., *πάντες ἀνασείειν τῆς β.*), and, if the Acharnians are the subj. of *ἐμ.*, it is difficult to understand who were to be moved by the cries: if the 'coals of Parnes' are the subj., how can they be represented as crying? Furthermore, the gen. *τῆς βοῆς*, 'with your cry,' is a construction not hitherto recognized in Greek.

348. It is necessary to accept v. Herw.'s alterations for *ἄνθρακες Παρνησσιοί*. I now see that the reading of the codd. has been well defended by Willems (*Bulletin d. Acad. roy. d. Belg.*, 1903, p. 623). Even eighty years ago the correct sense was suggested by Fritzsche, *Jahn*,

Annal. 1829, p. 29, 'Ihr solltet alle (aus euern Mänteln Geschrei aufschütteln?'

377-382. ΔΙΚ. αὐτός τ' ἐμαυτὸν ὑπὸ Κλέωνος ἄπαθον
ἐπίσταμαι διὰ τὴν πέρνσι κωμῳδίαν.
εἰσελκύσας γάρ μ' εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον
διέβαλλε καὶ ψευδῇ κατεγλώττιζε μου
κάκυκλόβορει κάπλυνεν, ὥστε ὀλίγου πάνυ
ἀπωλόμην μολυνοπραγμονούμενος.

DIC. "Take my own case: I know how I was served by Cleon for last year's comedy. He haled me into the Senate house, and slandered me, and bethumped me with lies: and roared like a torrent 'peering o'er his bounds': and slanged me; so that I nearly lost my life in swinish snuffs and packings."

377. Schol. ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου τοῦ ποιητοῦ ὁ λόγος, showing that, in his opinion at any rate, it is Aristophanes, and not Callistratus, who speaks. It is very remarkable that the actor of the chief part should thus speak as the mouthpiece of the poet, in the manner elsewhere observed for the Coryphaeus in the Parabasis. This departure from usage is due to the fact that the *Acharneis* is a *pièce justificative*: and, in my opinion, it also gives colour to the suspicion that the actor of the part of Dicaeopolis was the poet himself, 'the just citizen,' who, in writing his attack upon the Athenian executive, was influenced solely by patriotic motives.

378. τὴν πέρνσι κωμῳδίαν: Schol. R here is unusually important: τοὺς Βαβυλωνίους λέγει· τούτους γὰρ πρὸ τῶν Ἀχαρνέων Ἀριστοφάνης ἐδίδαξεν· ἐν οἷς πολλοὺς κακῶς εἶπεν. ἐκωμώδησεν γὰρ τὰς τε κληρωτὰς καὶ χειροτονητὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ Κλέωνα, παρόντων τῶν ξένων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὀργισθεὶς ὁ Κλέων ἐγράψατο αὐτὸν ἀδικίας εἰς τοὺς πολίτας ὡς εἰς ὕβριν τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ταῦτα πεποιηκότα· καὶ ξενίας δὲ αὐτὸν ἐγράψατο καὶ εἰς ἀγῶνα ἐνέβαλεν. It cannot be inferred either from

this passage or from [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* II. i. 8 that there was at this time any *law* restricting the freedom of comic poets, and Schol. R seems to err in mentioning a *γραφὴ ἀδικίας* (Rutherford reads *ἀδικίου*, but this means 'maladministration': cp. Gilbert, *Const. Ant.*, p. 226; <Arist.> *Ath. Pol.* 53, § 10).

The procedure against the poet was probably by means of an *εἰσαγγελία* to the Senate, for an *ἄγραφον ἀδίκημα*, viz.: *lèse majesté*, in the presence of strangers. Aristophanes seems to have escaped from this charge—perhaps with a small fine.

But his troubles with Cleon were not over: a *γραφὴ ξενίας* was brought against him: it is not stated when, and the most probable view is that it was subsequently to the *Equites* (cp. *Vesp.* 1284 n). The justification for this charge is unknown: *Vita* (xii Bergk) assigns him a father (Philippus), a deme (Cydathenaion), and a tribe (Pandionis). These cannot have been invented by the scholiasts; and the charge, which was a common one at Athens, may have been that his father was not a true-born Athenian. There is evidence that the family came from Aegina (cp. lines 653 sqq.), where the name was not unknown in earlier times. On the question of his *ξενία*, see Römer, *Arist. Stud.* i., p. 132. The long-standing controversy as to whether Aristophanes or Callistratus was the object of Cleon's attack has at length been decided by the article of E. Capps (*Am. J. Phil.* xxviii. 2, pp. 190 sqq.), who has demonstrated that, even in the days of the old comedy, the name of the real author, as well as that of the *ὑποδιδάσκαλος*, appeared in the *Didascaliae*. In the case of the *Babylonii*, the formula would have been *Ἀριστοφάνης ἐδίδασκε διὰ Καλλιστράτου*: in the *Fasti*, the name of the *ὑποδιδάσκαλος* would have been omitted (see *ib.*, p. 182). This view has always been recommended to me by common sense, as Callistratus

was a man of straw—a wretched poetaster; and it seems incredible that the identity of the author of the *Babyloni* and the *Daitaleis* could have been long concealed in such a small society. But the commentators, both ancient and modern, have been much divided on the question. (1) The following contend that Aristophanes was attacked by Cleon:—Fritzsche, *Qu. Ar.* i., pp. 301 sqq.: Bergk, ap. Mein. *Fr. Com.* ii., pp. 932 sqq.: A. Müller, Praef. to his ed., p. xiii: W. Ribbeck, ed. *Acharn.*, p. 216: Cobet, *Obs. Crit.*, p. 107. (2) The following think that Callistratus was the defendant:—C. F. Hermann, *Progr.* Marburg, 1835, p. v: E. Petersen, *Fleck. Ann.* lxxxv, p. 655: Müller-Strübing, *Hist. Krit.*, pp. 603 sqq.: E. Meyer, *de Ar. Fab. commiss.*, p. 31: Leo, *Qu. Ar.*, p. 27: Briel, *de Philon.*, pp. 22 sqq.: the latest and ablest advocate of this view is Römer, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 sqq. (3) The following contend that both Aristophanes and Callistratus were successively attacked:—Kock, *de Philon.*: H. Schrader, *Phil.* xxxvi, pp. 385 sqq.: Gunning, *de Babyl.*, pp. 75 sqq.

410-13. ΔΙΚ. Εὐριπίδη. ΕΥΡ. τί λέλακας; ΔΙΚ. ἀναβάδην ποεῖς,
ἐξὸν καταβάδην; οὐκ ἐτὸς χωλοὺς ποεῖς.
ἀτὰρ τί εἶχες τὰ ῥακί', ἐκ τραγῳδίας
ἐσθλῆτ' ἐλαινὴν; οὐκ ἐτὸς πτωχοὺς ποεῖς.

[*Euripides is pushed forward by means of the eccyclema, which represents him lying, like a cripple, on a couch.*]

DIC. "Euripides!" EURIP. [*tragically*]. "Why shrillest thou?" DIC. [*with impertinent curiosity*]. "Do you compose 'supplanted' on a day-bed, and not, as you might, with firmly planted feet? 'Tis no wonder you sing of cripples. But why have you been carrying these rags, this 'tragico-pathetical raiment'? 'Tis no wonder you sing of beggars."

411. κατάβην R: // ἔτως R: // πτωχοὺς μόνους R.

412. V. Herw. thinks τὰ ῥάκια a gloss, and reads ἂ. <σὺ πάντως>; but I see no force in πάντως here: Bergk ἂ. τί

τὰ ῥάκι'; ἢ 'κ τραγ. ἔχ., which is plausible. 'Ράκια is metrically objectionable, since the thesis of the anap. is formed by a trisyllabic word whose final syllable is elided: this is allowable in the second or fourth foot (19, 43, 147, 1063, 1177), but not in the third or fifth: if we exclude this line, the only exception is *Pax* 185, where Bentley reads *τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦνομ'*; *οὐκ ἐρεῖς*. As the position of *ἐκ τραγῳδ.* is also objectionable, since it goes with *ἐσθῆτα*, not with *τὰ ῥάκια*, I would suggest *ἀτὰρ τί εἶχες τὰ ῥάκι'*—*ἐκ τραγ. κτλ.* For the imperf., cp. *Vesp.* 855 n: *Pax.* 142 *ἐπίτηδες εἶχον πηδάλιον, ᾧ χρῆσομαι*. The argument of the passage is given in *Thesm.* 148 sqq., esp. *ὅμοια γὰρ ποεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει*. Dicaeopolis explains the lameness of Eur.'s heroes from the fact that the poet is lame: he explains their raggedness from the fact that the poet is dressed in rags. He asks two questions, and does not wait for the answers, which would have been, 'I compose *ἀναβ.*, because I wish to sing of halting heroes: I compose dressed in rags, because I wish to sing of ragged heroes: no other course is possible, since the driver of fat oxen must himself be fat.' *ἀναβάδην*: Schol. R gives two interpretations, viz., (1) *ἄνω τοὺς πόδας ἔχων*: (2) *ἐπὶ ὑψηλοῦ τόπου καθήμενος*: linguistically either is possible; but the best-known passage in which the word occurs (*Athen.* 528 F) favours (1), viz. (of Sardanapalus) *εἰσελθὼν εἶδεν ὁ Μῆδος ἐψιμυθιωμένον γυναικιστὶ καὶ μετὰ τῶν παλλακίδων ξαίνοντα πορφύραν ἀναβάδην τε μετ' αὐτῶν καθήμενον, τὰς ὀφρῦς <ὑπογεγραμμένον> κτλ.* The majority of edd. translate 'in a garret,' and fancy that Eur.'s heroes were lamed by falling down stairs: but this is farfetched, and is not consonant with the reasoning of the passage. *Plut.* 1122 *νυνὶ δὲ πεινῶν ἀναβάδην ἀναπαύομαι* is also ambiguous, since it might very well mean 'upstairs,' contemptuously of heaven, as in *Plaut. Am.* III. i. 3, Jupiter says *in superiore qui habito cenaculo*. *καταβάδην*

does not occur elsewhere, and is certainly a humorous coinage of Aristoph. I have sought to convey the idea in the translation by using 'supplanted' in its etymological sense, since Aristoph. loves to play with etymologies (cp. *Vesp.* 589 n).

470. EYP. ἀπολείς μ'. ἰδού σοι. φροῦδά μοι τὰ δράματα.

Eur. 'You'll be my death. [*Giving Dicaeopolis a handful of pot-herbs*]: There! [*with despairing pathos*.] My dramas you have glibbed.' [Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, II. i. 149.] It seems to me certain that φροῦδος is used in a physical sense, which is best illustrated by *Ran.* 94 (χελιδόνων μουσεῖα κτλ.) ἃ φροῦδα θᾶπτον, ἣν μόνον χορὸν λαβῆ, | ἅπαξ προσουρήσαντα τῇ τραγωδίᾳ: Eur. *Med.* 722 (Aegeus) ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ φροῦδός εἰμι πᾶς ἐγώ: *Or.* 390. τὸ σῶμα φροῦδον: Eur.'s plays will be no longer γόνιμα, now that the properties are gone.

475. Εὐριπίδιον ὦ φιλάτιον καὶ [or ὦ] γλυκύτατον.

'O bully Euripides! O sweetest, incony Euripides!'

So the line should be read: R has Εὐ. γλυκύτατον καὶ φιλάτιον: ABC Εὐ. ὦ φιλάτιον καὶ γλυκύτατον: Su. ὦ Εὐ. γλυκύτατον, ὦ φιλάτιον. Elmsley read Εὐ. ὦ γλυκύτατον καὶ φίλτατον; but it seems uncritical to abolish the curious diminutive φιλάτιον, which is given by all codd. and Su. Its effect here may perhaps be given by Costard's word 'incony': cf. Shakespeare's *Love's Labour's Lost*, III. 136, 'My sweet ounce of man's flesh, my incony Jew.'

609. ΔΙΚ. ἐτεὸν ὦ Μαριλάδη,
ἤδη πεπρέσβευκας σὺ πολὺς ὢν ἔνης;

DIC. 'Really and truly, my friend Collier, have you ever been on an embassy, grizzled man as you are—in a day or two?'

610. ὦν; εἰνη R (εἰνη written a little above the line, as if over an erasure, by the late hand which has supplied omitted lines and words throughout this MS.). Elmsley (with Su.) ὦν ξῖνη; Fritzsche thinks ξῖνη a strong denial (cp. *übermorgen*): some edd. read ἐνί (= *ecce*), which is without authority: others think ξῖνη = 'long since,' but there is no evidence for this signification. The word is almost certainly corrupt: ἀνὴρ is an obvious, but improbable, correction, as such a common noun would not have been corrupted. The scholiasts were completely gravelled by the passage: viz., οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις ξῖνη, ἵνα λέγῃ ἐκ πολλοῦ: // Ἀττικοὶ τὸ ξῖνη περιττόν ἐτίθεισαν, ὡς τὸ ἔχων, ληρεῖς ἔχων (a very naïve remark). // οἱ δὲ λείπειν φασὶ τὸ δύο, ἵνα ἐρωτῶν λέγῃ ἐν ᾗ δύο: but they do not explain what 'one or two' would mean: is it 'one or two embassies'? Possibly ξῖνης (= *perendie*) should be read: it may have been used (as in *Ecccl.* 796 θάρρει, καταθήσεις, κἂν ξῖνης ἔλθῃς) in a slang sense, 'you who are grizzled in a day or two'; meaning ὀλίγου, *propediem*, 'almost.'

723-6: ἀγορανόμους δὲ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καθίσταμαι
 τρεῖς τοὺς λαχόντας τούσδ' ἱμάντας ἐκ Λεπρῶν.
 ἐνταῦθα μήτε συκοφάντης εἰσίστω,
 μήτ' ἄλλος ὅστις Φασιανός ἐστ' ἀνὴρ.

The translation of the jests in these lines has been attempted in various ways: Tyrrell suggests 'three thongs from Flayborough' and 'no informer, nor any other water-telltale wight': Merry proposes 'Skinner-street' for Λεπρῶν (from λέπειν 'to flay'). It seems to me to spoil the effect to introduce modern equivalents among the Megarians and Athenians of 2000 years ago. I suggest, 'These aediles next I institute, duly appointed by lot—to wit, these Phlayu-sian straps [an anagrammatism for Phlyasian]: and let no action-taking hawk here intrude; or any of the pheezyant tribe': the jest is suggested by 'Thou'rt an

emperor, Caesar, Keisar, and Pheezar' (Shakespeare, *Merry Wives of Windsor*, I. 3. 10.) from 'to pheeze' = 'to worry' (*Tro.* II. iii. 215).

847-53. οὐδ' ἐντυχὼν ἐν τᾷγορᾷ πρόσσεισί σοι βαδίζων
 Κρατῖνος εὖ κεκαρμένος μοιχὸν μιᾷ μαχαίρᾳ,
 ὁ περιπόνηρος Ἀρτέμων,
 ὁ ταχὺς ἄγαν τὴν μουσικὴν,
 ὄζων κακὸν τῶν μασχαλῶν
 πατρὸς Τραγασαίου.

'No, nor shall Cratinus, strolling idly in your market-place, meet you and accost you—the gallant with his hair cut *à l'adultère* with the single blade, the litter-ate Artemo, the hasty-footed composer, the capricious son of a Gothic sire.'

849. περιπόνηρος is a pun on περιφόρητος <Ἀρτέμων>, an old proverb of a certain rake who was always carried about in a litter (*App. Prov.* iv. 32: *Athen.* 533 E). The translation 'litter-ate,' is suggested by *litteratus homo*, a *man trium litterarum* (viz.: *fur.*), cp. *Plaut. Cas.* ii. 6. 49.

853. Τραγασαίου: there is a similar jest in 808, ὡς Τραγασαῖα φαίνεται: 'They seem to be Hungarian,' cp. *Sh. Wives* I. iii. 23, where Pistol says: 'O base Hungarian (viz.: starving) wight! wilt thou the spigot wield?' Here, the equivalent is suggested by Touchstone, in Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, III. iii. 10, 'I am here with thee and thy goats, as the most capricious poet, honest Ovid, was among the Goths.'

1025. ΓΕΩ. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, νῆ Δί, ὥπερ μ' ἐτρεφέτην
 ἐν πᾶσι βολίτοις.

The renderings of this jest do not seem to me very successful: e.g., 'mucksery,' 'muck—no, luck, I mean.' None of them brings out the sense, which is that the boor

was thriving like *φακοί* in manure (cp. Theophr. *HP.* II. 4. 2). Translate: 'that kept my fortunes rank—with compost': cp. *Hamlet* III. 4. 151 sq., 'And do not spread the compost on the weeds To make them ranker.'

1085-94. ΑΓ. Β. Δικαιοπόλι. ΔΙΚ. τί ἔστιν; ΑΓ. Β. ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ταχὺ
 βάδιζε, τὴν κίστην λαβὼν καὶ τὸν χοᾶ.
 ὁ τοῦ Διονύσου γάρ σ' ἱερεὺς μεταπέμπεται.
 ἀλλ' ἐγκόνοι' δειπνεῖν κατακλύεις πάλαι.
 τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἔστιν παρεσκευασμένα,
 κλῖναι, πρᾶπεζαι, προσκεφάλαια, στρώματα,
 στέφανοι, μύρον, τραγήμαθ'—αἱ πορναὶ πάρα— 1090
 ἄμυλοι, πλακοῦντες, σησαμοῦντες, ἴτρια
 ὀρχηστρίδες δ', αἱ "φιлтаθ' Ἀρμόδι' οὐ," καλαί.
 ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα σπεῦδε.

MESSENGER. "Dicaeopolis." DIC. "What's the coil?"
 MES. "Quick, quick—to dinner, and bring your luncheon-basket, and the flask. The priest of Dionysius invites you: come, haste away: you've been delaying the feast. Everything else is ready—[*with a rapid breathless delivery*] couches, tables, cushions, coverlets, chaplets, perfumes, cates—[*in a confidential whisper*] the bona robas, too, are there—baked-meats, crumpets, muffins, wafer-cakes, fair dancing-girls, also, who are dogs at the 'dearest Harmodius': but do make haste."

1090. αἱ πορναὶ πάρα: These words have often been questioned, as they interrupt the enumeration by introducing a new verb *πάρα*, and an article, which is absent in the case of the other items: hence (in *Hermath.*, 1898) I was rash enough to suggest *ὀρνίθων γάλα*, which Blaydes (*Spicileg. Ar.*, p. 12) terms *ingeniosa coniectura et fortasse vera*: but he is too kind. The text is correct; and the difficulty is caused by the absence in Greek codd. of visible aids (viz.: italics or inverted commas) to the reader which a modern reader expects: αἱ π. π. is said in a whisper, and the article implies that

no dinner-party was complete without the bona robas. The real anomaly in these lines is that the *πορναί* at a dinner were the dancing-girls, who are not mentioned until 1092. R. has a full stop before αἱ π., which may be an argument in favour of my suggestion: but I do not attach much weight to the punctuation-marks in R, which are scattered as out of a pepper-caster.

1092. This emendation I suggested in *Hermath.*, 1898, and I still believe it to be the best correction of this passage, which is certainly corrupt: for the use of the article, cp. *Vesp.* 661 τοὺς "οὐχὶ προδώσω τὸν Ἀθηναίων κολοσυρτόν": not unlike is Shakespeare, *Twelfth-Night*, II. iii. 73 'Malvolio is a Peg-a-Ramsey' (from an old song). The corruption may have been caused, as frequently, by the lack of inverted commas to show that φιλ. 'Α. οὐ is a quotation. For the sense, cp. *Twelfth Night*, II. iii. 64 'I am dog at a catch.'

1122 sq. ΛΑΜ. τοὺς κιλλίβαντας οἶσε, παῖ, τῆς ἀσπίδος.

ΔΙΚ. καὶ τῆς ἐφ' ἧς τοὺς κριβανίτας ἐκφέρει.

In 1123 κάκ τῆς σιπύης has been suggested for καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς, with a lamentable lack of humour: ἐμῆς is correct; but we cannot supply γαστήρ with schol. and edd. The lines may be translated: LAM. "Boy, hand me the staves to support my shield." DICAEOΠ. [*rubbing his stomach*] "Fetch out the 'staff of life' to support mine." There is an *annominatio* in κιλλίβ. and κριβαν.: as to Dicaeop.'s ἀσπίς (his γαστήρ), the comparison is apt enough, *utrique est περιφέρεια, utrique prominentia, utrique ὀμφαλός, bonam tegit uterque partem corporis* (v. Herw.).

1132 sq. ΛΑΜ. φέρε δεῦρο, παῖ θώρακα πολεμιστήριον.

ΔΙΚ. ἔξαιρε, παῖ, θώρακα κάμοι τὸν χοᾶ.

LAM. 'Boy, fetch hither my martial habergeon.'

DIC. 'Boy, hand me out, too, my festal demi—john.'

For the 'red lattice' word θώραξ, cp. *Vesp.* 1195 n.

1150-1160.

XOP. Ἀντίμαχον τὸν Ψακάδος, τὸν μέλεον ξυγγραφέα ποιητήν,
ὥς μὲν ἀπλῶ λόγῳ κακῶς ἐξολέσειεν ὁ Ζεὺς·

ὅς γ' ἐμὲ τὸν τλήμονα Λήναια χορηγῶν ἀπέλυσ' ἄδειπνον·

ὃν ἔτ' ἐπίδοιμι τευθίδος

δεόμενον, ἧ δ' ὀπτημένη

σίζουσα πάραλος ἐπὶ τραπέζῃ κειμένη

ὀκέλλοι· κῆτα μέλλοντος λαβεῖν

αὐτοῦ κύων ἀρπάσασα φεύγει.

'May Antimachus, the son of Splutterer, the draftsman—poetaster, may he, O Zeus, in brief, perish evilly at thy hands, inasmuch as when Choragus at the Lenaean festival, he let me go away without my feast. Come the day when I shall see him longing for some cuttlefish: and may the dish well cooked and hissing stand near the brine, in the offing of—the table, and then make land: and, while he hesitates to seize it, may a dog snatch it from him, and make off.'

1150. τὸν ξυγγραφεῖ, τὸν μελέων ποιητήν codd. (τῶν μ. π. R): Elmsley, being offended by the diiambus for a choriambus, read τὸν μέλεον τῶν μελέων π., which has the merit of curing the solecism of the absence of the article either with μελέων or with ποιητήν (as in R): v. Herw. (*Vind.*, p. 15) ξυρραφέα, '*sarcinalorem suorum carminum poetam*'), which would be good if it were not certain that ξυγγραφεύς is right: the Oxford edd. read ξυγγραφέα, taking ψακάδος as a surprise for ψηφίσματος, but a surprise ought to follow, not to precede, ξυγ.: van Leeuwen rejects everything after ψακάδος to the end of the line as a gloss: I read μέλεον ξυγγραφέα ποιητήν. Perhaps ξυγγραφέα (scanned εᾱ by synizesis, in which Aristoph. is very bold) and τὸν μέλεον ποιητήν are possible. As to the metre, a diiambus is not impossible in choriambic metre, if the MSS. are to be trusted: see *Vesp.*, p. lxxv: Christ, *Metrik*, pp. 473, 481, and *Lys.* 326)(340, where γυναικας ἀνθρακεύειν corresponds to ὑστερόπους βοηθῶ. J. H. H. Schmidt, *Compositionslehre*, p. ccii, reads τὸν

λόγιον, holding ξυγ. to be unmetrical. Nothing is known of Antimachus beyond what is narrated in the scholia on this line, and on *Nub.* 1022: even these statements rest on doubtful authority; and it is, furthermore, not certain that they should be attached to the same individual. Schol. *Nub.* l. c. mentions five persons of the same name, viz.: (1) οὗτος εἰς θηλύτητα κωμωδεῖται καὶ εὐμορφίαν. (2) ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἕτερός τις ἐπὶ πονηρίᾳ κωμωδούμενος. (3) τρίτος ὁ ψακάδος λεγόμενος. (4) τέταρτος ὁ τραπεζίτης, οὗ μέμνηται Εὐπολὶς ἐν Δήμοις. (5) πέμπτος ἱστοριογράφος: τάχα δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῷ εὐμόρφῳ. It is clear that the writer did not speak out of the fullness of his knowledge, as he separates (3) from (5). Schol. *Ach.* is more valuable, although, even there, inconsistent comments are jumbled up in strange confusion. The principal statements may be arranged as follows:—(1) φασὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν γράψαι ψήφισμα ὥστε τοὺς χοροὺς μηδὲν ἐκ τῶν χορηγῶν λαμβάνειν: so R. (2) ἐδόκει ὁ Ἀντίμαχος οὗτος ψήφισμα πεποικέναι, μὴ δεῖν κωμωδεῖν ἐξ ὀνόματος. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οὐ προσῆλθον ληψόμενοι τὸν χορόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐπέινων. ἐχορήγει δὲ ὁ Ἀντίμαχος, ὅτε εἰσήνεγκε τὸ ψήφισμα (cp. Diogenian, viii. 71). (3) οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι ποιητῆς ὦν καλὸς (*lege* κακός) χορηγῶν ποτε μικρολόγως τοῖς χορευταῖς ἐχρήσατο. (1) Is of no value, as it is a stupid inference from the text. (2) ἐδόκει, being an expression affected by Didymus, even in the case of comparatively authentic facts, is probably of Didymean origin (cp. Meiners, *Qu. ad Scholia Aris. historica pertinentes*, p. 18), and consequently of value. It should not be denied, as has been done by many commentators, that there was a decree of Antimachus, since the statement of the schol. is not an inference from the text. The decrees restraining, or proposing to restrain, the liberty of comedy may have been numerous. We know of none but the law of Morychides (440 B.C.), and the law of Syracosius (415 B.C.); but the times were unsettled, and it is possible that an Antimachus

may have proposed, but not carried, a decree such as that here attributed to him. The year of the revolt of Lesbos was suitable for such a measure.

Zielinski has a curious idea that Antimachus was nicknamed Morychus (the spirit who attended Dionysus), and being confounded with Morychides, was credited with the latter's law. There is no evidence of any kind for this suggestion [see Zielinski, *Glied.*, p. 55 n 6: Lübke, *Obs. Crit. in Hist. Vet. Com.*, pp. 4 sqq.: Cobet, *Obs. Crit. ad Plat. Com.*, pp. 34 sqq.: Fritzsche, *Qu. Arist.* i., p. 306: Leo, *Qu. Arist.*, pp. 22 sqq.: Keck, *Qu. Hist.*, pp. 3 sqq.: Meineke, *Fr.* i., pp. 39 sqq.: Fähræus, *Daetalenses*, p. 13].

τὸν ξυγγραφέα: 'the drafter' of decrees, a clear reference to the *lex Antimachea*: 'to propose,' 'to draft' a motion was συγγράφειν—εἶσθαι, as well as γράφειν: cp. *Thesm.* 432 τὰ δ' ἄλλα μετὰ τοῦ γραμματέως συγγράφομαι. Antimachus may have been one of those περὶ τὸ βῆμα (schol. *Av.* 1297), like Syracosius, whose *Fach* it was to propose motions.

1155. ἐμέ: This must mean each member of Semichorus I, who sang this ode (and, through them, the whole chorus), not the poet, who would be called ὁ διδάσκαλος ἡμῶν (628; *Pax* 738) or ὁ ποιητής (633: *Eq.* 509, 548: *Vesp.* 1016, 1049). The grievance is that for some reason or other the chorus was deprived of the usual banquet after the play. There has been much controversy as to the incident alluded to. Probably the semichorus is referring to the last Lenaea, when the chorus was shabbily treated by its choregus. The poet and the play are not mentioned: van Leeuwen's theory that it was a play of Cratinus is unsupported by evidence. Fähræus, Fritzsche, Bergk think that the play was the *Daetalenses* of 427 B.C.: Zielinski argues that it was the *Acharneis*, of which, according to his view, the present play is the second ed., rewritten for the *Magna Dionysia*. But there is no real evidence that this play was

ever produced a second time. [See Fähræus, *Daetal.*, p. 13 : Gunning, *De Babyl.*, p. 46 : Fritzsche, *de Daet.*, p. 9 : Bergk, ap. Mein., *Fr.* ii., pp. 939 : 1021 : Meineke, *ib.* i., p. 41 : v. Wilamowitz, *Obs. Crit.*, p. 15 : Zielinski, *Glied*, p. 62 : Meyer, *de Ar. fab. Commiss.*, p. 9.]

1158. *πάραλος* : An 'etymological jest' (cp. *Vesp.* 589 n), being derived from *ἅλεις* 'salt,' not from *ἅλς* 'sea,' though the usual sign. 'state galley' is also glanced at.

ἐπὶ τραπέζῃ : *ἐπὶ* is used as in *ἐπικεῖσθαι* 'to be in the offing' (*ἐν σάλῳ*), cp. Thuc. ii. 14 : iv. 44.

πάραλος was obsolete at this time, except (1) in tragedy (S. *Aj.* 412 : Eur. *Ion.* 1584); and (2) in certain special signif., such as *ἡ π. γῆ* 'the coastland of Attica' (Thuc. ii. 55); *ἡ Π. ναῦς* 'the state ship' : *οἱ Πάραλοι* 'the crew of the Paralus' (*Ran.* 1071 : Thuc. viii. 73). For such survivals in special senses, cp. *Vesp.* 186 n.

1159. *λαβεῖν* : As *μέλλειν* is followed in comic Greek by the aor. inf. only when it means 'to delay,' it is necessary to translate here 'when he was hesitating to take it,' cp. *Av.* 366 sq. *εἰπέ μοι τί μέλλετε . . . ἀπολέσαι*, where the text has been wrongly questioned. The only real exception to the law which requires a fut. or a pres. inf. after *μέλλω* in the sense of 'to purpose,' is *Lys.* 117 (Spartan). The usage of this verb has been misapprehended by Rutherford, *New Phryn.*, pp. 420 sqq.

1210. *ΛΑΜ.* *τάλας ἐγὼ τῆς ξυμβολῆς βαρείας.*

ΔΙΚ. *τοῖς χουσι γάρ τις ξυμβολὰς ἐπράττετο.*

ΛΑΜ. "Alas, for that shot so parlous!"

ΔΙΚ. "What! have you not been shot-free on the day of 'the Flasks'?" The jest here is well illustrated from Shakespeare, 1 *Henry IV.* v. iii. 31 : 'Though I could 'scape shot-free at London, I fear the shot here : here's no scoring but upon the pate.'

W. J. M. STARKIE.

THE ABSOLUTE IN ETHICS.

A DIFFICULTY presents itself at the very beginning of this inquiry. It may be said that, as we have already seen that Metaphysics must rest on belief in GOD, and as the Metaphysical Absolute must be identified with the LOGOS, there are only two possible courses before us. We must either seek the Absolute of Ethics elsewhere, or embark on speculations that are not so much metaphysical as dogmatic and historical: for the development of the LOGOS IDEA belongs to Theology, and the doctrine of the Incarnation—which cannot well be neglected in applying the theory of a Theistic Absolute to human conduct—is partly dogmatic and partly historical.

It is impossible, within the narrow limits of this paper, to answer this objection fully: but it is perfectly possible to give a sufficient answer. If Metaphysics, as a whole, rests on belief in GOD, Theology is, so far, a Metaphysical Science in its contents, though not in its method. If the doctrine of the LOGOS had—as it certainly had—a metaphysical origin, it too has a lawful place in Metaphysics. If there is a metaphysical *nexus* between the LOGOS-theory and the Incarnation, this also has a metaphysical basis. The belief in an historical Incarnation of the LOGOS can no more interfere with its metaphysical nature than the existence of human beings in the flesh can destroy Psychology, or than Psychological Science can make Ontology impossible. History, Psychology, and Ontology deal largely with the same contents, but they approach their subject-matter by different methods: and it is quite

sufficient for both Ontology and Ethics that their problems are approached and solved from a definitely Metaphysical standpoint. So, too, an enquiry into the basis of Morality may be historical, anthropological, or theological : but the existence of these sciences cannot detract from the Ethical truth of a purely Ethical examination of the laws and basis of Conscience and Moral Reason, even if the results obtained harmonise with those found in Theology, History, or daily life. It ought not to be necessary to point this out : but the difficulty to which I have referred rests on its practical contradiction, and, when stripped of verbal subterfuges, simply amounts to a demand that we should treat history, and all other sciences that deal with Man, as necessarily untrue and contradictory to a sound Metaphysic, before we apply the methods of Ontology to either the reality or the moral nature of Man.¹

There is no need to dwell on the other alternative. We cannot well seek *two* Absolutes. If Metaphysics and Ethics find different Absolutes, *both* have failed.

We are therefore in this position. The Ethical Absolute must be the same as the Metaphysical Absolute, or each science becomes a Dialectic to the other, and we must sacrifice one or both. If, on the other hand, both Ontologies

¹ There is also a second fallacy underlying the objection treated in the text. It deals with "Ethics" as a single science, and as conterminous with "Deontology." Now, every competent Metaphysician admits that Psychology — the examination of the phenomena of the Mind and of all things related to it—is only a part of Metaphysics, which needs for its completion the higher science of Ontology. So, too, Deontology is only the examination of the phenomena of moral action, and Ethics requires for its completion the examination of moral

noumena. In other words, Ethics has its ontological part : and the relation of Morality to God—to the Absolute—to any Reality—is ontological. Therefore (somewhat obviously) an inquirer into ontological Ethics can possess his soul in peace. There *may* be community of phenomena in Psychology and Deontology. To a great extent, there must be. Is it not, therefore, both natural and necessary that there should also be a community of "Realities" in Metaphysical and Ethical Ontology?

point to the same Absolute, this affords a presumption that both are true—provided always that the subject-matter has in each case been treated with the same care and by the same methods. As it is certain that the form of the phenomena in Ethics and Metaphysics is not the same, we may expect a difference in the form of the Absolute: but under this difference there must be conformity, agreement, of Reality. And the greater this conformity is, the more it is adapted to satisfy a fair mind. Moreover, from the peculiar nature of the case, since there is no room for “the multiplicity of causes” without sacrificing the law of Unity, the establishment of the identity of the Absolute in each case practically clinches the arguments in both cases, and amounts to a proof of both conclusions. Thus the *nexus* between Ethics and the Absolute, following the establishment of the Metaphysical position of the same Absolute, is “*dogma stantis vel cadentis*” *Philosophiæ*. To split or to bind, it is the last nail driven. To prove or to disprove, it is the last word said.

But, to make this clear, we must examine two sets of facts. (I.) What has been already proved in the articles preceding this, as to Metaphysical Reality? (II.) How does this bear on the underlying Reality of Ethics? Ethical Ontology, it must be remembered, has a distinct character of its own: but, unless it is to commit intellectual suicide, it must agree with Metaphysical Ontology.

I. Taking the system of Pneuma-Metaphysics in the order in which it has already been presented, we have found the following facts as to Reality.

- (1.) The Ego of Man is spiritual, and is a spirit, of which each of us is conscious in Perception—and it is needed to give Unity to the Moral and the Intellectual Reason.
- (2.) As Creationism and Generationism are both impossible theories, there seems no other possible belief but that this

spirit must owe its origin to a Spiritual Universe, homogeneous and persistent, and probably outcomprehending Personality—as its “material cause.” (3.) The individual personal Ego has its only knowledge of Unity in the Oneness of itself, so that the Reality of the Ego is the primary postulate of all Rational Ontology. (4.) From this Reality of his own Ego each of us derives, as necessary consequences, knowledge of *other* personal Egos—of a non-Ego common to all these limited Egos—and, ultimately, of GOD.

From this recognition of Man as a Spirit, and of GOD as his efficient cause, we passed on to the recognition of the Absolute, and the determination of its nature. We saw (5.) that the gulf between Man and GOD—an Infinite GOD—cannot be bridged without recognising an Absolute —“limited but unconditioned”—Who may be defined as “GOD brought near to Creation, Immanent in Creation, shown forth in Creation.” The limitation here *must*, of course, be the limitation whose objective side is the limit of the created world, *quâ* created, quite apart from the question as to whether the Created Universe has “bounds” or not, and this Immanent Absolute can be nothing but the LOGOS. (6.) This, again, necessarily involves that full state of which “Incarnation” is but a part—i.e. the Immanent Unity of the Creator with His whole Creation.

To this we must now add certain other consequences that spring from these doctrines. (7.) This Immanence must be, not merely complete, but growing and variable. It cannot be true that the Immanence of the Absolute is

“As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart,”

because the qualities from which we infer Immanence are not as perfect in the hair as in the heart. So, if the act of Creation implies a continuous development from dead matter up to Personality,—if Personality is a condition of

the highest Spiritual Being,—if such Spirituality is the state of highest Immanence,—the relation of the Absolute LOGOS to a stone cannot be the same as His relation to a Person. Therefore (8) the general Immanence (which is the ground of “Incarnation”) of the LOGOS must imply His personal and full manifestation as Spirit in Spirit, as Person in Person : and, since Individuality is a necessary condition of Personality, the Incarnate LOGOS must be the highest Being—Individual—Person—in Creation. An Incarnation in Race will not suffice, because the Race has no definite Individual Unity. (9.) But if the Incarnation be Individual, it must also be complete. A man, though complex in his Nature, is one in his Person, Self, Ego : and this Ego, which we have identified as “Spirit,” is both definitely separate from all other Egos as “Individual,” and definitely Supreme over all his faculties, as his only true bond of Unity. If his pure and practical “Reasons” are different things, they find a real Unity in his Ego : if, as seems more probable, they are simply the same faculty operating on different “matter,” we cannot avoid identifying this “faculty” with the Ego itself—the Spirit of Man,—operating *as* Reason. (10.) Therefore, if the Immanence of the Absolute necessarily implies—as we have seen that it does—the Union of the LOGOS with Man,¹ it must imply, equally necessarily, His equal Union with the pure and the practical Reason, whether these be regarded as two faculties or one. As “Personal,” too, the Union can be with no separate part of the Ego, but with the Ego itself : and this must necessarily mean either the identification of the LOGOS with an individual Ego, or the absolute government of an individual Ego by the

¹ This is the Christian Idea of the Incarnation, most briefly expressed in a strangely mistranslated passage in the *Te Deum* : “*Tu ad liberandum*

suscepturus hominem.” “When Thou didst take [on Thee] Man, to deliver him.”

LOGOS. But, as the Humanity in which the Absolute thus manifests Itself must be complete, we are obliged to think of the Incarnated LOGOS as retaining His own Personality, and therefore appearing as *the Absolute Ego*, subordinating the whole of His Humanity (including its "Spirit") to His Personality. Thus the Absolute, *quâ* Incarnate personally, appears as an "Absolute Will"; *quâ* Divine, as an Absolute Loving Will, for it is only in Will that we find the presence of the Ego in its full force. The Will is the Ego without a veil. But it is equally necessary that the Personal Spirit of Man should have its Will; so the concept of an Incarnate Absolute implies, not the extinction, but the subordination, of human Will, and the continued presence of all other human faculties.

(11.) One other thing is also implied. The presence of the Absolute must, as we have seen, be complete in an Individual human being, of whom it *is* the Ego, or Personality. But it must, just as surely, be complete in Humanity at large. Therefore the Absolute must necessarily be manifested, not only *as* a Person, but as a supreme Power in all Persons. If He *is* the Ego of *one* Humanity, he must also be united with *all* Humanity.¹

II. No one can deny that such a doctrine as this has a manifest bearing on Ethics. Passing by its directly theological aspect, and bearing in mind the fact that the whole process by which it has been obtained is purely Metaphysical, its directly moral contents may be summed up in one sentence: THE LOGOS, *being the Absolute for all Creation and for the whole of Man and for all Mankind, must be the Absolute in Ethics as certainly and as fully as in Metaphysics.*

¹ This is expressed, in Theology, by the dictum: "The Incarnate LOGOS was made Man, not *a* man." That is to say, His Self was not changed, His Ego or Person remained entirely Divine: but It took to Itself and united in Itself all that was needed to make a perfect human being, *and also the natures of all other human beings.*

Pursuing the same course of investigation, we can learn more. In former papers it has been shown that there are certain peculiarities connected with Moral Science, of which we must take account before we can obtain anything approaching to a sound system of Ethics. Let us examine them, and see whether the doctrine of the LOGOS as Absolute throws any fresh light on them.

(1.) Pure Ethics has one great weakness, which it shares with other abstract Sciences,—the weakness of practical inefficiency. Whatsoever may be its “ground,” it can only teach,—and teaching is a weak force beside human nature. There is, as Bishop Butler tells us, nothing in Man that is *contrary* to good. But this is true of the Reason only. No man’s conscience contains any element of evil in itself: no man, acting on Moral Reason, can *approve* evil. But there are quite enough and strong enough motives resulting in the doing of evil, and the ideal Man, who follows his Moral Reason only, is—at best—a rare visitant in the practical Sphere. To know the Right may be the necessary step to doing the Right; yet Man remains *un méchant animal*. If Ethical Science stops at this point, it is only a sign-post, after all; and, even as a sign-post, it is often misread. We have seen, in the paper on “Ethics and Theism,” that the reason for this is simple. We differ from each other in secondary Moral Principles because we interpose different ratiocinations between primary Moral Principles and our immediate motives of action: but universal experience shows that every man is subject to this mistake, and it leads to practical immoralities. Though there is nothing in Man contrary to conscience, there is, in fact, nothing so contrary to Good as never to have been done by some man. So that Ethics, left at the point where it usually ends, is mere Deontology: and, even as Deontology, it is subject to corruption. I, for one, cannot be satisfied with

a Moral Science that ends where the real difficulties begin, and leaves Man helpless when, if ever, he most needs the help that Moral Science ought to give. It is fatally easy to assent to the right principle, and fatally difficult to give it force. In a Spiritual Metaphysic and Theistic Ethic this is practically a contradiction in terms; and if Moral Science can find only its solution, Moral Practice demands its reformation. (2.) What has just been said applies mainly to Non-Theistic Ethics. A belief in a GOD gives a strong backing to Ethical teaching: and it is by no means necessary that this should require the sanctions of rewards or punishments. We may, in fact, say that the purer a man's belief in GOD is, the less he thinks of the consequences to himself, as contrasted with the Moral Nature, of his actions. But, even then, mere belief in GOD is not exactly an efficient motive to right conduct. It may even be a hindrance. Men often play with the idea of a non-moral, or immoral, or cruel Deity, as a child does with a gollywog, with a fearful delight, desiring least of all things any conformity to its likeness. And even when Man has saner ideas about GOD, it is unfortunately as easy to banish the thought of Him far out of our daily life as it is to drive the Moral Law to the dim distance of a mystic's vision or a poet's dream. So *belief*, as a moral force, is about as efficacious as a certain religious charm of whose potency a friend of mine boasted. "I have often," he told me, "taken it off and left it at home when I wanted to go to the mischief." A sanction that can—mentally—be left on one's dressing-table can hardly be of much use in giving either permanence or efficiency.

(3.) We saw, too, that the supreme principle of Theistic Ethics must consist in obedience to GOD. But here again there is a difficulty. Obedience implies direct moral contact. It is not possible to conceive GOD, in His infinite Being, *directly* giving Laws. To do so, He should

limit Himself by entering the moral sphere : and, while Morality demands that Man should not act under compulsion from GOD, the idea of the ultimate Deity requires us to believe that the Will of GOD must be fulfilled. This seems to be the thought under the story of Jacob's wrestling with the Angel. Jacob had subjugated his own will, so far as he himself had power over that will : but, before his moral victory was complete, he was obliged to fight against and conquer the Power outside himself that, even to his faults, made him what he was. No Theist can call this Power—the pagan "Fate"—by any name but "GOD": and, as long as a man's moral life is compelled by heredity, environment, or circumstance of any kind, so long Ethics speak vainly to him, since he is not free. Something more is needed, then, than the Ideas of GOD, Man, and Obedience, to make the formula of a thinkable Moral Theory : and something even more is needed to convert that Theory into moral possibility.

(4.) The last difficulty is partly met by recognition of the fact that there must be a conformity of character between GOD, as a model of human character, and Human Nature. But, here again, "character" implies limitation, and the Idea of GOD implies His existence from "everlasting times,"—from Eternity *ab ante*. The boldest metaphysician might well decline to define what he meant by the eternal moral character of GOD before He entered into relations with any created thing, before He had as companion a single atom of any individual spirit except His own.

(5.) This difficulty becomes still greater, in the case of Christianity, when we remember that the root of all Christian Morality is the one element that is impossible in a being without companions,—Love.

(6.) Finally, we saw that GOD, to be a possible object of Obedience, must be Personal, Moral, Individual :—a position impossible, at first sight, to reconcile with the Idea of Monotheism.

For a GOD *purely* Transcendent and Individual, and at the same time containing all the basis of Goodness, must not only be separate from the subjects whose obedience He demands, but must also hold all goodness out of their reach. A "Monad" Infinite GOD is as inconsistent with the Idea of a Moral Creation as with that of either a Physical or a Spiritual Creation. To unite the latter with its Maker, we have been obliged to establish the nature of the Absolute: we have exactly the same work to do in order to show the possibility of Moral Law and Moral Action. We saw that the only possible Metaphysical Absolute is the LOGOS: what we have now to show is that this same Idea, in its Ethical aspect, meets the difficulties of Deontology, completes its scope, and makes moral action possible.

Everything here points in the same direction. The only possible root of perfect Morality, as we have seen, is a GOD Who is truly the One GOD, and yet not GOD in His pure Infinity,—Who is the Absolute,—Who is both Immanent and in special "Humanisation" as GOD in a human existence and in lasting manifestation through all Humanity. The *τέλος* of Ethics, then, must be, not only Obedience to GOD, not only Likeness to GOD, but also Obedience *to* GOD and *from* GOD the Absolute—humanised, Incarnate—to the Moral Law that is fully embodied only in His own Moral Being. So the Self of Man meets the Self of GOD, and the Law from without passes into the Law within, because the true Self is at one with the true Absolute.

In the same way, we know something more than that the Moral Law contains nothing that Man cannot do. The Incarnation, as a matter of history, may perhaps be dismissed as non-Metaphysical: but the *Incarnate state* of the LOGOS is a matter for Ethics. Taken historically it shows the working out of this very problem as a part of

Creation. The Historian may justly say: "It is not impossible for Man to obey the Law: for Christ obeyed it." The Ethical Philosopher may go further, and say: "It was to be expected that, in an Ethical system of Creation, nothing would be ordered that was impossible. The story of Christianity tells us that our temptations were met, our obligations fulfilled, by One Who was limited as we are,—and yet was the Absolute GOD." This gives us the point where the *a-priori* evidence that "Right" ought to be possible meets the *a-posteriori* proof that it was shown to be possible in at least one life. I have nothing to say, here, to the latter conditions. Christian Ethics rest partly on them, just as Ethics in general partly rest on certain facts as to human conduct that cannot be known except as they are given in experience. The important point is the proof, from the story of the Incarnation, that a pure and perfect human life is thinkable, and that there is, therefore, no impossibility in the demands of the Moral Law. But it is hard to see how any Ethical system, however abstract, can cut itself loose from the record of human lives: therefore, I think, we have a right to fall back on both the place of Christ in History and on the moral development that has taken place under Christianity, as proof that the Moral Law is, not merely an abstract picture of ideal perfection, but a practical guide to life. If so, "Obedience" is seen, in the light of the Absolute, to be *practically* possible for men. The necessary metaphysical limitation of the Absolute LOGOS must be found in that ideal manifestation which includes Incarnation: the Christian dogma of the Incarnation has always recognised Christ's *Self* as Divine, but His lawful Passions and Powers as essentially Human. So He is the Absolute GOD, truly and fully, but just as truly the Absolute in Creation,—*"the First-born of every creature."* And, as Creator and Creature meet in Him, so too do the

Law-giver and the Law-obeyer: so that the picture, in Christian Ethics, of our "perfect exemplar" gives us more than a mere example. It shows us GOD obeying GOD's Law, and confirms the most important principle of Theistic Morality: since, if the Command and the Obedience are both perfected in Christ, human "goodness" must not only be like the goodness of GOD in principle, but must also itself be a part of the Divine Goodness: for the perfected human will of Christ, made subject to the One Divine Will, is the perfect mirror of that Divine Will. Therefore, the Incarnation, in Christian Ethics, solves all our theoretical difficulties by sending us to look at the very Face of GOD Itself to find GOD's character and follow that.¹

Up to this, we have spoken of the difficulty in passing from mere theoretical Deontology to practical Morality from one point of view only—the "hardness" of the Moral Law. There is, however, one other great practical difficulty,—our weakness. Paul of Tarsus probably knew as much about Ethics as any man in his day: he sums up this hindrance by saying that "the law in the members" is contrary to "the law in the mind"—so that "we cannot do the thing that we would." Those who object to the citing of the example of Christ as a proof of

¹ The *explanation* of the Atonement has been the cause of many repulsive theories and many profitless disputes. It seems to me probable, in view both of the above reasoning and of the frequent references to the "Obedience" of Christ in Scripture, that the true explanation is simple, just, and intelligible. If the purpose of human life is the fulfilment of GOD's Will,—if Christ, as the "Absolute" where GOD and Creation meet, mystically unites GOD and Man,—if, in His Incarnation,

He came to do GOD's Will perfectly,—the critical passage as to the Atonement is the "Agony" in Gethsemane. Thus the *τέλος*, for Him, was *not* "Obedience to death," but "Obedience [to GOD] even unto death": the words, "not my [human] will, but Thine [and My Divine] Will be done," mark the culmination of the struggle: and the work done in the Atonement was the subjugation of the will of Man to the Will of GOD.

possibility point out that He, being supposed faultless, might be able to do things that we, "by reason of the frailty of our nature," cannot do. "The Moral Law," they say, "would probably present no difficulty at all to a perfectly sound man in a perfectly sound world ; but we are weak, frail, imperfect, unsound." Now, this is perfectly true ; and it points to another requisite (besides perfect teaching and perfect example) for sound and firm practical morality. We have found the example in the Incarnate LOGOS ; where are we to look for a source of strength ? If the union of GOD and Man in the Absolute is to give strength *now*, it seems quite plain that we cannot look back to what that union was in the historic lifetime of the Lord. Our concern is with what it is *now*. It must be permanent, if it is to be a source of strength to a permanent Race.

This is exactly what Christianity teaches about the Incarnation. Its force is to be found in the doctrine of the Resurrection, by which we believe that the Incarnate LOGOS passed, unchanged in His Godhead and His Manhood (leaving behind only mutability, griefs, and weaknesses), to become a permanent source of strength for us. By a true instinct, practically all parts of the Christian Church have held fast to the signs and teachings that have kept before our eyes this particular idea of Christ. We affirm that He was, from everlasting, the Absolute, the LOGOS : we follow the steps of His life on earth : but the practical point, which we grasp as of most importance, is the existence of the now-living Word, always true GOD, *still true man*, as the only source from which living men can find strength for their weakness, and absolute power to obey. It is natural—a natural completion of the development of everything else that went before it—that the Absolute Himself should give us strength to grow into the Perfect Man, by the power that comes from Him Who is both Perfect Man and perfect GOD.

But, it may be said, this is still incomplete. Such an Absolute is, to all intents, purely Objective: an Incarnated LOGOS, however Immanent, can only be received as the Object of a limited consciousness. It is the individual human will that seeks Him in prayer; it is the individual human weakness that leans on Him for strength. We need something more, before we can recognise an Absolute sufficient for morality. As Goethe puts it:

“ Oh never yet hath mortal drunk
A draught restorative
That flowed not from the depths of his own heart.”

Christianity has recognised this difficulty, and has met it by a doctrine that, on account of its Ethical force, we cannot pass by here. It connects especially with the belief in a risen and living Incarnate LOGOS another Divine Immanence, which is absolutely Subjective. It is called by many names, though It has no absolutely distinctive title—the Spirit, the Advocate, the Promise (during the lifetime of the Christ; and afterwards), the Gift. The last name represents the Greek word *δωρεά*, which is never used in the New Testament in any other sense. Metaphysically, this Spirit is treated as the ground of life, consciousness, and, above all, of the human “Spirit.” Ethically, It is regarded as so identified with the workings of the human higher motives and will that we may attribute to It all good thought and action. If Man seeks GOD, “The Spirit maketh intercession for us [along] with our Spirit with groanings that cannot be uttered.” If we doubt our Oneness with GOD, “the Spirit beareth witness with our Spirit.” Still more important is the teaching that Christ Himself gives, when He says of this Spirit, “He shall take of Mine, and give it unto you.” Thus the “Spirit” is represented in Christianity as the Subjective side of the Absolute, and as related to the abysmal Person of GOD in the same way as the LOGOS. I need not dwell

on the Theological meaning of this doctrine. Morally, it rounds off and completes the theory of the Absolute, and so brings to perfection that Transcendental and practical system of Ethics which has never been presented to the world except under Christianity.

We may deal in a similar way with another difficulty, which, whether it has actually been raised or not, is fairly obvious on the surface. In the historical account of the Incarnation, Christ certainly did not face *all* our difficulties. Even though all His acts were perfect, this is not the same as His performance of all perfect acts. Every life has its own difficulties; but He did not follow out the details of any life but His own. Now, as a matter of fact, no life can be an example of all the details in every life. We have no right to say that all possible good deeds have been done, or all possible wrongs committed; and Ethics seeks only for the general principles that apply to all possible actions, and determine whether they are good or bad. Metaphysically, we are obliged to accept the LOGOS and the Spirit as the Objective and Subjective sides of the Absolute, not merely in relation to all things that have been and are, but also in relation to all possibilities of being. It is therefore enough, ethically, to show that His Life—with its works and its temptations—was *of the same kind* as ours, and that His principles of action were applicable to all that is involved in the conception of human morality. Here, as before, the doctrine of His Godhead solves the difficulty; for His Life was not a brick from the house, but the whole house—on a perfect, though limited, scale. In the Absolute we see, perhaps, only the surface; but we can tell the solid from a perfect view of the surface. In the Absolute we see, perhaps, not the boundless Ocean of Infinity, but only a sea that can be brought within the ken of our senses. But the wind blows the surface of the sea into the image of the ocean billows, and, when the

wind has ceased, both gleam in the same sunlight and rest in the same perfect peace. In a lower sense, for this very reason, we speak of "Spirituality," of "God-likeness," in the men we know ; theirs is likeness to the Absolute, as that of the Absolute is likeness to the Infinite. So the Ontological Ethic of Christianity teaches us that the "Spirit" brings us, not a slavish repetition of even the life of Christ, but His motives, strength, "Obedience" to GOD, even as, by our very nature, we are always placed in circumstances that, in their inmost being, are *like* His. And this seems necessarily to imply—what Kant thinks we must assume—Immortality, as a necessary condition of our relation to the Absolute: since Moral Perfection in all things means a perfect likeness to the Incarnate LOGOS, and this has never been reached in this world by any Individual Human Spirit, or in all Time by all the Race of Man. And we have no reason to believe that full perfection in the endlessly varying forms of Good—"the living garment of GOD"—can be reached in anything short of the everlasting and ever-growing life of a deathless Spirit.

ALEX. R. EAGAR.

A SYNOPSIS, ANALYTICAL AND QUOTATIONAL,
OF THE VERBAL FORMS IN THE BASKISH
NEW TESTAMENT PRINTED AT LA ROCHELLE
IN 1571.

[*Continued from Vol. XIV., 1907, No. XXXIII., p. 260.*]

GVINÉN. 2. Ind. imp. pl. 1., aux. *We were.*

3. 23. . . . , Leguearen azpian BEGUIRATZEN *guinen*
ERTSIAC

. . . , nous estions gardez sous la Loy, enclos

4. 3. . . . , munduco elementén AZPIRATUAC GUINÉN
sueiectionetan : (H. omit la virgule.)

. . . , estions reduits en seruitude sous les rudimens
du monde.

GVINENEAN. 1. I. q. *guinén*, le *n* final devenant le
rel. loc. de temps (ou rel. temporel) décliné au temporel.
(*nean* = *lors que.*) *When we were.*

4. 3. Hala gu-ere haourrac GUINENEAN, (H. omit la
virgule.) Nous aussi pareillement, lors que nous estions
enfants,

ITZAÇVE. 1. Imp. pl. 2., r. pl., aux. act. *Have ye them!*

6. 2. Elkarren cargác EGAR¹ *itzaçue*:

Portez les charges les vns des autres :

LEQVIENÇÁT. 1. Subj. passé s. 3., décl. dest., aux.
To the end that it should be to them. (Voyez *Duteney*. Cf.
Rom. 4. 11.)

3. 22. . . . , promessa Iesus Christen fedeaz EMAN
lequiençdt

¹ Cf. *egarrico* chez B. Dechepare, St. Jean 16. 12.

1545. Voyez ci-dessus *Du* 6. 5. et

. . . , afin que la promesse par la foy de Iesus Christ fust donnee à ceux

LEDINÇÁT. 1. Subj. passé s. 3., décl. dest., aux. *To the end that it should be.*

3. 14. Abrahamen benedictionea Gentiletara HEL ledinçát Iesus Christez, Afin que la benediction d'Abraham aduint aux Gentils par Iesus Christ :

LEITENO. 1. Conditionnel prés. s. 3., n. rel. temp. décl. duratif, aux. (*no = jusqu'à tant que.*) *Until it should be.*

3. 19. . . . , ETHOR leiteno haci hura . . . , iusqu'à tant que la semence vint

LEÇAN. 1. Subj. passé s. 3., r. s., aux. act. *That it should have one.*

3. 21. . . . ceinec VIVIFICA AHAL leçan, . . . pour pouuoir viuifier, (Le régime n'est pas exprimé.)

LEÇANÇÁT. 1. I. q. leçan, décl. dest. *To the end that it should have it.*

2. 5. . . . , Euangelioco eguiác çuetan IRAUN leçançdt.

. . . : afin que la verité de l'Euangile fust permanente en vous.

LITZANÇÁT. 1. Subj. passé s. 3., r. pl., décl. dest., aux. act. *To the end that he might have them.* (Voyez Ciradenac.)

4. 5. . . . REDEMI litzançdt, Afin qu'il rachetast ceux baLIZ. 3. Hypothétique s. 3., aux. *If he, or it were.*

3. 16. . . . , anhitzez MINÇO baliz beçala: (H. mit minço = *parlant.*)

. . . , comme *parlant* de plusieurs :

3. 21. . . . Ecen EMAN içan baliz Leguea

. . . : car si la Loy eust esté donnee

4. 15. . . . , baldin possible IÇAN ALbaliz, . . . , que s'il eust esté possible,

LIÇATE. 1. Cond. prés. s. 3., v. s. *It would be.*

3. 21. . . . , segur Leguetic LIÇATE iustitiá.

. . . , vrayement la iustice seroit de la Loy.

NABILA. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1., avec *a* interrogatif, v. irr. intr. *ebil*. *Walk I?*

1. 10. . . . ? ala¹ guïçonén gogara EGUIN NAHIZ NABILA ?
 . . . ? ou cherche-ie à plaire aux hommes? (On remarque que *dut* dans ce verset ne porte pas la terminaison interrogative. Celle-ci est en effet rare chez Leïçarraga.)

NADIN. 1. Subj. prés. s. 1., aux. *That I be*.

6. 14. . . . GLORIA *nadin* Iesus Christ gure Iaunaren crutzean baïcen :

. . . que ie me glorifie sinon en la croix de nostre Seigneur Iesus Christ,

ezNAGVIAN. 1. Conj. passé s. 1., r. s., v. irr. act. *eguin*. *That I should (not) make it*.

2. 2. . . . , neholerè alfer laster ezNAGUIAN (H. mit *aznaguian*.)

. . . : afin qu'en quelque sorte que ce soit ie ne courusse . . . en vain.

NAGO. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1., v. irr. neut. *egon*. *I stand, remain*.

1. 6. Miraz NAGO nola horrein sarri, . . . Ie m'esbahi qu' . . . soudainement (L. traduit *δύρω ταχέως*.)

NAIZ. 13. Ind. prés. s. 1., v. s. & aux. *Am*.

1. 16. . . . , eznaiz bertan CONSEILLATU *içan* hara-guiarequin edo odolarequin: . . . : ie ne prins point conseil incontinent de la chair & du sang : (*arequin* signifie *avec la* ou *le*.)

1. 17. Eta eznaiz Ierusalemra ITZULI *içan*

Et ie ne reuins point en Ierusalem

2. 10. . . . : eta haren beraren EGUITERA arthatsu IÇAN *naiz*.

. . . : ce que i'ay aussi esté songneux de faire.

2. 19. . . . , Christequin batean CRUCIFICATU *içan naiz*.

. . . : & suis crucifié avec Iesus Christ,

2. 20. Bada VICI *naiz*, ez guehiagoric ni, . . . Iaincoaren

¹ Cf. *ἀπα* en grec.

Semearen fedeaz VICI *naiz*, Ainsi ie vi, non point maintenant moy, . . . , ie vi en la foy du fils de Dieu,

3. 15. Anayeac, guiçonén ançora MINÇO *naiz*,

Freres, ie parle à la façon des hommes,

4. 12. . . . : ecen ni-ere çuec beçala NAIZ : (H. mit *naiz* parce que L. a lui *ὅτι καὶ ὡς ὑμεῖς*, sans l'équivalent de *suis*.) . . . : car aussi suis ie comme vous,

4. 19. . . . , ceinéz berriz ERTZECO penatan baiNAIZ,

. . . , pour lesquels enfanter ie trauaille derechef,

4. 20. . . . : ecen dudatan NAIZ çueçaz.

. . . : car ie suis en doute quant à vous.

5. 10. Ni SEGURATZEN *naiz* çueçaz *gure* Iaunean, Ie m'assure de vous au Seigneur, (*gure* est une interpolation du traducteur. Il a employé l'italique sur un système régulier qui nous permet d'affirmer qu'il a étudié non seulement le texte grec, mais aussi la traduction de J. Calvin publiée à Lyon, ou Lion, en 1566. Leizarraga and his four collaborators began their task in 1565, as appears from a note on p. 288 of *La Revue Internationale des Etudes Basques* (1907). The text of the reformed Calvinian version is identical in the editions from 1561 until 1566. But certain typographical details indicate that those Bask scholars studied minutely that of Sebastian Honorati, published at Lyon in 1566.)

5. 11. . . . , cergatic are PERSECUTATZEN *naiz* ?

. . . , pourquoy souffre-ie encore persecution ?

NAICÉN. 2. I. q. *naiz*, aux., avec *e* euph. devant *n* rel. médiatif (= *par laquelle*), & conj. = *que*. *By which I am; that I am.*

2. 20. . . . : eta orain haraguian VICI *naicen* VICITZEAZ, (H. omit les deux points et cette virgule.) . . . : & ce que ie vi maintenant en la chair,

4. 11. . . . , alfer TRABAILLATU *naicén* çuec baithan.

. . . , que d'adventure ie n'aye trauaillé en vain enuers vous.

NAICENEAN. 1. I. q. *naicēn*, v.s., *n* rel. temp. décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*.) *When I am*.

4. 18. . . . , eta ez solament çuec baithan present NAICENEAN.

. . . , & non seulement quand ie suis present avec vous.

baiNAV. 2. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. s. 1^e pers., aux. act. *Has me*.

1. 15. . . . (ceinec . . . , eta DEITHU bainau bere gratiaz) [H. omit la virgule.]

. . . , & qui m'a appelé par sa grace.)

2. 20. . . . , ceinec ONHETSI *ukan* bainau, . . . , qui m'a aimé,

NAVÇVE. 2. Ind. prés. pl. 2., r. s. 1^e pers., aux. act. *Ye have me*.

4. 12. . . . : ni deusetan eznauçue INIURIATU *ukan*.

. . . , vous me m'avez en rien offensé.

4. 14. . . . , aitzitic Iaincoaren Ainguerubat beçala RECEBITU *ukan nauçue*, . . . : ains vous m'avez reçu comme vn Ange de Dieu,

NAZAYÓ. 1. (Il faut lire *natzayó*. Cf. St. Jean 16. 33., et ailleurs). Ind. prés. s. 1., r. i. s., aux. *Am to it*.

2. 19. Ecen ni Legueaz Legueari HIL *içan natzayó*, Car par la Loy ie suis mort à la Loy :

NATZAIÇVE. 1. Ind. prés. s. 1., r. i. pl. 2^e pers., aux. *Am I to you ?*

4. 16. Etsay EGUIN *natzaiçue* . . . ? Vous suis-ie donc fait ennemi . . . ?

NEQVIONÇAT. 1. Subj. prés. s. 1., r. i. s., décl. dest., aux. *To the end that I be to Him*.

2. 19. . . . , Iaincoari VICI *nequionçat*, . . . , afin que ie viue à Dieu.

NENDIN. 7 Ind. imp. s. 1., aux. Syn. de *Nincen*. *I was*.

1. 17. . . . : baina IOAN *nendin* Arabiara : eta harçara ITZUL *nendin* Damascera.

. . . : ains ie m'en allay en Arabie, & derechef retournay à Damas.

1. 18. Gueroztic hirur vrtheren buruān ITZUL *nendin* Ierusalemra Pierrisen VISITATZERA : eta EGON *nendin* harequin amorz¹ egun. Depuis, trois ans apres ie reuins en Ierusalem pour visiter Pierre : & demeuray auec luy quinze iours.

1. 21. Guero ETHOR *nendin* Syriaco eta Ciliciaco herrietara. Depuis ie vins és païs de Syrie & de Cilice.

2. 1. . . . , berriz IGAN *nendin* Ierusalemra Barnabasequin, eta Tite-ere HARTURIC. . . . , ie montay derechef en Ierusalem auec Barnabas, & prins aussi Tite.

(L. traduit, συμπαραλαβὼν καὶ Τίτον')

2. 2. Eta IGAN *nendin* reuelationez, Et y montay par reuelation,

ezNEÇAN. 1. Ind. imp. s. 1., r.s., aux. act. (Synonyme de *Nuen*.) *I had him*.

1. 19. Eta berce Apostoluetaric ezneçan² IKUS

Et ne vi nul autre des Apostres,

NEÇANÇÁT. 1. Subj. passé s. 1., r.s., décl. dest., aux. act. *To the end that I should have Him*. (Cf. Actes 11. 17., 23. 18.; Luc 19. 27.)

1. 16. Bere Semearen REVELATZERA nitan, hura EVANGELIZA *neçançdt*² Gentilén artean, De reueler son Fils en moy, afin que ie l'euangelizasse entre les Gentils :

NIECÉN. 1. Ind. imp. s. 1., r.s., r. i. pl., aux. act. *I had it to them*.

2. 2. . . . , eta hæy COMMUNICA *niecén* . . . Euangelioa,

¹ Forme dialectale de *hamaborz*, prononcé *hamaborts*.

² *Neçan* is used by Leizarraga in three senses other than these two ; i.e. *A*. Subj. prés. s. 3., r. s. 1^{re} pers., Luke 10. 40, John 5. 7. *B*. Subj. prés. s. 2., r. s. 1^{re} pers. adressé à un

mâle, Mark 5. 7, Acts 26, 3 (where the accent on *neçan* appears to be a misprint : for *neçan* would be the contraction of *neçacan*.) *C*. Imp. s. 2., r. s. 1^{re} pers. adressé à une femme, John 4. 21. In the Acts it occurs ten times in the sense of *Nuen*.

... , & communiquay avec eux de l'Euangile (L. traduit αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.)

NIEÇÓN. 2. Ind. imp. s. 1, r. s., r. i. s., aux. act. *I had it to him.*

2. 11. . . . , bekoquiz RESISTI *nieçon* hari, . . . , ie luy resistay en face,

2. 14. . . . , ERRAN *nieçon* Pierrisi gucien aitzinean, . . . , ie di à Pierre deuant tous,

bai NINDVEN. 1. Ind. imp. s. 3., r. s. 1^{re} pers., aux. act. (*Of Him*) *Who had me.*

1. 15. . . . (ceinec neure amaren sabeleandanic APPAR-TATU baininduen, (H. omit la virgule.) . . . (qui m'auoit mis à part dés le ventre de ma mere,

baNINZ. 1. Suppositif s. 1., v. s. *If I were.*

1. 10. . . . ? Segur baldin oraino guiçonén gogaraco ba-NINZ,

. . . ? certes si ie plaisoye encore aux hommes,

ezNINÇANDE. 1. Cond. prés s. 1., v. s. *I should (not) be.*

1. 10. . . . , Christen cerbitzari ezNINÇANDE.

. . . , ie ne seroye point seruiteur de Christ.

NINCELARIC. 1. I. q. *nincén*, v. s., avec élision du *n* devant *laric* participial. *While I was.*

1. 14. . . . , neure aitén ordenancetara affectione guehienduna¹ NINCELARIC.

. . . : estant le plus ardent zelateur des traditions de mes peres.

NINCÉN. 2. Ind. imp. s. 1., v. s. & aux. *I was.*

1. 14. Eta *nola* PROBETCHATZEN *nincén* Iudaismoan, ene quidetaric anhitz baino guehiago, neure nationean, Et profitoye en la loy Judaïque plus que plusieurs de mes pareils en ma nation: (Voyez *Duque* et le verset 13. On remarque *kide* = *pareil*, *fellow*. Il est fréquent comme

¹ *Guehien-duna* is the same as *The termination dun = holder, haver,*
guehien duena = he who has most. is common in Heuscara.

terminaison, e.g. *adizkide* = *ami*, littéralement 'pareil d'esprit,' 'mind-fellow,' 'animi comes.')

1. 22. Eta NINCEN beguithartez EÇAGUN gabea Iudeaco Eliça Christean *ciradeney*: (La forme dativale = "j'étais à eux" est celle qu'exige *ciradeney*. Mais L. l'attache plutôt à 'eçagun gabea' qu'à *nincen*. L. fit imprimer *ciradeney* parce que l'équivalent manque au texte grec.) Et estoye incognu de face aux Eglises de Iudee, qui estoyent en Christ.

NVQVE. 1. Cond. prés. s. I., r. s., aux. act. *I would have it.*

4. 20. NAHI *nuque* orain çuequin IÇAN, eta CAMBIATU neure voza: Je voudroye maintenant estre avec vous, & changer ma voix:

NVEN. 2. Ind. imp. s. I., r. s., aux. act. (= *Neçan*. 1. 19). *I had it.*

1. 13. . . ., nola terriblequi Iaincoaren Eliça PERSECUTATZEN eta DESEGUITEN *nuen*:

. . .: comment ie persecutoye l'Eglise de Dieu à outrance,

2. 2. . . . edo¹ EGUIN *eznuen*. (ἦ ἔδραμον.) . . . ou eusse couru en vain. (Voyez *ezNaguian*. Il faut répéter 'laster' mentalement après 'edo'.)

NVENEAN. 1. I. q. *nuen*, le *n* final servant de rel. temp. décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*.) *When I had it.*

2. 14. Baina IKUSSI *ukan nuenean* . . . Mais quand ie vi

TA. 15. I. q. *da*, avec les préfixes *bai*, *éz*, *ezpai* qui ont empêché la décadence du *T* initial primitif. *Is*, or (with *éz*, *ezpai*) *is not*, Middle-English *nis*. (*Ezpai*, literally 'yes not,' means 'really,' or 'certainly not.' It affirms the negation.)

2. 16. . . .: ceren haraguiric batre *ezpaita* IUSTIFI-

¹ If Baskish *eta* = *and* comes from Latin *et*, is it not possible that *edo* = *or* was taken from a Visi-Gothic equivalent of *aip̃hau*, as used by Wulfila in the fourth century, e.g. Matt. 6. 24, Luke 16. 13?

CATUREN Legueco obréz, . . . : pource que nulle chair ne sera iustificée par les œuvres de la Loy.

3. 10. . . . norere *ezpaita* EGONEN . . . gauça gucietan, . . . quiconque n'est permanent en toutes les choses (L. traduit 'ne restera point,' 'non permanserit.' Le grec est *ἐμμένει*.)

3. 12. Eta Leguea *ezTA* fedetic : Et la Loy n'est point de la foy :

3. 16. . . . , cein *baïTA* Christ. . . . : qui est Christ.

3. 20. Eta Arartecoa *ezTA* batena : Or le Mediateur n'est point d'vn,

3. 28. *EzTA* Iuduric ez Grecquic, *ezTA* sclaboric ez librerie, *ezTA* arric ez emeric : Il n'y a ne Iuif ne Grec, il n'y a ne serf ne franc, il n'y a ne masle ne femelle :

4. 1. . . . , *ezTA* different deusetan cerbitzariaganic, . . . , il n'est different en rien du serf,

4. 6. . . . , Abba, ERRAN NAHI *baita*, Aita. . . . , Abba, Pere. (H. mit *erran nahi baita*. Il n'y a rien d'équivalent dans le texte grec, ni chez Calvin. Voyez 5. 14.)

4. 26. . . . , cein *baïTA* gure gución ama.

. . . , laquelle est mere de nous tous. (*gución* est la forme démonstrative de *gucién*, et signifie 'de ces tous,' 'de nous-autres tous,' 'de nosotros todos.' À cause du démonstratif L. mit *gure* = *de nous*, le possessif, au lieu de *gu* = *nous*. Cf. *Çareten* 5. 4, *Çarete* 3. 28, où *gucióc* est 'ces (vous) tous.'

5. 8. Persuasione hori *ezTA* . . . Ceste persuasion ne vient point

5. 10. . . . , norere *baïTA* hura. . . . , quiconque il soit.

5. 14. . . . , cein *baïTA*, . . . *asçauoir* (H. mit *baita*.)

5. 23. Hunelacoén contra legueric *ezTA*.

: contre telles choses il n'y a point de loy.

ezTAQVIDALA. 1. I. q. *daquidala*, Imp. s. 3., r. i. s. 1^o pers., aux. *Let it (not) be to me !*

6. 14. Baina niri GUERTHA *eztaquidala*

Mais quand [sic] à moy, ainsi n'aduienne

ezTADILA. 2. I. q. *dadila*, Imp. s. 3., aux. *Be it (not!)*

2. 17. . . . ? GUERTHA *eztadila*. . . . ? Ainsi n'aduienne.

3. 21. . . . ? GUERTHA *eztadila*. . . . ? Ainsi n'aduienne :

ezTELA. 3. I. q. *dela*, aux. *That he is (not.)*

1. 11. . . . , ezTELA guiçonaren araura. . . . que . . . , n'est point selon l'homme.

2. 16. . . . ecen *eztela* guiçona IUSTIFICATZEN Legueco obréz,

. . . que l'homme n'est point iustifié par les œuvres de la Loy,

3. 11. Eta Legueaz nehor *eztela* IUSTIFICATZEN Iaincoa baithan, Or que par la Loy nul n'est iustifié enuers Dieu.

ezTELARIC. 2. I. q. *dela*, v. s., avec *laric* participial.

While it is (not.)

1. 7. Berceric batre ezTELARIC : Qui n'est pas vn autre *Euangile* : *δ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο*,

6. 3. . . . , deus ezTELARIC, . . . , comme ainsi soit qu'il ne soit rien,

ezTÉN. 1. I. q. *den*, v. s., conjonctif. *That it be (not!)*

5. 13. . . . , libertatea ezTÉN haraguiari occasionetan :

. . . que la liberté ne soit occasion à la chair,

ezTEÇATENÇÁT. 1. I. q. *deçatençdt*. Subj. prés. pl. 3. r. s., décl. dest., aux. act. *To the end that they have it (not).*

6. 12. . . . : solament Christen crutzeagatic persecutioner SUFFRI *ezteçatençdt*. . . . : a fin seulement qu'ils n'endurent persecution pour la croix de Christ.

ezTEÇAÇVEN. 1. Subj. prés. pl. 2, r. s., aux. act. *That ye have it (not.)*

3. 1. . . . eguia OBEDI *ezteçaçuen* ? . . . que n'obeissiez à la verité,

ezTIC. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. s., adr. masc., aux. act. *Has it (not), O man!*

4. 30. . . . : ecen *eztic* HERETATUREN nescatoaren semeac . . . : car le fils de la seruante ne sera point heritier

(L. translates 'shall not inherit it,' οὐ γὰρ μὴ κληρονομήσῃ.)

ezTIDALA. 1. Imp. s. 3., r. s., r. i. s. 1° pers., v. irr. act. *eguin* en sens d'*eman*. (Inchauspe confirma cette interprétation.) *Let him (not) give it to me!*

6. 17. Hemendic harát nehorc enoyuric ezTIDALA :

Que nul désormais ne me baille peine :

ezTIODALA. 1. I. q. *diot*, avec *da* euph. pour *t* devant la conj. en complément d'*ecen* = *que*. *That I say it (not.)*

1. 20. . . . , ecen ezTIODALA gueçurric. . . . que ie ne mens point.

baiTIRADE. 4. I. q. *dirade*. *They indeed are.*

3. 10. Ecen norere Legueco obretaric baitIRADE,
Car tous ceux qui font des œuvres de la Loy,

5. 19. . . . , cein baitIRADE, . . . : lesquelles sont,

6. 12. Nor-ere NAHI baitirade apparent ERACUTSI haraguian, Tous ceux qui cherchent belle apparence en la chair,

6. 16. Eta nor-ere regla hunen araura EBILTEN baitirade, Et tous ceux qui marchent selon ceste reigle,

ezTIRADENAC. 1. I. q. *diradenac*, accusatif. (*nac* = *ceux qui*.) *Those who are (not.)*

4. 8. . . . naturaz iainco ezTIRADENAC.

. . . à ceux qui de nature ne sont point dieux.

baiTITVÇVE. 2. I. q. *dituçue*. *Ye have them, or (with éz) have them not.*

4. 9. . . . , cein ohi beçala CERBITZATU NAHI baitituçue ?
. . . , ausquels vous voulez derechef servir comme au parauant ?

5. 17. . . . : hala non . . . gauça guciac ezpaitituçue EGUITEN.

. . . , tellement que vous ne faites point tout (L. rend *rāvra* par *gauça guciac*. Voyez *Dituçuen* 5. 17.).

ezTITZAÇVELA. 1. I. q. *ditzaçuela*. Imp. pl. 2., r. pl., aux. act. *Have ye them (not!)*

5. 16. . . . : eta haraguiaren guthiciac *eztitzaçuela* COMPLI.

. . . , & vous n'accomplirez point les desirs de la chair.
οὐ μὴ τελέσητε. (L. traduit l'impératif.)

ezTRAVDATE. 1. I. q. *draudaté*. Ind. prés. pl. 3., r. s.,
r. i. s. 1^{re} pers., aux. act. *They have it (not) to me.*

2. 6. . . . eztraudate deus guehiagoric COMMUNICATU.

. . . ne m'ont rien apporté d'auantage.

TV. 7. I. q. *du*, aux. act. *Has*, or (with *éz*) *has not, it.*

1. 4. Ceinec bere buruä EMAN *ukan baitu* gure bekatu-
acgatic, Qui s'est donné soy-mesme pour nos pechez,

2. 6. . . . : ecen Iaincoac *eztu* guiçonaren campoco
apparentiä HARTZEN) . . . : car Dieu n'accepte point
l'apparence extérieure de l'homme) (Chaucerian *nath.*)

2. 20. . . . , eta EMAN *ukan baitu* bere buruä enegatic.

. . . , & s'est baillé soy-mesme pour moy.

3. 6. *Baina aitzitic* Abrahamec nola Iaincoa SINHETSI
ukan baitu, *Ains plustost* comme Abraham a creu à Dieu,

3. 15. . . . , nehorc *eztu* HAUSTEN ez EMENDATZEN.

. . . , nul ne le casse ou y adiouste.

3. 16. . . . *Eztu* ERRAITEN, . . . Il ne dit point,

6. 7. . . . : ecen cer-ere EREINEN *baitu* guiçonac,

. . . : car ce que l'homme aura semé,

ezTVELA. 1. I. q. *duela*, i.e. *du*, avec *e* euph. & *la* conj.,
aux. act. *That it has it (not.)*

3. 17. . . . Legueac *eztuela* HAUSTEN,

. . . , que la Loy . . . ne la peut enfreindre, (Voyez
Den 3. 17.)

ezTVT. 3. I. q. *dut*, aux. act. *I have it (not.)*

1. 12. Ecen *eztut* hura guiçonanic RECEBITU ez IKASSI :
Car ie ne l'ay point receu ou apprins d'aucun homme,

2. 6. Eta *eztut deus* IKASSI . . . *Et n'ay rien apprins*
(H. mit *eztut deus ikassi*, mais Eta pour δὲ.)

2. 21. *Eztut* ABOLITZEN Iaincoaren gratiä :

le n'aboli point la grace de Dieu :

ezTVTE. 1. I. q. *duté*. *They have it (not.)*

6. 13. . . . berec-ere *eztute* Leguea BEGUIRATZEN :

. . . ceux-mesmes . . . , ne gardent point la Loy :

ezTVTELA. 1. I. q. *tute*, avec *la* conj. *That they have it (not.)*

5. 21. . . . Iaincoaren resumá HERETATUREN *eztutela*.

. . . n'heriteront point le royaume de Dieu.

ezTVÇVE. 2. I. q. *duçue*, aux. act. *Ye have it (not.)*

4. 14. Eta niçaz . . . : experientia *eztuçue* MENOSPRESIATU ez ARBUIATU¹ *ukan*,

Et n'auez point mesprisé ne reietté l'espreuue de moy,

4. 21. . . . , Leguea *eztuçue* ENÇUTEN ? . . . , n'oyez-vous point la Loy ?

ezTVÇVELA. 1. I. q. *tuçue*, avec *la* conj. *That ye have it (not.)*

5. 10. . . . , ecen *eztuçuela* berce sendimenduric UKANEN :

. . . , que vous n'aurez autre sentiment :

eTZABILTZALA. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 3., *la* conj., v. irr. intr. *ebil*. *That they walked (not.)*

2. 14. . . . ecen eTZABILTZALA oin chuchenez,

. . . qu'ils ne cheminoyent point de droit pied

baiTZAYÓ. 2. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. i. s., aux. *Is to him*, or *her*.

3. 6. . . . , eta hari iustitiatan IMPUTATU *içan baitzayo* :

. . . , & il luy a esté imputé à iustice.

3. 19. . . . ceini promessa EGUIN *içan baitzayó*,

. . . à laquelle auoit esté faite la promesse :

ÇAYÓN. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. i. s., *n* rel. nom., aux. *Which is to him*.

4. 2. . . . aitáz ORDENATU *içan çayón* demborarano. (H. omit ce point.) . . . iusqu'au temps déterminé par le pere.

eTZAIT. 2. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. i. s. 1^{re} pers., aux. *Is*, or (with *e*) *is not*, *to me*.

¹ From Latin *repudiato*, or Castilian *repuja* ?

2. 6. . . ., *etzait* deus HUNQUITZEN : (il ne me touche en rien (οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. *Deus* = rien n'est pas ici le sujet de *tzait*, mais l'adverbe = *de rien, nullement*. Cf. *TZaiç-uela*.)

6. 14. . . . : ceinez mundua niri CRUCIFICATU *baitzait*, eta ni munduari. . . ., par laquelle le monde m'est crucifié, & moy au monde.

ÇAITADALA. 1. I. q. *tzait*, avec *ada* euph. pour *t* devant la conj. *That it is to me*.

2. 7. . . . ecen . . . Euangelioaren *predicationea* niri EMAN *içan çaitadala*,

. . . que la predication . . . m'estoit commise, (En grec τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, sans l'équivalent de *predicationea*.)

ÇAITADAN. 1. I. q. *tzait*, avec *ada* euph. devant *n* rel. nom. = *qui*. *Which is to me*.

2. 9. . . . niri EMAN *içan çaitadan gratiá*,

. . . la grace qui m'estoit donnée : (L. dit 'm'est été.)

eTZAITEZTELA. 2. I. q. *Çaitertzela*, avec *e* négatif.

Imp. pl. 2., aux. *Be ye (not !)*

5. 1. . . ., eta berriz *etzaitertzela* EDUQUI *suiectioñezco* vztarriaz. . . ., & ne soyez point derechef retenus du ioug de servitude.

6. 7. *Etzaitertzela* ENGANA : Ne vous abusez point,

eTZAITEZTEN & ÇAITEZTEN. 2. Conj. prés. pl. 2., aux. *That ye be, or (with e) be not*.

5. 15. . . . bata berceaz CONSUMI *etzaitertzten*.

. . . que ne soyez consommez l'un par l'autre.

6. 13. . . . çuec CIRCONCIDI *çaitertzten*, . . . que soyez circoncis,

ÇAITEZTEZ. 1. Hypothétique pl. 2., aux. (*If*) *ye be*.

5. 2. . . ., baldin CIRCONCIDI *baçaitertez*,¹ (H. omit ces virgules.)

. . . si vous estes circoncis,

ÇAITEZTEZ. 1. Imp. pl. 2., aux. *Be ye!*

5. 16. . . . , Spirituaren araura EBIL *çaitetztez* :¹

. . . , cheminez selon l'Esprit,

ÇAITVZTENAC. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. pl. 2^e pers., *n* rel, s. nom. act. décl. nom. s. act. (sujet de *du*), aux. act. (*nac* = *celui qui*.) *He who has you.*

5. 10. . . . : baina çuec TRUBLATZEN *çaituztenac*,

. . . : mais celui [sic]qui vous trouble

ÇAITVZTENAC. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3., r. pl. 2^e pers., *n* rel. pl. nom. act. décl. nom. pl. passif (sujet de *ailitez*), aux. act. (*nac* = *ceux qui*.) *Those who have you.*

5. 12. . . . çuec TRUBLATZEN *çaituztenac*. . . . ceux qui troublent vostre repos,

ÇAITVZTENAGANIC. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. pl. 2^e pers., *n* rel. s. nom. act. décl. ablatif dét., aux. act. (*naganic* = *de celui qui*.)

5. 8. . . . çuec DEITZEN *çaituztenaganic*. . . . de celui qui vous appele.

ÇAITVZTÉZ. 2. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. pl. 2^e pers., aux. act. *Has you.*

3. 1. . . . , norc ENCANTATU *çaituztéz* . . . ? . . . , qui vous a ensorcelez . . . ?

5. 7. . . . , norc EMPATCHATU *çaituztéz*, . . . ? . . . , qui vous a empeschez . . . ?

ÇAITVZTÉZ. 3. Ind. prés. pl. 3., r. pl. 2^e pers., aux. act. *They have you.*

1. 7. . . . : baina batzuc TRUBLATZEN *çaituztéz*,

. . . : mais il y en a qui vous troublent,

4. 17. . . . , ez onetacotz : baina aitzitic IDOQUI NAHI *çaituztéz*, (H. omit les : et la 2^e virgule.) . . . , non point. pour bien : plustost vous veulent-ils forclorre,

6. 12. . . . , hec BORTCHATZEN *çaituztez* CIRCONCIDITU IÇATERA :

¹ Compare the different ways in which "be ye" and "ye be" may be used in English, indicative, interroga-

tive, and imperative. The hypothetic is the suppositive of the subjunctive. See *Çarête* 3. 29 & 5. 18.

... , sont ceux qui vous contraignent d'estre circoncis :

ÇAIZQVIO. 1. Ind. prés. pl. 3., r. i. s., aux. *They are to him.*

3. 16. Abrahami bada promessac ERRAN *içan çaizquio*, eta haren haciari. Or les promesses ont esté dites à Abraham & à sa semence.

baiTZAIÇVE. 1. Ind. prés. s. 3., r. i. pl. 2° pers., aux. *Is to you.*

3. 1. . . . ? ceiney beguién aitzinean lehenetic REPRESENTATU *içan baitzaiçue* Iesus Christ, çuen artean CRUCIFICATUA ?

... , ausquels Iesus Christ a esté par ci deuant pourtrait deuant les yeux, & crucifié entre vous ?

eTZAIÇVELA. 1. I. q. *tzaiçue*, avec la conj. = *que*, en compl. d'*ecen*. *That he is to you.*

5. 2. . . . ecen, . . . , Christ *etzaiçuela* deus PROBETCHATUREN. (H. omit ces virgules.) . . . que . . . , Christ ne vous profitera de rien.

ÇARETE & TZARETE. 12. Ind. prés. pl. 2., v. s. & aux. *Ye are.*

3. 3. Hain çoro ÇARETE, Spirituaz HASSIRIC, . . . ?

Estes-vous tant mal-advisez, que en ayant commencé par l'Esprit, . . . ?

3. 26. Ecen guciác Iaincoaren haour ÇARETE

Car vous estes tous enfans de Dieu

3. 28. . . . : ecen çuec gucioc bat ÇARETE Iesus Christean.

. . . : car vous estes tous vn en Iesus Christ.

3. 29. Eta baldin çuec Christenac baÇARETE, beraz Abrahamen haci ÇARETE, (H. mit *baçarete*, parce que L. avait lu *εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ*.) Que si vous estes de Christ, vous estes donc semence d'Abraham,

4. 6. Eta ceren haour baitzarete, Et pourtant que vous estes enfans,

4. 9. . . . , nola CONVERTITZEN *çarete* harçara . . . ?¹

. . . , comment vous conuertissez-vous derechef . . . ?

5. 4. Christez GABETU *çarete* . . . : eta gratiatic ERORI *çarete*. . . , vous-vous aneantissez Christ, & estes decheus de la grace. κατηγορήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ,

5. 13. . . . , çuec libertatera DEITHU *içan çarête* :²

. . . , vous auez esté appelez à liberté :

5. 18. Baldineta Spirituaz GUIDATZEN *baçarete*, *etzarete* Leguearen azpico. Que si vous estes menez de l'Esprit, vous n'estes point sous la Loy.

ÇARETEN. 4. I. q. *çarete*, avec *n* rel. pl. nom. (3. 27. & 5. 4.) et conj. = *que* (4. 12. en sens optatif ou impératif.) *Ye who are; that ye are; be ye!* (Voyez Nago.)

1. 6. . . . UTZIRIC TRANSPORTATU *içan çareten* berce Euangeliotara : . . . qu'en delaissant . . . vous estes soudainement transportez en vn autre Euangile.

3. 27. Ecen BATHEYATU *içan çareten* guciéc

Car vous tous qui estes baptizez, (Voyez *Duçue*.)

4. 12. ÇARETEN ni beçala : Soyez comme moy :

5. 4. . . . Legueaz IUSTIFICATU NAHI *çareten* gucioc :

Vous tous qui voulez estre iustifiez par la Loy,

ÇARETENAZ. 1. I. q. *çareten*, aux., avec *n* rel. temp. décl. méd. dét. régi. par *gueroz*. (*naz* = *depuis que*.) (*Since the (time) when ye are*.)

4. 9. . . . , baina aitzitic Iaincoaz EÇAGUTU *çaretenaz* gueroz, . . . , ou plustost auez esté cognus de Dieu,

ÇARETENÉC. 1. I. q. *çareten*, aux., *n* rel. pl. nom. décl. voc. pl. tr., avec *erradaçue*. (*néc* = *o vous qui*.) *Ye who are!*

¹ In Acts 27. 43. L. uses *harçara* as a radical active in the sense of *empescha*, ἐκάλυπεν. Pedro Novia de Salcedo in his Dictionary (small edition, Tolosa, 1902) says *Hartsaratu. Prohibir*. The idea of 'repeating' implies 'going

back.' See *Nendin* 1. 17. & 2. 1., where πάλιν is first *harçara* as here, and then *berris* = *anew, de nuevo*.

² Cet accent est-il unique chez Leizarraga ? En 1 Cor. 7. 23. H. mit *çareté*.

4. 21. . . . Leguearen azpico İÇAN NAHI *çaretencé*,
 . . . , vous qui voulez estre sous la Loy,
 ÇARETENOC. 1. I. q. *çaretencé*, mais démonstratif &
 v. s., avec *Eçaçue*. (*noc* = *vous-autres*, ou *ceux-vous*, *qui*.)
Those ye, you there, who are.

6. 1. . . . , çuec spiritual ÇARETENOC
 . . . , vous qui estes spirituels,

ÇAUDETE. 1. Imp. pl. 2., v. irr. neut. *egon*. *Stay ye!*

5. 1. Beraz . . . , ÇAUDETE fermu, Tenez-vous donc
 fermes

CEDIN & TZEDIN. 4. Ind. imp. s. 3., aux. (En 1 som.
 13. & 3. 23. le *n* final est la conj. *que* régi par *baino* = *que*.)
It was, or (with *e*) *was not* (Chaucerian *nas*).

1 som. 13. *Haren conuersionea CONVERTI cedin baino*
lehen. 13 *Sa conuersion auant sa conuersion*.

2. 3. . . . , etzedin BORTCHA CIRCONCIDITU İÇATERA,
 (H. mit un point.) . . . , ne fut contraint d'estre cir-
 concis,

2. 12. . . . , RETIRA eta SEPARA *cedin* hetaric
 . . . , il s'en retira, & se separa

3. 23. Bada fedea ETHOR *cedin* baino lehen,
 Or deuant que la foy vint,

CELA. 1. I. q. *cen*, aux., avec *la* conj. = *que* au lieu
 du *n*. *That it was*.

1. 23. . . . ERRAITEN *cela*, . . . dire, (H. mit *erraiten cela*,
 parce que *dire* ne se trouve pas au grec.)

CEN & TZÉN. 9. I. q. *cedin* & *tsedin*, qui en sont les
 formes anciennes, v. s. & aux. En 3. 23. & 4. 14. le *n* est
 le pron. rel. s. = *qui*.) *It was* ; *which was*.

2. 3. . . . , cein baitZÉN enequin, Grec bacEN-ere,
 . . . qui estoit avec moy, combien qu'il fust Grec,
 (L'accent sur *tsén* nous dit que ce mot est la contraction
 de *tsedin*.)

2. 11. . . . , ceren REPREHENDITZECO baitZén.
 . . . , pource qu'il estoit à reprendre.

2. 13. . . . : hala non Barnabas-ere EREKARRI *içan* baitzén hayén simulationera.

. . . , tellement que Barnabas mesme estoit induit à leur faintise.

3. 23. . . . REVELATZECO CEN federa HELTZECO. (H. mit *heltzeco*.)

. . . pour *paruenir* à la foy qui deuoit estre reuelee.

4. 14. Eta niçaz ene haraguian EGUITEN *cen* experientia (H. mit *eguiten cen*. L. a lu τὸν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου)

. . . l'espreuue de moy, telle qu'elle estoit en ma chair :

4. 15. Ceric CEN bada çuen dohainontassuna ?

Quelle estoit donc vostre beatitude ?

4. 23. Baina nescatoaganicoa haraguiaren araura IAYO *içan cen*, Mais celuy qui estoit de la seruante estoit nay selon la chair :

CENDRAVZQVEDETELA. 1. Cond. passé pl. 2., r. pl., r. i. s. 1^e pers., *la* conj., aux. act. (On prononcerait un *e* entre le *d* et le *r*. On ne trouve pas ce mot ailleurs chez Leiçarraga.) *That ye would have had them to me.*

4. 15. . . . , çuen beguiac IDOQUIRIC EMAN *cendraz-quedetela*.

. . . , vous eussiez arraché vos yeux, & les m'eussiez donnez.

CENDVTEN. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 2., r. s., aux. act. *Ye had it.*

5. 7. Vngui laster EGUITEN *cenduten*, Vous couriez bien, eTZENDVTENEAN. 1. I. q. *cenduten*, le *n* devenant rel. temp. décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*.) *When ye had Him (not).*

4. 8. Baina, Iaincoa EÇAGUTZEN *etzendutenean*, (H. omit les virgules.) Or alors que vous ne cognoissiez point Dieu,

CENDVZTENA. 1. Ind. imp. s. 3., r. pl. 2^e pers., *n* rel. s. nom. act. décl. acc., aux. act. (*na* = *celui qui*.) *Him who had you.*

1. 6. . . . , Christen gratiara DEITHU *ukan cenduztena* UTZIRIC . . . delaissant celuy qui vous auoit appelez par grace (L. traduit 'à grace.' Le grec est ἐν χάριτι.)

134 A SYNOPSIS OF THE VERBAL FORMS

CENEAN. 1. I. q. *cen*, aux., le *n* devenant le pron. rel. temp. décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*, *at the time at which*.) *When he was*.

2. 11. Eta ETHORRI *içan cenean* Pierris Antiochera,
Et quand Pierre fut venu en Antioche,

eTZENEÇATEN. 1. Sub. prés. pl. 2., r. s., aux. act. *That ye should (not) have it*.

5. 7. . . . , eguia OBEDI *etzeneçaten* ? . . . que n'obeissiez à vérité ?

CENTVZTEN. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 2., r. pl., aux. act. *Ye had them*.

4. 8. . . . , CERBITZATZEN *centuzten* (H. omit la virgule. Voyez *ezTiradenac*.) . . . , vous serviez à ceux

CIOELA. 1. Ind. imp. s. 3., r. s., *e* euph., la participial, v. irr. act. *erran*. *While he said it, he saying it*.

3. 8. . . . , CIOELA, (H. mit *cioela*.) . . . , *disant*,

CIRADENAC. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 3., avec *n* rel. pl. nom. décl. acc. (rég. de *litzançdt.*), v.s. (*nac* = *ceux qui*.) *Those who were*.

4. 5. Leguearen azpico CIRADENAC

. . . ceux qui estoient sous la Loy :

CIRADENEAN. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 3., *n* rel. temp. décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*.), aux. *When they were*.

2. 12. . . . : baina ETHORRI *içan ciradenean*,

. . . : mais quand ils furent venus,

CIRADENEY. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 3., *n* rel. pl. nom. décl. dat. pl. dét., aux. (*ney* = *à celles qui*.) *To those which were*.

1. 22. Iudeaco Eliça Christean CIRADENEY : (H. mit *ciradene* : parce que L. a lu *ταῖς ἐν Χριστῷ* sans verbe.)

. . . aux Eglises de Judee, qui estoient en Christ.

CIRADENETARA. 1. Ind. imp. pl. 3., *n* rel. pl. nom. décl. directif, aux. (*netara* = *à ceux qui*.)

1. 17. . . . ni baino lehen Apostolu CIRADENETARA :

. . . à ceux qui auoyent esté Apostres deuant moy :
(H. mit *ciradenetara* ; parce que L. a lu *πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοὶ ἀποστόλους*, sans verbe.)

CITECEN. 2. Ind. imp. pl. 3., aux. (i. q. *ciraden*, mais presque exclusivement comme auxiliaire. Voyez Mat. 25. 5.) *They were*.

2. 4. Anaye falsu *Eliçdn* bere buruz NAHASTECATUÉN causaz, . . . , cein SAR baitzitecen

A cause des faux freres qui s'estoyent fourrez *en l'Eglise*, lesquels estoyent couuertement entrez

2. 12. Ecén Iacquesanic batzu ETHOR *citecen* baino lehen,

Car deuant qu'aucuns fussent venus de la part de Iaques,

CITVELA. 1. Ind. imp. s. 3., r. pl., *la* conj., aux. act. *That he had them*.

4. 22. (H. mit 21.) . . . Abrahamec bi seme UKAN *cituela* : bat nescatoaganic, eta bat libreaganic. . . qu'Abraham a eu deux fils : vn de la seruante, & vn de la franche.

ÇVEN & baiTZVEN. 3. Ind. imp. s. 3., r. s., aux. act. (En 1. 23. le *n* est le rel. s. acc. = *laquelle*.) *He had it ; (that) which he had*.

1. 23. . . . berce orduz DESEGUITEN *çuen* fedea.

. . . la foy laquelle autrefois il destruisoit.

2. 12. . . . , Gentilequin batean IATEN *çuen* :

. . . , il mangeoit avec les Gentils :

4. 29. . . . haraguiaren araeuz SORTHUAC PERSECUTATZEN baitzuen Spirituaren araeuz SORTHUA, (H. mit *sorthua*, parce que L. a lu τὸν κατὰ πνεῦμα, sans verbe.)

. . . celui qui auoit esté nay selon la chair persecutoit celui qui estoit nay selon l'Esprit,

ÇVTEN. 3. Ind. imp. pl. 3., r. s., aux. act. *They had Him, or it*.

1. 23. Baina solament ENÇUN *ukan çuten*

Mais ils auoyent seulement ouy

1. 24. Eta GLORIFICATZEN *çuten* Iaincoa nitan.

Et glorifioyent Dieu en moy.

2. 13. Eta simulationez USATZEN *çuten* harequin batean berce Iuduec-ere :

Et les autres Iuifs aussi vsoyent de simulation comme luy, (L. translates 'at one with him.' See *Naiz* 2. 19; *Çuen* 2. 12.)

ÇVTENEAN. 2. I. q. *çuten*, aux. act., *n* rel. temp. décl. temp. (*nean* = *quand*.) *When they had it.*

2. 7. . . ., IKUSSI *ukan çutenean* ecen . . ., quand ils ont veu que

2. 9. Eta ΕÇAGUTU *çutenean* . . . gratiá, Iacquesec eta Cephasec eta Ioannesec . . . (v. 7) quand . . . Et Iaques, Cephas & Iean . . . ont cognu la grace

ἀλλ' ἄθρει, εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιούμεν' (Platonis *Respublica*, 420. d.)

οὗτοι προδώσω· διὰ τέλους δέ σοι φίλαξ
ἐγγὺς παρεστῶς, καὶ πρόσω δ'αποστατῶν,
ἐχθροῖσι τοῖς σοῖς οὐ γενήσομαι πέπων.

(ΑἰΣΧΥΑΙΟΣ ΕΤΜΕΝΙΑΔΕΞ, 64-66 : Ed. A. W. VERRALL. 1908.)

Vade, Liber, verbisque meis loca grata saluta.

(Homerus 'Εβραλζων, by Zachary Bogan. Oxoniæ. 1648.)

The Thee-and-thou-ing Forms in this Epistle are seven¹ :—

Feminine : DITUN. *Masculine* : egotzQUIC, DITUC, DITUC, DUALARIC, DUC, ezTIC.

The Relative Pronoun *N* occurs in these fifty-five Forms :—

DAITENO, DEN, DENA, DENAC, DENEAN, DENO, DIRADEN, DIRADENAC, DIRADENEC, DIRADENEY, DITUDAN, DITUEN, DITUENAC, DITUZTENEC, DITUÇUEN, DRAUCANIC, DRAU-ZQUIÇUEDAN, DRAUÇUEDAN, DRAUÇUEDANEAN, DRAUÇUE-GUNAZ, DRAUÇUENAC, DUDAN, DUENA, DUENAC, DUENAREN,

¹In the edition of *Testamentu Berria*, published by the Trinitarian Bible Society, 7 Bury Street, London, W.C., September, 1908, I have introduced, in some cases with doubt, many *tutoie-*

mental forms which Leicarraga for some reason did not use. I propose to publish an essay on the Leicarragan use of these addressive words.

DUGUNAREN, DUGUNO, DUTENEY, DUTENETARIC, DUÇUENAZ, GAITUEN, GUENTUENAC, GUINENEAN, LEITENO, NAICÉN, NAICENEAN, NUENEAN, ezTIRADENAC, ÇAYÓN, ÇAITADAN, les deux ÇAITUZTENAC, ÇARETEN, ÇARETENAZ, ÇARETENÉC, ÇARETENÓC, CEN, etZENDUTENEAN, CENDUZTENA, CENEAN, CIRADENAC, CIRADENEAN, CIRADENEY, CIRADENETARA, ÇUTENEAN.

The Verbal Adjectives, or Verbalised Radicals, are 134.

Active and Passive, 15.

AL & AHAL, ABOLI, BEGUIRA, COMPLI, CONVERTI, CRUCIFICA, DEITHU, EGUIN, EMAN, EREKAR & EREKARRI, ERRAN, IUSTIFICA, NAHI, PERSECUTA, PREDICA.

Passive, 52.

ALEGUERA, BATHEYA, BENEDICA, BILHA, VICI, CONSEILLA, CONSUMI, DENDA, EBIL, EDUQUI, EGON, EMAN, ENGANA, ENOYA, ERATCHEQUI, EROR & ERORI, ERDI (ertzen), ESCARNIA, ETHORRI, ECIN, FORMA, GABETU, GUERTHA, GUIDA, GLORIA, HEL, HIL, HUNQUI, IAYO, IELOSSI, IGAN, IMPUTA, IOAN, IRACAS, ITZULI, IÇAN, MARADICA, MINÇO, NAHI, ORDENA, ORHOIT, PROBETCHA, REPRESENTA, RETIRA, SEGURA, SEPARA, SUSMETI, TENTA, TRABAILLA, TRANSPORTA, TRENCA, CIRCONCIDI.

Active, 67.

ACABA, APPARTA, ARBUIA, AUSSIQUI, AVISA, BALIO, BILDU, BORTCHA, COMMUNICA, CONSIDERA, CONVERSA, DESEGUIN, DESIRA, EKAR & EGAR, EDIFICA, EGOTZ, EMENDA, EMPATCHA, ENCANTA, ENGENDRA, ENÇUN, ERACI, ERIDEN, EREIN, ERRAN, ERTSI, EVANGELIZA, EXPERIMENTA, EÇAGUN, FORNI, GLORIFICA, GOITI, GUTHICIA, HAUTSI, HERETA, IAQUIN, IAN, IAUNCI, IKASSI, IKUS & IKUSSI, IDOQUI, IGORRI, IHARDETS, INIURIA, IRAUN, IRETSI, IRUDI, MENOSPRECIA, MIN, NAHI, OBEDI, OBRA,

ONHETSI, REDEMI, RESISTI, RESUSCITA, RECEBI, SCRIBA, SINHETS, SUFFRI, TESTIFICA, TRUBLA, UKAN, USA, USTE, VIVIFICA, CERBITZA.

The only interrogative form is NABILA.

The first Englishman known to have referred to Baskish Grammar was Sir Thomas Browne, of Norwich (1605-1682). He derived his information about it from the manuscript of Rafael de Nicoleta, a Presbyter of Bilboa, now preserved in the British Museum. Of this, three editions have been published—the latest in 1897. It is of little value, except for the Glossary of Biscayan words, and the Biscayan version of the first of the *Dialogos* of John Minsheu, which it contains. However, for many of the words recorded by this the most ancient Bask grammarian we have no older authority; while the others occur before Nicoleta (1653) only in the 500 bi-lingual Proverbs, mostly Biscayan, published anonymously at Pamplona, in 1596. Compiled perhaps by a member, or a friend, of the family which held the Castles of Aramayona and Butrón, they are arranged so as to serve as a Dictionary, each Castilian word being marked with a number shewing which of the Biscayan words it represents. They were mentioned in the valuable Dictionary of Larramendi (published at San Sebastián in 1745), and re-discovered by Mr. W. J. Van Eys in the Schloss-Bibliothek at Darmstadt in 1894, but have not yet been quite accurately reprinted, still less criticised.

Basque, in the sense of *Heuscara*, came into English only in the nineteenth century, it appears. In "An English Dictionary," by Elisha Coles (London, 1708, and earlier), one finds "Bascuence, sp. *the Biscay tongue*." Here "Biscay" was used in the old sense for Baskland as a whole. On p. 126 of *Sketches in Spain*, by S. S. Cook (London, 1834), the phrase "The dialect of Vascuence or

Basque, spoken here (San Sebastián), is one of three distinguished by the natives, and is considered the most pure and graceful of the whole." Nicoleta wrote both *Vascuence* and *Vascuense*; but the latter is the correcter form, as it stands for Latin *Vasconense*. The *c* was introduced at the end on the false analogy of the word *Romance*.

My Synopsis of the Verb in the Epistle to the Galatians was finished in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* at Paris, on the 20th of June, 1892. In preparing it for the judgment of the readers of HERMATHENA, I have added the English translation of the capital words which occur therein, some notes, some Greek quotations, and some appendices. I hope eventually to publish a paradigm of the Leizarragan Verb, with a study of its formation.

EDWARD SPENCER DODGSON.

In the Bodleian Library, on the 26th day of May, 1908,
being the deathday of St. Augustin of Canterbury
and of the Venerable Bæda.

Corrigenda et Addenda.

IN HERMATHENA, No. XXXIII., 1907.

- p. 240, l. 29, read, 'ERTZECO'.
- p. 241, last line, 2nd col., add 'Rom. 8. 22'.
- p. 242, last line, 2nd col., add 'Cf. Rom. 6. 20. libré;
Gal. 3. 28. librerie; 4. 22. libreaganic'.
- p. 245, l. 20, after 5. 3, insert '& 6. 3'.
- p. 258, l. 22, read '*gaitu*'.
- p. 259, l. 17, read 'GVENEÇANÇÁT'.
- p. 259, note, 1st col., read 'équiva-'.
p. 259, note, 2nd col., last line, add: 'compare p. 246
hitzean from hitz, p. 244, gorputzean from
gorputz'.
- p. 260, l. 3, for '*has*' read '*had*'.

A BOOK OF GREEK VERSE.¹

NO reader who loves literature and who has at heart the interests of scholarship can take up this charming book without mingled feelings of enthusiastic admiration of splendid mental gifts and poignant regret that such a starry spirit should be so prematurely quenched in death. Walter Headlam had achieved much. There can hardly be a scholar whose interleaved copies of the classics do not record many a brilliant emendation, many an acute interpretation, by him of the great poets of antiquity. He held high the torch of British scholarship, and was the legitimate successor of Bentley, Porson, Munro, Jebb, Elmsley, Gaisford, Conington — not to mention scholars who still adorn their Universities. If this were an article on Headlam as a scholar, there would be abundant material to show what the world of scholarship owes to him. But we have here to consider only the last work of him whom Fate allowed barely to close his eighth lustrum. The Roman poet chose this epoch in man's life as that in which his passions have cooled down, a time when we must no longer look for enthusiasm. But the book before us shows an enthusiasm for literature and art still growing and surely destined to shed bright rays over classical literature. He writes in his Preface—

This Volume may I hope please those who care for poetry,

¹ By Walter Headlam, LITT.D., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1907.

whether they know Greek or not, and at the same time help to give a truer notion of what Greek poetry was like.

This modest aspiration cannot fail to be realized. The specimens translated—from Greek into English and from English into Greek—range from the seventh century B.C. to the sixth century A.D., and are full of literary instruction, which is emphasized and illustrated by about fifty pages of appended notes, which show very wide learning and highly cultured taste.

In the remarks of the Preface on translation into Greek in general, we meet an admonition which all “composers” should lay to heart:—

We must use discrimination, and take care that what we choose for rendering into Greek shall really bear the stamp of Greek in style and sentiment. Not seldom one may see Greek made to say what certainly it never would have said, and to compose in metres which no Greek would ever have adopted for the purpose; for the Greeks were peculiarly sensitive to propriety of metre. However great their skill of execution, such performances are valueless, because they are artistically wrong; indeed they may be worse than valueless, because misleading.

Some ten years ago the present Provost of Eton, when Head Master of Haileybury, published a clever little book entitled, “Are we to go on with Latin Verses?” The book was amusing and judicious; and the conclusion was in favour of maintaining the practice. But there was one deep-seated defect. Dr. Lyttelton fell into the error against which Dr. Headlam has warned us. He gave several renderings by various scholars into Latin elegiacs of verses by Oliver Wendell Holmes called “Departed Days.” By these we were to judge how far modern Latin verse might be held to convey truly the meaning and spirit of modern poetry. It certainly can if the modern

poem is translatable. But "Departed Days" is not translatable. Why? Because it is nonsense. Fancy an ancient poet writing:—

Yes, dear departed cherished days,
 Could Memory's hand restore
 Your morning light, your evening rays,
 From Time's grey urn once more.

Observe, the light of departed days is stored by Time in a grey urn, and Memory is asked to restore it, presumably to the departed days. The rest of the piece is in just the same vein, and the result is that the renderings are all failures. The more tasteful versions (like Jebb's and E. D. Stone's) eschew the "grey urn" altogether. Those who attempt to reproduce it become grotesque. And the same may be said of the other unvisualised figures which are rife in the rest of the poem.

The extracts from early Greek lyric poetry in Dr. Headlam's book are delightful. On the well-known song in which Alcman compares himself to a 'ceryl,' he quotes from Antigonus of Carystus a note that the ceryl is the male halcyon, and that when he grows too old to fly, the females take him on their wings and carry him—which completely explains the aged poet's appeal to the choir of Spartan maidens, with whom he is no longer able to keep up. In the second extract from Alcman it may be noticed that he prints Schoeman's $\phi\tilde{\upsilon}\lambda\alpha$, but translates Bergk's $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\lambda\alpha$. In a note on Sappho's Hymn to Aphrodite, he thus analyses the charm of Sappho's poetry:—

There is always in the verse of Sappho a directness and unlaboured ease of language, as if every lovely sentence came by nature from the mouth at once; as though she spoke in

song, and what she sang were the expression of her very soul, the voice of languorous enjoyment and desire of beauty :

My blood was hot wan wine of love,
And my song's sound the sound thereof,
The sound of the delight of it.

The rendering of Shelley's Skylark is a masterpiece ; and we cannot help putting beside it a genuine lyric by Katharine Tynan-Hinkson which almost touches the song of Shelley :—

All day long in exquisite air
The song clomb an invisible stair,
Flight on flight, story on story,
Into the dazzling glory.

There was no bird, only a singing,
Up in the glory, climbing and ringing,
Like a small golden cloud at even,
'Trembling 'twixt earth and heaven.

I saw no staircase winding, winding,
Up in the dazzle, sapphire and blinding,
Yet round by round, in exquisite air,
The song went up the stair.

On a song of Ibycus (sixth century B.C.) Dr. Headlam beautifully comments :—

Remark how this idyllic opening shifts without a break and works up rapidly into a tempestuous passion. The sudden contrast and the stormy vehemence remind one of Hungarian music.

Here is his version of that very noble lyric :—

In the season of Spring is the season of growing ;
Where lies the inviolate orchard-meadow,
The apple-garden where Maidens dwell,
There, watered freshly with runnels flowing,
The quince-trees blossom, and safe in shadow
The vine-buds under the vine-leaf swell

In the season of Spring. But in my heart passion
 At no tide ever asleep is laid :
 From the Lady of Love as a blast of the North,
 When a blaze of lightning flashes it forth,
 With a rush, with a burst,
 In a dark storm parching and maddening with thirst,
 Unabashed, unafraid,
 It shoots to my bosom, gripping it still
 In the same rude fashion,
 And shakes and shatters at will.

We would gladly quote Hogg's "My love she's but a lassie yet" in trochaics (alternate tetram. and tetram. cat.) and Gay's "O ruddier than the cherry!" in glyconics, as well as some admirable *scolia*, including the National Anthem, which somehow does not seem nearly so brutal in the Greek. But we must find room for Paradise as pictured in a sublime fragment of Pindar :—

For them the sun shines ever in full might
 Throughout our earthly night ;
 There, reddening with the rose, their paradise,
 A fair green pleasance, lies,
 Cool beneath shade of incense-bearing trees,
 And rich with golden fruit :
 And there they take their pleasure as they will,
 In chariot-race, or young-limbed exercise
 In wrestling, at the game of tables these,
 And those with harp or lute :
 And blissful where they dwell, beside them still
 Dwells at full bloom perfect felicity :
 And spreading delicately
 Over the lovely region everywhere
 Fragrance in the air
 Floats from high altars where the fire is dense
 With perfumed frankincense
 Burned for the glory of Heaven continually.

Dr. Headlam happily remarks :—

Paradise is many times described (for instance by Pindar again in the second Olympian, by Aristophanes in the *Frogs* 344, 446) and with certain constant details. It is always a flowery Meadow, radiant with Light—symbolical of spiritual light—wherein the blessed walk amid celestial harpings and with wreaths upon their heads. But it is pretty here to notice how with all this Oriental happiness the Greek is not content to be without his games.

Dr. Headlam turns Chap. XVII. of *The Wisdom of Solomon* into fine hexameters, and Chap. XVIII. into a perfect Pindaric ode.

Of the latter he writes :—

Nothing I have ever read has seemed to me so strikingly Pindaric as this chapter, for its loftiness and vividness combined :—remark especially the noble passage on p. 62, with its magnificent image for the word of God. The Greek conceptions it recalls are Aeschylus *Theb.* 415 :

τὴν Διὸς
ἔριν πέδοι σκίψασαν ἐμποδών,

and Homer's description of Ἔρις in Δ 442 :

ἦτ' ὀλίγη μὲν πρῶτα κορύσσεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη, καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βαίνει.

He does not of course write in all respects as Pindar would have done ; he dwells at too great length upon the same ideas : but otherwise his treatment of an Epic narrative is very much like that employed by Pindar, and by Aeschylus in the first chorus of the *Agamemnon*.

The rhythm for a poem of this moral temper must of course be Dorian ; the arrangement here is that of the third Pythian.

Next come many fine translations of choral odes of Aeschylus (*Suppl.* and *Eum.*) and of Sophocles (*Ant.* and

Oed. Col.), which, moreover, introduce us to some admirable restorations of the text. These are followed by a few renderings into tragic trimeters from Shakspeare and Webster, which are as modest and restrained as though their writer had never soared to Attic choral odes or Aeolic sapphics.

Dr. Headlam is, as might be expected, a worshipper of Theocritus. Of the *Harvest Home* he writes :—

If anyone should wish to see what Alexandrian fashions, followed with complete fidelity, could produce in the hands of a true artist, I would choose this poem of Theocritus to be their representative. Observe the novelty of form—new subject for the metre, and new combination with the dialect—the smallness of the scale, the finish, the vivacity, the picturesqueness, the variety, the unhackneyed freshness of the rustic themes, so quaint and homely, some of them, but all in keeping; the description at the end, the geographical mention of romantic names, the touch of courtier's compliment, and the literary criticism. How rich it is, as Goethe would have said, in *motives*; and how many tastes and interests it makes appeal to without pedantry!

He has no such enthusiasm for Callimachus, in whom "the scholar tends to overcome the poet." He compares him with Wordsworth, whose "Lucy" and "A slumber did my spirit seal" he calls Callimachean, as producing their effect by the statement of an antithesis. Dr. Headlam renders these two poems in elegiacs. The latter is much better in the Greek, which avoids the tautology of "rocks and stones" in the last verse, and disguises a certain grotesqueness of suggested image which mars the English. He finds in Callimachus grimness and coldness, but concedes tenderness to some beautiful verses on the gay, chattering Crethis, and the well-known poem on Heraclitus.

The former is very tender. We give it in the Greek and in the English, which hardly catches the tone :—

<p>Κρηθίδα τὴν πολύμυθον, ἐπισταμένην καλὰ παίζειν, δίξηνται Σαμίων πολλάκι θυγατέρες, ἡδίστην συνέριθον, αἰεὶ λάλον· ἥ δ' ἀποβρίξει ἐνθάδε τὸν πάσαις ὕπνον ὀφειλόμενον.</p>	<p><i>Ah where is Crethis ? ofttimes say</i> <i>The girls in Samos,—where is she</i> <i>With all those tales from history,</i> <i>With all those pretty games to play ?</i> <i>They miss her when they spin,—the</i> <i>cheer,</i> <i>The sweet voice rippling.—She lies</i> <i>here</i> <i>Slumbering for ever, as they all</i> <i>Must slumber when their day shall</i> <i>fall.</i></p>
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Dr. Headlam reluctantly finds fault with William Johnson's familiar rendering of the touching poem on the death of Heraclitus. We cannot endorse his judgment. To us it seems nearly as good as the Greek :—

They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead ;
They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed.
I wept as I remember'd how often you and I
Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky.
And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,
A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,
Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake ;
For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take.

We will not put beside this Dr. Headlam's own version, which does not run smoothly, and is disfigured by unhappy phrases such as :—

Death with his clutch takes all away.

Moreover, "a charred ash" is not defended by Gladstone's :—

Once a flambeau, now an ash,
a poor version of

Dilapsam in cineres facem.

"Ash" in modern English means either a tree or the smoked-out part of a cigar.

Plato's "Stella" finds a good English garb in:—

Gazing at stars, O Star?
 Star of my soul! Ah me,
 That I were heaven, to gaze with all
 Those myriad eyes on thee!

But we do not think the tone is caught so well as in the version of Dr. Gwynn, the Dublin Regius Professor of Divinity:—

Star of my life! thine earnest eyes are bent
 On yon bright orbs that gem the firmament.
 Oh! that I were that heaven, so might I be
 All full of love-lit eyes to gaze on thee.

A few Latin pieces (three from Catullus and Horace's famous amœbaean ode) are introduced in connexion with the Alexandrine school. For the Horatian poem he has used with great skill and grace the metre of Prior's "Euphelia and Chloë" and "To a child of Quality aged five." The latter is perhaps not too familiar to quote:—

For, as our different ages move,
 'Tis so ordain'd—would Fate but mend it!—
 That I shall be past making love
 When she begins to comprehend it.

The book contains seven versions from Heine, three from Shakspeare, two from Landor, Shelley, and Wordsworth, and not more than one from any other English poet—on the whole, about forty, while there are about twice as many translations into English.

R. Y. TYRRELL.

THE SAYINGS OF SIMONIDES.

IN the first number of *The Classical Quarterly* Mr. H. Richards criticizes the obscure sayings of Simonides published by Grenfell and Hunt in *Hibeh Papyri*, vol. i, but does not contribute much to their interpretation. Though my view as to their meaning was briefly hinted at in the original publication, I take this opportunity of expressing it more explicitly.

The text, which I punctuate in accordance with what I believe to be the proper construction, runs thus :—

τὸ δὲ ἀναλωθὲν ὀλίγου μὲν εἴληπται, προσαναλίσκεται δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον· διὸ δεῖ ἔλκειν τὰς ψήφους καὶ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ δανείζεσθαι ὅταν τῇ ἀναγκαίᾳ καὶ φυσικῇ τροφῇ χρήσῃται ὥσπερ τὰ ζῷα ἀπλῆ.

Simonides, in the brief, aphoristic sentences characteristic of early Greek philosophy, is explaining why a man should be frugal. If he desires anything beyond the simple necessities of life, he must, in order to obtain it, incur expense, either of time or money or strength; and though at the time he estimated the expenditure at a low price, yet one expenditure entails another, and so, in the end, twice as much is expended, and the result is extravagance. λαμβάνειν is common enough with the meaning 'to estimate,' and in this sense might easily be accompanied by such a genitive of price as ὀλίγου.

The wise man, however, will avoid the expenditure by freeing himself from desire; for the absence of desire is equivalent to possession.

The metaphor involved in ἔλκειν τὰς ψήφους is not

quite clear ; but the words must be interpreted in the light of the other phrase, τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ δανείζεσθαι, the meaning of which can, I think, be determined with certainty. Possibly, in their literal application, they may refer to drawing the ψῆφοι from that end of the abacus, or calculating-table, which represented expenditure, to the other. Or Simonides may have compared expenditure to a bad move in chess! If we continue making bad moves, we run the risk of being checkmated, like Adeimantus in the *Republic* of Plato (487 c) ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι φέρωσιν, οὐτὼ καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὐτῆς τινὸς ἐτέρας οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις. In this case the phrase would resemble the Ciceronian 'calculus redducere,' quoted by Nonius 170.28. 'M. Tullius in *Hortensio*: itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis solemus, ut calculus redducas, si te alicuius dati penitet.' But whatever the source of the metaphor may be, the meaning which underlies it is that the wise man must avoid expenditure by curbing the lusts of the flesh.

When the Sapiens has satisfied the demands of Nature, he must, for all else, apply the maxim δανείζεσθαι τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ. This maxim is twice referred to by Seneca, who assigns it to Cato, once parenthetically, de Benef. v. 7: 'M. Cato ait "quod tibi deerit, a te ipso mutuare"' ; and once with an extensive commentary, Epp. Mor. xx. 2 (119). The whole of this letter is an exposition of the maxim under consideration, and deserves careful study ; here I can quote only a few of the most striking sentences :—Docebo quomodo fieri dives celerrime possis. Quam valde cupis audire ! nec immerito ; ad maximas te divitias compendiarie ducam. Opus erit tamen tibi creditore, ut negotiari possis, aes alienum facias oportet : sed nolo per intercessorem mutueris, nolo proxenetæ nomen tuum iactent ; paratum tibi creditorem dabo, Catonianum illum

A TE MUTUUM SUMES. Quantulumcumque est satis erit, si, quidquid deerit, id a nobis petierimus. Nihil enim, mi Lucili, interest utrum non desideres an habeas. Summa rei in utroque eadem est: non torqueberis. Nec illud praecipio, ut aliquid naturae neges; contumax est, non potest vinci, suum poscit; sed ut, quidquid naturam excedit scias precarium esse, non necessarium. Esurio; edendum est. . . . Finem omnium rerum specta et supervacua dimittes. . . . Nihil ergo monuisse te malim quam hoc, quod nemo monetur satis, ut omnia naturalibus desideriis metiaris, quibus aut gratis satisfiat aut parvo . . . nihil praeter cibum natura desiderat . . . ambitiosa non est fames, contenta desinere est; quo desinat, non nimis curat. Infelicis luxuriae illa tormenta sunt.

The advice of Simonides and Cato amounts to this: the necessities of life are few and easily obtained; when we have satisfied our hunger and quenched our thirst, like the animals, with simple food and pure water, we must be content, and rely upon ourselves for everything else; anything more than these necessities depends upon the will of others (*precarium est*) and is superfluous luxury; we must avoid the expenditure they involve by curbing our passions and moderating our desires.

J. G. SMYLY.

ARISTOTLE, *ETHICS*, BK. VII.

IN ch. xi. and section 4 of this book, 1152^b12-15, we read:—

ὅλως μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία.

And in ch. xii. and section 3, 1153^a15:—

δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν. τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἶονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.

After the death of Plato, the teaching of one branch of the school of philosophy which he founded seems to have assumed a decidedly ascetic complexion. Speusippus, nephew of Plato, may be regarded as the leader of this movement; while the opposite tendency towards Hedonism is represented in the same school by Eudoxus. It is against Speusippus and his followers that Aristotle (for I think Burnet is right in attributing this book to Aristotle, in opposition to the theory of Grant and others that it was written by Eudemus) is arguing in the passage which contains the words quoted above. It is a mistake to regard the statements criticized here as expressing the Cynic view, for "the arguments cannot be those of Antisthenes; for they are Platonic in character, and presuppose the *Philebos*. On the other hand, they are not the arguments of the *Philebos* itself."¹ Grant notices also that the definition of pleasure as *γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή* does not occur in Plato's writings. All the evidence, then, points to the

¹ Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, p. 330 n.

conclusion that the opinions referred to are those of the Platonist ascetics; and an opinion of Speusippus is expressly referred to in the following chapter (xiii. 1); the rest of this chapter is occupied almost exclusively with the discussion of ascetic doctrines.

The argument contained in the first of the two sentences quoted in Greek—that pleasure cannot be a good because it is a *γένεσις*—i.e., a mere process without any finality in it, and as such different in kind from the good which is an end in itself—is a familiar one and easily intelligible. Aristotle himself emphasizes the fact that the highest good, at least, must be *τέλειον*. So far all is clear. But when we meet in the next chapter the statement that pleasure is thought to be a *γένεσις*, because it is good in the strictest sense, the difficulty is obvious; *for from the context this second statement appears to refer to the same set of thinkers*. The same persons could not maintain that pleasure was bad and that it was a good in the strictest sense or in the highest degree. This has been noticed by commentators generally. Thus Grant says: "At first sight there appears to be a contradiction in saying that pleasure is thought not to be a good because it is a *γένεσις*, and that it is thought to be a *γένεσις* because it is a good." The contradiction is, however, according to him, only apparent; and "the explanation is that the latter clause refers not to the Platonists but to the Cyrenaics." This explanation, of course, removes one difficulty, as the Cyrenaics represent the extreme form of Hedonism; but it does so by raising up another, for the whole context seems to indicate that the words *δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι* refer to the Platonists. Otherwise there is no subject to the verb *οἶονται* in the next sentence. "They think" must refer to the thinkers already mentioned; and Grant does not propose to alter the MS. reading.

Rassow (quoted in Stewart's note on this passage) follows Grant in referring the words to the Cyrenaics: "Diese Worte sind völlig unverständlich, wenn man sie auf die in dem vorhergehenden Satze bestrittene Platonische Lehre bezieht. Man hat daher wohl mit Grant an die Cyrenaiker zu denken." At the same time he thinks it so strange that a new and contradictory set of opinions should suddenly be discussed, without any hint that the author is no longer speaking of the same persons, that he declares it to be necessary to alter the *τις* of the MS. into *τισιν* ("das ohne dies auffällige *τις* nach *γένεσις* in *τισιν* zu ändern"). Perhaps the word *τις* added to *γένεσις*, "a *γένεσις* of some kind," or "something like a *γένεσις*") may indicate Aristotle's own view that pleasure could not be properly regarded as a *γένεσις*. The Platonists themselves must have admitted that *γένεσις* was in the strict sense a predicate of the physical world.

This conjecture has been adopted by Stewart, Burnet, and many others, and of course solves the problem by cutting the knot. Rassow quotes the explanation of the Paraphrast, which he regards as correct, adding that it may indicate that he read *τισιν*, and this reading may perhaps derive some support from the *δοκεῖ τισι ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ* in ch. xiii. 4, which refers to certain Hedonists, though it does not seem to be quoted in its favour. This explanation is as follows:—

γένεσις δὲ ἔδοξέ τισιν εἶναι ἡδονὴ ὅτι ᾤοντο τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον· τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι· ἐνέργειαν δὲ καὶ γένεσιν μηδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν· τὸ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.

The evidence of the Paraphrast does not seem to count for much. According to Burnet, little real help is to be got from his commentary. But so far as it goes, it does not altogether seem to support the idea that the Cyrenaics

are referred to. Only the first clause—*ψοντο τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν*—would be true of them; it could not be said of them that they thought that the supreme form of the good was an *ἐνέργεια*; while this notion might well be attributed to Aristotle or the Platonists. The Paraphrast is at least right, as I think, in supplying the suppressed premiss of the reasoning—"an *ἐνέργεια* is the supreme form of good"—"good in the strict sense of the word"—but wrong in assigning the proposition—*ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν*—to a set of thinkers not yet mentioned. These words seem to me to express Aristotle's own opinion—pleasure is an *ἐνέργεια*, and therefore a good in the strictest sense. And I also think the Paraphrast is wrong in substituting for the *κυρίως ἀγαθόν* of the text, which means *a good of the highest kind*, *τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν*, which would mean *the supreme good*. It would not be true, according to Aristotle, that pleasure is the supreme good: this would be inconsistent with Bk. x.; but it would be true that pleasure is good in the strictest sense. It may be of interest to notice that the two doctrines attributed in the note of the Paraphrast to the same persons are regarded by Professor Paulsen, in his *System der Ethik*, as expressing opposite views of the ethical end, and are called by him Hedonism and Energism (a term based on Aristotle's conception of *ἐνέργεια*) respectively. There is, therefore, too much confusion in this note to allow us to look upon it as important.

It may be quite true, as urged by some commentators, that Plato, and the Platonists after him, adopted the definition of pleasure as *αἰσθητῇ γένεσις* from the Cyrenaics (though Burnet, p. 330, note, regards the addition *εἰς φύσιν* as due to Speusippus), for the purpose of condemning it out of the mouth of Aristippus, so to speak. Zeller suggests that the passage in the *Philebus*—*ἀρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὥς ἀεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ*

παράπαν ἡδονῆς—taken in conjunction with the words of Diogenes about Aristippus—τέλος δ' ἀπέφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην—may indicate this, though λεία κίνησις αἰσθητή would accord more nearly with the definition regularly attributed to Aristippus¹; and I cannot find any direct evidence that the Cyrenaics used the term γένεσις of pleasure at all. But in any case I maintain that it is with the definition as given by the Platonists, from whatever source adopted, that Aristotle is dealing; for they certainly defined pleasure as a γένεσις. Stewart and Burnet, who agree in reading *τισιν* for the MS. *τις*, and in referring the passage to the Cyrenaics, agree also in recognizing that it is only by a confusion of γένεσις with ἐνέργεια that pleasure is said to be a γένεσις. But while the former simply understands by γένεσις in this passage, “the outcome or operation of a ἔξις, not the process by which a ἔξις is formed,” the latter points out that the γένεσις with which pleasure is identified must be restricted to the λεία κίνησις of the Cyrenaics, because pain is also a κίνησις (τραχεῖα κίνησις), and therefore pleasure could not be regarded as good *quā* κίνησις. Stewart's interpretation would make the argument sound from Aristotle's point of view, but badly expressed, which seems to me to weaken Aristotle's criticism; he also gives at least a very unusual sense to γένεσις.

Burnet's identification of γένεσις with the λεία κίνησις of the Cyrenaics, and of this λεία κίνησις with the Platonic κίνησις εἰς φύσιν or κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν, involves a double hypothesis, though plausible. κίνησις and γένεσις appear to be almost interchangeable terms in this context (both at least are predicated of pleasure), except that the term γένεσις points more especially to the process not being an end in itself. If there be no further difference than

¹ Cf. Diog. II. 86: δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν, τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν, κατέ.

this, the *τραχέα κίνησις* of pain also would be a *γένεσις*—in the sense of mere process. It seems unlikely, moreover, that the Cyrenaics, whose interest was practical rather than speculative (as Zeller says, "sie legten dem Ethischen allein einen Werth bei"), would have troubled themselves to show any causal connexion between the fact that pleasure was the highest good (an intuitive truth for them) and the fact that it was a *γένεσις*, whereas the combination of metaphysical and ethical truth would be natural to the Platonists.

The main motive for referring the passage to the Cyrenaics, and for the explanations of Grant, Stewart, and Burnet depending on this hypothesis, disappears if the words *ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν* are taken to express Aristotle's view of pleasure, while the words *δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τίς εἶναι* are referred to the Platonists.

The question I propose to raise in this article is this. Is it not possible both to preserve the MS. reading and to refer this passage to the Platonists, whose opinions have been criticized up to this point, while at the same time avoiding the necessity of attributing to the same persons inconsistent views? This is obviously impossible if we adhere to the usual interpretation of the words *δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τίς εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν*; in other words, if the independent clause *ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν* is regarded as indicating the reason assigned or understood by the Platonists themselves to justify their belief that pleasure was a *γένεσις*. As before remarked, the same persons could not maintain that pleasure was not a good at all, and that it was also a good in the strictest sense (*κυρίως*) or in the highest degree. But the dependent clause (*ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν*) may be also regarded as giving Aristotle's own view of pleasure and of the reason which caused the Platonists to make the mistake of regarding it as a *γένεσις*. The meaning of the sentence would then

be: the Platonists *think* that pleasure is a γένεσις of some kind (τις), or something like a γένεσις, because it *really is* a good in the strictest sense—i.e., it is an ἐνέργεια, the supreme form of good on Aristotelian principles, as contrasted, on the one hand with what we call external goods, and on the other hand with the good in the merely potential form of the ἕξις. Owing to a certain resemblance between them—for an ἐνέργεια and a ἕξις are at least alike in this that they involve a certain movement as distinguished from something purely passive—the Platonists mistake an ἐνέργεια for a γένεσις. This is stated in the next sentence—τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. They are really different, though they look alike. Aristotle must have regarded them as having a certain resemblance; otherwise he could not attribute to a particular set of philosophers a confusion of the one with the other. The analogy would not be unlike that by which Locke distinguishes his position in one respect from that of the Cartesians. Thinking, he says, is to the soul what motion is to the body (i.e., its action, not its essence). Thinking would certainly be an ἐνέργεια in Aristotelian language; and pleasure is described by the Platonists themselves both as a κίνησις and as a γένεσις; so that if there is a resemblance between thinking and motion, there is the same resemblance between an ἐνέργεια and a γένεσις.

According to this interpretation, Aristotle would be deliberately stating a kind of paradox. The very circumstance that induced the Platonists to regard pleasure as a γένεσις, and therefore to condemn it as bad, really constitutes its claim to be a good in the highest degree. Had not pleasure been an ἐνέργεια—the highest form of good—instead of being a *mere* ἕξις, it could never have been confused with a γένεσις, and classified according to their metaphysico-ethical theory among bad things; and

Aristotle would no doubt have said that the Platonists themselves ought to have drawn the same conclusion as he drew.

No doctrine is more emphasized by Aristotle in the Ethics than this, that the highest good is an *ἐνέργεια*; the very same adverb *κυρίως* is used, as editors have noticed, to signify the superiority 'of the *ἐνέργεια* to the *ἕξις*' in Ethics I. 7, 13 (*τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι*). It is equally true that he regards pleasure in this Book VII. as an *ἐνέργεια*. He expressly corrects the definition of pleasure as *αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν* into *ἐνέργειαν ἀνεμπόδιστον τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως*. In the more accurate exposition of Book X., pleasure is not so absolutely identified with the *ἐνέργεια* as here; but even in Book X. he says that the *ἡδοναί* and the *ἐνέργειαι* are *ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ* (X. 5, 6). In that book the formula adopted to express the relation between *ἡδονή* and *ἐνέργεια* is rather *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*—pleasure perfects the *ἐνέργεια*.

In this connexion I may say that the view implied by Grant that the writer of Book VII. is more distinctly hedonistic than the author of Book X.—and that there is a real 'discrepancy' between them, appears to me a superficial one. There appears to be no more difference than this, that while Book VII. emphasizes the fact that pleasure is a necessary aspect of the highest good, Book X. shows that it is not the only aspect; and even in Book X. we find the statement that pleasure and life are so closely connected (*συνεζεύχθαι καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχασθαι*) that we cannot say whether life is chosen for the pleasure of it or pleasure for the sake of life. The fact that, in spite of such statements, Aristotle can in no wise be regarded as a Hedonist appears from the propositions that the main element in *εὐδαιμονία* is found in the *ἐνέργειαι κατ'*

ἀπερὴν, and that there are some things which we would choose even if no pleasure resulted from them.

The rendering of the passage suggested above possesses at least the advantages of preserving the MS. reading, of preserving also the unity of the context by referring the whole criticism to the same persons, and of involving no uncertain hypothesis with regard to the Cyrenaics. Too much may seem to be got out of a few Greek words; but condensation along with suppression of intermediate links in the chain of argument is so characteristic of Aristotle's style as to make it unnecessary to quote examples.

GERARD A. EXHAM.

NOTES.

HORACE, *Ep.* ii. 2, 49 sqq.

Unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi,
Decisis humilem pennis inopemque paterni
Et laris et fundi, paupertas impulit audax
Ut versus facerem ; sed *quod non desit* habentem
Quae poterunt unquam satis expurgare cicutae,
Ni melius dormire putem quam scribere versus ?

EDITORS seem to have glossed over the difficulties of the words *quod non desit*. A. S. Wilkins, following the earlier commentators, explains them as = *quod satis sit*. Undoubtedly the meaning 'a competence' is that required by the context ; but can the words *quod non desit* yield this sense ? A moment's reflection shows that they cannot. And, even supposing that they could, what is the explanation of the subjunctive ? I believe that *defit* should be restored for *desit*, and then all difficulty is removed. *Quod non defit habentem* will thus be equivalent to *non deficiente crumena* (*Ep.* i. 4, 11). For *quod non defit* = 'what is sufficient' : cf. Plaut. *Rud.* 4, 4, 63 "Opsonium affer tribus, vide, quod sit satis, neque defiat, neque super sit."

Defit and *desit* were readily confused : cf. Forcellini, s. v. *defit* : "Observarunt Critici in permultis Tibulli, Ovidii, Statii, &c., locis, in quibus *defit* legendum erat, *desit* ab imperitis librariis scriptum fuisse." An example of this confusion is to be found in *Tib.* iv. 1, 100 : "Tunc tibi non desit faciem componere pugnae," where three MSS. have *defit*.

LUCRETIIUS i. 657 sqq.

Sed quia multa sibi cernunt contraria *muse*
 Et fugitant in rebus inane relinquere purum,
 Ardua dum metuunt, amittunt vera viam.

Lucretius is attacking Heraclitus and his followers, and pointing out the difficulties in which they are entangled by their refusal to admit a void. The word at the end of the first line had become partly illegible in the archetype: *muse* is the reading of O, *mu* of Q. Lachmann proposed *adesse*; Munro, *nasci*; Palmer, *in usu*; Brieger, *rursum*, which is adopted by Giussani. Simpler and, I think, more satisfactory than any of these would be *sumi* (*sumei*), 'because they see many contradictions involved in their assumptions (as the argument proceeds)'. *Sumere* is frequently used by Lucretius in the sense of taking for granted.

SOPHOCLES, *Oed. Tyr.* 1261.

ἐκ δὲ πυθμένων

ἔκλινε κοῖλα κλῆθρα.

Jebb translates, "and from their sockets forced the bending bolts," and in his note says, "The pressure of Oedipus on the outer side forces the bolts, causing them to bend inwards (κοῖλα)." It is hard to believe that κοῖλα could bear this meaning, though it is an adjective of great elasticity. Jebb quotes no parallel. The word which would yield this sense naturally is κυλλὰ, which meant 'bending inwards' (τὰ ἔσω ῥέποντα Gal.), and was specially used of limbs. Sophocles uses the verb κυλλαίνω in the *Phaedra*, fr. 619.

GEORGE W. MOONEY.

M. MANILII *ASTRONOMICA*.¹

WE are at length in possession of a reasonably adequate commentary on Manilius. Breiter's name has long been familiar to students of Latin scientific poetry, especially in the pages of the *Jahrbücher*: but his various isolated papers were not easily accessible, and to lay hands on all of them was a business of some time. We may feel happy in being able to grasp his views of the disputed passages in the *Astronomica* without laborious hunting. Manilius has been to Breiter a life-long study: he collated the *Gemblacensis* as far back as 1853, again in 1892. His text and commentary, therefore—especially the latter—may be considered in an especial sense mature. To anyone who knows how very real are the difficulties of the poem, not only in the technical parts, but in those where he is more purely poetical, and where he may be compared with Ovid, Grattius, and other contemporaries, this maturity of judgment will perhaps seem the most valuable quality of the new edition. It is, however, a regrettable circumstance that the commentary is written in German, not Latin: designedly, we are told by the writer himself, as more easily understood by scientific students, many of whom are imperfectly familiar with Latin, and grasp an obscurity more readily when explained in a modern tongue.

¹ Ed. Theodorus Breiter; I, Carmina, 1907; II, Kommentar, 1908. Leipzig: Weicher.

The apparatus criticus, as a rule, extends to four primary MSS., the Gemblacensis, the Cusanus (both in the Royal Library at Brussels), the Lipsiensis, in the Pauline Library at Leipzig, the Matritensis, M 31, in the Bibl. Nazionale at Madrid. Breiter has himself collated the first three of these; for the readings of the Matritensis he depends partly on my collation published in the *Classical Review* (1893, 4), partly on one made in 1879 by the well-known Plautine scholar G. Löwe, and now in the Library of Göttingen. These manuscripts are lettered *gclm*. Two Vatican MSS., Urbinas 667, 668 (Housman's *a* and *R*), are occasionally referred to (*u*₁, *u*₂); Breiter considers Voss², on which Jacob laid much stress, to be considerably interpolated, but all these MSS. *u*₁, *u*₂, Voss² he believes to be copies more or less exact of *m*.

It is a distinguishing feature of Breiter's app. crit. that it mentions no emendations, not even those of Scaliger or Bentley. It may be said that this greatly simplifies matters for the average reader, and is so far a gain. On the other hand, it may be urged, and with much greater force, that by this omission of any corrections of a text as corrupt as that of Manilius, much of the scholar's interest in the poem is cut away. We live in an age which loves to compare itself with the past; only so can we estimate how we stand in relation to our predecessors, and assign to them their proper valuation. In the *Astronomica*, for instance, the names of Scaliger and Bentley deservedly rank as pre-eminent; yet Scaliger's over-erudition often missed the mark; and Bentley's corrections were in a large number of cases wrong. Now that we are removed by 200 years from Bentley, by 300 from Scaliger, we are in a position to see not only the excellences but the demerits of each of them. For this reason it may be objected to Breiter's app. crit. that, in excluding emendations and the names of their authors, he has

deprived us of one most indispensable element of classical criticism—the comparison with each other of the numerous scholars who at intervals have made suggestions on the Manilian text. We should be glad to see the names of Huet, D'Orville, Jacob occurring from time to time to diversify the monotonous various readings which make up one-fourth of each page of vol. I. I purposely abstain from extending the list to the yearly increasing series of more modern critics; it is enough to say that the ever-widening interest in palæographical studies cannot fail to sharpen the critical faculty of the present and coming generations, and that a great deal has already been published of which little or no account can be found in the pages of our latest editor.¹

The commentary appears to me on the whole judicious, and marked by the same qualities which we have long seen Breiter to possess—a satisfactory comprehension of the scientific, technical, and mathematical portions of the *Astronomica* (by far the most difficult section), and a competent perception of Manilius' idiosyncrasies of style and diction in those portions where he is more directly on a level with other poets. The two portions are not perhaps equally balanced in the commentary; not a few of Breiter's views as to the meaning of particular words or combinations, especially in the last two books, may be criticized; and in many passages where the text is corruptly given by the MSS. it may safely be asserted that his judgments are not unfrequently based on insufficient arguments, and that considerations seem to have little influence with him which with other critics

¹ For instance, the controversy raised by the publication of the readings of the Madrid MS., which MS. contains also the best copy of the *Silvae* of Statius; its connexion with another Madrid MS. containing Asconius and part of Val.

Flaccus, on which see A. C. Clark in *Class. Rev.* xiii., pp. 119 sqq., and Thielscher *de Statii Silvarum Sili Manilii scripta memoria*: Tübingen, 1906.

are preponderant, and determine the sense or the reading differently. I shall examine some of these presently: meanwhile I do not wish to deny that, in my opinion, the chief desideratum in a *perfect* edition of the *Astronomica* is, after all, a real acquaintance with the *science*, not indeed of the subject in its length and breadth, but of the poem as giving a sketch of it. The ornamental parts, such, for instance, as the prooemia of the several books, and in an especial degree the description of the various characters of mankind as influenced by the stars (Books IV., V.), are so much easier as hardly to stand on the same level with most of the second and third books, where, after the efforts of a long series of critics, there are passages which seem still to baffle exegesis. But to be intelligible and clear on a subject like the Dodecatemories, or the Decanies, was a difficult task even to the enthusiastic poet himself; to explain it intelligibly to a modern reader is a task no less difficult: and if Bentley's acknowledged lucidity in this line is nowadays the real basis of his fame as editor of Manilius; if Huet deserves reprinting mainly for this very excellence, we shall be ungrateful if we deny to our new exegete, Breiter, a large share of commendation for the same rare but indispensable quality.

We consider Breiter eminently right in returning to the now rather unfamiliar symbols for the signs of the Zodiac and Planets: since the eighteenth century they have gradually fallen into a disuse justified perhaps by the contempt into which astrology has fallen, but from many points of view undesirable. In Manilius they are almost necessary, and being most of them purely conventional take some time to learn. This is as it should be; it is well that those who start on the study of an astronomical and astrological poem (for the work of Manilius is both) should at the outset have to face its

minor difficulties, and be prepared for the greater and more real perplexities to come. The didactic poems of the Romans are all of them obscure and hard to understand; it is indeed part of their attractiveness that they should be: neither Lucretius, nor Manilius, nor *Aetna*, can be mastered in a day.

In the Introduction to his commentary Breiter gives a sketch of the rise and progress of astrology. Its brevity will commend it to some readers; others will find it unsatisfying. The works of French and German scientists, notably of Bouché-Leclercq, Maass, Thiele, Kroll, Boll, and the publication in a cheap and accessible form of several Greek writers on the stars, notably the *Calasterismi* of Pseudo-Eratosthenes, the *περὶ ἀστρολογίας* of Hermippus, the *Ἀράτου καὶ Εὐδόξου φαινομένων ἐξηγήσεις* of Hipparchus, the *εἰσαγωγή εἰς τὰ φαινόμενα* of Geminus, the *de motu circulari corporum caelestium* of Cleomedes, all in the smaller Teubner series, have put into our possession a vast amount of astronomical material, from which a more enlarged, perhaps a more adequate, sketch might have been drawn. Bouché-Leclercq, in particular, should be familiar to every reader of Manilius: his large volume of 658 pages contains an exhaustive account of what is known of ancient astrology.¹

On the other hand, it is difficult not to be angry with the far too frequent obtrusion of the name of the Delphin editor Fayus (du Fay), whose chief merit is now generally thought to be his inclusion in the same volume with Huet's lucid *Animadversiones*. Creech called du Fay 'wretched'; Housman damns his work as 'humble'; I can find no better name than 'intolerable'—the more intolerable that a really great Frenchman, Pingré, whose translation anticipated the outbreak of the French

¹ L'Astrologie Grecque, par A. Bouché-Leclercq, membre de l'Institut: Leroux, 1899.

Revolution by one year (1788), is still the best and clearest exponent of the poet's meaning. Breiter indeed has acknowledged this, and has done very wisely in quoting from time to time the actual words of Pingré. More use, we think, might advantageously have been made of Jacob's various dissertations—a remark which applies also to a recent English edition of the 1st book, reviewed by the present writer in HERMATHENA for 1904, to Postgate's *Silva Maniliana*, and to my own *Noctes Manilianae* (1891).

However, the long course of years in which Breiter has been engaged on our poet, extending to more than half a century, may well be thought to justify his seeming indifference to much of more modern criticism. Master, as he appears to me to be, of the technical difficulties of the poem, his views claim the respectful consideration which belongs to experts. We can only wish that his desire to be intelligible above all things to the Fatherland, had not led him to prefer the medium of German to Latin. This, however, is a point which, now that the way has been pioneered, and much that was obscure set in a clearer light, will no doubt be easily righted.

It will be said, and I think it is true, that the two sides of Manilian exegesis, the scientific and the literary, are not equally balanced in the edition at present under review. Breiter's merits as an interpreter of language are rather of a negative kind: he explains briefly and with very little illustration, or rather with not enough illustration. A few instances will explain my meaning:—

IV. 261, 262.

cernere sub terris undas, inducere terris,
ipsaque conuersis aspergere fluctibus astra.

Here both *fluctibus* and *astra* require examination—the former as a word hardly to be expected in a description

of water bubbling up from the earth, the latter as an exaggeration : *conuersis* is also difficult, but has been well commented upon by Huet.

V. 191, 192.

sternere litoreis monstrorum corpora harenis,
horrendumque †fretis in bella lacescere pontum

I have seen no explanation of *fretis*, and Breiter does not offer anything new. Manilius is speaking of the characters produced by Orion, mainly, hunters of animals on land or sea. In the latter case he seems to draw a distinction between animals taken in the open sea and such as come closer in shore, and when observed there are challenged by man to open conflict. In this case *fretis* will refer to narrow inlets of the sea along which the animals make their way till they come into close contiguity with their captors. *Horrendum* must be taken closely with *fretis*, 'dreadful with its inlets,' because it brings dangerous animals so far beyond mid-sea, where they naturally live.

V. 322.

nec non lasciuit amores
in uarios †ponitque forum suadetque† lyaeo.

Is this 'gives up the forum and devotes himself to love and wine,' or, as I suggest in my *Noctes Manilianae*, 'sets on the *dice-board*'? Breiter does not come to our assistance in the matter. These are only a few examples out of many.

I will now mention some passages where I agree or disagree with Breiter; some of these have already been discussed in my *Noctes*.

In iv. 530-534, the baleful effects of the Crab in a man's horoscope are described.

lumina deficient ortus, geminamque creatis
mortem fata dabunt. se quisque et uiuit et effert.

Breiter explains in reference to the blindness of those born under the Crab (*quisque*) *se uiuit mortuum, se uiuum sepelit*. I fail to see how this can be got out of the words. Such a construction as *se quisque uiuit* is, so far as I can judge, unexampled; yet there is no trace of MS. corruption. I should prefer to regard *se* as grammatically uninfluenced by *uiuit*, and dependent on *effert* alone. A blind man may be described as a living death: each day he lives is little better than an anticipation of the day of his funeral. I have illustrated this on Catull. xiv. 21 *uos hinc interea ualete abite*, where *hinc* refers to *abite*, to which word *ualete* acts as a mere introduction. Tr. 'each man in living is at the same time celebrating his own funeral.'

iv. 521.

auersus uenit in caelum diuesque puellis
Pleiadum paruo referens glomerabile sidus.

glomerabile MSS., retaining which Breiter would write *Pleiadum pluuiumque ferens glomerabile sidus*, a far too bold emendation, though it is strange, as he observes, that Manilius should dwell on the small group of Pleiades and say nothing of the Hyades in the Bull's head. But there is another question which the words suggest: is *puellis* ablative or dative? The Bull might fairly be called 'rich for maidens,' if their *dos* were supposed to be ampler for his influence. This, too, would account for the juxtaposition of *puellis* with the Pleiads; Taurus is rich for maidens, as we might expect from the group of maiden Pleiads, which

form part of his constellation. Here, again, Breiter's astronomical erudition starts an inquiry which may lead to a more decided result than we have yet attained to.

iv. 549.

iudex †extraneę sistet uitaeque necisque.

'*Examen* mit Bentr.,' says Breiter. This is not enough to satisfy the cravings of modern palæographers. We ask for some explanation of so curious a depravation. Gembl. has *extranea*, Matrit. *extraeme*. Is it possible that this last is a corruption of *exsagme(n)* through *exsacme(n)*?

588.

nascentem †ipsumque diem mediosque calores
teque, Helice.

A similar difficulty to the last. Bonincontri's *lapsumque* (1484) is generally accepted as right: it was afterwards ascribed by Scaliger to Andrew Melvil. A profitable monograph has still to be written examining the various corruptions which centre round this word (*ipse* and its cases). Breiter says nothing about it.

Bechert conjectures *nascentemque imumque*, which proves this eminent scholar to be dissatisfied with *lapsum*.

608, *sqq.*

et prius in laeas effundens circuit omnem
Italiam, [atque] adriam comitatur nomine ponto.

Our two modern editors, Bechert and Breiter, agree, and I think rightly, in correcting in 608 *se effundens* rather than *se fundens*; agree also, this time I think wrongly, to retain, in 609, *Hădria*, Bechert writing *atque Hadriam comitatur nomine pontus*, Breiter *atque Hadriae comitatur nomine pontus*.

The case against this is strong. *Hādria* is the only classical prosody; and *atque* is probably an interpolation, since the Lipsiensis has *atque* written above the line, and G omits the word. Gronovius' emendation *Hadriaco mutatum nomina ponto* easily accounts for the corrupt form of the MS. tradition, and does not offend against the usually strict prosody of our poet.

649.

Caspiaque Euxini similis facit aequora ponti (*sc.* fluctus).

Here the difficulty is *similis*, on the construction of which Breiter says nothing. The passage has a curious resemblance to Catalept. IX. 32 *saepe rubro similis sanguine fluxit humus*, where *humus* is said to take a *corresponding* hue (i.e. crimson, like the blood shed upon it): there, however, *rubrae similis* is an easy correction. In Man. IV. 649, *similis* may perhaps in the same way be 'corresponding,' not agreeing with *Euxini—ponti* as genitive, but as nominative, 'taking a corresponding form makes an Euxine-like sea of Caspian waters.' It is perhaps more easy to suppose that *Euxini—ponti* depends on *similis*, 'the wave like a second Euxine sea makes the level lake of the Caspian.'

696.

hos erit in fines orbis pontusque uocandus.

All MSS. give *uocandus*: Breiter, against his ordinary habit, prints *notandus*, because in 586 Manilius says *summa est rerum referenda figura*; and this points to the sense of 'indicating,' rather than of marking out into divisions. This is surely to refine unreasonably: *in fines uocare orbem* is simply a paraphrase for mapping out the world, justified by many analogous uses, *uocare in suspicionem, in inuidiam, discepcionem, periculum, exitium, iudicium, &c.*

I see that Bechert retains *uocandus*.

908, 9.

nec sola fronte deorum
contentus manet et caelum scrutatur in *†*aluo.

Neither Bechert nor Breiter records any difference of reading, yet *in aluo* is far from being clear. Bentley writes 'opponuntur frons exterior, aluus interior.' But the parallel use of *praecordia* in this sense of something inner and hidden is not enough to content; we desiderate a larger array and a more exact body of parallels. Does the original come from a Greek source, or is Manilius himself the author?

v. 8, 9.

omnia circum
sidera uectantem et toto decurrere caelo.

MSS. give *uectantur*, omitting *et*. Bechert retains the older correction *uectatum*, admitting, however, Bentley's *et*. I do not think an asyndeton impossible.

me properare uiam mundus iubet, omnia circum
sidera uectatum toto decurrere caelo.

171.

Speaking of a ball-player, Manilius says:

ut teneat tantos orbes sibi que ipse reludat
et uelut *†*edictos iubeat uolitare per ipsum.

Edictos, *Lips.*; *edictos*, *Matrit.*; pointing perhaps to *edicto*, 'by special order.' The reading of *Gemb.* *edoctos* is also good, but the idea is more decidedly, and to my feeling more originally, conveyed by *edicto*.

The balls feel themselves compelled as by special edict to find their way back again and again to the same one accomplished player.

195.

‡luxuria quia terra parum fastidiet orbem.

luxuriet *Breiter*: but *luxuria* suggests the origin of the corruption *luxuria*†, i.e. *luxuriat*, which is all but necessary on grammatical grounds also. Bechert gives *luxuriae* less probably.

226.

ardescit uitio uitium uiresque ministrat
Bacchus et in flammam saeuas exsuscitat iras.

Matrit. has in flammam seua sexsuscitat iras. This may have come from an original *saeva se exsuscitat ira*.

244.

nec parce uina recepta
hauriet †e miseris et fructibus ipse fouetur.

Vollmer's conjecture *e mustis*, accepted by Breiter, is not better than the others recorded by Bechert *e mystris*, *emessis*, *e murris*; and Scaliger's *fruetur* for *fouetur* is doubtful. I consider this one of the most deeply vitiated verses in the whole poem.

306 sqq.

qui serpentem super ora cubantem
infelix nati †sonumque animamque bibentem
sustinuit misso petere ac prosternere telo.

sucumque Immisch. *sanguenque* Breiter; no improvement and an improbable archaism. Surely the old emendation *somnumque* is right (1) as palæographically supported by 326, where *somnum* appears variously as *sonum*, *sonitum*, *somnum*; (2) as adding a detail to the picture: the youth's breath is sucked by the serpent whilst sleeping.

291-293.

haec fuerat quondam diuis concessa figura
 nunc iam luxuriae pars et triclinia templis
 concertant tectique auro iam uescimur auro.

The sudden break at *pars* makes the MS. reading in 292 suspect, and the old correction *est* may well be right. More certainly wrong is *iam uescimur auro*; for in what sense can gold be *eaten*? Perhaps we should write *tectique auro uestimur et auro*. Man not only has roofs and ceilings of gold, but wears gold as part of his attire.

There are other cases where palæography has, I suggest, a paramount claim to be regarded as determining against or for particular readings: V. 145. MSS. give *delphinumque suos per inane †natantia motus*. Scaliger's *imitantia* makes excellent sense, but is not likely to have been changed into *natantia*: *notantia* is the word with which this is most readily interchanged; *therefore* it is preferable. This I mention because both the two latest editors retain *imitantia*, and Prof. Postgate wishes to improve upon *notantia*, which I offered in *Noctes Manilianae*, p. 192 (with *suo* for *suos*), by writing *rotantia*, to which the same palæographical argument would *not* apply. V. 508 *carnique adquirere dotem | materiae* 'to win for flesh the extra set-off of gems and gold,' as Manilius himself explains, 516-519, is intelligible as Latin, and quite in keeping with the poet's style; hence, when we find *carae* substituted for *carni*, we are obliged to pause, and, as a preliminary, to ask whether such a change is likely as an error of writing. Such a test must of course be far short of conclusive; yet if the general verdict should reply 'no,' we should, I submit, be right in retaining the MS. reading and dismissing the conjecture.¹ I would not deny, however, that there are passages where emendations

¹ Markland preferred *carnisque*.

seem almost certain which defy or disregard palæography. Such is the word *respublica* in v. 738 :

sic etiam magno quaedam res publica mundo est
quam natura facit quae caelo condidit urbem.

MSS. give *respondere* or *res pendere* with no adequate meaning. Bentley conj. *res publica*, and this must, I think, be right. Possibly the corruption sprang from an abbreviation *resp.*, which was filled out in a period of barbarism, by some one who did not understand the contraction.

I. 679.

sed nitet ingenti stellatus balteus orbe
insignemque facit caelato flumine mundum.

culmine, Housman. *lato caelamine*, Garrod ingeniously.

On the whole, Breiter's *Manilius* must be considered a decided step in advance. Its conscientious and usually sane judgments are particularly valuable in dealing with a poet whose theme is at starting one of unusual perplexity. The perplexity in the material is enhanced by the poet's obvious struggle with the penury of the language he writes in. Instead of the multifarious resources of the Greek vocabulary, Manilius had to work in the trammels of the, for poetical purposes, comparatively weak language of Rome. Both Cicero and Lucretius confess as much; and it is very distinctly felt in Manilius. Whether, indeed, the poet was even an Italian is uncertain; and there are not wanting critics who pronounce his Latin hybrid and inferior. Into these questions Breiter does not enter; he finds a justifiable apology for this reserve, as for the scanty use he has made of much that has been published on Manilius, in the wish to avoid swelling his volume to an unwieldy bulk.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF EUSEBIUS' *MARTYRS*
OF PALESTINE.

THE work of Eusebius of Caesarea which is known by the title *De Martyribus Palestinae* has come down to us in two forms. The better known of these is the Greek recension, which in the printed editions of the *Ecclesiastical History* of the same writer always follows the eighth book. But it is now nearly half a century since a Syriac version of another recension was made generally accessible by the labours of the late Dr. Cureton.¹ It is contained in the British Museum MS. Add. 12,150, which bears the date 411 A.D. It is obviously a translation from a Greek original; but the manifest corruptions of the text suggest that it is considerably later than the Syriac exemplar from which it is ultimately derived, and certain erroneous readings of the underlying Greek which can still be detected point to the conclusion that the manuscript from which the rendering was made was in its turn separated by some decades from the autograph. Thus there can be little doubt that the original work was contemporary with Eusebius († 339)². And there is not wanting evidence, internal and external, that both it and the more familiar Greek recension are products of his pen.³

¹ *History of the Martyrs in Palestine by Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, discovered in a very antient Syriac manuscript*: edited and translated into

English by William Cureton. London, Edinburgh, and Paris, 1861.

² *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, ii. 318 f.

³ *Ibid.*, 320.

Lightfoot's theory of the relation between the two forms of the work is probably correct. He held that the longer edition, now represented by Cureton's Syriac, was the original form of the book, and that it was written mainly for the instruction of the Christians of Caesarea; while the shorter edition, on the other hand, was abridged from it, and was but a part of a larger work intended for a wider public.¹ But it is not necessary in this paper to assume the truth of Lightfoot's conclusion. We may rest content with the assurance that the Syriac and the Greek recensions are two editions of the same treatise, both of which received their final form from Eusebius of Caesarea.

Now both of them present a very striking contrast to the two books of the *Ecclesiastical History* which cover the same period. The ninth book of the *History* is absolutely devoid of explicit chronological data; the eighth has only a few, and those for the most part vague and difficult to interpret. The *De Martyribus*, on the contrary, bristles with dates. Of almost every event recorded in it we are told the year, the month, the day of the month, and even sometimes the day of the week. Quite apart, therefore, from certain incidents of the persecution of Diocletian, of which our knowledge is derived from it alone, this work ought, in virtue of the number and accuracy of its dates, to serve as a valuable supplement to the *History*. But there is an initial difficulty to be overcome. If we except one passage of the Greek recension, which seems to have been copied from the *History*,² and has no parallel in the Syriac, the chronology of the *Martyrs* is expressed, not in terms of the regnal years of the Emperors, but in terms of the years of the persecution. The customary formula in its most complete form is seen, for example, at the beginning of c. 6: τετάρτῃ γε μὲν τοῦ καθ' ἡμῶν ἔτει διωγμοῦ, πρὸ

¹ *Dictionary of Christian Biography*,
ii. 320 f.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) Pref. Cf. *H. E.* viii.
2. 4, 5.

δώδεκα καλανδῶν δεκεμβρίων, ἥ γένοιτ' ἂν μηνὸς δίου εἰκάδι, προσαββάτου ἡμέρα, κ.τ.λ.; for which we have in the Syriac,¹ 'It was in the fourth year of the persecution in our days, and on Friday the twentieth of the latter Teshri,' &c. What did Eusebius mean by a 'year of the persecution'? On what days of the year, according to our reckoning, did such a year begin and end? This is a question to which we must find an answer if we are to understand the chronology of the persecution.

It will be admitted that the most obvious assumption is that the first year covered a period of twelve months, counted from the actual outbreak of the persecution, and that each of the later years covered a like period, and began in the same month of our reckoning. This assumption, indeed, does not supply a full answer to our question, for the outbreak of the persecution is variously dated. According to Lactantius,² the first edict of Diocletian against the Christians was issued 24 February, 303, the persecution having actually begun on the previous day; Eusebius, in *H. E.* viii. 2, places the publication of the edict in March,³ and in *M.P.* (Grk.) Pref. in April of the same year. These dates may perhaps be reconciled. But a mere reconciliation of the dates cannot determine whether Eusebius' persecution-years began in February, in March, or in April.⁴ But I hope to be able to show that discussion of that problem is superfluous.

The possibility of finding an answer different from this, and perhaps more satisfactory, was suggested to the present writer by a short but illuminative discussion by Mr. C. H. Turner, of the meaning of regnal years in

¹ Cureton, p. 19.

² *De Mort. Pers.*, 12 f.

³ So also in the *Chronica*, ed. Schoene, ii. 189.

⁴ Mr. M'Giffert holds that Eusebius dated the beginning of the persecution-

years sometimes before, sometimes after, April 2, though always in April. But why not in March? See his note on *M.P.* 7. 1, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. i., p. 348.

Eusebius, which was printed in an early number of the *Journal of Theological Studies*.¹ The conclusion at which Mr. Turner arrives is, that the beginning of a regnal year was independent of the actual day of accession of the emperor, and that it was in all cases regarded by Eusebius as falling in the month of September. What if it should prove that the starting-point of the persecution-years was likewise independent of the actual date of the outbreak of the persecution? Once this hypothesis is admitted as possible, some of the arguments urged by Mr. Turner in favour of his theory, that all regnal years in Eusebius began in September, might be used to prove that persecution-years began in the same month. It will be found, however, if I am not mistaken, that the latter conclusion is inconsistent with the facts.

The validity of both these suggestions must be tested by an appeal to the text of the *Martyrs*. But a word may first be said as to the method of indicating dates in the two recensions. The Greek has a double notation. First the date is given in the ordinary Roman fashion, counting backwards from Kalends, Nones, and Ides, the Roman names of the months being used. Then it is given in the style to which we are accustomed, counting forwards from the first day of the month, the Roman names being replaced by the names of the Macedonian months which correspond to them. In the Syriac, only the second of these methods is used; and instead of the Macedonian names we find what the translator regarded as their Syriac equivalents. Thus the martyrdom of Procopius (7 June) is dated in the Greek (1. 2) vii. id. Jun. = Daesius 7. while in the parallel passage of the Syriac it is dated Khaziran 7.

Now the year which has the largest number of martyrdoms is the seventh. The Greek does not mark the point

¹ Vol. i., p. 188 ff.

at which we pass from the sixth year to the seventh, though it indicates that, so far as the proceedings at Caesarea are concerned, the record of those two years extends from c. 8 to c. 11.¹ But in the Syriac two successive passions are headed respectively, 'The confession of Ares, and Primus, and Elias, in the sixth year of the persecution in our days at Ashkelon,' and 'The confession of Peter, who was sur-named Absalom, in the seventh year of the persecution in our days in the city of Caesarea.'² These two passions correspond to the two sections of the tenth chapter of the Greek. It may be assumed, therefore, that chapter 10, § 2, and chapter 11 of the Greek text contain the narrative of the seventh year at Caesarea. The martyrdom of Peter, then, is the first recorded as belonging to the seventh year. It is dated in the Greek 11 Audinaeus = 3 id. Jan. (i.e. 11 January), and in the Syriac 10 Conun (i.e. 10 January). The last martyrdom of the year is that of Peleus³ and his companions. The Syriac dates it 19 Elul⁴; and as Elul included the greater part of September with a portion of October, we may interpret this to mean 19 September. It is true that in the Greek this martyrdom is without date; but there is at any rate nothing in the context at variance with the date given in the Syriac.⁵ Thus we see that the seventh year of the persecution began before 11 January, and ended after 19 September. This fact puts out of court the hypothesis that the persecution-years began on or near the anniversary of the promulgation of the first

¹ See 8. 1; 13. 1.

² Cureton, p. 34 f.

³ This is the correct form of the name. See Eus. *H.E.* viii. 13. 5. The Syriac calls him Paulus.

⁴ Cureton, p. 46.

⁵ 13. 1-3. It is necessary to emphasize this, because the opening words of the chapter have sometimes been mis-translated, 'The seventh year of our

conflict was completed,' the martyrdom of Peleus being thus apparently thrown into the eighth year. They should rather be rendered 'was approaching completion' (*ἤνυετο*), which suits one of the later months of the seventh year. It is not implied that the events narrated in the immediate sequel belonged to the eighth year.

edict of Diocletian. We cannot regard any date in February, March, or April as the first day of such a year: it must have begun between 19 September and 11 January. This, of course, still leaves open the possibility that it ran from September to September. Let us see then whether its beginning may be determined within narrower limits.

The first dated martyrdom in the sixth year—that of Khatha and Valentina—took place on 25 July, according to both recensions¹: the last—that of Ares and others—again according to both recensions, on 14 December.² Hence the year ended on or after 14 December. The beginning of the year cannot have been in September. It must have commenced between 14 December and 11 January. If we conclude that the normal persecution-year of Eusebius was simply the ordinary Roman year, which began on 1 January and ended on 31 December, we cannot be astray by more than a few days.

The conclusion being thus reached that the beginning of the persecution-years, according to Eusebius, was on or about 1 January, and as a consequence that they approximately coincided with years of our A.D. reckoning, the solution of a further problem may be attempted. With what year of our era did each several persecution-year synchronize? A consideration of the account given of the passion of Apphianus, or, as the Syriac calls him, Epiphanius,³ and of the context which leads up to it, supplies us with the answer to our question. After mentioning the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian, Eusebius proceeds to describe the renewal of the persecution after the accession of Maximin, and the consternation which as

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 8. 12; Cureton, p. 31.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 10. 1; Cureton, p. 34.
The Greek does not give the number of the year.

³ Apphianus is correct, since another Syriac version of his passion has Api-

anus. See S. E. Assemani, *Acta SS. Mart. Orient. et Occident.*, Rome, 1748, vol. ii., p. 189.

⁴ *M.P.* (Grk.) 3. 5-4. 15; Cureton, p. 12 ff.

a result fell upon the Christians of Palestine. Apphianus appears to have been the first victim of his fury at Caesarea. After proceedings which must have occupied at least several days—more probably some weeks—Apphianus was seized, imprisoned, tortured, brought three times before the judge, and finally cast into the sea. The date is given in both recensions as 2 April, in the third year of the persecution. Now we learn from Lactantius¹ that the abdication of Diocletian took place on 1 May, 305. The earliest possible date for the martyrdom is therefore 2 April, 306. It could not have been 2 April, 307, for on no possible hypothesis could the year 307 have been reckoned as the third of the persecution. It follows therefore that A.D. 306 was the third persecution-year.

It may indeed be suggested that Eusebius was in error as to the date of the abdication, and supposed that it occurred before 2 April, 305. If so, his error must have been much greater than is at all likely, perhaps six weeks or two months. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the martyrdom in actual fact followed the abdication, and did not precede it. That is not only stated by the historian; it is implied throughout the entire narrative. If, to relieve ourselves of the necessity of placing the martyrdom of Apphianus in the year 306, we assume that Eusebius ante-dated the accession of Maximin, we must therefore also assume that he ante-dated the martyrdom: a second improbability which is not easy to be got over. And, finally, we must admit that he has contradicted himself in a very remarkable fashion. For he elsewhere informs us—after the manner of a most unwilling witness, it is true—that the half year which followed the accession

¹ *De Mort. Pers.* 19. Lactantius in the context exhibits minute knowledge of the movements of Diocletian at this

period, and his dates cannot reasonably be doubted. See cc. 12-14, 17

of Maximin was marked by a relaxation of the persecution;¹ and this statement is supported by independent evidence.² If it is true, it is impossible that the measures described in the passage before us can have been carried into effect within six months of his appointment as Caesar. If the martyrdom of Apphianus took place in 305, it cannot have been earlier than November. But it is scarcely credible that Eusebius misdated both the abdication and the martyrdom, the one by one or two months, and the other by six. We may conclude therefore that the third year of the persecution coincided with 306 A.D.

There are similar indications that the second year coincided with 305 A.D. For, after dating the decapitation of Timolaus and others on 24 March in the second year, the Greek proceeds (3. 5) : ἐν τούτῳ μεταβολή τις τῶν κρατούντων . . . γίνεται. The phrase ἐν τούτῳ may here mean 'in this year'; and we know that the change referred to was made on 1 May, 305. But it must be admitted that elsewhere Eusebius uses the words ἐν τούτῳ loosely³; and the rendering of the Syriac in this place, 'at the same time' (ܠܒܠ ܨܡ), is probably correct, if it does not err by being too precise. But, however that may be, if the date of these martyrdoms had been as early as 24 March, 304, or as late as 24 March, 306, it could hardly have been connected with the abdication by the phrase ἐν τούτῳ. And indeed in other passages the

¹ *H.E.* ix. 1; 2. 1. It should be added that the Syriac recension of the *De Martyribus* ignores the favour shown to the Christians at the beginning of Maximin's reign. He is said to have gone forth, 'even from his very commencement, to fight, as it were, against God.' Cureton, p. 12.

² Letter of Maximin ap. Eus. *H.E.* ix. 9. 15-17. Cp. Lactantius, *De Mort.*

Pers. 36. 6: 'Facere autem parabat, quae iamdudum in Orientis partibus fecerat. Nam cum clementiam specie tenus profiteretur, occidi servos Dei vetuit, debilitari iussit.

³ See, e.g., *H.E.* iii. 18. 1; 21. 2; iv. 15. 1; vi. 7; 18. 1; 31. 1; vii. 1; 14. 1; 31. 1. In these passages the phrase may be rendered 'at this epoch.'

abdication is stated in unambiguous language to have taken place in the second year.¹

If we have argued correctly thus far, the third year of the persecution must have ended about 31 December, 306, the second about 31 December, 305, and the first about 31 December, 304. This is certainly an unexpected result. For the actual beginning of the persecution at Nicomedia is dated by Lactantius 23 February, 303, and Eusebius represents it to have commenced in other parts of the Empire in March or April of the same year.² The first 'year' must therefore have been a period, not of twelve, but of at least twenty months.³ The tenth 'year,' on the same computation, began 1 January, 313; and as it ended with the edict of Maximin, probably in September or October,⁴ it included about ten months.

It may be well, however, at this point, to anticipate a possible objection. We have relied on the accuracy of the texts, Greek and Syriac, in regard to chronological data. But it may be urged that their dates are demonstrably inaccurate in some places. I do not think that much stress will be laid on a few passages in which the two recensions are inconsistent with each other. Of this we have several

¹ *H.E.* viii. 13. 10; App. 2; *Chron.*, ed. Schoene, ii. 189.

² Lact. *De Mort. Pers.* 12; Eus. *H.E.* viii. 2. 4; *M.P.* (Grk.) Pref.

³ In other words, a considerable part of 303 is reckoned by Eusebius as belonging to 304. In like manner the period between the accession of an Emperor and the following September was regarded by him as belonging to the first regnal year, which in strictness began in the latter month. Dr. Carleton makes the interesting suggestion that Eusebius, in thus making a persecution-year or a regnal year include a period prior to its nominal beginning, may have been influenced by a rule of the

Metonic Cycle, in the adaptation of which to ecclesiastical purposes he took a leading part. In that cycle a lunation was conceived as belonging to the year in which it ended. Thus the twelfth lunation of the tenth year of the cycle ended 3 December. The following lunation, because it ended on 2 January, was held to belong to the *eleventh* year. So a Julian year, nominally beginning on 1 January, might include nearly a month prior to 1 January. See S. Butcher, *The Ecclesiastical Calendar, its theory and construction*, Dublin, 1877, p. 61 ff.

⁴ Eus. *H.E.* ix. 10. For the date see §§ 8, 12.

examples. Alphaeus and Zacchaeus were beheaded, and Romanus was burned at the stake, according to the Greek on 17 November, according to the Syriac on 7 November¹; Domninus was given to the flames according to the Greek on 5 November, according to the Syriac on 1 November²; Peter, called Apselamus (Absalom), suffered according to the Greek on 11 January, according to the Syriac on 10 January.³ But such slight discrepancies are not more serious or more numerous than might be expected in two independent texts, each of which has suffered to some extent at the hands of transcribers. In all cases one of the dates is almost certainly what Eusebius held to be correct; and whichever be accepted as his, our argument is unaffected.

Another class of passages demands more consideration. Four times in the Greek, and once in the Syriac, a date is defined not only by the year, the month, and the day of the month, but also by the day of the week. Let us examine the passages.

The Greek text, after stating that the martyr Apphianus was drowned on 2 April of the third year of the persecution, adds that the day was Friday.⁴ We have used this date to prove that 306 was the third year of the persecution; and it is therefore important for our theory. Now 2 April is Friday only in a year whose Sunday letter is C (or a leap year whose Sunday letters are DC). But the Sunday letter of 306 is F, and in it 2 April was Tuesday. Thus, if the date is correct, our theory cannot be maintained. It is true that the Syriac gives no support to the statement that Apphianus suffered on Friday; and so it may be that the

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 1. 5; 2. 1; Cureton, p. 6. The Syriac version of this passion edited by S. E. Assemani, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 177, has 17 November. The Greek is therefore in this case almost certainly correct.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 7. 3f.; Cureton, p. 24.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 10. 2; Cureton, 35. With the latter agrees Assemani's Syriac version, *op. cit.*, ii. 208.

⁴ ἡμέρα παρασκευῆς. *M.P.* (Grk.) 4. 15.

note in the Greek is due, not to Eusebius, but to a scribe who desired to indicate a parallel between his passion and that of Christ. But there is no need for such a suggestion. The fact is, that the only years falling within the period of the persecution which have the Sunday letter C are 303 and 308; and on no scheme of the chronology could 2 April in either of those years be counted as belonging to the third persecution-year. We must, therefore, make our choice between rejecting the day of the week in the Greek text, and rejecting the day of the month in both Greek and Syriac. Here the Syriac comes to our aid. In it we read, 'Such was the termination of the history of Epiphanius, on the second of the month Nisan, and his memory is observed on this day.'¹ Thus the tradition of the year 411, if not of the time when Eusebius wrote, confirms the date 2 April. This is decisive in favour of the supposition that the words *ἡμέρα παρασκευῆς* are an incorrect gloss, whether of Eusebius or another.

But again, the Greek and the Syriac agree in dating the death of Agapius on 20 November, the birthday of the Emperor Maximin, in the fourth year (307, according to the theory here advocated); and once more the Greek adds that the day was Friday.² This requires the Sunday letter D (or ED), while the Sunday letter of 307 is E. But the first year after 302 which has the Sunday letter D is 313³; and by 20 November, 313, the persecution was over. Since there is no reasonable ground for doubting that 20 November⁴ was observed as Maximin's birthday,

¹ Cureton, p. 17. So also Assemani's Syriac, the date of the martyrdom being nevertheless given as 11 April (*op. cit.*, ii. 189). It has been suggested by H. Brown in his *Ordo Saeculorum*, London, 1844, p. 535 f. (§ 479), that Eusebius 'has confounded the date of the martyr Apphianus' first hearing on

Tuesday, 2 April, with the date of his martyrdom on the third day following, i.e. Friday, 5 April.'

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 6. 1; Cureton, p. 19.

³ Not counting 308, which has D in January and February only.

⁴ We might have expected 1 May, the day of Maximin's accession. But

the phrase of the Greek, *προσαβάρου ἡμέρα*, must once more be rejected as unhistorical.¹

The next date to be considered is that of the martyrdom of Procopius, which both recensions assign to 7 June in the first year, the Greek adding that it was on 'the fourth day of the week.'² On our theory this might mean either 7 June, 303, or 7 June, 304. But it can be proved that 7 June, 303, is intended. For the martyrdoms of Alphaeus, Zacchaeus, and Romanus are said to have taken place on 17 November in the first year, and they are definitely connected with the vicennalia of Diocletian, which immediately followed them.³ But the vicennalia were celebrated 20 November, 303.⁴ Now the martyrdom of Procopius

by substituting 1 May for 20 November we do not get rid of our difficulty, for the former falls on the same day of the week as the latter. Dodwell (*Dissertationes Cyprianicae*, Oxford, 1684, p. 322) plausibly suggests that Maximin observed Diocletian's day as his own.

¹ Browne (*ubi sup.*) writes: 'I understand it thus: 20 November (Wednesday) the martyr was thrown to the wild beast. Dreadfully mangled, he was taken back to his prison, and there lingered one whole day. On the day after that he was cast into the sea (*i.e.* Friday). Eusebius again throws together the month-date in the Roman Acta, and the week-date of the Passion.' Thus he concludes that Agapius was martyred in 306, in which 22 November was Friday. But both Greek and Syriac imply that he was cast into the sea the day following his contest in the arena, not two days after it. If Browne's suggestion as to the source of Eusebius' error is correct, the date of the martyrdom is 21 November, which was Friday, not in 306, but in 307, the year to which by independent reasoning we have assigned it.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 1. 2; Cureton, p. 4.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 1. 5; 2. 1, 4; Cureton, p. 4 ff.

⁴ Lactantius, *De Mort. Persec.* 17. Mason, following Hunziker, thinks that this date is due to a blunder of Lactantius or of a scribe, and that the true date is not 12 Kal. Dec., but 12 Kal. Jan. = 21 December. (A. J. Mason, *The Persecution of Diocletian*, Cambridge, 1876, p. 205.) But he relies mainly on two rescripts in the Codex of Justinian (II. iii. 28, IV. xix. 21) which seem to have been incorrectly dated. See Mommsen in the *Abhandlungen der königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1860, pp. 357, 372, 437 f. It is somewhat to our purpose, however, to observe that in an argument based on Eusebius' account of the sufferings of Romanus he appears to have misapprehended the facts. He says that Romanus had his tongue cut out on 17 November, and contends that 'the three days that would elapse between Romanus' mutilation and the 20th of November could hardly be called *πλεονος χρόνος*' [see *M.P.* (Grk.) 2. 4]. This

must have been earlier than those just mentioned, not merely because it precedes them in our texts, but because Procopius is stated to have been the first of the Palestinian martyrs.¹ But in 303 the 7th June was not Wednesday, but Monday. Clearly, either 7 June or Wednesday is an error.²

Finally, both Greek and Syriac give 2 April in the fifth year as the day of the martyrdom of Theodosia.³ The Syriac declares that it was Sunday; and the Greek addition may have the same meaning—ἐν αὐτῇ κυριακῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἀναστάσεως. But both recensions are certainly incorrect. Twice during the persecution did 2 April fall on Sunday—in 304 and 310. But no part of either of these years can have coincided with the fifth persecution-year. This example is interesting, because the agreement of the Syriac and the Greek makes it highly probable that the error originated with Eusebius himself.⁴

Thus every one of these four dates is incorrect. And

implies that he died on the day of the vicennialia. But what Eusebius says is that after his mutilation, for which no date is given, he suffered a long imprisonment, and died 17 November, τῆς ἀρχικῆς εἰκοσαετηρίδος ἐπιστάσης. This, so far from furnishing an argument against the date given by Lactantius, actually confirms it. For the phrase just quoted is inconsistent with the supposition that five weeks intervened between the martyrdom and the vicennialia.

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 1. 1; Cureton, p. 3.

² The Latin version of the Passion of Procopius, which, like the Syriac, does not mention the day of the week, gives the date as 'Desii septima Julii mensis, quae nonas Julias dicitur apud Latinos.' (Cureton, p. 50, Ruinart, *Acta sinc.* Amsterdam, 1713, p. 353.) And it so happens that 7 July, 303, was Wednesday. But the text is evidently

corrupt, for 'Desii' is transliterated from the Greek, and is the Macedonian equivalent of June. Thus the Latin is a fresh witness for the date 7 June. There was an interval of at least one day, probably two, between the arraignment and the execution of Alphaeus and Zacchaeus. On Browne's principle it might be conjectured that the arraignment was on Monday, 7 June, and the martyrdom on Wednesday, 9 June.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 7. 1; Cureton, p. 23.

⁴ Browne (*ubi sup.*), in his attempt to account for the error in this date, asserts that 2 April fell on Friday in 307, and places the martyrdom in that year. In fact, 2 April was Friday in 308, the year to which we have assigned it. But Browne's explanation of the origin of the mistake is unsatisfactory; and I cannot suggest another of greater probability.

not only is each by itself proved to be erroneous, but they are also inconsistent with one another. It is impossible that a year in which 2 April fell on Friday could be followed by a year in which 20 November fell on Friday, or that it in turn should be followed by a year in which 2 April fell on Sunday.

Are we to conclude then that the dates in the *Martyrs* are too untrustworthy to be used for our purpose? That is not a necessary conclusion. For in two, if not three, cases out of the four which have been examined we have seen reason to believe that the month-day is correct and only the week-day at fault. And it is on the month-days alone that our argument rests. Now there are fourteen dates reported in both recensions. In every instance the Greek and the Syriac are in agreement as to the month; in only three cases they differ as to the day of the month, and that but slightly. This is a sufficient guarantee that the dates which Eusebius wrote have been preserved to us in both recensions where they agree, in one or other of them where they differ. And it must be remembered that our argument is based only on the belief which Eusebius held as to the dates of the several martyrdoms which he records, not on the actual facts. Its validity is in no way affected if some or all of Eusebius' dates should prove to be historically inaccurate.

Nevertheless, recognizing the possibility of textual error in some of the dates which we have used, we may notice some further considerations which tend to confirm our conclusion.

We take first two passages which have been already used. The date of the martyrdom of Peter Apseamus has been referred to as indicating that persecution-years began before 11 January; but for placing it in the seventh year we were obliged to rely on the Syriac alone. It is therefore worth observing that the next series of events

recorded is the trial and death of Pamphilus and those who suffered with him.¹ It cannot be doubted that Eusebius assigned this group of martyrdoms to the seventh year. Not only is this directly stated in the Syriac: both Greek and Syriac add that the martyrs had been imprisoned for 'two full years,' or 'about two years' before their trial.² The latter assertion must be discussed later. For the present it may suffice to say that it is inexplicable if Pamphilus was imprisoned in the fifth,³ and brought to trial in the sixth year of the persecution. Moreover, after a parenthetic chapter which follows the recital of the passion of Pamphilus, Eusebius makes the remarkable statement that 'the seventh year was approaching completion.'⁴ But the arraignment of Pamphilus is dated in both recensions 16 February. Hence that day is the earliest on which this narrative allows us to place the beginning of a persecution-year.

It has already been pointed out that Eusebius dates the martyrdom of Timolaus and others 24 March in the second year, and places the abdication of Diocletian in the same year. If he agreed with Lactantius that the date of the latter incident was 1 May, the supposition that a persecution-year began between 24 March and 1 May is excluded. Again, if we suppose the first persecution-year to have begun earlier than 24 March, 303, and each year to have consisted of twelve months, it is impossible that the martyrdom of Timolaus could have been in the second year, unless we place it in 304, which has been shown to be extremely unlikely. And one other remark must be made. It is implied both in the Syriac and in the Greek that Timothy suffered before Timolaus at Gaza.⁵ And since the Syriac makes it plain that the

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 11; Cureton, p. 36 ff.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 11. 5; Cureton, p. 40.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 7. 6; Cureton, p. 25.

⁴ *M.P.* (Grk.) 13. 1

⁵ *M.P.* (Grk.) 3. 1; Cureton, p. 8.

praeses Urbanus was at Gaza when Timothy was executed, and both recensions represent him to have been at Caesarea during the festival at which Timolaus was condemned, there must have been a considerable interval between the two martyrdoms. The second year must therefore have been some way advanced by 24 March.

In the fourth year we find but one martyrdom, that of Agapius, put to death on 20 November.¹ If this event belongs to the close rather than to the earlier months of the year, it proves that the year ended after 20 November.

The record of the fifth year supplies two dates, 2 April for the martyrdom of Theodosia, and 5 (or 1) November for the exile of Silvanus.² The former proves that the year began before 2 April. After the later date are placed many important events,³ all of which apparently belonged to the same year.⁴ Urbanus, the governor, adopted a fresh policy of greater cruelty towards the Christians, of which several examples are given⁵; after an interval⁶ came the imprisonment of Pamphilus, and finally, a little later,⁷ the deposition of Urbanus. It is not extravagant to demand at least a month for all this, and thus the end of the year is pushed forward to December.

It may now be pointed out that our scheme of the chronology throws light on some statements about the

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 6; Cureton, p. 19 ff.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 7. 1, 3; Cureton, p. 22.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 7. 4-7; Cureton, p. 24 f.

⁴ See *M.P.* (Grk.) 7. 1; 8. 1; Cureton, pp. 24, 26. That the imprisonment of Pamphilus belonged to the fifth year is again implied in *M.P.* (Grk.) 11. 5; Cureton, p. 40.

⁵ The Greek prefixes to this statement the words *μεθ' ἧν*; but in the Syriac the order of events is different, and it is said that all these things and

the banishment of Silvanus happened 'in the same day,' and indeed 'in one hour.'

⁶ Syr., 'After all these things which I have described.' There is no note of time in the Greek.

⁷ Grk. *εὐθὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰς μακρὸν τοῖς κατὰ τοῦ Παμφίλου τετολημένοις*. Syr., 'forthwith, and immediately, and without any long delay.' The purpose of the writer is obviously to minimize the interval between the tyranny and the degradation of Urbanus.

course of the persecution inaugurated by the Emperor Diocletian. We may turn first to a passage near the close of the Greek recension of the *Martyrs* which has no counterpart in the Syriac. In it we are told¹ that in Italy, and the West generally, the persecution lasted not two complete years. The context informs us that peace in the West was brought about by the division of the empire. What is meant is more clearly stated in a somewhat similar passage, *H.E.* viii. 13. 10 f., where the division is said to have followed immediately upon the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian. But the persecution began in February, 303, and the abdication did not take place till 1 May, 305. How does this period come to be described 'as not two complete years'? Probably because Eusebius had in view his arbitrary persecution-years,² the first of which lasted, as we have seen, twenty months. He simply means that peace was established in the West before 31 December, 305. And so in the passage of his *History* referred to above, he puts the matter differently: οὐπω δ' αὐτοῖς τῆς τοιασδὶ κινήσεως δεύτερον ἔτος πεπλήρωτο κ. τ. λ.

In a somewhat similar way we may perhaps explain Eusebius' comment on the final edict of toleration issued by Maximin,³ that it was put forth 'not a complete year (οὐδ' ὅλον ἐνιαυτόν) after the ordinances against the Christians set up by him on pillars.' This note seems to be a bungling inference from the words of the edict, which obviously referred to something quite different—'Last year (τῷ παρελθόντι ἐνιαυτῷ) letters were sent to the governors of each province.'⁴ There is nothing in the phrase to exclude the supposition that the letters referred

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 13. 12 τὰ γὰρ τοι ἐπέκεινα τῶν δεδηλωμένων, Ἰταλία, κ.τ.λ., οὐδ' ὅλοις ἔτεσιν δυοὶ τοῖς πρώτοις τοῦ διαγμοῦ τὸν πόλεμον ὑπομείναντα.

² This indeed is implied by the words τοῖς πρώτοις.

³ *H.E.* ix. 10. 12.

⁴ *Ib.* § 8.

to were sent more than twelve months previously. But the interval between them and the edict was 'not a complete year,' because it was made up of parts of two successive years, and did not include an unbroken calendar year.

In general the phrase 'so many complete years' was used by Eusebius to indicate a series of unbroken years, together with parts of the years preceding and following the series. Thus having inferred from one statement of Josephus¹ that Pilate was sent to Judaea in 12 Tiberius, and from another² that he was recalled immediately before the emperor's death, i.e. in 23 Tiberius, he stated that he was in Judaea 'ten complete years,'³ viz.: 13-22 Tiberius, and portions of 12 Tiberius and 23 Tiberius. In the same way he stated that Demetrius was Bishop of Alexandria forty-three full years, meaning that he was appointed in 10 Commodus, and died in 10 Severus,⁴ and therefore held the bishopric for the 43 regnal years, 11 Commodus-9 Severus, and for a short time before and after. And similarly when he says that he knew Meletius as a fugitive in Palestine in the time of the persecution for seven complete years (ἐφ' ὅλοις ἔτεσιν ἑπτά)⁵ he indicates that he knew him during the whole course of the persecution, until he himself left Palestine for Egypt early in the eighth year.⁶

More difficult to explain is the remark that Pamphilus and his companions were in prison for 'two complete years' (ἐτῶν δυεῖν ὅλων χρόνον) before their final examination. For Pamphilus was arrested under the praeses Urbanus not earlier than November, 308⁷; and he was brought before Firmilianus, 16 February, 310. This period of fifteen months included one unbroken persecution-year (309), and parts of

¹ *Ant.* xviii. 2. 2.

² *Ib.* 4. 2.

³ *H.E.* i. 9. 1 f.

⁴ *H.E.* v. 22, vi. 26.

⁵ *H.E.* vii. 32. 28

⁶ He seems to have been on his way to Egypt when he visited the mines. See *M.P.* (Grk.) 13. 8.

⁷ *M.P.* (Grk.) 11. 5 f.

⁸ *M.P.* (Grk. 7. 5 f.; Cureton, p. 25.

two others. It might therefore, according to the usage of which examples have been given, be described as 'one complete year,' or 'not two complete years,' but not as 'two complete years.' The Syriac has 'about two years,'¹ which may be right. Perhaps the simplest hypothesis is that *ὅδ'* has fallen out of the Greek text; but it is not altogether satisfactory.

One further remark remains to be made. When the dates of the events recorded in *Martyrs of Palestine* are noted and compared, we are at once struck with the intermittent character of the persecution—at least in Caesarea. It was very far from being, as it is sometimes pictured, a reign of terror which continued everywhere in the East without cessation for ten years or more. The first edict of Diocletian against the Christians was issued 24 February, 303. It reached Palestine six weeks or two months later. But no record of proceedings at Caesarea under its provisions has come down to us. For it might plausibly be argued that the protomartyr, Procopius, who suffered in June, 303, was arrested, not in consequence of this edict, but under the ordinary law: certainly sentence of death was passed upon him on account of language which was regarded as insulting to the Emperors.² It appears, however, that in the latter part of the year active measures were taken against the Christian clergy under the second edict—provoked, it may be, by the somewhat extravagant conduct of Procopius. The result of these

¹ Cureton, p. 40.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) i. 1; Cureton, p. 4. The first edict ordered the destruction of churches. Yet, if we may believe the statements of the Syriac recension, churches were still standing in or near Caesarea in 310; for the bodies of Pamphilus and his companions, we are told, 'were buried with honourable burial, as they were worthy, and were

deposited in shrines [*ἑλὲς*, houses of shrines]: and into the temples [i.e. the naves as distinct from the sanctuaries of the churches] they were committed, for a memorial not to be forgotten, that they might be honoured of their brethren who are with God.' I owe the translation to the kindness of Dr. Gwynn. Cureton (p. 45) is inaccurate.

proceedings was a large number of imprisonments, the infliction of tortures in many cases, and two martyrdoms on 17 November, 303.¹ But after this there appears to have been a lull for fifteen or sixteen months. We hear of no martyrdoms and no acts of violence till March, 305. It seems clear that throughout the Empire the rigour of the persecution must have largely depended on the anti-Christian zeal of the local authorities, and that the praeses who held office at Caesarea up to the end of 304—Flavianus by name—was not eager to exceed his duty in the enforcement of the imperial edicts.

At any rate the increased violence of the proceedings in the early part of 305 is directly connected, both in the Greek and in the Syriac,² with the advent of a new praeses, one Urbanus, and the issue of the fourth anti-Christian edict of Diocletian.³ But if Urbanus was more zealous than his predecessor, his activity was speedily checked. Eight martyrs were beheaded by his order on the 24 March, 305; but no act of persecution and no martyrdom is recorded after that day till the following year, when Maximin put forth an edict more severe than any that had preceded it,⁴ and as a result Apphianus was put to death, 2 April, 306. It is evident that there was a cessation of persecution for the greater part of a year. This agrees well, as has been already pointed out, with the fact that Maximin became Emperor on 1 May, 305, and that till the following October or November, as Eusebius somewhat

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 1. 3-5; Cureton, pp. 4-6. Somewhat earlier than this date we may probably put the so-called 'Third Edict' (Eus., *H.E.* viii. 6. 10). See Mason, p. 206 f.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 3. 1; Cureton, p. 8.

³ If this edict is to be dated with Mason (*Persecution of Diocletian*, 212 f.) 30 April, 304 it was long in finding its way to Caesarea. But the argument

for this date is not very satisfying; and one is at a loss to understand why it is said to 'agree' with the phrase *ἐτους διαλαβόντος* of *M.P.* (Grk.) 3. 1, even if that passage has to do with 304, not 305.

⁴ *M.P.* (Grk.) 4. 8; Cureton, p. 13 f. This seems to have been a republication of the fourth edict in a more stringent form.

grudgingly admits, his policy was favourable to the Church. Afterwards, indeed, Maximin became a bitter persecutor, but the change in his attitude towards Christianity was plainly gradual¹; and Caesarea may very well have been unaffected by it till the spring of 306.

It is surprising to find that the execution of Apphianus was succeeded by another long respite of a year and a half.² The next event recorded as having taken place at Caesarea was the martyrdom of Agapius, 20 November, 307.³ On this occasion the revival of persecution was due to the presence of Maximin himself at Caesarea, and his desire to celebrate his birthday by a spectacle of an unusual kind. After the birth-day games of Maximin the persecution seems to have been continued steadily, and with increasing violence, under Urbanus and his yet more ferocious successor Firmilianus, until 25 July, 309, the day of the martyrdom of the virgin Khatha, her companion Valentina, and Paul at Gaza.⁴ Then there was another intermission which for several reasons demands special attention.

In the first place, it is the only cessation of persecution to which Eusebius explicitly directs attention. Hitherto the fact that there were periods of comparative rest to the Church has been brought to light only by careful attention to the chronology. The historian makes no mention of any of them. A hasty reader might easily suppose that the persecution was continuous from the day when the first edict of Diocletian reached Palestine in April, 303, to the month of August in the sixth year. But the most careless

¹ Eus. *H.E.* ix. 2.

² This is not an argument *e silentio*. See Cureton, p. 19: 'The next confessor after Epiphanius [Apphianus] who was called to the conflict of martyrdom in Palestine was Agapius.'

The statement, it will be observed, is not limited to Caesarea.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 6; Cureton, p. 19 ff.

⁴ *M.P.* (Grk.) 8. 4-13; Cureton, p. 26 ff.

student of the Greek recension of the *De Martyribus* cannot overlook the cessation of activity at which we have now arrived. Eusebius records it as follows:—

“After (or, as a result of) so many¹ heroic acts of the noble martyrs of Christ, the fire of the persecution having decreased, and being as it were in the course of being quenched by their holy blood, and release and liberty having been granted in the Thebaid to those who laboured for Christ’s sake in the mines there, and we being about for a little while to breathe the pure air,” &c.²

And yet this interval of peace upon which stress is thus laid was much shorter than the others which Eusebius passes over in silence. For three martyrs were sentenced to death no later than 13 November, 309.³ Thus the pause cannot have lasted much more than three months. Why, then, did Eusebius think it worthy of remark? Probably because it was not limited to Caesarea or Palestine, but extended throughout the whole of Maximin’s dominions. That this was the case seems to be implied by the mention of the convicts of the Thebaid. And the universality of this breathing-space leads us to another inference. The brief respite was not due to the carelessness or apathy of provincial officials. Rather the persecution ceased, as it was presently resumed, by the fiat of the Emperor himself.

Eusebius is at a loss to explain the fresh outbreak of the persecution; and the reason which he seems to suggest for its temporary abandonment will scarcely satisfy a historian. But perhaps a sufficient account can be given of both. The time of rest ended with the issue of the ‘Fifth Edict.’ The summary of it which is given by Eusebius⁴

¹ ἐπὶ δὴ τοῖς τοσούτοις . . . ἀνδραγαθήμασι.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 9. 1. It is also mentioned, but much more briefly, in the

Syriac. Cureton, p. 31.

³ *M.P.* (Grk.) 9. 5; Cureton, p. 32.

M.P. (Grk.) 9. 2; Cureton, p. 31.

leads one to think that it was differentiated from its fore-runners mainly by increased stringency and brutality. But one of its clauses arrests attention: the imperial officers are commanded to rebuild the fallen temples. This indicates a change of policy. The persecution was no longer to be a mere effort to destroy Christianity by brute force, though brute force was still to be used. It was to be accompanied by a revival of paganism. And with this revival of the ancient religion the remaining provisions of the edict were not improbably closely associated. We may believe that it was less with the purpose of embarrassing the Christians than to bring the heathen rites into closer relation with the daily lives of the mass of the people that such commands were given as Eusebius summarizes from his own standpoint: 'That all men, as well as women and household servants, and even children at the breast, should sacrifice and perform libations, and that they should be made to taste the abominable sacrifices, and that things exposed for sale in the market should be defiled with the libations of the sacrifices, and that those who were making use of the baths should be defiled with the execrable sacrifices.' It is evident, at any rate, that henceforth there was to be a contest, not merely of the State with the Church, regarded as a political danger, but of the old faith, aided by the State, with the new. We are at once reminded of the later attempt of Maximin, elsewhere recorded—so like, and yet so unlike, that of Julian half a century afterwards—to organize a new pagan hierarchy.¹ No doubt these two movements, for the building of temples and for the establishment of a heathen priesthood, were parts of the same general policy. The temporary cessation of persecution was due to the recognition by Maximin of the failure of the old policy; it gave

¹ Eus. *H.E.* viii. 14. 9; ix. 4. 2; *H.E.* ix. 7. 7, 12.
Lact. *De Mort. Pers.* 36. 4. Cp. Eus.

the time and leisure which were needed for the evolution of the new.

After the issue of the Fifth Edict the persecution appears to have raged unceasingly at Caesarea for four months. It then ended as far as actual martyrdoms are concerned. For Eubulus, 'the last of the martyrs of Caesarea,' was thrown to the beasts 7 March, 310.¹ It was prolonged for a year in other parts of Palestine, where the Bishop Silvanus and his companions—'the final seal of the whole contest in Palestine'—were beheaded 4 May, 311.² This last martyrdom occurred four days after the publication of the 'palinodia' of Galerius,³ with which, as the final proclamation of peace for Palestine, the Greek recension of the *De Martyribus* fitly closed.⁴

Glancing back through this brief survey, we see that at Caesarea the persecution took the form of five spasmodic onslaughts⁵ on the Church, of which four were ushered in by imperial edicts, and the fifth by a visit of Maximian himself to Caesarea for the celebration of his birthday, and each of which was followed by a period of inactivity. The first lasted about six months, June to November, 303. The second and third seem to have been very brief, and may be dated respectively March, 305, and March–April, 306. The fourth was much the longest, continuing for about a year and eight months, November, 307, to July, 309. The last embraced some five months, November, 309, to March, 310. It ended about three years and a half

¹ *M.P.* (Grk.) 11. 30; Cureton, p. 45.

² *M.P.* (Grk.) 13. 5; Cureton, p. 48. The exact date is given in the Syriac only.

³ 30 April, 311. See Lact. *De Mort. Pers.* 35; Eus. *H.E.* viii. 17. The copy which originally followed *M.P.* (Grk.) 13 has disappeared from that place in the MSS.

⁴ The Greek recension of the *De*

Martyribus obviously implies that the palinodia brought the persecution to an end in Palestine. Our scheme of the chronology is therefore strongly confirmed by the fact that it makes the last martyrdom so nearly synchronize with it.

⁵ ἐναυαορδοεῖς, as Eusebius would have called them. See *M.P.* (Grk.) 4. 8.

before the final edict of toleration of Maximin. Even in the intervals which were free from martyrdoms, no doubt, there was persecution of a sort: the Christians were not allowed full liberty of worship,¹ and confessors who had been imprisoned were not released;² but it is improbable that fresh arrests were made, or that Christians, as such, were examined by the magistrates. Thus the time of actual, whole-hearted persecution was limited. At Caesarea, where the rigour of the government officials is not likely to have been less than in other places, all the periods of active persecution of the Faith taken together amounted to less than three years out of the ten years and a half which intervened between the first edict of Diocletian and the last edict of Maximin.

H. J. LAWLOR.

¹ Yet see *M.P.* (Grk.) 13. 8; Cureton, p. 46.

² Pamphilus and his companions were kept in prison even during the

cessation which procured liberty for the exiles in the Thebaid. *M.P.* (Grk.) 11. 5; Cureton, p. 40.

'SPRECHTEMPO' OR PHONETIC LAW?

IN a recent number of HERMATHENA (no. xxxii., p. 132) I have denied that the so-called principle of 'Sprechtempo' is legitimately used as an explanation of syncope in certain Latin words. For this heresy I have been courteously reproved by more than one scholar, though no scholar, so far as I am aware, has attempted to meet the objections which I there raised to this supposed principle. I regard the use actually made of 'Sprechtempo' as so serious a blot on the method of many philologists, that it seems worth while to discuss this question somewhat more fully than was possible in the article referred to. If the principle were consistently applied, instead of being, as it actually is, held in reserve, and used only as an *ultima ratio* for giving a quietus to recalcitrant forms in moments of embarrassment, the result would be the overthrow of those other principles by virtue of which alone it can be claimed that the study of language is a science.

'Sprechtempo' as a principle of comparative philology seems to have been first used by Professor Osthoff. He suggested that Latin doublets like *calidus* : *caldus* owed their existence to the fact that the Latin word for 'hot' was uttered sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly (Wölfflin's *Archiv f. lat. Lexicog.* 4. 464 f.). Brugmann formally adopted the principle in the second edition of the *Grundriss* (I², p. 62); but he gave it a significantly brief introduction. Since that time it has been freely used by

many philologists, though some have spoken slightly of it—for example, Hirt.¹ It has even been put forward as an explanation of syncope in cases where no doublet exists. For instance, the syncope in Latin *cette*, from **cedate*, has been explained as due to Sprechtempo, the longer form, the so-called 'lentoform,' being assumed to have yielded to the shorter, or 'allegroform.' But no attempt has been made to prove that speed of utterance really is a cause of variations in language, or to determine within what limits its supposed influence is confined. One is left to infer from the practice of those who use the principle what their postulate really is. They seem to claim that when people speak quickly they shorten their words, not by subtracting something from the length of each syllable in proportion to its normal duration, but by suppressing some part of the word (which part is undetermined), or at least some element (also undetermined); and that these occasional variations in pronunciation produce permanent effects in language. Professor Sommer, assuming the existence of a more than doubtful Latin word **dīnus*,² suggests that it may be the allegroform of *dīuīnus* (in the time of Plautus, *deiuīnus*, pronounced *dēuīnus*): here a word is shortened by the sacrifice of the long syllable of the root!³ Professor Postgate declares that in the English word *often* the *t* is sounded in the lentoform, mute in the allegroform: here it is only a consonant which seems to be lost.⁴ All this is very vague; and one is tempted to doubt whether this vagueness—since no effort is made to remove it—is felt by users of Sprechtempo to be a disadvantage. It

¹ *Handbuch d. griech. Laut-u. Formenl.*, p. 52 f.

² See Redslob in *Berl. Phil. Wochenschrift*, 22. 553, and Lindsay in Bursian's *J.-Bericht*, for 1906, p. 201.

Redslob denies the existence of this form, in my judgment rightly.

³ *Handbuch*, p. 176.

⁴ *Class. Rev.*, 13, p. 70b.

obviously offers a door of escape from the rigour of scientific method. Either it is or it is not the accepted postulate of linguistic science, that all changes in language which are not due to 'analogy' are due to the operation of 'sound-laws,' which can be exactly formulated, and which admit no exceptions. Analogy we know, and sound-laws we know; but what is this *tertium quid*, Sprechtempo? Is it possible that it is nothing more than a door of escape from the rigour of scientific method, so recently imported into a philological domain where formerly the scholar had things all his own way? Let a philologist attribute the syncope of *cette* to a sound-law: he must formulate his law, and explain why **cedate* (or **cedite*) fell under it, while such forms as *fodite*, *iacite*, *regite* did not. But let him attribute it to Sprechtempo, and he is free from any such necessity. Sprechtempo has been a godsend to embarrassed theorizers, and, for that very reason, has injured science and retarded its progress.

Professor Fay, writing in the *Classical Quarterly* for October, 1907 (vol. i., p. 282), attributes to me a desire to "reject any distinction between quick-speech and slow-speech," and expresses the opinion that facts are against me, since "the modern phoneticians demonstrate that this distinction is not a fiction, but a reality." But I have no such desire. There is undoubtedly a distinction between quick-speech and slow-speech; and I am willing to admit that phoneticians may have proved that there exist variations in pronunciation which depend upon the speed of utterance. But what exactly are these variations in pronunciation, and what exactly is their permanent effect on language? I cannot admit that it has been proved that their permanent effect is what it is tacitly assumed to be, or even that they have any permanent effect at all. Professor Fay refers me to Passy and Rambeau's *Chrestomathie Française*. This book is unfortunately not

accessible to me; but I venture to doubt whether its transcriptions prove that when people speak quickly they suppress one or more syllables in a word, and leave the others unchanged; and that this occasional modification of pronunciation is recognized and represented in language. So far as I am acquainted with the work of the experimental phoneticians, they say little—and that not very definite—as to the immediate effects of rapidity of utterance on the pronunciation of the individual, and nothing at all as to its permanent effects on language. Sievers, I suppose, cannot be classed as an experimental phonetician; but his account of *Sprechtempo* (in the sense in which phoneticians use that word) is this: “Die absolute Dauer aller phonetischen Gebilde wechselt stets nach dem Tempo der Rede. . . . Die relative Dauer braucht beim Tempowechsel nicht erheblich verschoben zu werden.”¹ This statement is certainly not very positive; but, such as it is, it lends no support to the assumption that speed of utterance could affect a word of three short syllables like *calidus* in such a way that two of its syllables remain, while one disappears.

I cannot discover that Sievers says anything more as to the effects of *Sprechtempo*, using the word in the sense of the greater or less speed at which the same group of syllables may be uttered—the sense in which philologists use it. But he has more to say on variation in the duration of syllables due to other causes. The chief of these other causes is variation in the length of what he calls the “*Sprechtakt*” in which the syllable is included. By “*Sprechtakt*” he seems to mean a number of syllables grouped about a single accent and uttered by a single effort—what Sweet calls a “stress-group.” It appears that the absolute, but not the relative, duration of a given syllable varies inversely with the length of the stress-

¹ *Grundsätze d. Phonetik*,⁶ § 690 (p. 255).

group. Thus, in the series of stress-groups *heil*, *heilig*, *heilige*, *heiligere*, the syllable *hei-* continually loses absolute duration, but retains its relative preponderance (ibid., § 714, [p. 264]). Similarly in English the syllable *see-* in *seed* is longer than the same syllable in *seedy* (ibid., § 697). In French, the Abbé Rousselot proves experimentally that "les articulations perdent de la durée par le seul fait qu'elles sont unies entre elles."¹ Thus in the series *pâte*, *pâté*, *pâtisserie*, the syllable *pâ-* continually loses duration. Now these observations, as I have already said, have nothing to do with Sprechtempo in the sense in which philologists use the word, inasmuch as the loss of duration appears whether the speaker talks quickly or slowly. But they are interesting as presenting a contrast to the vague and scanty observations made of the effects of speed of utterance properly so called. From them may be formulated something like a law of utterance. They are interesting also because they prove that long accented syllables may and do suffer loss of duration no less than short unaccented ones. It seems to be generally assumed by philologists that Sprechtempo is without effect on accented syllables.²

But let us come to the heart of this matter. However completely the observations or experiments of phoneticians may demonstrate the existence of this or that variation in pronunciation, it is not thereby proved that there exist corresponding variations in language. This is no paradox; for in a certain sense the phonetician is not concerned with language. The words to which phoneticians listen must be distinguished from the words found in dictionaries and dealt with by philologists. The word to which the phonetician listens is an attempt of a particular person at

¹ *Précis de Prononciation Française*. Paris, 1902, p. 88.

fessor Postgate in *Class. Rev.* 13, p. 70 b (1899).

² This seems to be assumed by Pro-

a particular moment of time under a particular combination of conditions to make certain sounds according to a remembered pattern: the word of the dictionary and the philologist is the pattern to which any particular spoken word seeks to conform. The word of the phonetician is thus concrete and particular: the word of the philologist is abstract and ideal. The former may be called the concrete, the latter the ideal word. On theoretical grounds we are forced to admit that it is extremely improbable that any two concrete words—that is, any two utterances of the same word, even though made by the same individual—are absolutely identical. We must also admit that it is of the essence of a pattern not to vary, though it may be modified or withdrawn with the conscious or unconscious consent of those who accept it as such. The loss of one or more teeth, excessive cold, fright, intoxication, a thousand other circumstances, may affect pronunciation; but the philologist does not and should not concern himself with such variations. They have no direct effects in that Language which is the philologist’s object of study. And this holds true of all occasional variations in pronunciation: they must remain occasional and particular, unless they win general acceptance. It is precisely because this general acceptance is necessary, because the only sort of word with which the philologist has to deal is abstract and ideal, a pattern accepted by a whole community, that any change coming into it (if we disregard changes due to analogy) must do so under the operation of a law.

But this line of argument would lead us too deeply into the philosophy of language. I have already said that *Sprechtempo*, as a principle of linguistic science, has not been proved or defined; and that it seems to be kept in reserve for production in moments of difficulty. Perhaps the best way to test its legitimacy is to assume its truth and to take it seriously. Let it be granted, then,

that the Latin words *caldus*, *cette*, owed their contraction to rapid utterance of the original forms *calidus*, **cedate*.

It cannot be denied that this cause of variation in language must have operated in all places and at all times, unless it can be shown that there have been places in which, and times at which, men did not speak quickly. Consequently, we should expect the effects of this cause to be equally manifest in all languages. They would be found, for example, in Greek. Surely the Greeks were not less given to occasional rapid speech than were the Romans? Would it not be well, then, to illustrate the effects of Sprechtempo from Greek as well as from Latin? Yet Hirt, in his *Handbuch*, does not, to my knowledge, attribute to Sprechtempo any effects whatever in Greek. Nor can its effects be traced with certainty in modern languages. Prof. Postgate adduces the English *often* as showing the effects of Sprechtempo. His words are these: (Sprechtempo) "is the varying rapidity of the enunciation which produces doublets like *caldus* (an allegro-form) and *calidus* (a *lento*-form). A familiar example from English may be seen in *often*, pronounced *oft'n*, or even *of-ten*, in speeches and sermons, but *of'n* in ordinary conversation."¹ Here "rapidity of the enunciation" is said to be the cause of the disappearance of *t*. But since *t* does not disappear in all positions in English when we speak quickly, it is clear that quick speech cannot, to say the least, be the sole factor causing its disappearance in *of'n*. A very brief examination reveals the fact that the disappearance of *t* in *often* is the result of the operation of a sound-law which can be quite definitely formulated as follows:—

Whenever the English unaccented terminations *-ten*, *-tic* are in contact with a preceding spirant, *t* disappears;

¹ *Class. Rev.* 13, p. 70 b (1899).

and the said terminations are pronounced as sonant *n* and *l* respectively.

Examples: *listen* (pron. *lisn*), *christen* (pron. *krisn*), *often* (pron. *ofn*), *soften* (pron. *sofn*), *fasten* (pron. *fāsn*), *nestle* (pron. *nesl*), *whistle* (pron. *hwisl*), etc.

The pronunciations I have given are normal. They are the only pronunciations given in the dictionaries of Webster, Chambers, Bellows (English-French), and Wessely (English-Italian)—the only ‘pronouncing’ dictionaries at hand—and they are the only pronunciations I employ myself. I never under any circumstances pronounce *t* in (e.g.) *listen* or *whistle*, nor can I remember to have heard any other speaker pronounce it. The sounding of *t* in *often* is only heard among educated people who are influenced by the analogy of *oft*, and perhaps by spelling. The speed of utterance has nothing whatever to do with it. This supposed example not unfairly illustrates the laxity of method with which facts of language may be attributed to *Sprechtempo*.

The English doublet *cannot* : *can’t* offers a much better test. The shorter form is undoubtedly syncopated from the longer; but the duration of both forms is equal, *a* being short in the first, long in the second (*kānot* : *kānt*). In this case therefore it is definitely proved that a word can lose a syllable by syncope without losing time, and that syncope may therefore have nothing to do with quick speech. So also in Latin, *caldus* and *calidus* are metrically equivalent. This agrees well with the observations of Sievers and Rousselot already referred to, whereby it is shown that the stress-groups *heil*, *heilig* in German, *pâte*, *pâté* in French, *seed*, *seedy* in English, are approximately equal. On the same principle of the approximate equality of stress-groups depends the shortening observed when long monosyllables in English enter into composition; e.g., *sheep* : *shēpherd*, *vine* : *vineyard*, *know* : *knowledge* (*nō* :

nöl-). Here the stress-group *shepherd* is made equal to the stress-group *sheep* by the shortening of the first syllable, whereas *can't* is made equal to *cannot* by the lengthening of the first syllable. On the same principle also seems to depend the variation in the Italian representation of Latin *ŏ*: e.g., *sŏnus* → *suono* : *pŏpulus* → *popolo*. The stress-groups (Sprechtakte) *suono*, *popolo* are equal in duration, the *u* in the first adding to its time. (In Late Latin, after the lengthening of all accented vowels, *sonus* and *populus* must also have been equal stress-groups.) If this evidence points—as it certainly seems to point—to the conclusion that it is a principle of phonetics that stress-groups are approximately equal in time, then it is entirely unfavourable to the assumption that quick speech may be a cause of syncope, since, *ex hypothesi*, the time of the contracted form is equal to the time of the uncontracted form.

Variations in language caused by speed of utterance, if such there be, must have existed from the beginnings of language. Either all words or some words (this is undetermined) must have existed in two (or more ?) forms. If the allegroforms were—as we must assume them to have been—as intelligible as the lentoforms, why did the latter persist, against the economy of nature? If they did not persist, the distinction between the two forms must have ceased to exist. If the lentoforms did persist, then the two forms must have followed different lines of phonetic development, causing them to diverge perpetually; and the divergent forms, grown at last utterly unlike, must in their turn have split into lentoforms and allegroforms, till language was shattered by the infinite dichotomy.

But it is hardly necessary to multiply arguments on the negative side of a controversy in which so little is done on the positive side. *Sprechtempo*, though often

used to the injury of science, seems hardly to be taken seriously. It would probably never have been heard of were it not for the fact that philologists have found special difficulty in explaining Latin syncope. That special difficulty is doubtless due to the fact that, since Latin syncope was not an inheritance, but was developed during the separate existence of the language, the purely comparative method was not available, and needed to be replaced by a strictly scientific method, associated with a more intimate and accurate acquaintance with the facts of the Latin language than is, perhaps, to be expected from anyone but a specialist in that language. And the difficulty of explaining Latin syncope was increased by the existence of a number of doublets such as *calidus* : *caldus*, *dextera* : *dextra*, *columen* : *culmen*, &c. These doublets, at the least, were got rid of by attributing them to the distinction between quick and slow speech.¹ But it should, I believe, be accepted as generally true that wherever a word exists in two forms indistinguishable in function and meaning, one of them is the true phonetic form, the other is due to analogy. When a word takes on a new form owing to the operation of a sound-law, the preceding form necessarily ceases to exist. This follows from the nature of phonetic development, which must proceed by imperceptible degrees. Thus, when early Greek *μάτηρ* had become Ionic *μήτηρ*, the earlier form could not linger on beside the new one (though it might of course be deliberately reimported into the dialect from old writings or from other dialects by learned men).

But Prof. Postgate produces one Latin doublet which,

¹ There was no logical reason, perhaps, why this 'explanation' should not have been applied to the entire phenomenon of Latin syncope; but it seems to be accepted that *Sprechtempo* shall be appealed to as little as possible—only in case of need.

he says, it will "task the ingenuity of Prof. Exon to get round"¹—*solidum* : *soldum*. I understand him to mean that *soldum* cannot be explained under the law of syncope proposed by me;² and further, that it cannot be explained otherwise than by the principle of Sprechtempo, since he speaks of *soldum* as a word "compressed in rapid speaking." I therefore take this occasion of briefly discussing this word.

Perhaps it will be convenient if I repeat here the formula which I have suggested: "In all words or word-groups of four or more syllables bearing the chief accent on a long syllable, a short unaccented medial vowel was necessarily syncopated, but might be restored by analogy." Under this formula syncopated *caldus*, e.g., is explained without difficulty. *Calidus* does not, of course, fall directly under the law; but its syncope is easily attributed to the analogy of *caldarium*, &c., which did. In the case of *soldum*, no such related form falling directly under the proposed law seems, at first sight, to be forthcoming. I regret, therefore, that I overlooked this form in my discussion of syncope.

Soldum is much rarer than, say, *calda*. It seems to be recorded only seven times. In four of these places it is used in a special sense in connexion with the payment of money—'in full,' 'clear,' 'twenty shillings in the pound':—

se *soldum* soluere non posse : C. I. L., I. 206. 114 and 115.

filia Nasicae metuentis reddere *soldum* : Hor. S. 2. 5. 65.

ex insulis fundisque tricies *soldum* : Mart. 4. 37 4.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that this special sense of *soldum* originated in the use of the word together with some noun meaning 'money' or 'cash,' the two forming a word-group under a single principal accent—*sol(i)dum*—

¹ See *Classical Philology* (Chicago), vol. iii., p. 99, n. 4.

² HERMATHENA, xxxii., p. 128.

nūmmum (gen. pl.) or the like. Or, even in historical times, it seems highly probable that an established phrase like *sol(i)dum-sóluerē*, 'pay up in full,' would form a word-group under a single principal accent (the accent of *solidum* becoming secondary). If so, the syncope of *sol(i)dum* in this special sense would fall under my law, and would be exactly parallel with the syncope of *ual(i)dē* in the special sense of 'very.' In both cases change of meaning would be accompanied by change of accentuation, bringing the forms under the operation of the law: *uāl(i)dē-māgnumst* : *sōl(i)dum-sóluit*. It would also be explained why *soldum*, in four out of seven instances, has this special sense.

Of the remaining three instances, one is in Hor. S. 1. 2. 113: *inane apscindere soldo*. The meaning of *soldo* here is so closely related to the special commercial sense of *soldum*, just discussed, that this instance might almost have been included with the four already quoted. Perhaps we might translate 'distinguish an empty cheat from that in which you get your full money's worth.' At any rate we are justified in attributing its syncope to the analogy of *soldum* in the sense of 'paid in full.'

The remaining two instances are in Varro R. R. I. 48. 1; I. 51. 2. Here *soldus* has its literal meaning and is an adjective—e.g., *aream ut habeant soldam*. It would hardly be critical to attribute the syncope of *soldus* in the literal sense to the analogy of *soldum* in the specialised sense, in view of their semantic differentiation: that might tend to keep them apart. But I see no reason why we should not attribute some influence to the analogy of *caldus*. The equation would be *calidus, caldus* : *solidus, soldus*. It is true that this influence might not have been great. But so also the effects which, I suggest, may have been produced by it are not great: a solitary pair of instances, or at most three, in all

Latin literature. Moreover, these two instances are in Varro, and it cannot be denied, I think, that syncopated forms are specially frequent in writers *de rebus rusticis*. For example, *caldus* is unusually frequent in Varro *R. R.* and Cato *R. R.* Is it not possible that their style may have been slightly influenced by their subject? Most *rustici* spoke dialects in which syncope was a marked feature. Many words connected with rural life show the influence of the dialects: *anser, olus, arena* for *hanser, holus, harena*; *popina* for pure Latin *coquina*; *plostrum* and *cōliculi* for *plaustrum* and *cauliculi*; *cors*, 'poultry-yard' (not *cohors*). If this be thought too fanciful, there remain a number of derivatives of *solidus* which do not seem to occur in syncopated forms in the extant literature, but which must surely have been syncopated in the spoken language—*sol(i)diōrem*, *sol(i)dissimus*, *sol(i)dāre*, *sol(i)dītātem*, etc. Under any theory of syncope, such forms must have been syncopated in spoken Latin. The fact that they are preserved in literature in the unsyncopated form may be mere accident, or may be due to some special dislike of the grammarians for a shortening which not only seemed to them vulgar, but also may have suggested the other special meaning. It is to be remembered that the grammarians seem to have objected to those syncopations which were less common in the classical age: "calida, non calda," says Probus (Probi App. 198. 3). To the analogy, therefore, of numerous forms which in living Latin must have been syncopated, it would not be extravagant to attribute the two solitary instances of *soldus* in the literal sense which have been preserved.

But, even if *soldum* could not be explained under the particular formula which I have suggested, it does not, of course, follow that we must fly to that refuge of the distressed philologist, Sprechtempo. I reject the use of that principle in philology in the interests of scientific method.

I am at least disinterested in doing so, for it would have been a convenience to me, when proposing a law of syncope for Latin, to do as some distinguished philologists have done—accept it in silence, and refer to its action such forms as I could not otherwise explain.

CHARLES EXON.

THE PARTICLE ΓΕ IN SOPHOCLES.

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THE present paper aims at the fulfilment of two purposes, of which the first is to discuss the employment of the particle by the most artistic of all Greek writers; while the other is to print for the benefit of scholars a list of references to the cases of its occurrence, which will be found, I hope, as the result of many hours of labour, to be practically complete. As to the uses of the particle, though it cannot be expected that at this late day there is much that is novel to bring forward, it is nevertheless true that no reasoned discussion exists, unless we except the appendix added by the late Dr. R. A. Neil to his edition of the *Knights* of Aristophanes (1901)—an appendix to which I shall, of course, have frequent occasion to refer.

§ 1. *The uses of simple γε.*¹

(a) The use of γε to add emphasis to a word or words is very common. As a rule it follows the word which it (so to speak) underlines: *Aj.* 183 οὔποτε γὰρ φρενόθεν γ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ . . . ἔβας τόσσον. But there are certain cases in which the rule is the other way about, viz. when the word underlined is accompanied by a preposition or article. The instances are: *Aj.* 476, 1310; *Ant.* 207, 321, 519, 659, 747, 771, 1241; *El.* 137, 536, 612, 909; *O. C.* 42, 51, 110, 153, 260, 265, 266, 926, 977; *O. T.* 80, 90, 290, 357, 376, 393, 516, 586, 706, 852, 1377, 1380, 1440, 1448; *Ph.* 422, 441, 648, 1056; *Tr.* 80, 92, 305, 322, 331, 461, 491, 738, 801, 945, 1108, 1127, 1128; *Frag.*² 328. In these cases the particle is brought before its word: at the same time, there are a good many exceptions: *Ant.* 217; *El.* 482, 925, 1029, 1105, 1124; *O. C.* 650, 848, 966; *O. T.* 712, 770, 1007, 1169; *Ph.* 109, 438, 895, 907, 1212; *Tr.* 621, 1211. Some of the passages referred to require consideration. In *Ant.* 747 οὗ τῶν ἔλοις ἦσσω γε τῶν αἰσχροῶν ἐμέ, Haemon is meeting his father's exclamation ὦ μαιρὸν ἦθος καὶ γυναικὸς ὕστερον. It is obvious that the γε opposes αἰσχροῶν to γυναικός, and its position is precisely that in, e. g., 207 ἔκ γ' ἐμοῦ, αἰσχροῶν depending grammatically on ἦσσω, just as ἐμοῦ does on ἐκ. Not seeing this, Jebb was driven to suppose that "γε emphasizes the whole phrase ἦσσω τῶν αἰσχροῶν"; but such a function is to be attributed to γε only within very narrow limits, if at all. On *Aj.* 811 f. οὐχ ἔδρας ἀκμὴ | σῶζειν θέλοντας ἄνδρα γ' δς σπεύδῃ θανεῖν, Jebb says: "The γε after ἄνδρα emphasizes not that word, but the whole clause ἄνδρα δς σπεύδῃ θανεῖν. Cp. *Ant.* 213 f., 648 f.; *El.* 1506; *O. C.* 1278." *Ant.* 213 is νόμῳ δὲ χρῆσθαι παντὶ πού γ'

¹ The text of Sophocles used is that of the late Sir Richard Jebb (Cambridge University Press, 1897).

² Nauck's text.

ἔνεστί σοι. No MS. has γ', and σου is meaningless here; besides, we find it nowhere followed by γε in Sophocles. I think we should read γοῦν *certainly*, which gives precisely the tone of disapproval required in the passage. *Ant.* 648 f. is μή νύν ποτ' ὦ παῖ τὰς φρένας γ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς | γυναικὸς οὔνεκ' ἐκβάλης: here γ' is rightly inserted by Triclinius, and taken by Jebb as possibly emphasizing τὰς φρ. ἐκ. It is true that γε occurs fairly often in commands and prohibitions, and this may be an instance; but I think that it rather underlines φρένας in opposition to ἡδονῆς; and in neither case is Jebb right. *El.* 1506 ὅστις πέρα πράσσειν γε τῶν νόμων θέλει raises an interesting question: does Sophocles use γε with the infinitive (except, of course, when it is a mere noun)? Jebb takes it here as emphasizing the whole sentence, and adds that it might have followed ὅστις if metre had allowed. Now there is, indeed, an important use of γε in qualifying (*not* emphasizing), which will be fully illustrated below: it occurs when a general statement is restricted in application by, e. g., an *if*-clause; and it is just possible that this is an example: cf. *O. C.* 810 οὐ δὴθ' ὅτῳ γε νοῦς ἴσος καὶ σοὶ πάρα. If so, it has nothing to do with πράσσειν, and does not help Jebb's view of *Aj.* 811 f. I think, however, that the three lines are spurious: that every transgression should be punished by death is too Draconian a sentiment for Sophocles; but if they are kept, we must read τι with Nicephorus Vasilakes, and this will at any rate save the poet from saying, "It is right to kill everybody—I mean, if he wishes to transgress the laws." In *O. C.* 1278 τοῦ θεοῦ γε προστάτην, we have the well-known use of γε for *utpote*; and this is the only other case where γε may be said to emphasize the whole sentence, though the expression is not a happy one. We find in a similar sense ὅς . γε, ὅς γε, and ὅστις γε (the lists are given below), used like *quippe qui*; but even if this were applicable to *Aj.*

811 f., it violates the usage of Sophocles, for the poet has no instance of this γε before the relative, though he is rather fond of bringing γε forward. Jebb overlooked one passage where γε seems flagrantly displaced: *Tr.* 425 κλύειν γ' ἔφασκον. But γε here does not underline ἔφασκον: it is γε used in commenting on a previous statement. It appears, then, that the use of γε in *Aj.* 812 is without a parallel in Sophocles and incapable of explanation, which will justify us in rejecting a line that is in itself most inartistic.

O. C. 260 εἰ τάς γ' Ἀθήνας φασὶ θεοσεβεστάτας | εἶναι is an instance of a rare use of γε in εἰ-clauses. It is the γε that we find sometimes introducing an illustration or argument, and at the same time indicating where the point of the illustration or argument lies. There are five other examples in Sophocles: *Aj.* 1268, *Phil.* 1393, *Tr.* 1113, and *O. T.* 383, 1015 πῶς δ' οὐχί, παῖς γ' εἰ τῶνδε γεννητῶν ἔφυν, where Jebb misses the point by translating 'if' instead of 'seeing that.'¹ *O. T.* 290 καὶ μὴν τά γ' ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ παλαι' ἔπη should not, perhaps, be in the list above—see on καὶ μὴν . γε below (§ 7).² So, too, in *O. T.* 393 καίτοι τό γ' αἶνιγμ' οὐχὶ τοῦπιόντος ἦν ('yet the riddle, at least, was not for the first comer to read,' Jebb), we have rather a case of καίτοι . γε 'yet verily': there seems no point in underlining αἶνιγμα. *O. T.* 1440 ἀλλ' ἡ γ' ἐκείνου πᾶς' ἐδηλώθη φάτις shows a natural enough extension of the rule for metrical convenience (like *Tr.* 491), which is assisted by the presence of ἀλλά (see ἀλλά . γε, § 4). *Ph.* 648 τί τοῦθ' ὁ μὴ νεώς γε τῆς ἐμῆς ἔπι; is very dubious as regards both the use of γε and the text, and I believe that 647 and 648 are spurious. *Ph.* 1056 is really an instance of γε = *utpote*. In *Tr.* 621 οὐ τι μὴ σφαλῶ γ' ἐν σοί ποτε we should read 'ν γε σοί.

¹ More about this use of γε will be found on p. 227.

² This line should be translated,

'Our other clues, of a truth, are stories, vague and old.'

I give now a list of the cases in which simple γε underlines the preceding word: *Aj.* 111, 183, 291, 441, 469, 519, 529, 552, 678, 1068, 1070, 1123, 1342, 1369, 1372; *Ant.* 70, 217, 323, 380, 436, 456, 465, 502, 538, 556, 614, 636, 648, 720, 739, 762, 788, 930, 993; *El.* 150, 332, 345, 411, 518, 520, 552, 561, 631, 817, 925, 932, 1020, 1023, 1029, 1124, 1146, 1260, 1416, 1439; *O. C.* 359, 387, 403, 408, 590, 597, 649, 650, 664, 836, 848, 882, 919, 924, 966, 1191, 1250, 1407, 1416, 1436, 1691, 1720, 1750; *O. T.* 105, 294, 326, 335, 363, 506, 565, 570, 571, 685, 810, 840, 845, 848, 849, 855, 857, 1007, 1046, 1091, 1161, 1163, 1169, 1455, 1519, 1522; *Ph.* 106, 117, 162, 169, 231, 245, 246, 330, 339, 410, 413, 419, 424, 438, 446, 524, 559, 658, 681, 735, 763, 895, 904, 977, 1202, 1276, 1362, 1389; *Tr.* 72, 153, 321, 328, 424, 444, 630, 879, 949, 1020, 1111, 1208, 1211, 1248; *Frag.* 481, 513. Some of these, however, require consideration.

On *Ant.* 323 ΦΥ. ἡ δεινόν, ᾧ δοκεῖ γε, καὶ ψευδῇ δοκεῖν Jebb remarks: "The Guard says, 'It is grievous that, when a man *does* harbour suspicions (ᾧ δοκεῖ γε), those suspicions should at the same time (καὶ) be false.' γε means that, in such a matter, hasty δόξα should be avoided altogether." But this is not convincing, even on the very large assumption that γε could have the force here attributed to it: why does it call forth κόμψευέ νυν τὴν δόξαν from Creon? The Guard's remark is at the very opposite pole from τὸ κομψόν. The γε has no meaning, and should be replaced by τε: while δοκεῖ should be taken in the two senses of 'decide' and 'form an opinion': we may then translate in the very words of Jebb himself, "'Tis sad, truly, that he who judges should misjudge."

In *Ant.* 787 f. the reading is very doubtful; but if ἀμερίων σέ γ' ἀνθρώπων be right, the γε belongs not to σέ, but to ἀμ. ἀν. In 929 f. ἔτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνέμων αὐταὶ | ψυχῆς ῥιπαὶ τήνδε γ' ἔχουσι the γε seems pointless. I suggest τήνδ' ἐπέχουσι. *El.* 345 ἔπειθ' ἔλου γε θάτερ' is an instance of γε

with the imperative—despite Paley's definite statement that this does not occur.¹ Other instances are: Soph. *El.* 411, 1035; *O. C.* 1743; Eur. *El.* 619, *Hel.* 973, *Ion.* 518, *Suppl.* 842, *Rhes.* 623, *Andr.* 589, *Cycl.* 652—and this list does not profess to be complete. In *El.* 517 f. *ὅς σ' ἐπεῖχ' ἀεὶ | μή τοι θυράων γ' οὔσαν αἰσχύνειν φίλους*, Jebb misses the point of γε in his translation: the words should be rendered, 'who kept thee from disgracing thy friends, outside the palace at any rate.' In *El.* 1416 θ' of L and most MSS. is right: γε is meaningless here. On *O. C.* 387 *ἔγωγε τοῖς νῦν γ' ὦ πάτερ μαντεύμασιν*, Jebb says, "Since *ἔγωγε* is virtually one word, this verse cannot be regarded as an instance of γε used twice in the same sentence. Such repetition is allowable when more than one word is to be emphasized, but no certain example happens to occur in Sophocles." He means that in *ἔγωγε* the γε has no force²: this statement, if true anywhere, is certainly not true here, where we have the elliptical γε in replies, treated below in § 1 (δ). *O. C.* 882 *Ζεὺς γ' ἂν εἰδείη* refutes Neil's statement (p. 197), "There does not seem to be any instance of γε in an *ἄν*-clause, unless some other particle also occurs in the clause." So also *Cho.* 777 *κακός γε μάντις ἂν γνοίη τάδε*; *O. C.* 42; *Ant.* 739; *O. T.* 840; *Tr.* 399; Eur. *Hel.* 448, and no doubt many other passages.³

There is a difficulty in *O. C.* 1250 ff. *καὶ μὴν ὅδ' ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ξένος, | ἀνδρῶν γε μούνος, ὦ πάτερ, δι' ὅμματος | ἀστακτὶ λείβων δάκρυον ὥδ' ὁδοιπορεῖ*. Jebb takes *ἀνδρῶν γε μούνος* as "'with no escort at least,' in contrast to Creon, 722," which cannot be called satisfactory. I think that

¹ "The particle γε is not used with the imperative," *Greek Particles and their Combinations*, p. 18.

² When Neil (p. 188) speaks of *ἔγωγε* as being regarded as a single word, he does not mean that the particle is otiose.

³ It should be noted that Neil extends the term *particle* in this statement to cover *καί*, *πρίν*, the negatives, and so forth, which would rob his remark of all interest, even if it were true with this limitation.

we should read δὲ, and translate: 'Here verily comes, as I think, the stranger of whom we spake, and unaccompanied, my father, with tears welling in unbroken stream from his eyes, he is making his way hither.' For the use of the article in 1250 cf. *El.* 7 f. οὐξ ἀριστερᾶς δ' ἔδε | Ἥρας ὁ κλεινὸς ναός. If it be thought that the poet really wished to lay stress on the words ἀνδρῶν μούνος, more than he has done by their position, this will be gained by reading κἀνδρῶν γε μούνος 'aye, and alone': the text at any rate, I am convinced, is impossible.

O. C. 1407 μή τοί με πρὸς θεῶν σφῷ γ' . . . | | . . . , μή μ' ἀτιμάσητέ γε is a clear instance of the phenomenon denied by Jebb (see on *O. C.* 387, above)—the repetition of γε in the same sentence in Sophocles. The first emphasizes σφῷ, the second is the γε which so often appears in one of two co-ordinated sentences or alternatives (list below), and is here rendered still more to be expected by the presence of the prohibitive μή. *O. C.* 1416 f. στρέψαι στράτευμ' ἐς Ἄργος ὡς τάχιστα γε, | καὶ μή σέ τ' αὐτὸν καὶ πόλιν διεργάσῃ is difficult. There is no authority in Sophocles, and I doubt if there is any in Greek literature, for translating the first line as it nevertheless must be translated: 'Turn thy host back to Argos, aye, with all speed.' The instinctive repugnance of scholars is shown by the various efforts made to get rid of it. There are only five other examples in Sophocles of the use of γε with superlatives (*Ant.* 1103, *O. T.* 994, 1386; *Tr.* 669, 879), and one of these (*Tr.* 879) is doubtful; but in every case the γε is not the γε of emphasis, but that used in responses, and meaning *Yes* or *No*. I believe that its presence here is due to the fact that the previous line ends with λέγε, and that the right reading is δῆ, as Jebb seems to have felt. In the next line all the MSS. give γ' for τ', and γ' is precisely what we require; but unfortunately there is no parallel for its position, as will be seen by referring to the lines in which it occurs in

conjunction with αὐτός (*Aj.* 84; *Ant.* 657; *O. C.* 966; *O. T.* 712, 1169, *Ph.* 438). In *O. T.* 294 ἀλ' εἴ τι μὲν δὴ δέματός γ' ἔχει μέρος no MS. has γ', which was inserted by Triclinius. If right, it is not used to give emphasis, but is the qualificatory γε in *if*-clauses, *I mean, that is to say*. As a rule the apodosis comes first in this idiom, but not always: so also I would explain *O. T.* 571 ποῖον τόδ'; εἰ γὰρ οἶδά γ', οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι.

On *Ph.* 230 f. οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐτ' ἐμὲ | ὑμῶν ἀμαρτεῖν τοῦτό γ' οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ Neil makes the following curious remark (p. 188): "With demonstrative pronouns I have not found any certain case of γε merely emphasizing. There are a few possible cases in votive inscriptions, e.g., no. 1369 Collitz (from Dodona) Πολυξένη τά γε γεν ἀντίθητι if γεν is for γε and no. 229 Roberts (742 Kaibel, 314 Röhl) τάσδε γ' Ἀθηναίᾳ . . . ἔθηκε. *Soph. Phil.* 231 may be a case." If this means what it says, it is a very remarkable error, as there are many scores of cases in which γε emphasizes demonstrative pronouns: thus, to take Sophocles alone, it does so in *Aj.* 535, 552; *Ant.* 538; *El.* 612, 925; *O. C.* 403, 597, 649, 836, 848; *O. T.* 849, 855, 1440, 1522; *Ph.* 106, 117, 231, 419, 422, 424, 438, 570, 763; *Tr.* 72. Dr. Starkie in his index refers to six cases in the *Wasps*. That Neil should have overlooked all these examples is incredible; and I am entirely at a loss as to his meaning. *Ph.* 524 ἀλλ' αἰσχρὰ μέντοι σοῦ γέ μ' ἐνδεέστερον is given by Neil (p. 194) as the only case of μέντοι . γε in tragedy. I can find no cases in Euripides or the tragic fragments; but one occurs in Aeschylus, *Agam.* 943 κράτος μέντοι πάρες γ' ἐκὼν ἐμοί. This rarity is strange in view of the comparative frequency of καίτοι . γε, οὐτοί . γε, and μήτοι . γε.¹ *Ph.* 559 φράσον δ' ἄπερ ἔλεξας, the reading of L and most MSS., is corrected by Jebb (following A) by the insertion of γ', which he regards

¹ It should be noticed that the γε to do with μέντοι. simply underlines σοῦ, and has nothing

as emphasizing ἄπερ, 'just those things which.' But there appears to be no point in this, apart from the fact that γε does not elsewhere follow ὅσπερ in Sophocles; and Hartung's προὔλεξας seems in every way a better emendation. In *Ph.* 1276 μάτην γὰρ ἂν εἶπης γε πάντ' εἰρήσεται we should surely read συ with Dobree. γε would only be possible if εἶρ. were ἔσται: besides, Neoptolemus has just expressed himself in a way that puts recourse to violence in act out of the question. *Ph.* 1362 καὶ σοῦ δ' ἐγωγε θαυμάσας ἔχω τόδε is given by Jebb as the only instance of the formula καὶ . . . δέ in Sophocles; it is rather a case of δὲ . γε meaning *aye, and* as in *Aj.* 1409 παῖ, σὺ δὲ πατρός γ' κ.τ.λ. and elsewhere, with καὶ emphasizing σοῦ.

Tr. 443 f. οὗτος (sc. Eros) γὰρ ἄρχει καὶ θεῶν ὅπως θέλει, | κάμου γε πῶς δ' οὐ χᾶτέρας οἷας γ' ἐμοῦ; has given rise to argument. Stobaeus quotes 441-3, but not 444; Wunder and Nauck reject 444 for reasons given by Jebb; and Fritzsche denied that οἷός γε was Attic. It occurs, however, in Plato, *Soph.* 237 C χαλεπὸν ἥρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἷφ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον: cf. also Eur. *Herac.* 632 πάρεσμεν, οἷα δὲ γ' ἐμοῦ παρουσία. In this idiom οἷας γ' ἐμοῦ is not put by attraction for οἷα γ' ἐγώ, but is an abbreviation of εἰ τοιαύτη γέ ἐστι οἷα καὶ ἐγώ, the γε being qualificatory. Hence the correct translation of the couplet is: 'for Love rules even the gods as he will, aye, and me; and why not another woman also, unless she be different from me?' It is not now such a 'beautiful' verse as Jebb's rendering makes it; and it is not very probable that the poet Sophocles regarded *any* woman, however superior a person she might be, as proof against Eros, and mightier than the mighty gods themselves. Finally, this line not only gives us the sole Sophoclean instance of οἷός γε, and the sole Sophoclean instance of the idiomatic attraction of οἷος, but it is also the only line in Sophocles in which emphatic γε appears twice (cf. *O. C.* 387). I think it should go out.

In *Tr.* 879 Jebb adopts, on metrical grounds, H. Schmidt's σχελιώτατά γε πρὸς πράξιν. If right, γε does not emphasize the superlative, but is that used in an answer to mark an ellipse. This occurs very rarely when the question is introduced by an interrogative, as here (τίνι τρόπῳ θανεῖν σφε φής;), and the passage reminds us of one in Shakespeare:

Hamlet. How came he mad?

First Clown. Very strangely, they say.

Hamlet. How 'strangely'?

First Clown. Faith, e'en with losing his wits.

There are, however, two parallels: *El.* 319 and *O. T.* 678f. XO. γύναι, τί μέλλεις κομίζεῖν δόμων τόνδ' ἔσω; IO. μαθοῦσά γ' ἥτις ἡ τύχη. The only other cases (*Aj.* 678 and *O. C.* 1134) are of course merely apparent; but those quoted, though not very satisfactory, will perhaps serve for Schmidt's reading.

On *Tr.* 1111 καὶ ζῶν κακούς γε καὶ θανόν ἐτεισάμην Jebb says: "The γε is very expressive: it means, 'when *guilt* is to be chastised, I am strong even in weakness,—even unto death.'" If true, this does great honour to γε: but there seems to be no point in underlining guilt—as if to chastise guilt instead of innocence were something out of the common. We must, I think, read κακούργους (with Cobet), and insert γ' after θανόν.

(b) A second important use of γε is in answering a question or commenting on a statement just made. In the large majority of cases there is an ellipse in the sentence containing this γε. The list is as follows:—*Aj.* 78, 104, 533, 678, 872, 983, 1132, 1347, 1365; *Ant.* 90, 321, 322, 404, 570, 577, 749, 771, 1103; *El.* 164, 319, 341, 773, 1216, 1221; *O. C.* 65, 195, 328, 387, 417, 479, 590, 644, 648, 792, 862, 881, 1109, 1134, 1441; *O. T.* 361, 365, 369, 563.

629, 680, 994, 1011, 1131, 1175, 1377, 1378, 1386; *Ph.* 33, 35, 327, 735, 763, 907, 912, 999, 1389, 1403, 1409; *Tr.* 335, 415, 669, 879, 896, 899, 1127, 1188, 1208, 1214, 1248. The cases in which there is no ellipse are: *Aj.* 589, 1127, 1376; *Ant.* 241, 573, 1312; *O. C.* 651; *O. T.* 628, 1035, 1159, 1357; *Ph.* 570, 755, 812, 1225, 1268; *Tr.* 425, 590; *Frag.* 103. In 54 of these 93 cases γε occupies the second place in the sentence, and 35 of the other 39 are of the stamp of οὐκουν ἔγωγε, μὴ σύ γε, εἴ μοι θέμις γ' ἦν, and so forth. The 4 cases left are: εἰ καὶ δυνήσῃ γ' *Ant.* 90; καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν ἀργύρῳ γε τὴν ψυχὴν προδούς 322; καὶ κάρτα, τοῦδε τοῦ θεοῦ γ' ἐπώνυμοι *O. C.* 65; and λιπὼν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε *Ph.* 912.

No cases in the lists just given call for particular notice, except *Ph.* 327 εὔ γ', ὦ τέκνον. τίνοσ γὰρ ὦδε τὸν μέγαν | χόλον κατ' αὐτῶν ἐγκαλῶν ἐλήλυθας; 'There is no other example in Tragedy of this colloquial εὔ γε without a verb' (Jebb). But a colloquialism is quite out of place here, especially one with the effect of our 'go it, my boy!'; and this consideration, coupled with the other peculiarities of the passage, inclines me to regard 324-8 as spurious, or else as supporting the traditional view that Sophocles was eighty-seven when he wrote the *Philoctetes*.

Connected with this use of γε in replies and comments is another thus described by Neil (p. 189): "There are cases when the first speaker gives a clause containing a nominative without a verb to complete the sentence: the sentence is completed by the second speaker in response with γε. These cases have the optative in the final clause, and are mainly parodies of prayers: it seems likely that religious services took this form, the priest beginning the sentence and giving the subject of the prayer, and the congregation finishing it with the appropriate verb and wish."¹ To the cases quoted by Neil I

¹ The whole passage in Neil's *Appendix* should be studied.

add the following, in which a sentence begun by one person is finished by another, using γε: Eur. *Cycl.* 683; *H. F.* 713, *Ion* 271, *Suppl.* 818; *O. C.* 534, 536; *Aj.* 875 (delete ; after οὖν); and perhaps *El.* 164. It will be observed that in none of these is there an optative in the final clause or a parody of a prayer.

(c) Thirdly, there is the use of γε in sentences which give a reason. We find this (1) with δς, ὅστις, etc.; (2) in participial clauses; (3) in other clauses. The lists are: (1) δς . γε *O. C.* 562; δς γε *El.* 441, 911, 923; *O. C.* 427, 1149, 1354; *O. T.* 35, 342, 853; *Ph.* 250, 600, 663, 1215, 1247, 1364, 1386; ὅστις γε *O. T.* 1334, *Ph.* 1282 (no examples of ὅστις . γε); (2) *Ant.* 745; *O. C.* 565, 836, 981; *O. T.* 257, 445 [?], 930; *Ph.* 587, 1056, 1385; *Tr.* 1192; (3) εἰ . γε *Aj.* 1268, *O. C.* 260, *O. T.* 383, *Ph.* 1393, γ' εἰ *O. T.* 1015; *Tr.* 1113 (on these six see above, p. 219); and *Aj.* 715, 887; *Ant.* 923; *O. C.* 1278, 1720; *Ph.* 1099, 1214.¹ Some of these cases require discussion. In *El.* 441 the relative precedes the antecedent: it is curious that Jebb, while quoting four passages which are not to the point, overlooked two perfect parallels (*Ph.* 1247, 1364). *O. C.* 565 should be translated, 'so I would not turn aside from any man just because he is a stranger.' Both the force of γε and the reading are doubtful in *O. T.* 445 ὡς παρὼν σύ γ' ἐμποδὼν | ὀχλεῖς, συθείς τ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. Jebb says σύ γε is scornful, but gives no parallels; probably we have here γε in one of two alternatives (see below).² *Aj.* 887 ff. σχέτλια γὰρ | ἐμέ γε

¹ Neil thinks that this is the γε used in *Tr.* 444 πᾶς δ' οὐ χάνερας ὄλας γ' ἐμοῦ, discussed above, p. 224. But apart from other considerations, this is contrary to the use of attracted ὄλος.

² Jebb takes παρὼν ἐμποδὼν to-

gether, and makes ὀχλεῖς neuter. The verb does not occur again in Soph., and not at all in Thuc.; Aesch. has it once (*P. V.* 1001 ὀχλεῖς μάτην με) and Herod. once (5. 41 ἐχούσαν αὐτὴν οἰκίῃσι ὀχλεῖον)—transitive in both

τὸν μακρῶν ἀλάταν πόνων | οὐρίῳ μὴ πελάσαι δρόμῳ is curious. Jebb translates 888 "I the wanderer who have toiled so long"; Heath and Nauck suspect the verse. If it is sound, the γε = *ultrate*. A note on this use of γε in introducing some reason in support of a previous statement will be found in Starkie's *Wasps* (p. 231, on μέν γε); as both he and Neil (p. 192) say, the only certain tragic example of μέν γε is Eur. *fr.* 909. 4. It is the force of γε (without μέν) in *Aj.* 715 and *Ph.* 1099 (εὐτέ γε in both cases); and Eur. *Heracl.* 986 ἐγὼ δὲ νεῖκος οὐχ ἐκὼν τόδ' ἡράμην | ἤδη γε σοὶ μὲν αὐτανέψιος γεγώς, | τῷ σῷ δὲ παιδὶ συγγενὴς Ἡρακλῆι, an interesting case to which I have not yet found a parallel in tragedy. My object in including *O. C.* 1720 f. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὀλβίως γ' ἔλυσε τὸ τέλος, ὦ φίλαι, βίου, | λήγετε τοῦδ' ἄχους was to raise the question whether in cases of ἐπεὶ. γε, γε strengthened the introductory force of ἐπεὶ, or had a quite separate function. I believe it is the latter that is correct: thus, in *O. C.* 1720 it emphasizes ὀλβίως; in 266 f. ἐπεὶ τά γ' ἔργα μου | πεπονθότες ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεδρακότα it emphasizes ἔργα,¹ and so on. I have omitted the difficult line *O. C.* 1172 καὶ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν. ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαμι τι; Jebb translates in his note, 'who is he, to whom I could possibly have any objection?' and remarks (p. 276) that ὃν γ' ἐγὼ is 'evidently preferable' to ὃν ἂν ἐγὼ (Vauvilliers). But there is no point in γε here, and no reason why Theseus should ask this question. He has just been telling Oedipus that an unknown suppliant has arrived, desiring to have speech with him, and

cases. On the whole, τὰ γ' ἐμποδόν, or still better γε τοῦμποδόν, seems to me most probable: the MS. tradition points to this, and the change to σὺ γε would be caused by the peculiar sense of ἐμποδόν, different from that given to it in the other passage where it

occurs (*O. T.* 128). We should also read δὲ in 446 (cf. *Tr.* 1234).

¹ This should be translated, 'I say my acts, because,' not 'since mine acts, at least,' as 'at least' is really meaningless.

suggests that it may be some kinsman from Argos. The dialogue then proceeds:—

ΟΙ. ὦ φίλτατε, σχές οὔπερ εἶ. ΘΗ. τί δ' ἔστι σοι;
ΟΙ. μή μου δεηθῆς. ΘΗ. πράγματος ποίου; λέγε.
ΟΙ. ἔξοιδ' ἀκούων τῶνδ' ὅς ἐσθ' ὁ προστάτης.

It is surely incredible that the king in reply asks 'Who is he, to whom I could possibly have any objection?' What we should expect him to ask, prompted by *σχές οὔπερ εἶ* and *μή μου δεηθῆς*, and what he does ask, is: 'And is it anyone whom I might somewhat blame?' If it be desired to keep *γε*—though the MSS. hardly affect this question—we should regard it as elliptical and put; after *ἐστίν*: 'And who is it? (Is it one) whom' etc.

With regard to the cases in which a reason is implied by *γε* with a participle, Neil remarks (p. 190) that *γε* comes second in the participial clause,¹ unless the preceding words are very closely connected, as Aristot. *Eth. Nicom.* 1110 b 21 *ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε*. This rule holds good for Sophocles, and is important, as it explains why *γε* seems out of its place in *O. T.* 930 and *Ph.* 587 (which should be written *ἐμοί γ'*, not *ἐμοιγ'*).

(d) Finally, there is a use of *γε* which may well be handled separately, though merely a variety of its use to give emphasis: I mean its employment in one or two co-ordinated clauses, which mark an alternative, a contrast, or some such thing, e.g., *Aj.* 1073 ff. *οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς | φέρειντ' ἂν, ἔνθα μὴ καθεστήκη δέος, | οὔτ' ἂν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοιτ' ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.* The other Sophoclean instances are: *Aj.* 1312 (where the MSS. wrongly give *θ'*);

¹ Yet in the line before he quotes *στέφανον ἔχοντά γε*.
Ar. *Plut.* 21, *οὐ γὰρ με τυπτήσεις*,

Ant. 657; *El.* 482 (where the γε should not be explained, with Jebb, as 'marking assurance,' and we should read σ' ὁ φύσας γ'), 560; *O. T.* 65, 1101; *Ph.* 1117, 1212; *Tr.* 80, 337 (where γ' should be read with Α after ἱκμάθης, and taken as laying stress on ᾶ δει); *frag.* 83, 513, 663.

For simple γε used in qualifications, see § 3, ΕΙ ΓΕ.

§ 2. δὲ . γε, δέ γε.

This combination is used (1) in expressing assent, but with a reservation, correction, or reproof; (2) in retorts; (3) in 'capping' one blessing with another; and (4) in 'capping' generally. As might be expected, opinions will sometimes differ in placing the various instances under these heads: thus, I think that Dr. Starkie is wrong in taking *Wasps* 926 as an example of (2) instead of (4); and I would translate δέ γ' there *aye, and*, not *aye, but*. The lists for Sophocles are (1) *O. T.* 1030; (2) *Aj.* 1150; *El.* 1347; *O. C.* 840, 1743; *O. T.* 372, 432; *Ph.* 1293; (3) *O. T.* 931; (4) *Aj.* 1409; *Ant.* 213 (but see p. 217), 1349; *El.* 548, 1367; *O. C.* 1702; *O. T.* 1378; *Ph.* 1037, 1053, 1362. In all these cases we have δὲ . γε, except *Aj.* 1150; *El.* 1347; *O. C.* 1702, 1743. In the fourth sense the combination may best be rendered by *aye, and*, or *furthermore*. Thus, for example, in *El.* 1367 γε emphasizes neither σφῆρ nor ἐννέπω, but goes with δέ in introducing a further statement. In *O. C.* 1702 οὐδὲ γέρων ἀφίλητος κ.τ.λ., there is no meaning in Wecklein's οὐδὲ γ' ἐνερθ', and we should read οὐδὲ γὰρ ὦν with Hermann, while in *O. T.* 1348 Dindorf is right (ὥς ἠθέλησα μηδέ σ' ἄν κ.τ.λ.).

§ 3. εἴ γε, εἰ . γε.

This section will give the cases where the γε marks some kind of qualification of a previous statement or

¹ See the references in the index to Starkie's *Wasps*, p. 438.

command. As is natural, the qualifying clause will be participial, or introduced by *εἰ*, *ἥν*, or *εἵπερ*; and the *γε* may be rendered by *I mean, at least*, or some such phrase. The cases are: *Aj.* 84; *Ant.* 551 (where Heath's *γ'* is right); *El.* 365 οὐδ' ἂν σύ, σώφρων *γ'* οὔσα, 387, 394, 583, 605, 944, 1105; *O. C.* 27, 48 πρίν *γ'* (here and *Tr.* 415 only), 926 ἄνευ *γε* τοῦ κραίνοντος, 1699 ὁπότε *γε*; *O. T.* 294, 326 μὴ πρὸς θεῶν φρονῶν *γ'* ἀποστραφῆς, 583, 586, 715 ὥσπερ *γ'* ἡ φάτις, 1158; *Ph.* 107, 109, 947, 1392, 1393; *Tr.* 67 (where the *γ'* is certainly to be read), 399 ἴστω μέγας Ζεὺς, ὦν *γ'* ἂν ἐξειδῶς κυρῶ, 415, 1113 (or = 'seeing that'?), 1220, 1251; *frag.* 616. In *Tr.* 1220 Ἰόλην ἔλεξας, ὥστ' ἐπικάζειν ἐμέ, Jebb reads ὥς *γ'* with Schaefer, while Wecklein prefers ὡς. Jebb's note is: "ὥς *γ'*, as a correction of ὥστ', is preferable to ὡς, not only as accounting for τ', but because ἐμέ is added: cf. Eur. *Alc.* 801 ὥς *γ'* ἐμοὶ χρῆσθαι κριτῇ; Ar. *Plut.* 736 ὥς *γ'* ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν." There, however, the *γε* goes with ἐμοὶ, while here it has nothing to do with ἐμέ. Neither does it emphasize ἐπικάζειν—there would be no point in doing so, and besides, Sophocles does not seem to use *γε* in emphasizing the infinitive. The cases in which he brings *γε* and the infinitive in conjunction are *El.* 992, 1506; *O. C.* 1191; *O. T.* 361, 1131; *Tr.* 425, 1220. *El.* 992 καὶ πρίν *γε* φωνεῖν means 'aye, and before speaking'; 1506 is discussed above; in *O. C.* 1191 σέ *γ'* εἶναι, *γε* underlines σε; *O. T.* 361 οὐχ ὥστε *γ'* εἰπεῖν γνωστόν means 'no, not to call known'; 1131 is precisely the same; *Tr.* 425 has been already treated; and in 1220, the case under consideration, we cannot assume one solitary example, by an emendation, for all Sophocles.¹ Hence we must either read with Wecklein or force the sense *I mean* upon the particle—the former being infinitely the better way to deal with the difficulty.

¹ I cannot account for this peculiarity; Euripides has *γε c. inf.* quite frequently, as *H. F.* 857 οὐχὶ σωφρονεῖν *γ'* ἔπεμψε δεῦρ' σ' ἡ Διὸς δάμαρ.

§ 4. ἀλλὰ . γε.

The combination ἀλλὰ . γε, in all cases where the two particles are not entirely disconnected, has the effect of emphasizing the word to which they refer: it is always placed between them, except in such cases as Aeschin. 3. 157 ἀλλὰ ταῖς γε διανοίαις, 'with your minds at any rate.' Sophocles has it:—*El.* 147; *O. C.* 1276 πειράσας' ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς γε; *Tr.* 801. In the other apparent instances the particles have their separate force, ἀλλὰ being always the ἀλλὰ of comment on what has gone before: *Aj.* 291, 469; *Ant.* 217, 538, 556; *O. T.* 848, 1440, 1519; *Ph.* 1202; *Tr.* 72. *El.* 147 ἀλλ' ἐμέ γ' ἄ σπονόεσσ' ἄραρεν φρένας, with many other passages, refutes the statement which has been put forward in print, that γε never follows ἐμέ.

§ 5. ἀλλ' οὖν . γε.

The lines in which these particles occur are: *Aj.* 535; *Ant.* 84; *El.* 233, 1035; *Ph.* 1305. The combination means *at any rate*, and is found pretty frequently in prose and verse. There are curiously few examples without γε (e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 498, *Ion* 1325, Ar. *Wasps* 1190, Aeschin. 3. 86, [Dem.] 58. 26—the only cases in these two orators), and most of them can be easily corrected: otherwise I should not have included here *Aj.* 535 ἀλλ' οὖν ἐγὼ φύλαξα τοῦτό γ' ἀρκέσαι.

§ 6. καὶ . γε.

We find καὶ . γε *yes, and* in *Aj.* 1376; *Ant.* 322 (καὶ ταῦτα . γε), 577, 749; *El.* 597, 992; *O. C.* 333, 1352 νῦν ἔ' ἀξιωθεὶς εἶσι κακούσας γ' ἐμοῦ, 1432; *O. T.* 771, 963, 1132, 1170, 1319, 1446; *Ph.* 29, 38, 674, 1277, 1296; *Tr.* 444. As this is merely a case of elliptical γε, even where it occurs in a speech (as *O. C.* 1352), the γε will naturally come near the

beginning and be separated from *καί* only by one word, as a rule : if there are more, they must be closely connected. The *καί* begins a sentence in Sophocles except in *O. C.* 1352, *Ph.* 29, 1296 (neither really an exception), the very suspicious *Tr.* 444, and *Tr.* 1236 *κρείσσόν κάμ' ἐγώ, ὦ πάτερ, θανεῖν*, which is not an example of *καὶ . γε*, the *γε* being *γε* of comment, and *καί* meaning 'also.'

§ 7. *καὶ μὲν . γε*.

This combination occurs : *Aj.* 531, 539 ; *Ant.* 221 ; *El.* 321, 1045, 1188 ; *O. C.* 396 ; *O. T.* 290, 345, 836, 987, 1004, 1066 ; *Ph.* 660. *καὶ μὲν* are always the first words of a new speaker ; and they are never separated from *γε* by more than one word (*Ant.* 221 *καὶ μὲν ὁ μισθός γ' οὗτος*). On *Aj.* 531 Jebb says : " In all these passages the effect of *γε* is the same ; *i.e.*, it does not modify the sense of *καὶ μὲν*, but emphasizes the word or phrase with which it is immediately connected " ; and Neil agrees with this statement (p. 193). I venture to think, however, that there is seldom any point in emphasizing the word followed by *γε*, and that in nearly every case the *γε* should be regarded as *γε* in comment. This would account for its persistently early appearance, as well as for the fact that *καὶ μὲν* seems to have now and then an adversative force, since a comment may be unfavourable. This occurs in *El.* 321 *καὶ μὲν ἔγωγ' ἔσωσ' ἐκείνον οὐκ ὄκνῳ*, ' Well, it was assuredly not by hesitation that I saved his life ' (a comment on *φιλεῖ γὰρ ὀκνεῖν πρᾶγμα' ἀνὴρ πράσσων μέγα*), in *O. C.* 396, and *O. T.* 1066. There is difficulty in *Aj.* 531 *καὶ μὲν φόβοισι γ' αὐτὸν ἐξελευσάμην*, which is Tecmessa's reply to the command of Ajax, *κόμιζε νῦν μοι παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν, ὥς ἴδω*. Jebb wrongly explains *γε* in his note as emphatic *γε*, but translates it correctly as *γε* in comment : I am convinced, however, that Ellendt's

φόβοισιν is right. We have then the weak καὶ μὴν, no stronger than our *indeed* often is.

§ 8. καίτοι . γε.

These particles are found in the same sentence in *Aj.* 441, 552; *Ant.* 502; *El.* 332; *O. C.* 919; *O. T.* 393, 855, 1455. In each case καίτοι begins a sentence, and has nothing to do with γε, which always has its separate force, emphasizing its word. The only possible exception is *O. T.* 393 (above, p. 219), where γε seems rather to strengthen the adversative force of καίτοι, *yet verily*, as in *Eur. Or.* 77 καίτοι στένω γε τὸν Κλυταιμῆστρας μόρον, *Ar. Ach.* 357 καίτοι φιλῶ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐγώ.

§ 9. μή τοι . γε.

The cases are *Aj.* 472; *El.* 518; *O. C.* 1407. In the first and third τοι and γε strengthen the negative, as τω so often does when alone; in *El.* 518 it has probably separate force, underlining *θυραῖαν*.

§ 10. οὔτοι . γε; τοι . γε.

These particles¹ are found in *Ant.* 747; *El.* 137, 773; *O. C.* 650, 857; *O. T.* 629; *Tr.* 491 (where it underlines ἐπακτόν). In every case γε has its separate force.

τοι . γε occurs only in *El.* 298 ἀλλ' ἴσθι τοι τεύσσουσά γ' ἀξίαν δίκην. Jebb supports it by references to 'other examples of γε combined with ἀλλά τοι in threats.' But these are cases of γέ τοι, which is not the same thing as τοι . γε. It is possible that γε goes here with τοι, as Jebb implies, and strengthens its force; but in all the other

¹ Neil remarks (p. 188) that 'γε is little used in lyrics, and never I think at the beginning of a *first* sentence.' If this means that γε is never the second word in a lyrical passage, it

can hardly help being correct; if it means more, Neil overlooked such cases as *El.* 137 XO. ἀλλ' οὔτοι τὴν γ' ἐξ Ἀἴδα, 233 XO. ἀλλ' οὔν εὐνοίῃ γ' αἰδῶ.

examples of *τοι . γε* that I can find *γε* emphasizes the word it follows. It certainly does not do so here; and on the whole I think we should read *τείσουσ' ἔτ'* with Blaydes and Wecklein, especially as *τ* and *γ* are so persistently confused in the manuscripts.

§ 11. οὐ μὴν . γε.

We have these particles in *El.* 817, *O. C.* 153, *O. T.* 810, *Ph.* 811, and in the 'Αχαιῶν Σύλλογος' l. 16 οὐ μὴν ἐπ' ἀκταῖς γ' ἐστὶ κωπῆρης στρατός, | οὐτ' οὖν ὀπλίτης ἐξετάζεται παρών. In the last case it is the *γε* used in one of two co-ordinated sentences (above, p. 229); and I think that this is probably the explanation of *Ph.* 811 οὐ μὴν σ' ἐνορκόν γ' ἀξιῶ θέσθαι, τέκνον: cf. 813.¹ In the other cases *γε* emphasizes the word with which it is connected. Except in *El.* 817 ἀλλ' οὐ τι μὴν κ. τ. λ., οὐ and μὴν come together.

§ 12. οὐκουν . γε.

The use of *οὐκουν* to introduce a negative comment would naturally bring with it the use of *γε* in emphasizing the point of the comment, or else marking ellipse. We find the following examples in Sophocles: *Ant.* 321, 993; *O. C.* 651, 848, 924; *O. T.* 565, 1357; *Ph.* 907, 1389. These cases are all non-interrogative, and *γε* is separated from *οὐκουν* by one word only, except in *O. C.* 848 οὐκουν ποτ' ἐκ τούτοις γε μὴ σκήπτρουν and *Ph.* 907 οὐκουν ἐν οἷς γε δρᾶς.

§ 13. γε δῆ.

This combination has three distinct forces: (1) corrective, *at any rate, at least, anyhow*; (2) emphasizing, *especially*; (3) summarizing, *in short*. Sophocles has it in

¹ *Berliner Klassikertexte*, Heft v, ever adversative, *per se*, though, like
zweite Hälfte, p. 65. our *certainly*, it may be used in

² It is a mistake to regard *μὴν* as sentences that are adversative.

Ant. 923 only: τί χρή με τὴν δύστηνον εἰς θεοὺς ἔτι | βλέπειν; τίν' αὐδ' ἄν ξυμμάχων; ἐπεὶ γε δὴ | τὴν δυσσέβειαν εὐσεβοῦς' ἐκτησάμην. It is used here in the second sense: other examples are Thuc. 4. 78, 2; 92. 4, Plato *Soph.* 237 B. For the first sense cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1176 θανείται δ', ἣν γε δὴ ληφθῆ μόνον, Plato *Gorg.* 449 B; for the third, Xen. *Oec.* 5. 20 εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι οἱ σώφρονες καὶ ὑπὲρ . . . καρπῶν καὶ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων γε δὴ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς θεοὺς θεραπεύουσιν. It is the second sense that occurs in the phrase μή τί γε δὴ, which we find twice in Demosthenes (2. 23; 54. 17). Aeschylus has γε δὴ once: *P. V.* 42 αἰεὶ γε δὴ νηλὴς σὺ καὶ θράσους πλέως, where it seems to be emphatic; it does not occur in Isocrates or Hyperides. Euripides has it only in *Hel.* 1176, *I. T.* 512.

§ 14. γε μὲν δὴ.

This is a variation for γε μέντοι (see § 15). It occurs very rarely, if at all, in prose, but is used occasionally by the tragedians. Sophocles has it *El.* 1243 δρα γε μὲν ἂν κὰν γυναιξιν ὥς Ἄρης | ἔνεστι, and *Tr.* 484 ἐπεὶ γε μὲν δὴ πάντ' ἐπίστασαι λόγον, with the *admonitory* force of our *however* in the first case, and its *transitional* force in the second. In *El.* 1243 Blomfield proposed μέντοι on the ground that μὲν δὴ was not used *de rebus adhuc faciendis*. This is wrong: cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1259 διδούς γε μὲν δὴ δυσγενὲς μηδὲν δίδου, Aesch. *Eum.* 419 τιμάς γε μὲν δὴ τὰς ἐμὰς πείθει τάχα.

§ 15. γε μέντοι.

Like γε μὲν δὴ, this combination is quite poetical. It has a strong adversative force, affecting the *whole sentence* in which it occurs, and I venture to think that Jebb is entirely wrong in breaking up the combination, and saying that μέντοι means 'however,' while γε emphasizes the word it follows. Apart from such cases as Aesch. *Pers.* 386 ἐπεὶ γε

μέντοι κ.τ.λ., I believe that there is not a single instance where Jebb's explanation is really adequate. The particles are indissolubly coherent, and throw the whole sentence into opposition. Sometimes γε μέντοι is equivalent to a very emphatic δέ, and may be rendered *but on the other hand*; so *O. T.* 778 τύχη | . . . θαυμάσαι μὲν ἄξια, | σπουδῆς γε μέντοι τῆς ἐμῆς οὐκ ἄξια 'a chance worthy of wonder, but, on the other hand, not worthy of my vexation about it'; *Ph.* 93 πεμφθεὶς γε μέντοι σοὶ ξυνεργάτης ὀκνῶ | προδότης καλεῖσθαι 'on the other hand, as I have been sent to assist you, I shrink from being called a traitor.' Sometimes this adversative force can best be expressed by '*as to that, however*'; so *Ant.* 495. Creon has just been talking of Ismene as a *skulking* traitor; and then, fearing lest this might palliate Antigone's open defiance, he adds, μισῶ γε μέντοι χῶταν ἐν κακοῖσί τις | ἄλous ἔπειτα τοῦτο καλλύνειν θέλῃ, and *O. T.* 1292—he declares that he will hurl himself out of the country: ῥώμης γε μέντοι καὶ προηγητοῦ τινος | δέεται. Sometimes *for all that* gives the force most accurately: so *Aj.* 483 everyone will agree that you have spoken just like yourself: παῦσαι γε μέντοι καὶ δὸς ἀνδράσιν φίλοις | γνώμης κρατῆσαι, *Ant.* 233 I walked very slowly, so that the short road became long: τέλος γε μέντοι δεῦρ' ἐνίκησεν μολεῖν, and *Ph.* 1052 (where on Jebb's view it would be necessary to regard γε as emphasizing an infinitive, apart from the weakening of the expression). Hence we find its most frequent use, viz. in rejoinders: *Aj.* 1370 ἀλλ' εὖ γε μέντοι τοῦτ' ἐπίστασ', *El.* 398 ΧΡ. καλόν γε μέντοι μὴ 'ξ ἀβουλίας πεσεῖν, and *O. T.* 442 αὕτη γε μέντοι σ' ἡ τύχη διώλεσεν.¹

§ 16. γε μήν.

This combination—rare in tragedy and almost unknown to prose, outside Plato—occurs twice in Sophocles. In

¹ So Aesch. *Agam.* 937 f.; *Sept. Heracl.* 266 f., 636 f.; *Or.* 105 f., etc. 715 f., 1043 f.; *Suppl.* 345 f.; Eur.

El. 973 f. λόγων γε μὴν εὐκλειαν οὐχ ὀρᾶς ὄσσην | σπαντῇ τε
καμοὶ προσβαλεῖς πεισθεῖς' ἐμοί; it means *furthermore*, and
marks transition to a new consideration. In *O. C.* 587 it
has its usual strongly adversative force, *for all that*.

§ 17. γέ πω.

They come together only in *O. T.* 105 ἔξοιδ' ἀκούων· οὐ
γὰρ εἰσεῖδόν γε πω, and are in no way connected. πω
belongs to οὐ: γε emphasizes εἰσεῖδον.

§ 18. γέ που.

Aj. 533 μή σοί γε που δύστηνος ἀντήσας θάνοι is the only
example: που means *perchance*, and γε marks ellipse.

§ 19. γέ τοι.

Sophocles uses this combination seven times: *Aj.* 534,
Ant. 1064, *O. C.* 1324, *Ph.* 823, *Tr.* 234, 1107, 1212. It is
the English *at any rate*, as used in introducing some
consideration that supports a statement just made, or
something that favours an affirmative answer to a question
or command. Under the first head come *Aj.* 534 (where
Jebb's "aye truly" is not good), *O. C.* 1324, *Ph.* 823; under
the second come *Tr.* 234, 1212. The remaining two cases
are in commands: *Ant.* 1064 ἀλλ' εὖ γε τοι κάτιστα and
Tr. 1107 ἀλλ' εὖ γε τοι τόδ' ἴσ τε, where the whole clause
introduces a threat, the carrying out of which will be
evidence in favour of the statement in the previous lines,
that the speaker is the son of Zeus; while in *Ant.* 1064 it
introduces a direful prophecy, in response to Creon's ὥς μὴ
'μπολήσων ἴσθι τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα, which gives good reason for
believing the statement made by Teiresias in the previous
line.

It may be noted that γέ τοι does not occur in Thucydides, Xenophon, or the Orators, and is very rare in Plato.

§ 20. γέ τοι δή.

This combination occurs very rarely. It is not found in Aeschylus or Euripides, and only once in Sophocles, *O. T.* 1171 κείνου γέ τοι δὴ παῖς ἐκλύζεθ'. It has the same force as γέ τοι: cf. Plato (the only prose writer who uses it) *Crito* 44 Α τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν. ΚΡ. φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

§ 21. *Some additional Notes.*

The old rule that ἄν γε never came together, though not valid absolutely (see Neil, p. 197), holds good for Sophocles; on the other hand, he has γ' ἄν nearly a score of times.

Neil writes (p. 199): "A last class of cases is where γε marks the apodosis of a sentence. After a conditional clause or the like, 'well' introduces the main clause naturally enough, and the usage is to be expected. Instances are *Soph. Ant.* 655-7 [and a number of others]. . . . Similar is the use after a suspense, *well*, as *Soph. Ajax* 476 τί γὰρ παρ' ἡμᾶρ ἡμέρα τέρπειν ἔχει | προσθεῖσα κἀναθεῖσα τοῦ γε καθανεῖν." While acknowledging the general truth of this remark, I do not think that the usage is Sophoclean. Jebb's explanation of γε in *Aj.* 477 is much better than Neil's; the γε in *Ant.* 657, which Jebb does not attempt to explain, is a case of γε in one of two alternatives.

In *O. C.* 1278 f. the MSS. give ὥς μή μ' ἄτιμον, τοῦ θεοῦ γε προστάτην, | οὕτως μ' ἀφῇ γε, μηδὲν ἀντειπὼν ἔπος. Jebb reads Dindorf's οὕτως ἀφῇ με, because "the second γε is weak after θεοῦ γε." A stronger objection is that γε does not occur in Sophocles with ὥς and the subjunctive;

another, that it is devoid of meaning here. But the double μ' cannot be right. The repetition of the pronoun is very rare in tragedy, and occurs only in lyrical passages (*Ant.* 789 by conjecture, *O. T.* 1101, *Ph.* 1116), or where there is a considerable clause interposed (*O. C.* 1407, *Eur. Phoen.* 497). I suggest here

οὕτως ἀφῆ, 'με μηδὲν ἀντειπὼν ἔπος.

For prodelision after a stop, cf. *Ph.* 591 λέγω. 'πὶ τοῦτον κ.τ.λ.; for the accusative *ib.* 1065 μή μ' ἀντιφώνει μηδὲν, *Ant.* 1053 οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς.

Neil says (p. 199) that "οὐ. γε not in reply [as e.g. in *O. T.* 361, *Ant.* 771] is very rare, but it occurs in a parenthesis in Soph. *O. T.* 711," οὐκ ἐρῶ Φοίβου γ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. It occurs also in *Aj.* 1342 ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐνδίκως γ' ἀτιμάζοιτό σοι; *Ant.* 207, 456; *El.* 482, 561, 1020; *O. C.* 1436 οὐ μοι ζωντί γ' αὐθις ἔξετον; 359 ἥκεις γὰρ οὐ κενή γε; *O. T.* 65, 105, 849, 855, 857, etc. Neil's edition of the *Knights* was published after his death; and this accounts for the inaccuracies and vague statements which occur especially in the Appendix on γε. It is to be deplored that Neil's editors did not make some effort to remove these blemishes: what, for instance, is to be gained by printing such a statement as that on p. 190, "ὥς γε is restrictive, as Thuc. vi. 92. 1"? Here is the Greek: γίγνεσθαι δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τάχει καὶ προθυμότερον ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ ὥς γε δυνατὰ . . . πάνυ θαρσύν.

W. A. GOLIGHER.

REVIEWS.

Aristotle, de Anima, with Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by
R. D. HICKS, M.A., Fellow and late Lecturer of Trinity College,
Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1907.

THE peculiar value of Aristotle's *de Anima* lies not so much in what it teaches—for modern science and philosophy have long transcended its teaching—as in its effects in developing the philosophic mind. This value it retains in full for each successive generation. The ancient Greek attitude appears, at first sight, to have been fundamentally different from the modern attitude towards the problems of psychology; but further reflection shows that the differences though real are less fundamental than they seem. The process of appreciating—distinguishing and comparing—both points of view in general and in detail, and of endeavouring to discover a common conception within which to embrace them both—to find their common measure, so to speak—offers what is perhaps the most valuable discipline in liberal thinking accessible to modern culture. To find a way across the chasm that divides us from the Greeks—to translate not only our ordinary but our highest conceptions into terms of theirs, and thus work ourselves round to their point of view—is an accomplishment of philosophic faculty which ranks next in value to the *πρᾶξις* of Plato. It is here that our chief advantage lies as compared with the Greeks in philosophy. They lacked the historical perspective which enables us to compare philosophic systems separated from one another by wide tracts of time, to see thought evolving itself, and thus, while we rise to ever higher levels, and survey an ever wider horizon, to participate in the benefit of such evolution.

Plato and Aristotle—each in his own way—introduce us to the most philosophic thinking of the Greeks in psychology; but the *de Anima*, owing to its condensation and pregnancy, its mixture of history and speculation, its author's intensity of insight and

alertness in observing and discussing his differences from predecessors—is perhaps the book beyond all others suitable to provide such an introduction. It exhibits Aristotle's characteristic style, and contains many of those brief, dark, dogmatic utterances which at first sound so strangely in our ears, but which have for centuries riveted the attention of Schoolmen and scholars.

Taken as so much Greek, it is exceedingly difficult—enough to try the learning and acumen of the most critical scholar. To master it in detail would be too much to expect of the cleverest young student without assistance. It has been misread and misunderstood in certain particulars by many great pioneers of thought, some of whose misinterpretations have been caught up with favour, and have long lived a sort of spurious life in the tissue of current philosophy. Mr. Hicks in this edition affords the needful assistance to all classes of readers. For expository power, sympathy with his author, and synthetic grasp of ancient and modern speculation, he has produced a work which will take its place beside the late lamented James Adam's edition of Plato's Republic, and will even add to the renown of Cambridge scholarship. We will not say it is superior to anything of the kind hitherto existing in English, for there has only been Edwin Wallace's edition, and to compare it with this would be unfair to both. When Wallace wrote, he suffered from the limitations of his time; and it is largely owing to his work that these limitations have since then been to a considerable extent removed. It would ill become those to whom he taught their first lessons to disparage his work, when his period of mastership is past. But Mr. Hicks' book is quite new, and very different from his in quality and matter—a point which we desire to emphasize the more because of an erroneous statement as to the relationship between them which we observed some months ago in a certain critical journal. If one compares the two translations, he will find that in a host of passages—almost, indeed, on every page—the earlier suffers from faults of grammatical inaccuracy, verbiage, and clumsiness of expression, from which the later is totally free. We have read through Mr. Hicks' work, and are of opinion that it amply fulfils what was to have been expected of his well-known erudition and scholarship. It is much superior in all respects to that of Trendelenburg-Belger, and for accuracy and sound judgment compares favourably with the great edition of Rodier. Torstrik's is almost a work of genius, but so different in scope from that of Mr. Hicks, that one cannot properly compare them. While Mr. Hicks' book is more valuable than Torstrik's to students and historians of philosophy, Torstrik's will always remain for scholars and critics a work of first-rate importance. Mr. Hicks' commentary is admirable in form as well as in matter. If ever critical discussions tended to tempt a writer into the ways of controversy, those on the *de Anima* might well do so;

but Mr. Hicks, with philosophic urbanity, steadily refrains from acrimonious censure of recent writers. He reserves his strictures for the work of the ancients. Though evidently well acquainted with what has been written lately, and doubtless as capable as anyone of distinguishing chaff from wheat, he scarcely ever refers to recent books connected with his subject except in order to express approval. Where he disagrees with them, as of course he often must, he generally prefers to remain silent. This practical principle is worthy of *litterae humaniores*, and helps to promote good humour—and good work, withal—in the little republic of letters. Mr. Hicks proceeds straight through his subject, with his searchlight steadily directed on and around his path, thus making the way pleasant as well as profitable for all students of Aristotle who choose to accompany him.

J. I. B.

The Annalist Licinianus. A lecture delivered in the Hall of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, May 29, 1908. With an Appendix of emendations of the text. By ROBINSON ELLIS, M.A., Hon. LL.D., Corpus Professor of Latin. London: Henry Frowde.

WHEN Professor Ellis applies his great learning and ingenuity to a difficult author, we are sure to be enlightened in no small degree: and so it is in the case of the present lecture, which he has published with an appendix containing the valuable conjectures which he printed last year in *HERMATHENA*. The chief point urged in the lecture is that we must accept with caution the received date of the author, viz., the age of the Antonines: in the very few cases in which the corruptions allow us to judge of style, there seem a simplicity and absence of affectation which do not betoken the age of Fronto and Gellius. Yet the author does seem to have lived between the time of Hadrian—unless, with Prof. Ellis, we suppose the passage which alludes to the completion of the temple of Zeus Olympius to be a later accretion—and that of Solinus (who quotes Licinianus). And does not *multa praecatus et impraecatus*,¹ justly defended by Prof. Ellis, introduce something of an artificiality? Many stories, too, in Gellius (e.g. to take one at random, vii. 1.

¹ Prof. Ellis (p. 20) takes *praecatus* as referring to prayers to the gods to forgive the rash act of murder, and *impraecatus* to curses on the authors of the civil war. The account in Val. Max. would lead us to take the latter to refer to curses on the gods for giving

him his luckless victory (*multum ac diu convicio deos et donum impiae victoriae insecutus*): if this is so, then probably *praecatus* will refer to prayers to the manes of his brother for forgiveness.

1-4.) are told in quite a simple way. Though far from being proved, we think no other date than about 150 to 250 A.D. meets all the difficulties of the case.

Among Prof. Ellis's emendations the following seem worthy of high commendation:—8 col. A, l. 8, *adulescentulis comisator*: 20 col. I, l. 1, *in consilio Iovis* (*consilio* being the MS. reading altered to *solio* by the editors: Prof. Ellis refers to Horace Carm. iii. 25. 6 in defence of *consilio*). We have some doubt about the alteration in l. 8, *Ludosqui futuri erant* into *lud. Osqui* (= *ludi Osce*), on account of the improbability of such entertainments (they appear to have been the Atellanae) being connected with a religious ceremony. Doubtful also is the abbreviation of *Talamonis* into *Tals* (22 A, 23). In 32 A, 20, Prof. Ellis most ingeniously for . . . DERIDI suggests *usque ad meridiem*, to make a contrast with *se noctu* (Traube's emendation, which seems to us undoubtedly right). The objection is that the battle next day appears to have commenced early, *μὲν ἡμέραν* (Appian), *ἡμέρας δὲ* (Plutarch). From Plutarch's account (Sull. 21) *κατακλεισθέντες εἰς τὸν χάρακα μοχθηρῶς ὑπὸ τραυμάτων καὶ φόβου* (a very probable emendation of Bekker for *φόνον*) *διενετέρευσαν*, we suggest with hesitation *deterriti*. In the celebrated criticism of Sallust for DATINCE . . . loca montes flumina, Prof. Ellis ingeniously suggests *dat in scaenam*. Our guesses had been *dat in colorem*, or *dat inter ea*. Prof. Ellis is rightly conservative in retaining, in 36 A, 10, *Sicheana* (or perhaps *Siceana*), from Syce, a town of Cilicia.

This paper is an example of the unexhausted fertility of Prof. Ellis's ingenuity in critical emendation.

L. C. P.

Rutilii Claudii Namatiani De Reditu Suo Libri Duo. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, Critical and Explanatory, by CHARLES HAINES KEENE, M.A., and translated into English Verse by GEORGE F. SAVAGE-ARMSTRONG, M.A., D.LIT. Dublin: Printed at the University Press, by Ponsonby & Gibbs; London: George Bell & Sons. 1907.

MR. KEENE has given us a very scholarly edition of Rutilius, and the value of the work is enhanced by the fact that it is the first edition of the poet which has appeared in English. Rutilius has but little claim to the title of poet, but yet his poem possesses an enduring interest as a picture of the times of the Gothic invasion. He had attained to the office of *praefectus urbis* at Rome under Honorius, and his return to Gaul, in 416 A.D., was occasioned by the laying waste of his estates in the general ruin. The journey

had to be undertaken by sea, for fear of the foe; and the tedious voyage gives the poet an opportunity of introducing many descriptions and legends of the places he passed and visited. His friends are eulogised as occasion offers, but he excels in invective. The treacherous conduct of Stilicho, the Roman commander, is fearlessly denounced, while Jews and monks are attacked with a refreshing ferocity.

Mr. Keene's introduction deals fully with all that appertains to the poet and the poem, and gives a detailed account of the MSS. The editor has personally re-examined the most important MS., that at Vienna.

The metrical version, which is the work of the late Dr. Savage-Armstrong, is graced by a poetic charm which is sadly wanting in the original.

The explanatory notes abound in valuable exegetical and illustrative matter. There are but few blemishes in them, e.g. in the note on l. 9, "*semina virtutum*, 'the seeds of virtues,' i.e. the germs from which virtues spring, the persons in whom they are formed," the words "the persons in whom they are formed" should be deleted.

The critical notes are the weakest part of the work. Mr. Keene seems unable to make up his own mind. If he backed horses, he would have a little bit on every horse in the race. As an example of his vacillation we may take the note on l. 76, "Factus et Alcides nobilitate deus." Mr. Keene says, "Possibly we should read *strenuitate* or *sedulitate* or perhaps even Castalio's *mobilitate*.' Why not read the ablative of any noun denoting any excellence, bodily or mental, which would happen to scan? In l. 206, *se daret* (Heinsius) is read in the text for the MSS.; *fideret* or *funderet* is proposed in the critical note; while in the explanatory note we are told that "perhaps *sideret* is the true reading," with a reminder that, under certain conditions, *fieret* would offer a satisfactory solution. Those who are familiar with the *Rudens* of Plautus will be surprised at being told on p. 132 that *horia* has the first syllable short. Mr. Keene should not trust implicitly the quantities given in Lewis and Short.

Franere for *frangere* (l. 464) is the only misprint we have noticed in the text of a beautifully printed volume.

G. W. M.

The Works of Aristotle. Part 2, *De Lineis Insecabilibus*. Translated into English by HAROLD H. JOACHIM, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. At the Clarendon Press. 1908.

IN these five pages of Bekker's text, written to prove that there are no indivisible lines (*ἀτομοὶ γραμμαὶ*), and that a line does not

consist of points, nor a time of 'nows,' there are difficulties enough to test the critical and exegetical power of any—even the most diligent—student of Aristotle. The reasoning throughout is close and logical; and one is tempted when brought to a stand to rely upon himself to divine the true lection, correcting corrupt or supplying missing words by finding out what the writer was driving at. There is the faith that he is always driving at something intelligible, and that not too profoundly mathematical for the ordinary reader. Thus the translator or critic feels himself, so to speak, on his mettle. A fair and constant challenge is before him throughout these five pages. They are so short, and the general sense is so evident, that to translate them perfectly should not seem to surpass the wit of scholars; yet the completion of this apparently small task seems as difficult of attainment as the beach of Calais to a Channel swimmer. Few read this tract, and it may be not out of place to suggest that, to form a judgment of the nature of the problems which were before Mr. Joachim, and of his merit in dealing with them, one should read Bekker's text first, then Apelt's, and then Mr. Joachim's translation and notes, with both these texts beside him.

Mr. Joachim's work is essentially the result of critical study, and a good ἀφορμὴ of a critical edition. The author has had to examine into the state of the text and the evidences for it, as well as to interpret it in English. In a work of this kind an almost sufficient criterion of the correctness of the text is its intelligibility, or the logical coherency of the reasoning which it expresses. Here, while the ways of going wrong are infinite, there is generally only one way of going right; and that the text which gives the right train of thought is sound, is a fairly safe conclusion, which has been consistently adopted by all who have dealt with the *De Lineis Insecabilibus* and similar mathematical or scientific Greek works.

It will be found that as Apelt (helped by Hayduck) made a great advance on Bekker, so Mr. Joachim has in turn made a further advance on Apelt.

But Mr. Joachim's work, though an advance on Apelt's, is not complete or final. In one or two passages he modestly avows himself unable to determine the sense or reading with any confidence. Those readers who know the number of difficult problems which he has solved for us, and who know also their own helplessness before those in which he has failed, will be the last to disparage this excellent translation and commentary. They will feel that it would be very difficult to find another person more competent to assist in carrying out Jowett's project.

Having said so much, we may add some observations on a few passages to which our attention was particularly drawn when reading this book with the texts of Apelt and Bekker.

If in what follows we in some places criticize Mr. Joachim, it must not be thought that we have the less admiration for his work. Not the least part of his achievement is to have given his critics, with this work before them, an advantage which he himself did not possess, and for which they owe him gratitude. Nor must we forget that, where we differ from him, he may, after all, turn out to be right, and we to be wrong.

968^a 14-18. This argument from the position that 'body' consists of *στοιχεῖα* to the conclusion that there is 'something indivisible' in sensible bodies, appears to confound (intentionally or not) qualitative and quantitative division. When Aristotle calls the Earth, Air, Fire, and Water *τὰ ἀπλά σώματα*, he does not mean that each is *ἀμερές* in the sense in which an indivisible line might be so. He means that each is qualitatively simple, or ultimate, that, e.g., fire cannot be resolved into anything else more fundamental than itself. He does not mean that a given fire (ordinary or 'elemental') could not be conceived as divided into several fires and distributed in several places. Yet this latter would be the only sense of *ἀμερές* relevant to the present argument, which is all geometrical. To argue from indivisibility *εἶδει* to indivisibility *μεγέθει* is patent sophistry. When, therefore, the physicists said *ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὅλως τῶν τοῦ σώματος στοιχείων ἕκαστον*, we should ask them—which did they mean? This point is, we think, one which should be dwelt upon here in any commentary.

968^b 9-12. The conclusion as expressed by the translation is—"and thus the original unit of measurement would turn out to be twice one of its parts, viz. twice its half. But since this is impossible, there must be an indivisible unit of measurement." The 'impossibility' is not so obvious to one who would contend (as the opponents of this argument do) that the 'unit' (*μῆκος τι*) has a half, and is of course double of this. Besides, too much use seems to be made in the translation of the mere term 'unit,' which occurs five times here in the English, though not at all in the Greek till 969^b 7 (*τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐνὶ*), where the reply argument comes in. To catch the opponent on the 'unity' of the *μῆκος τι*, by fallaciously converting this unity into 'simplicity' (but for which it might, of course, be multiple) without his observing it, and by then arguing that there is a contradiction in supposing the 'simple' to be divided into halves, would be a *λίαν εὐσύνοπτον ψεύδος*. It appears to us that not its being a *unit* of measurement (for nothing is really said or made of 'unity' here), but its being a *measure* (*μέτρον*), is the essential matter. The advocate of *ἄτομοι γραμμαί* falsely assumes first that ALL *γραμμαί* are *σύμμετροι*, and next that there is *μῆκος τι* which is the actual *μέτρον* of all lines. If his opponents agree with him in these assumptions, he can prove that the *μέτρον* is not divisible. For if it is divisible, it will have parts; and these parts will be 'symmetrical' with and be measured by the

same measure as the whole. For the whole, of which they are parts, is the μέτρον of *all* lines whatever. This being so, it will measure, i.e. go without remainder into, not only all other lines, but even those which are its own parts. Thus, the double (i.e. the whole) would measure its half. Here in reality lies the 'impossibility' on which the conclusion turns. To preclude this 'reductio,' the opponent should deny that there is any such μήκος π, and also deny that *all* lines are σύμμετροι. The latter point is excellently disposed of by Mr. Joachim in his note 969^b 6-12.

970^a 30-33. "If not *every* line, but only lines consisting of an even number of units, admit of bisection: still, even so, the 'indivisible' line will be divided, when the line consisting of an even number of units is divided into unequal parts (by progressive bisection)." Taking these words of the translation as they stand, let us test the truth of what they assert. If divisible lines consist of indivisible lines, then let us suppose we cannot bisect a line consisting of an odd number of 'indivisibles,' for, in order to do so, we should cut the middle 'indivisible' in half, which is contrary to hypothesis. Only lines, therefore, which are made up of an even number of indivisibles admit of bisection. This is the point here assailed. If, says the translation in effect, you divide such a line into unequal parts by progressive bisection, you will find that this involves dividing the indivisible. But this is not true. For take a line made up of sixteen indivisibles, and bisect it into parts of eight indivisibles each; bisect either of these parts again, and you get four; either of these, and you get two, and then one. At no step do you divide the indivisible—progressive bisection being just the way which enables you to avoid doing so in this instance. The argument thus expressed fails altogether. It appears, therefore, that there is more in this matter than the translator thinks, and that he should have felt more compunction in omitting (as he does) the words τὴν δὲ δίχα διαιρουμένην καὶ ὅσα δυνατόν τέμνειν (970^b 31).

970^b 10-14. Here it would seem from the note that the writer proves, or might prove, the divisibility of the alleged ἀτομα γραμμαί, by urging that any line which has a πέρασ (to say nothing of two πέρατα) "is divisible into (α) the limit, and (β) the limited. The only escape from this dilemma ('either infinite or limited, and so divisible') would be to say that the indivisible lines constitute a third class of line, neither finite nor infinite." But it occurs to us, as we read this, that the translator's reference to an 'indivisible line that has even one limit' is irrelevant. The question whether a line with only one limit is divisible could not give rise to dispute. For, of course, it might run to any length, from its one limit, in the other direction, and be divisible as often as one pleased. The reference to it is also unfortunate, for it seems to imply that divisibility *into the limit and the limited* is of the sort intended by

the argument. This is not the case, however. The divisibility here intended is divisibility *μεγέθει*, not *λόγῳ*. In geometry a line cannot be divided into τὸ πέρασ and τὸ πεπερασμένον. This is a metaphysical conception; nor is such the division meant here. The words in 970^b12 τὸ γὰρ πέρασ ἄλλο καὶ οὐ πέρασ—'the πέρασ is one thing, that of which it is πέρασ another'—direct attention to the facts that there is something between the πέρατα [the writer does not speak of a γραμμὴ with only one πέρασ], and that though the πέρασ is indivisible, yet τὸ μεταξύ τῶν π., or τὸ πεπερασμένον, is divisible. The doctrine of the writer himself is expressed by 972^a13 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀφαιρεθῆναι οἶόν τε στιγμὴν ἀπὸ γραμμῆς, and (if Aristotle) by τὸ γὰρ πέρασ ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον, 185^b18. Since, then, the line does not vanish into its πέρατα and become a point, but remains between them as *ξυνεχές τι*, it is divisible. The 'third kind of line' would be one which had πέρατα with nothing between them. It would be neither limited (for there would be nothing πεπερασμένον) nor unlimited (for it has πέρατα). It would be an absurdity. From the dilemma stated in the translator's note, 'either infinite or limited, and so divisible,' the translator's own gratuitous allusion to an 'indivisible line with only one limit' (or, if he does not really mean this self-contradiction, 'a line with only one limit') would seem to provide another way of escape from the dilemma, and one not contemplated either by the Greek writer or by the English translator. Such a line would be *both* infinite and limited, being infinite in one direction, and limited in the other; like eternities *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, both limited at the *vñv*, but each reaching to a limitless past or future.

971^a17. εἰ . . . μὴ ἔστι δὲ συνεχὴς ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πέρασ, ἀλλ' ἔχουσιν τι μεταξύ. This is rendered in the text: "And since the beginning of anything is not continuous with its end, but they have an interval between them"; and the rendering is a premiss towards the conclusion that "neither Nows nor Points can be continuous with one another." But this conclusion could not follow from the premiss; for one could not argue that, because a beginning and an end are not 'sibi coniuncta' (Rota), but have something between them, therefore two Points, or two Nows, if *together*, with *nothing* between them, might not be continuous. The true translation (as appears to us, and as indicated by the translator's note) would also yield the true premiss, viz., "Since the beginning or the end is not continuous (= since neither is, *per se*, a continuum), but they have something between them (= since the continuum lies in that which falls between the ἀρχή and the πέρασ)."

The argument, correctly stated in the note, is this: "Points and Nows are beginnings or endings; but beginnings or endings have no continuity: therefore Points and Nows have no continuity, and, being without continuity, cannot be continuous with one another."

971^a25. The suggestion of οὐδ' ἂν <ᾗρ> αἱ στιγμαί, so far as sense goes, is admirable; but we feel (we cannot prove the point, authorities being silent, and time for investigation short) that the order should be οὐδ' <ᾗρ> ἂν. It appears that in negative apodoseis ᾗρ' ἂν, where they come together, have the order of γὰρ ἂν, as the illative particle belongs logically to and goes with the negative, while the conditional ἂν refers to the verb, which usually follows. The collocation of ᾗρα with ἂν does not (so far as we can find) occur at all in this tract, unless (if Mr. Joachim's conj. be right) in this place, and in 971^a1, where Apelt writes οὐδ' <ᾗρ> ἂν γραμμὴ εἴη ἀδιαίρετος. In fact, this collocation is comparatively rare, nor can we find it referred to by Kühner-Gerth in their elaborate reviews of the uses of ἂν and ᾗρα respectively. In the cases where one would expect . . . ᾗρ' ἂν εἴη, Aristotle generally uses his customary future indic. Bonitz, Eucken, Waitz, Ast, etc., give little but negative help in their lexicons and indices. In Plato only in the Hippias Major, 298 A, can we at this moment discover the collocation in apodosis: πῶς τί (al. τι) ᾗρ' ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; In fact, wherever we have come across the close collocation of ᾗρα illative and ἂν conditional, whether in negative or affirmative apodoseis, and even where words intervene, the order is as we have stated above.

In the Magna Moralia, ᾗρα is used more frequently than elsewhere in Aristotle. Looking there we find the following instances (all referred to by Eucken): 1184^b35 (ᾗρ' ἂν εἴη), 1190^b32 (οὐκ ᾗρα ἢ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη), 1192^a6 (ὁ ᾗρα ἐλευθέριος . . . ἂν εἴη), 1192^b11 (ᾗρ' ἂν εἴη), 1196^b26 (ᾗρ' ἂν εἴη), 1199^a21 (ὁ ἀδίκος ᾗρα . . . εἶδεῖν ἂν).

In one case, however, where the verb comes first in the sentence, the ἂν goes with it, and the order is reversed, 1210^a4 (δέοι ἂν ᾗρα. ὡς εἰσικε). This last case seems to suggest that the reason of the order is as stated above.

The matter is not so small as it looks at first, and we should be obliged to anyone who could and would determine finally whether οὐδ' ἂν ᾗρ' εἴη is legitimate Greek, as οὐδὲν ᾗρ' ἂν εἴη certainly is. The question has a number of ramifications more or less interesting. We cannot, of course, reason from the use of γὰρ to that of ᾗρα though said to be connected, but about γὰρ similar questions arise. Would a schoolboy who, for metrical reasons, chose to begin a trimeter iambic verse with οὐκ ἂν γὰρ εἴη (instead of οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη) be at all justified in doing so?

971^a29. Mr. Joachim's η for ῆ here, as also in 971^b31, is very neat, also ῆ for ῆ, 972^a29.

971^b11. εὐθεία εὐθείας ᾗσεται κατὰ δύο στιγμάς. The Greek text which argues for this conclusion is corrupt in several places; but the conclusion itself seems to mean that if two right lines be drawn from a common point, then, according to the theory of those who hold that several points may be in contact *without becoming one*.

either of the lines will touch the other (*a*) in a point proper to that other, viz., its tangent extremity, (*b*) in a point common to both, viz., that from which both are drawn. Thus, in Mr. Joachim's figure, the line drawn from K to A would, with its own initial point B, touch that drawn from K to D at the common point K and at the point C, these latter being here regarded as two points in the line KD. [So the line KD might be regarded as touching KA in the points K and B.] We do not understand how KA could be made out to touch KD at any point *x*, lower down than C on the latter line; nor do we think that this is required here for the *ad absurdum* argument.

972^b 18. Mr. Joachim corrects μήτε τῆς οἰκίας συµβαλλομένης τοῦ μή τι τῆς οἰκίας = 'without in the least comparing the house.' Emendation is of course necessary, and this mode of correction is obvious; yet there is a difficulty in it. Such adverbial use of τι with μή or οὐ is, at least in the prose of this period, very much restricted. τι goes adverbially with μή in μή τί γε = nedom; but we cannot readily recall any other case in which it is safe to use it so. With οὐ, too, in Aristotle τι adverbial seems to have γε invariably connected with it, except in 439^a 32, where, however, Bonitz suggests τοι for τι, though there the latter may be logically separate from οὐ, and regarded as predicative.

J. I. B.

The Attic Theatre. A. E. HAIGH. Third edition.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

THE ten years which have elapsed since the last edition of this book was published have witnessed the death of its author, Mr. Haigh. But the great increase in our knowledge of matters relative to the Greek stage has made a new edition necessary; and the work has been entrusted to Mr. Pickard-Cambridge. He has re-written much of the book, in which connexion it may be noticed that in Appendix B we have received access to much more of the inscriptional material bearing upon the Greek drama than was formerly the case—an alteration demanded and facilitated by the appearance of Dr. Adolph Wilhelm's work on Athenian dramatic productions. To a second work, Puchstein's "Die griechische Bühne," which has also been published since 1898, the consideration which it merits has been fully accorded, while the vexed question of the site of the Lenæum has been treated in an entirely new appendix. It will thus be plain that in this edition of Mr. Haigh's work a great advance on the last one has been made. As regards the site of the Lenæum, it is indeed unfortunate that no

certain conclusion can be reached; we can say no more than that it was in or near the market-place; but on many other points we have received much new and valuable information. For instance, it is now proved by an inscription, that comic contests at the city Dionysia were in existence at any rate in 463 B.C., while it is probable that they were established as early as 487 B.C. Again, if Wilhelm is right, there seems to be evidence of contests between comic actors as far back as 313 B.C. at least. It has, of course, been for some time well known that the greater part of the stone theatre at Athens cannot with certainty be dated before the middle of the fourth century, and that the plays of the great tragedians were produced in a simple wooden building; but there are other matters of no less interest, for the elucidation of which we depend upon information more lately obtained. To take an example, it seems pretty clear that Dörpfeld is wrong, and that in Greek theatres a stage existed from the first; that in the fifth century it was low (only a few feet above the orchestra); and that it was then gradually raised to about twelve feet, as the character of the drama changed, and the chorus became quite unimportant. Again, Puchstein is probably right in assigning the stone proscenium at Athens to the time of Lycurgus, viz., the latter half of the fourth century B.C., as against Dörpfeld, who dates it considerably later. On certain points indeed, the work of even the latest investigators still leaves us in doubt. No one has as yet succeeded in giving a satisfactory explanation of the existence in certain Greek theatres of subterranean passages leading from the stage buildings to the middle of the orchestra. Some of these passages are of Greek, some of Roman workmanship. In neither case has their purpose been made clear. The latter portion of the book, dealing with the scenery, stage properties and contrivances, actors, and chorus though abounding in interest, contains comparatively little that is new, and so scarcely calls for comment in this notice of the excellent and thorough work of Mr. Pickard-Cambridge.—R.W.T.

Greek Historical Writing, and Apollo: two Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, June 3rd and 4th, 1908, by ULRICH VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORF. (Translation by GILBERT MURRAY.) Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1908.

THE former of these lectures is a judicious investigation of Greek historical writing. Having reviewed the methods of the various Greek writers on history, von Wilamowitz concludes that after Thucydides there was no effort at historical criticism, as the term

is now understood. This weakness he attributes to Ionic individualism, and to the inability of the Greeks to "put themselves in the place" of those about whom they wrote.

In the second lecture we have a concise and happy presentment of the history and attributes of Apollo. The writer differs from Dr. Farnell in his theory of the original home of the Apolline religion. In von Wilamowitz' view, the seats of Apollo's worship in Asia are pre-Hellenic; hence "either the Greek colonists adopted this god together with his sacred sites—in that case he is an Asiatic; or else they brought a god with them whom they identified with the pre-Hellenic god." Later came the belief in Apollo's birth at Delos; later still he superseded Gaia and Poseidon at Delphi. Dr. Farnell, on the other hand, though he allows as pre-Hellenic the Apolline cults of Aeolian and Dorian Asia, holds that the god came originally from the lands north of Hellas—Illyria, Macedonia, and Thrace—to Delphi, and later became lord of Delos and the Asiatic coast.

Apollo's attaining at Delphi the position of a truly national god, his moral influence over Hellas, and that lack of mysticism and of the "striving after the infinite," which finally combined with Iono-Attic reason to weaken his power—are all touched on in this charming and sympathetic portrayal.—M. T. S.

Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society. Vol. vi., part i.
The Apparatus Criticus of the "Culex," by A. E. HOUSMAN.
Cambridge University Press.

THE chief MSS. of the "Culex" were stated by Mr. Housman himself (in *Classical Review*, 1902) to be Bembinus (saec. ix); Vossianus (saec. xv); and Corsinianus (saec. xv). He now replaces Vossianus by "its grandfather, Vaticanus, 2759, saec. xiii." Reasons for the supersession are given, and a full apparatus criticus is supplied on the new basis. To his conjectures published in 1902 Mr. Housman now adds two:—

(1) In line 251 he proposes to read—

iam Pandionia miserandas prole puellas.

(2) In 262-4 he obviates the difficulties of the text as it stands, by assuming after 263 the loss of such a line as—

fata fauente deo subiit, quem uallibus olim.—M. T. S.



Annals of Archæology and Anthropology: Liverpool, at the University Press; London, Archibald Constable & Co. Vol. I. Nos. 1, 2.

THIS newly founded and excellently produced periodical deserves and will obtain a cordial welcome from all university men really interested in those adjuncts of classical study which are rapidly claiming and obtaining the chief attention of the public. Its first two numbers contain articles of great interest—among others, those entitled "Notes on a Journey through Asia Minor," by Prof. Garstang; "Midas beyond the Halys," by Prof. J. L. Myres; "The Petty Kingdom of the Harpoon, and Egypt's earliest Mediterranean Port," by Prof. Newberry, and "The Copper Coinage of the Ptolemies," by Mr. J. Grafton Milne, special lecturer in Numismatics.

'Pure' classics has too long monopolised the regard of our universities. Few good scholars fail to understand and excuse this; but those who have wider than merely philological interests will insist that it is time for it to cease. Modern philosophy and modern literature have not, it is true, yet exhausted the Hellenic mines of inspiration which none can safely work save accurate scholars; but the profit derived in these directions is becoming comparatively less with each succeeding decade. The anthropological and archæological interests of classics, on the other hand—those sides of the subject which bear directly on the historical development of civilization in Europe, and indeed on that of human society in general—call imperatively for larger endowments than the old universities bestow upon them. Is it in the new universities only that these subjects are to receive due recognition? Are the old universities too prejudiced against everything new to endow such studies as they deserve? We hope it is not so, but we hesitate to answer the question. In the meantime, no one can help admiring the energy and success with which the University of Liverpool, while not neglecting the old and valued branches of learning, has devoted itself to the development and propagation of the new. We have no doubt that the '*Annals of Archæology and Anthropology*' has before it a prosperous future. The contents of this, its first issue, and the names of its editor and his collaborators, make it probable that the organ of the Institute of Archæology—*itself* a part of the University of Liverpool—will soon obtain wide circulation, and take an honoured place in university circles at home and abroad.—J. I. B.

The Rise of the Greek Epic: being a Course of Lectures delivered at the Harvard University, by GILBERT MURRAY, M.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1907.

Homer and his Age, by ANDREW LANG. Longmans, Green, & Co. London, 1906.

THE interest of the professed scholar and even of the layman in the Homeric problem, and in the subsidiary questions connected therewith, does not seem to be abating, if we are to judge from the series of articles and of interesting volumes that continue to pour forth from the press. The question of unity, perhaps, is receding into the background; for, after all, if the poems are really great, the question of authorship is of secondary importance. The change in the point of view is due, no doubt, to the widening of the prehistoric outlook conditioned by the archaeological discoveries extending from Schliemann's days down to our own time. We are now chiefly concerned to discover the place that the Homeric civilization occupies in that yearly widening purview of a prehistoric culture which is being gradually reconstructed, but for which we have not yet—so recent is the discovery—invented an adequate name.

Thanks to the efforts of archæologists over the eastern half of the Mediterranean basin, we are now in a position to explain in some degree the "miracle" of Hellenic culture. It is plain that here, as in other spheres, the principle of continuity is not broken. We have glimpses of a culture which extends back at least two millenniums before the earliest traditional date assigned to our *Iliad*. In Sicily, in Asia Minor, in Crete, and in the Danube basin, we have evidence of a primeval civilization which contains in embryo most of the elements which we now designate as Hellenic.

It was scarcely to be expected that the means thus placed at our disposal by the widening of our horizon should not have been applied as a solvent to the question of the unity. Yet the contribution afforded to the solution of the problem has been comparatively slight. A little reflection, however, shows that this result is inevitable. The question, it would seem, is to be decided mainly on the internal evidence of the poems themselves, and the more or less doubtful external evidence that is to be found in ancient writers. Archæology has thrown a flood of light on the *matter* of the poems; it has told us and can tell us nothing as to how they attained their present form. It is significant, we think, in this regard that recent archæological research has done nothing to support the advocates of unity against the position maintained (say) by Grote.

Mr. Lang is, however, of a different opinion. He sees in the results of recent research a striking proof, or at least indication,

of original unity. The poems, he holds, are contemporaneous with the events they describe. There is no deliberate archaizing. Further—and this is the central point—the period depicted is a period of transition, which, by the nature of things, could last only one or two generations. The traces of different strata of culture which the critics profess to have discovered are illusory; the contradictions are unimportant. Thus, the main arguments of the “expansionists” fall to the ground, and we are obliged to admit a consistency and harmony, an artistic unity and finish, which could originate only in the brain of a single author. Unfortunately for this view, there are phenomena in the text which the plain man finds inexplicable on Mr. Lang’s theory; while, on the other hand, it is quite possible to admit all that Mr. Lang has proved—if he has proved it—when he limits the composition of the poems to one or two generations, without at the same time being obliged to hold to the theory of a single author.

Mr. Murray is occupied with the more profitable task of elucidation of the circumstances, social, political, religious, artistic, amid which Greek epic had its rise. He does not contend especially for any theory, but holds to the expansionist theory. His account of the rise of the epic of Roland is peculiarly illuminating and instructive for his special purpose. Here at least we are on fairly safe and scientific ground; and Mr. Murray makes the most of it. He makes a good point in favour of the “expansionist” theory by exhibiting the “moralization” of the epic. Yet this theory is not free from great difficulties. “Why,” we may ask, “did the expansionists not show more regard for consistency? Why did they not show more consideration for the great original author of the nucleus?” It is not that we are confronted by mere contradictions and inconsistencies: there are in many passages unmistakable tokens of a conflation of two excellent though incompatible versions. What is the most natural explanation of this phenomenon?

Mr. Verrall attempts in the current *Quarterly Review* to answer this and cognate questions. His theory is—like everything that proceeds from Mr. Verrall’s pen—suggestive if not convincing. It certainly disposes of the contradiction, and has the further advantage that it leaves the question of the time of composition to be decided on other grounds. He rehabilitates the much-ridiculed theory of a recension under the Pisistratids, and connects this recension with the intellectual advance of Athens from the middle of the sixth century B.C. onwards. The intellectual, moral, and political greatness of Athens, he holds, was due to her magnificent system of education established about this time. The instrument of that education was the “Poems of Homer,” i.e., the Cyclic Poems, in which Mr. Verrall includes our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In fact, it was from this very use that the name “Cyclic,” he thinks, was

derived. Then, finally, with the increasing demands of new literature, it was necessary to make a selection of the best, and hence the origin of our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. On this theory he explains the obvious sutures which our *Iliad* manifests, especially in the double accounts given of such an important event as the sending of Patroclus. The arranger had before him two accounts, both artistically good, though inconsistent. He took for his purpose as much of both as he possibly could, yet he unwittingly admits four or five lines which indicate the sutures. We find a similar phenomenon in the Old Testament, e.g., in the story of David.—H. C.

Who were the Romans? By W. RIDGEWAY. H. Frowde.
(Proceedings of British Academy, vol. iii.)

A LEARNED and interesting paper, in which the author concludes, *inter alia*, that the Latins were Ligurians, that the Plebeians of Rome were of this Ligurian stock, and that it was their language which became the Latin of classical times. This paper is of great value not only to archæologists, but also to students of comparative philology.

Plato or Protagoras? A Critical Examination of the 'Protagoras' speech in the Theaetetus, with some remarks upon error. By F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.SC., Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Blackwell: Oxford. 1908.

"THE philosophical significance of the Theaetetus has been very strangely misconstrued. It contains no tenable account of knowledge. It contains no refutation of Humanism. It refutes nothing but an extreme and probably exaggerated or misapprehended form of sensationalism. Nor, again, has what it does contain been fully recognized. It contains a sweeping repudiation of the senses and the feelings as contributory to the growth of knowledge. It contains a renunciation by Platonic logic of the duty of explaining the individual." (Author's Preface.) This is a highly noteworthy paper, which all students of Plato—psychologists, epistemologists, or philosophers—would do well to read. It proceeds to this among other interesting conclusions, that the 'Protagoras' speech yields trustworthy evidence for the re-constitution of the actual doctrine of the historic Protagoras.

The Early History of India. By VINCENT A. SMITH. Oxford.
Second edition, enlarged and revised.

WE are glad to notice a second edition of this work, which on its first issue was reviewed in HERMATHENA, 1905, No. XXXI. The author has, as he tells us in his preface, subjected the text and

notes of the first edition to careful scrutiny and revision. Chapter xiv., 'The Mediaeval Dynasties of the North from 648 to 1200 A.D.', has been enlarged from 20 pp. to 50 pp.; chap. xvi., 'The Dynasties of the South,' has been re-written and also enlarged; and much new material has been utilised for the whole work.

M. Antonius Imperator Ad se Ipsum recognovit, brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. H. LEOPOLD. (Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.)

THIS is a useful critical edition of a work which may be called an eternal manual of moralists. The editor's preface sets forth the principles and methods adopted for the constitution of the text. They are—as becomes the series to which this book belongs—unexceptionable. He has in his critical apparatus made use of all 'subsidiary' codices, and availed himself besides of the help afforded by modern English and other critics, as well as that contained in any editions of the so-called 'Meditations' which have appeared since the editio princeps of Xylander in 1558.

Homeri Opera recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit. By THOMAS W. ALLEN. Tomi III-IV *Odysseae libros continentes*.

THIS text will receive a hearty welcome from all who love Homer and Homeric study. Its editor's name is an immediate guarantee not only of the sympathy with his author, but of the high level of scholarly capacity and care, which the editorship of the *Odyssey* demands. It is refreshing to turn to a book like this, in which, without leaving the field of critical Homeric study, one may read 'Homer' undisturbed by the questions, archæological or philological, which have of late years been rendering the way to this highest of literary enjoyments intolerably painful and perplexing.

The Platonic Theory of Knowledge. By MARIE V. WILLIAMS. Cambridge University Press. 1908.

THIS is a bright and readable little book, exhibiting great acuteness and constructive ability on its author's part, as well as a thorough grasp of the trend of Platonic thinking, and of that part of Aristotle's writings which seems to bear on Plato's theory of ideas. She has of course been influenced by Professor Henry Jackson's well-known articles in the *Journal of Philology*, and she acknowledges her indebtedness to him and to others in her modestly written preface. The Platonism of Cambridge has long been and still is a mainstay both of philosophy and of Greek in the higher education of modern England.

BOOKS ALSO RECEIVED.

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- The Iliad of Homer*, books v. and vi., trans. by E. H. BLAKENEY, M.A. Bell & Sons, 1907.
- A List of First Editions and other Rare Books* in the Weinhold Library. Compiled by W. R. R. PINGER, M.A. Berkeley (Cal.) University Press, 1907.
- La Colonne Torse et le Décor en Hélice dans l'Art Antique*, par VICTOR CHAPOT. Paris, E. Leroux, 1907.
- A History of Classical Scholarship*, vols. ii. and iii., by JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, LITT.D. Cambridge University Press, 1908.
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- A Latin Reader (Verse and Prose)*, by W. KING GILLIES and HECTOR J. ANDERSON. London: Bell & Sons, 1908.
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- Homeric: Emendations and Elucidations of the Odyssey of Homer*, by T. L. AGAR. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1908.
- Homeri Opera: recognoverunt brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt* DAVID B. MONRO et THOMAS W. ALLEN: Tomi I-II Iliadis libros I-XXIV continentes. Editio Altera. Oxonii: e Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1908.

THE RANAE.¹

IF down in Hades there is a chair established for the greatest comedian, with what play shall we say that Aristophanes would back his claim to it? A modern advocate would assuredly bid him call in evidence either the *Birds* or the *Frogs*; but our poet himself—is it not equally certain?—would appeal to that most ambitious of his creations, the *Knights*. In the *Knights* he joined issue with the jagged-toothed monster, Cleon; in the *Frogs* he is constrained to devote himself to lesser game. Inevitably the impression shapes itself that in the *Frogs* we have a sort of holiday task, which is great because of the innate greatness of the man, and whose words ring the clearer across the centuries just because for the nonce Aristophanes had renounced his most cherished ideals. It is not that it is free from his prejudices or prepossessions, but that these are no longer the sole or central interest. Comedians had always considered that duty required them to instruct the town; circumstances now made it impossible to answer duty's call, and so for once we are delivered from the personal and political gossip of Athens. Consider, then, the possibilities when, towards the end of 406 B.C., Aristophanes began to speculate on his subject for the spring Lenaea. Political discussion was debarred by express enactment; Socrates he had already caricatured, with unpleasant ill-success, in the *Clouds*; Euripides, his continual butt, had passed beyond reach. There would have been nothing for it but some subject of the Middle Comedy, if the happy thought had not come that a new Odysseus might penetrate the darkness of the tomb. The idea is a little hackneyed now; dialogues of the dead have grown familiar things—they are such a very convenient setting for any topic. The idea was not absolutely new even in 405, and Aristophanes may have borrowed it from Eupolis. Still, it is not the plot that constitutes merit, but the development of the plot; and one may reasonably doubt if this subject has ever been more brilliantly worked out. The volatile genius of the poet has never revealed itself in such fullness. As a study of a contradictory personality, its interest is unique. Here we find the champion of the traditional gods, of the traditional morality, and he mocks at gods, at decency; the stubborn conservative, to whom all change is abhorrent, and he has the nimble mind of a revolutionary; the poet of the man in the street, and he is inspired by the most romantic muse of ancient Greece. The whole gamut of the ludicrous is here exemplified, from merest farce to subtlest wit and delicate humour. As to wit,

¹ A paper read before the College Classical Society, June 7th, 1907.

is not that the most perfect of puns where the cup of hemlock is named 'a quick and beaten path to death'? But the work of Aristophanes always glitters with wit, that is comedy in words; humour, the comedy of idea and situation, distinct from either verbal cleverness or ridiculous action, is a rarer quality in Greek. It seems to consist in a comprehension and sympathy which are nearly, but not quite, complete. Completion would merge the poet in his creation, and give pathos; for humorous presentment, a character must be seen partly, but not altogether, from the outside. Such a character study we here find in Dionysus, and to a lesser extent in Euripides. To a degree that is otherwise quite modern, the personae are made ridiculous without ceasing to be intelligible.

For romantic beauty, for true inspiration of nature-worship, Aristophanes is not surpassed even by the moderns. Whilst Dionysus is being ferried across the black waters of Styx, a chorus of sweet sounds circles about the boat; it is the voice of the frogs who inhabit that 'ever-flowing mud.' And the songs which follow found no parallel outside Aristophanes himself, until the Middle Ages breathed a new spirit into the world. It is passing strange to find a humour so coarse linked to such a tender sensitiveness of perception as that which created the *Birds* and the *Frogs*. Although the parallel is far from being exact, the history of Elizabethan drama may be called to mind, where literary tradition and popular demand compelled dramatists to maintain elements quite alien to their taste. This poet, too, inherited from his predecessors both the animal chorus and the ribald fun of which we speak: he even attempted a revolt from this Dorian coarseness. The remarkable feature is, that in both departments of his art, an equal genius is displayed. Not only do these first choral songs rival in lyric sweetness the work of our own great dramatist, who, in the judgment of Milton, was

fancy's child,

Warbling his native wood-notes wild;

not only have they such an impression of delicacy as might come from some work of Gothic tracery; there is in them the expression of a spirit granted to none other in that ancient world, the spirit which

loveth well

Both man and bird and beast.

Other poets had known gleams of this light; in Aristophanes alone we see the glory of full dawn. Though more imaginative and complete, it is the same feeling as that which breathed in Homer when he beheld the sea parted in sunder with gladness at the coming of its god; or, when, at the nuptials of Juno and Jove, mother earth, put forth

young grass, deep and soft, crocus and hyacinth.

The birds and beasts of our poet are real living things, filled with the mere joy of living ; not simply moving objects to be seen, noted, admired, raised but a little above mountain or rock, but, in the fullest sense of the word, alive. As he could feel the wide freedom of the birds of the air, so he can conjure up the gladness of the frogs in the dewy grass ; their pleasure in beaming sunshine or cool pelting rain. This is one song of the 'marshy children of waters'—in clumsy, ineffectual English :—

Nay rather, loudly we will chant, I ween ;
 For oft-times we've been singing
 Beneath the sunbeam's golden sheen,
 Through sedge and rushes springing.
 With gladsome strain
 We plunge beneath,
 Safe from the rain,
 While the bubbles rise again.

Such is the romanticism which is mingled, and not only mingled but reconciled, with mere farce in Dionysus, who, as he says himself, is a poor hand with an oar.

But why of all persons possible should Aristophanes choose Dionysus to play Orpheus seeking his Eurydice ?

As the play is confessedly an attack on Euripides, the part would more naturally be assigned to one of those young philosophers, loiterers in lecture halls, of whom he is named spiritual father ; an added sting would be given to every action of the protagonist if it could be understood as a satire on the teaching of the poet ; and, as that teaching is his final and damning failure, a new unity would be given to the whole play. As it stands, we find three scenes not over-closely connected ; indeed the central thread which links the whole is not, as in most of these comedies, the idea, but the person of the hero. The *Bacchæ* had been staged a very short time before this play was written, and in it Dionysus appears somewhat effeminate and unathletic. Possibly, then, Aristophanes meant to caricature the youthful god of wine ; the lion-skin would be an exaggeration of the fawn-skin, and other items of dress might imitate the appearance of Euripides' god. If it were so, we can imagine what a shout of laughter went up from the waiting theatre when that ludicrous figure came forth.

The character of Dionysus is perhaps the best drawn in Aristophanes ; there are in it a vitality and realness far beyond such creations as Dicaeopolis. In the opening scene Dionysus affords a brilliant contrast to Heracles, the blunt soldier, who, reading his visitor through and through, refuses to understand his *dram* ; our imagination he presents himself as a small, pathetic

swept by an impossible enthusiasm, which he only half comprehends, out of the unthinking irresponsibility of Epicurean life. He never becomes simply an excuse for a joke, as Aristophanes' personages so often do; there is sufficient comic force in the original conception to prevent that necessity. Even the rapid exchanges of the lion-skin and club with Xanthias, on the approach of new dangers, have a naturalness which one could hardly expect. And there is something exquisitely ludicrous in making the insignia of Heracles saddle the bearer with credit for all the actions which that purifier of the earth had performed. Dionysus, relying on his borrowed reputation, knocks boldly at the door of Aeacus. Aeacus appears, recognizes Heracles, and begins to abuse him soundly for 'stealing our good dog Cerberus.' No one else had even bethought him that the good householders of hell might object to the removal of their watchdog. In the literary debate which concludes the play, Dionysus is really delightful; he stands silent, understanding about one-quarter of what is said, until a chance opening allows him to break in with some inane remark of his own. When the *Persæ* comes under discussion, he bursts out—"Yes, I liked it too; when I heard about the defunct Darius, and the chorus clapped their hands together, like that, and cried, Alas!" That is all he had seen in it.

Of course, for us the interest of the play centres in its final chapter—the judgment of poets. It can hardly have been so for the Athenian audience to whom this comedy was offered. Perhaps the value of the scene is for the reader only, not the spectator; perhaps these citizens of Athens were less intellectual than idealists would wish, and esteemed horse-play above philology. Else why should our poet introduce that whipping scene where the fun lies mainly in the giving of hard blows, and Xanthias and Dionysus take the part of the policeman in pantomime? But modern opinion would probably consider this trial scene, taken by itself, as the greatest piece of work Aristophanes ever produced. There is a feeling of completeness, of artistic finish, and co-ordination, which may have been foreign to the ideal of the Old Comedy, and is certainly not to be found in our specimens of it. It is not quite the earliest literary criticism of Greece! Pindar has a word to say on the question whether the inspiration of the poet or the acquired wisdom of the philosopher is the higher; Euripides had ridiculed the construction of plot in the *Choephoræ*; and if the *Batrachomyomachia* really belongs to the classical period, some one had already discovered the art of criticism by parody.

But in the *Frogs* the critic deals with two of the world's greatest poets, and is more instructive because of their peculiar differences of temperament and method; and that critic is, in his own fashion, as great a poet as either. Further, the dramatic

form allows the point of view to be frequently varied, so that both sides may seem to have justice, and all divergencies are set out by most agreeable contrasts, resulting in a life and personal interest which no continuous essay could possibly attain. Moreover, the dialogue is always truly dramatic, the interlocutors never degenerating, as in so many imaginary conversations of modern days, into mere puppets. The direct criticism is thus amplified by the indirect and implicit, for the skill of the poet preserves in his personages the breath of life, and Euripides is cold and contemptuous, while Aeschylus "inflames his furious heart to wrath."

With cunning art, Euripides is made to condemn his own work while he praises it; so confirmed is he in iniquity that he dares to brag of his *ἰδιῶται θεοί*, and is actually proud of that finicking style, of those words tried by rule and square. To all of which boasts his rival answers drily, "I quite agree." If Aeschylus was over tragic, Aristophanes would say, Euripides has lost all tragic dignity, whether in language, character, or plot. But Euripides is of another opinion; he has merely deflated tragedy; he rather plumes himself on *genre* subjects, "*οἰκεία πράγματα*" which people are competent to criticize and understand." The real Euripides probably did think so, and could doubtless have supported his theory with weighty reasons, such reasons as twenty-two centuries have found to justify their admiration; but, in some mysterious way, Aristophanes, stating the case apparently from the defendant's side, has made it appear absolutely indefensible. Parody, also, keenest of all the weapons of criticism, is here employed by either side in turn: surely never before nor since has it been used with such delightful insight at once to illustrate and to prove.

The criticism itself, apart from the form of its expression, is decidedly disappointing; not one of those points which we find most fascinating or suggestive in the work of either poet is touched at all. The deep bewilderment of Aeschylus, the sense of something out of joint, the groping after a guiding force behind pain and evil, seemingly purposeless—all this escapes Aristophanes: he can see only the warrior of Marathon inspiring Athenian youth with manliness and valour. So also in Euripides he cannot hear

The still, sad music of humanity;

he does not notice, or fails to understand, those questionings on human destiny; those inquiries into life as it is and as it should be, whether of king or slave. Aristophanes was not one given to abstract thought or deep philosophizing; an inconsistency in theory was no displeasing thing to him; born to wealth and comfort, he never troubled to look far below the surface. Consequently, his criticism in this respect is emphatically superficial.

Always it is the features which are observed on a first acquaintance that reach his perception and are retained in his memory.

The attack first falls on the style of Aeschylus. Euripides is made to assert that those effects of vague grandeur, of pain and bewilderment, dimly shadowing forth

the burthen of the mystery,
... the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,

are produced by a simple trick of manner. They are he thinks the result of obscure expression, obtained by using barbarous compounds, "bloody, remorseless phrases, that nobody could understand"—even by mere devices of staging, as when the protagonist maintains an impressive silence through the first scenes. Moreover, in this search after effect Aeschylus often falls into mere tautology.

In all of this there is a certain appearance of truth; no doubt, many an honest citizen of Athens had often thought so in his heart of hearts. But the retort of Aeschylus exactly meets the case; his tragedy dealt with great thoughts and sentiments; grand words like grand dresses befit these heroes who are more than men. Another point which Euripides censures is the construction of his rival's lyrics. They are, he says, mechanical in their sameness, and might all be contracted into one. But this is too much for the leader of the chorus. "What!" he cries, "I am impatient to know"

τίν' ἄρα μέμψιν ἐποίσει
ἀνδρὶ τῷ πολὺ πλείστα δὴ
καὶ κάλλιστα μέλη ποιή-
σαντι τῶν ἔτι νυνί—

a judgment in which everyone will heartily concur.

Euripides is charged with falling below the tragic dignity. His heroes come on the stage dressed in rags, as though they were beggars—an attempt at realism which Aristophanes is never weary of ridiculing. And his language is over-refined—*παραπρίσματα ἐπῶν*, verbal splinters and shavings, instead of those sounding lines which suit tragedy. Apparently the resolve to be clear and exact before everything did not meet with unqualified approbation. The rhythm of this poet's verse also is monotonous: the same cadence recurs in line after line; and further Aristophanes asserts that his sentences have a monotonously regular construction. This, too—for the censure seems justified—may result from the same endeavour to be clear; it is unlikely that it is due to any want of taste in a poet who produced some of the most perfectly musical lyrics in Greek literature. But even the lyrics do not escape; they are turgid, with continual descents into bathos; they are filled with meaningless repetitions of words which instead of being pathetic are simply silly.

Aristophanes is of opinion that Euripides had a hankering for morbid subjects; he is too fond of strange psychological studies—Sthenoboeas or Phædras—a trait shared with many realists of after-days. The defence that the story is true is not accepted; it is the poet's business to hide what is bad—a view which commends itself to a later critic, Aristotle. Then that other innovation, the prologue, deserved mention; but, with great art, this is put into Euripides' mouth: "the first actor who appeared used immediately to give the family history in the piece." "Ought you not to have been put to death for that?" retorts Aeschylus.

But the struggle really turns on the respective teaching of the two antagonists, for both profess to be teachers, agreeing that—

Children and boys have a master assigned them;
The bard is a master for manhood and youth;
Bound to instruct them in virtue and truth,
Beholden and bound.

According to our critic, the teaching of Euripides had resulted in garrulity and shamelessness, a conceit of the individual judgment, destroying all discipline and patriotism, a sickly training of the mind at the expense of the body. Under the influence of teachers like Aeschylus had been fashioned the mighty men of old, the men who could fight and row:

Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.

Certainly the remark is just; when reason is brought to bear on all things, when some one takes on himself "to introduce reason and inquiry into the art, so that men might note and see through all things," the traditional bases of morality, public and private, must go; and this destructive force of intellect is not always able to provide a new foundation on which to re-establish society. Some decay in the relationship of individual and State was connected with the triumph of Philip of Macedon; it may be that Euripides, it is certain that the Euripidean system of thought, was a precedent condition, perhaps a cause, of that decay. But modern civilization owes far more to the Hellenistic than to the purely Hellenic world.

What strikes a modern reader most in this criticism of Euripides is the things it leaves unsaid. The *deus ex machina* is not even hinted at; the construction of the plots, sometimes styled "botches," is passed over; the wonderful power of stirring pity and fear apparently escapes notice; the romantic beauty of some odes finds mention, but not acknowledgment; the sententious depth which made this poet a favourite with the anthologists is never recognized. Such utterances as "there is nought slavish about slaves but the

name," were surely an advance on contemporary thought; and fair criticism should give the thinker credit.

The judicial summing up is not unjust. "I admire the one," says Dionysus, "but I like the other"; and again: "The one speaks cleverly, but the other clearly." To determine their merits finally as advisers of the State, a test case is applied: each is required to deliver an opinion on Alcibiades. In his earlier plays Aristophanes had left that dangerous youth severely alone; but now, in two lines, he sums up with exquisite expressiveness the whole history of the relations between Athens and her unfilial son, catching also the exact flavour of Aeschylean verse:

οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν
ἦν δ' ἐκτραφῆ τις, τοῖς τρόποις ὑπηρετῆν.

There is much political wisdom in that couplet: it reads very like an anticipation of Aristotle.

At last Dionysus, with fine inconsistency, declares that he will take Aeschylus back to earth with him; and the hapless Euripides is left with such cold comfort as he can draw from a verse of his own:

τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν;

J. H. CRAIG.

PROCEEDINGS

COLLEGE CLASSICAL SOCIETY, TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, 1907-8.

Nov. 8th.—At the Opening Meeting held in the Regent House, Right Hon. Mr. Justice Madden read a paper on "The Early History of Classical Studies in Ireland," Dr. Tyrrell in the chair. Speakers: Professor J. I. Beare, Mr. E. J. Gwynn, Rev. Professor Henry Browne, S.J., Mr. Marriott Smiley.

Nov. 15.—Adjourned.

Nov. 22.—Mr. H. W. Lemon read a paper on "Greek Oracles," Dr. L. C. Purser in the chair. Speakers: Professor W. A. Goligher, Professor J. I. Beare, Messrs. Maunsell, Leland, Porter, and Craig.

Nov. 29.—Mr. R. F. T. Crook read a paper on "Excavations at Pompeii," which was illustrated by lantern slides, Professor Beare in the chair. Speakers: Messrs. M'Combe, Craig, Porter, and Flood.

Dec. 6.—Mr. E. H. Alton read a paper on "Lucian," Mr. McCombe in the chair. Speakers: Messrs. Porter, Craig, and the Chairman.

Dec. 13.—Mr. R. McCombe read a paper on Lucan, Mr. Maunsell in the chair. Speakers: Messrs. Maguire, Craig, Davies, and O'Grady.

Feb. 7, 1908.—Mr. J. E. Maguire read a paper on "The Philosophic Works of Cicero," Mr. G. W. Mooney in the chair. Speakers: Dr. L. C. Purser, Messrs. Acheson and Craig.

Feb. 14.—Mr. J. H. Craig read a paper on "The Greek Sense of Colour," Rev. George Wilkins in the chair. Speakers: Mr. O'Grady and Dr. L. C. Purser.

Feb. 21.—Mr. W. Kennedy read a paper on "Ancient Athletics," Dr. L. C. Purser in the chair. Speakers: Messrs. Craig, Maunsell, Beckett, Small, Davies, and Cox.

Feb. 28.—Mr. W. H. Porter read a paper on "The Apocolocyntosis," Mr. William Kennedy in the chair. Speakers: Rev. R. M. Gwynn, Messrs. M'Combe and Maunsell.

March 6.—Mr. J. E. L. Oulton read a paper on "Propertius," Dr. L. C. Purser in the chair. Speakers: Messrs. Bartley, Maguire, Craig, Wilkins.

March 13.—Mr. D. P. W. Maunsell read a paper on "The Eleusinian Mysteries," Dr. L. C. Purser in the chair. Speakers: Messrs. Craig, M'Combe, and E. R. Wade.

May 22.—Professor J. I. Beare read a paper on "A lately discovered Play of Euripides," Dr. L. C. Purser in the chair. Speakers: Professor W. A. Goligher, Messrs. Maunsell, Davies, and the Chairman.

June 5.—Mr. George Davies read a paper on "Catullus," Mr. W. Kennedy in the chair. Speakers: Dr. L. C. Purser, Rev. R. M. Gwynn, Mr. Craig. Mr. J. Johnston then read a paper on Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 533 ἴωμεν ὦ παῖ κ.τ.λ. Speakers: Dr. L. C. Purser, Messrs. Oulton and Flood.



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100

HERMATHENA:
A SERIES OF PAPERS ON
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Proceedings of Trinity College Classical Society.

HERMATHENA.



THE TERCENTENARY OF THE BIRTH OF MILTON.¹

I.

IN pride and gladness strong,
Spirit of holy song,
Awake as on that morning long gone by,
When angels stooped to earth
To hail a poet's birth,
And sing their welcome from the hushed dark sky,
To him who, with a human voice,
Should imitate those strains that bid the spheres rejoice.

II.

When day breaks grey and chill,
And earthly life is still,
A sound is softly wafted to our ears,
Surely the angels' hymn
Upon the twilight dim
Floats through the distance of three hundred years.
Listen! They prophesy that he
Is born to celebrate the Lord's nativity.

¹ Awarded the Vice-Chancellor's Prize for English Verse, 1908
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III.

Soft fall the strains and low
Across December's snow,
Thus from the winter sky the greeting rings:
" Infant, so helpless now,
Across thy sleeping brow
We scatter golden glory from our wings,
Before the dawn with earthly light
Shall break the sacred spell that charms this winter night.

IV.

" And from thy mind and heart
Shall never more depart
The mystic influence of December's breath ;
So shalt thou rightly sing
His birth, who came to bring
Life to a world bound in the frost of death.
O, little child, soft be thy sleep,
Full faithful is the watch the seraph hosts shall keep."

V.

Then from the angel choir,
Touching his golden lyre,
One son of glory lifts his triumph song.
" Brothers," he cries, " rejoice,
Pour forth each mighty voice,
Behold this child, with inspiration strong,
Our own abodes of light shall see
And take his daring flight throughout infinity.

VI.

" Surely the thought is bold
That leads him to behold
Those solemn realms of everlasting night,

That land of deathless woe,
 Those flames that darkly glow,
 The horrors looming through that dreadful light.
 Only in deep and trembling strains
 Can angels name that place where Death undying reigns.

VII.

"Fearlessly he shall see
 The ruined majesty,
 The darkened glory of one awful form,
 On that immortal face
 Shall mortal dare to trace
 Marks that betray the conflict and the storm,
 Shall show him prince of guile and ill,
 But still archangel lost, splendour in downfall still."

VIII.

Too terrible the theme
 To be an infant's dream,
 Too dark, too sad to be an angel's song.
 Hushed is the trembling lay,
 Awe-struck it dies away,
 More shall he know when years have made him
 strong,
 Strong with the might of manhood's prime,
 Strong with those brooding thoughts won from the deep
 of time.

IX.

But hark the sacred strain
 Softly awakes again,
 In notes like rippling water, crystal clear,
 "Now let thy spirit's flight
 Turn from the realms of night,
 Now pass the gate kept by the living Fear,
 And see before thy dazzled eye
 The light that mortals dread, that angels draw not nigh.

X.

Yes, worlds of living light,
Garments of stainless white,
To this one favoured mortal shall be shown,
Saints, martyrs he shall see,
Their crowns of victory,
Laid low before the Father's sapphire throne,
And God His grace and strength shall give
That he may enter there ; may see that throne and live.

XI.

Then he whose feet have trod
The presence halls of God,
Must turn away at last to seek the earth,
Clothed with the golden noon,
Or hushed beneath the moon,
And wearing still the glory of her birth,
Until the tempter enter in,
And half that glory flee, dimmed by the clouds of sin.

XII.

Oh thou that shalt be led
By God's own hand to tread
The courts of heaven, the deep abyss of hell,
And stand in Paradise
While evening airs breathe spice
Over the land where sinless mortals dwell,
Like incense wafted to the sky,
Prayers of the thornless flowers offered to the Most High !

XIII.

Thou little helpless child,
The hosts above have smiled
Upon thy innocent unconscious sleep.

Lo, we rejoice with thee
In fullest symphony,
We sing thee sacred strains pure, true, and deep.
Brothers, upon this infant's ears
Pour forth again the chants sung by the distant spheres.

XIV.

Sweep, sweep your golden chords ;
Each thrilling note affords
A treasured inspiration to his dreams.
Louder the anthem raise,
Swell high the song of praise,
Rivers of music blend your mighty streams.
Soon comes the day when his shall be
A voice of thunderous roll, of magic harmony.

XV.

Creator, to Thy might
Be glory infinite,
All strength, all good and perfect gifts are Thine ;
We render thanks to Thee
Who taught the melody
That swells through all things human and divine.
The depths of space Thy power proclaim ;
Music from world to world for ever bears Thy name !

XVI.

Yet ere the voices die,
There comes a minor cry,
Softly it breaks through the exultant hymn :
" Alas ! his soul shall see
Far through eternity,
But all too soon his earthly sight grows dim ;
Nature shall show her charms no more
For him, until he stands safe on the further shore.

XVII.

“ Yet on his spirit’s sight
Shall flow more perfect light,
And as he prays, so shall it inly shine,
In patience he shall wait
Till at the Palace gate
Once more he shall receive the gift divine ;
Till light, not on the soul alone,
But on the eyes long dark, streams from the rainbow throne.

XVIII.

“ Then knowledge, light, and peace
Shall bid all conflict cease,
And check all violence that mars thy fame,
Though worthier he whose mind
Grows fierce, whose zeal grows blind,
Than he who stands aside without an aim.
Be thou convinced thy cause is right ;
Better mistake thy part than waver in the fight.

XIX.

“ Yet though the clouds of strife
Darken thy prime of life,
The years that see thy greatest work are calm,
Calm as the garden fair,
When, through the evening air,
The first of mortals sent their vesper psalm.
Life’s sun low sinking in the west
Shall give high thought her hour, give after turmoil rest.

XX.

“ Then when thy work is done,
When earthly fights are won,
When all thy visions to the world are told,
Casts cares and faults aside,
And, trusting Him who died,
Enter once more the gates of crystal gold,

And stand among the seraph throng,
Learning of them to sing thy noblest, sweetest song."

XXI.

And now with pearly grey
Dawns the late winter day,
Far from the earth the angel legions fly ;
Yet streaks of golden light
Marking their heavenward flight
Lend added glory to the eastern sky.
The night is fled, the day begun,
The sleeping city wakes, touched by the rising sun.

XXII.

The light of this world's day
Has quenched each golden ray.
Dimmed by three hundred years, the gleam has fled ;
Yet though a dreamless sleep
The poet's body keep,
We say not he is numbered with the dead.
From earthly bounds and trammels free,
A voice upon our lips, he lives immortally.

XXIII.

Soul of the infinite,
Life-giving, holy light,
In whom the Almighty chose to set His throne,
Shine on our later day,
Though ages pass away,
Give thou to each a glory of its own ;
Awake the sleepers, guide the blind,
And lead us when we strive to read our nation's mind.

XXIV.

Voice of the infinite,
Teach us to hear aright
The music blended in

278 *TERCENTENARY OF THE BIRTH OF MILTON.*

As to the poet's ears
The message of the spheres
Was borne through all the jar of civil strife ;
That even so our theme may be,
Discord is overcome, and turned to harmony.

XXV.

For with a sweep sublime
On the broad flood of time,
The years pass on into eternity,
And as the way grows long,
Ever a deeper song
Arises when they join the shoreless sea,
And more of music in the heart
We need to catch the voice of years ere they depart.

XXVI.

But chiefly we would pray
Their help who passed away
From all that dulls the ear or blinds the eye,
Now know the hymns of praise
The seraph minstrels raise,
Who stand for ever round the throne on high,
Who strike with joy their harps of gold,
The power of God their song, a theme that grows not old.

XXVII.

So poet, prophet, sage,
Look on this distant age,
Look on this nation once so dear to thee,
And from thy realms of rest
Pray that their hands be blest
Who bear thy people's lamp of poetry,
Till song resound from shore to shore,
Till death be overthrown, till time shall be no more.

CLARA MICHELL.

EMENDATIONS IN CICERO'S EPISTLES.

A.—CORRUPTIONS CAUSED BY MISREADING (OR WANT OF COMPREHENSION) OF GREEK WORDS.

Ep. 22. 13 = ad Att. 1. 16. 13 :—

Videsne consulatum illum nostrum, quem Curio antea ἀποθέωσιν vocabat, si hic factus erit, †*fabam minum* futurum ?

Read φακῇ μύρον, in the sense that it was 'waste labour,' 'too good a thing.'

Ep. 27. 9 = ad Att. 2. 1. 9 :—

Accusavit Nasicam inhoneste, †*ac modeste tamen : dixit ita* ut Rhodi videretur molis potius quam Moloni operam dedisse.

Of course *modeste* is not the word. This difficulty is removed and the joke (such as it is) with *molis* is made clear, if for *ac modesteta* we read *aucmodestata*; i.e. accusavit Nasicam inhoneste : ἀνχμωδέστατα enim dixit, ita ut, &c. His oratory was of a miserably mean and dry kind.

Ep. 37. 3 = ad Att. 2. 12. 3 :—

Tota res etiam nunc fluctuat ; κατ' ὁπώρην τρύξ. Quae si deserit, magis erunt †*iudicata*, quae scribam.

The sense is given by *iam liquata*, but VDICATA arose from ΥΔICTA = ΥΛICTA, i.e. ὑλιστά. My only doubt is whether we should read the simple form or the compound (Δ)ΙΥΔICTA.

Ep. 46. 1 = ad Att. 2. 19. 1 :—

cetera in magnis rebus

has no real sense. At the end of the letter we have *cetera erunt ἐν αἰνυμοῖς*, and Orelli here corrects with *ἐν αἰνυμοῖς* (i.e. *en enigmis*) for *in magnis*. Complete this correction with *cetera ἐν αἰνυμοῖς ἡτοῖς* (a cipher message had been agreed upon).

Ep. 46. 5 :—

Caesar me sibi vult esse legatum. Honestior declinatio haec periculi. Sed ego ~~hoc~~ non repudio. Quid ergo est? Pugnare malo.

I can make no good sense of *hoc non*. Read *sed ego ὅκνον* repudio.

Ep. 53. 5 = ad Q. F. 1. 2. 5 :—

eum praesertim hominem, quem ego et ex suis civibus et ex multis aliis cottidie magis cognosco nobiliorem esse ~~†prope~~ quam civitatem suam.

The error lies, not in *nobiliorem*, but in *prope*, for which read *τρόπος* ('in character' or 'his ways').

The same error occurs in Ep. 66. 3 = ad Q. F. 1. 3. 3 :—

cum enim te desidero, fratrem solum desidero? Ego vero suavitate ~~†prope~~ fratrem prope aequalem, obsequio filium, consilio parentem.

Read suavitate *τρόπον* fratrem prope aequalem, &c.

Ep. 53. 13 = ad Q. F. 1. 2. 13 :—

cetera fuerunt in eadem epistula graviora quam vellem, *ὁρθὰν τὰν νῦν* et *ἄπαξ θανεῖν*. Maiora ista ~~†erunt~~: meae obiurgationes fuerunt amoris plenissimae, quae sunt ~~†nonnulla~~, sed tamen mediocria et parva potius.

Merely to bracket *erunt* is unsatisfactory, nor do I see how *nonnulla* can be good. Read—*Maiora ista. Eorum* meae obiurgationes f. a. plenissimae, quae sunt *ἀνώνυμα*,

sed tamen mediocria, &c., i.e. 'my reproaches—which were very affectionate—dealt with those things to which one can put no name, but of which I can at any rate say that they were no very great things.' The Greek letters ΝΩΝΥΜΑ were read as ΝΩΝΥΛΛΑ (through ΝΩΝΥΛΛΑ).

Ep. 123. 3 = ad Q. F. 2. 8. 3 :—

Habemus hanc philosophiam non ab Hymetto, sed †*ab araxila* (or *araysira*).

Read non ab Hymetto, sed ἀφ' ἀμαξιτροῦ. (= *ex trivio*, and cf. in trivio docere.) There is a jingle in ab Hymetto . . . ἀφ' ἀμαξιτροῦ, which may or may not be original with Cicero. [The final *a* perhaps represents *o* = οῦ.]

Ep. 123 (fin.) = ad Q. F. 2. 8. 3 :—

†Hortus domi est.

Read χόρος. So Ep. 466 (= ad Fam. 9. 4) si *hortum* (read χόρον) in bibliotheca habes, deerit nihil. For proof of the sense cf. Ep. 121. 1 *pascor* bibliotheca. Cicero uses the Greek χόρος as we use the Latin *pabulum*.

Ep. 124. 2 = ad Att. 4. 11. 2 :—

ego mecum praeter Dionysium eduxi neminem, nec metuo tamen ne mihi sermo *desit*: †*abs te opere* delector.

Repeat SIT from *desit*, and for SITABSTEOPERE read *sittabis et opere*, i.e. σιττεύσεις *et opere* delector. These σιττεύσεις are referred to in Ep. 107, 108, 112, where see the corruptions. For *opere* = 'workmanship,' see Ernesti, *Index* 'opus opponitur materiae: die Arbeit daran.'

Ep. 156. 1 = ad Q. F. 3. 7. 1 :—

Romae et maxime . . . et Appia ad Martis mira alluvies.

Between -XIME and ET there fell out XIMAZEI, i.e. χειμάζει. Cicero is in his Greek mood in this letter, and he wrote Romae et maxime χειμάζει et Appia, &c.

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Ep. 186. 3 = ad Att. 5. 3. 3 :—

nostra continentia et diligentia ~~tesse~~ *satis* faciemus *satis*.

I agree that 'latet vocabulum Graecum,' viz. *exetastis*,
i.e. ἐξερασταῖς.

Ep. 252. 1 = ad Att. 6. 1. 1 :—

accepi tuas litteras . . . Iis igitur ~~respondebo~~ : sic enim postulas : nec οἰκονομίαν meam institutam, sed ordinem conservabo tuum.

I think . . . respondebo <non χρύσεια χαλκείων> is far too much to supply. Rather (h)*exes* has fallen out before *res-* (i.e. in -*r exes resp-*), i.e. Iis igitur <ἐξῆς> respondebo . . .

Ep. 268. 3 = ad Att. 6. 4. 3 :—

δέδοικα δὴ, μή τι νοήσῃς.

If νοήσῃς were right, we should require μή τι <οὐ> νοήσῃς ; but nearer, and better in sense, is δέδοικα δὴ, μή τι νοοήσῃς : 'that something has gone wrong.'

Ep. 314. 2 = ad Fam. 16. 8. 2 :—

ego certe singulos eius versus singula ~~teius~~ testimonia puto.

The ἀληθείας of Orelli and *veritatis* of Klotz are too far from the letters. Singula *IVS* represents singula *ΔΙΟC*, i.e. Διὸς testimonia (proverbial of the irrefragable).

Ep. 365. 6 = ad Att. 9. 10. 6 :—

Inde, ut opinor, cum tu ad me quaedam γενικώτερον scripsisses et ego *mihi a te* quaedam significari putassem, &c.

Some support is required for *quaedam*, and we must have the adjective antithetic to γενικώτερον, in the sense of the Latin propria, praecipua. Read . . . et ego *mihi* εἰδικὰ *a te* . . . *ΔΙΚΑ* being lost or unintelligible in *ΜΙΗΙΔΙΚΑ* *ATE*. [My only doubt is whether *a te* should not be omitted.]

Ep. 376. 2 = ad Att. 9. 18. 2 :—

reliqua, o di ! qui comitatus ! quae, ut tu soles dicere, νέκυια, in qua erat fero sceleri.

I think λῆροι is certainly right, but *eros ce leri* = ἥρωες καὶ λῆροι. Caesar is the ἥρωες, the Odysseus among the ἀμειννὰ κάρηνα. The whole business is a sort of play, a Νέκυια, with one star part and the rest of the characters of no account.

Ep. 386. 1 = ad Att. 10. 6. 1 :—

astute nihil sum acturus : fiat in Hispania quidlibet, tamen †*recilet et*.

By all means read your ἰτητέον, but complete the correction with . . . tamen *recta* ἰτητέον. To go *recta* (*via*) is the opposite of *astute*.

Ep. 395. 1 = ad Att. 10. 10. 1 :—

vide quam ad haec ΠΑΡΗΝΙΚΩΣ (ΠΑΡΝΝΙΚΩΣ).

The meaning is certainly neither παροινικῶς nor τυραννικῶς, but perhaps παραινετικῶς is not so near as πραονοικῶς (from πραόνους).

Ep. 397. 2 = ad Att. 10. 12. 2 :—

ΠΑΡΑΟΤΑΕΥΤΕΟΝ igitur, &c.

Cicero prefers to put in Greek the notion of his deception. Read παραγοητευτέον.

Ep. 404. 1 = ad Att. 10. 18. 1 :—

quod ηὐτόκησεν †gaudeam : quod quidem est natum, perimbecillum est.

I hardly think <est quod> gaudeam would lose *est quod* ; and the words are perhaps insufficiently warm in feeling. After *eutocese* an easy word to be lost would be *necesse* (est). [We must not make a 'pure' senarius with quod ηὐτόκησεν <est necesse> gaudeam.]

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Ibid. :—

nam illa Hortensiana omnia †fuere infantia.

For *fuere* read *φλυαρία*, and omit *infantia* as a gloss upon that word: i.e. nam illa H. omnia *φλυαρία*: 'all (turns out to be) rubbish.' [*infantia* is almost certainly a gloss, and not a misreading for, e.g., ἀνα(πέ)φανται.]

Ep. 447 = ad Fam. 14. 22 :—

SVBEEV† nosto die tabellarios nostros exspectamus, qui si venerint, &c.

A wrong division for SVBE EVNOSTO die, &c., i.e. S.V.B.E. εὐνόστῳ die, &c. The day is a favourable one for arriving in port. Cicero is at Brundisium, and is expecting letters from across the water: this is a good day to get them. Cf. the εὐνοστός λιμὴν at Alexandria.

Ep. 466 = ad Fam. 9. 4 :—

Si †hortum in bibliotheca habes, deerit nihil.

Read *χόρον*. Cf. sup. Ep. 123.

Ep. 475. 2 = ad Fam. 9. 20. 2 :—

nos iam †ex artis tantum habemus, ut Verrium tuum et Camillum—qua munditia homines! qua elegantia!—vocare saepius audeamus.

I see no critical probability in *ex<quisitae> artis*. Read nos iam *ἐξιν* artis tantam habemus, &c. Cicero claims to be an 'expert.'

Ep. 436. 3 = ad Att. 11. 25. 3 :—

quod ad te iam pridem de testamento scripsi, apud †*epistolas* velim †*ut possim* adservari.

Perhaps apud *ἐπίστους* velim *ὑποτύπωσιν* adservari. He would like to have an outline (or rather a quietly made copy) of it kept in safe hands.

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Ep. 789. 2 = ad Fam. 10. 3. 2 :—

his de causis mirabiliter faveo dignitati tuae, quam mihi tecum statuo habere †*et esse* communem.

I cannot think that *debere* accounts for the error or is sufficiently strong in meaning. Read quam mihi tecum statuo habere κτῆσιν communem. [κτῆσιν becomes *et est* and this *et esse*.]

Ep. 916. 3 = ad Fam. 10. 24. 3 :—

quod consilium nostrum, etsi quanta sit aviditas hominum non sine causa †*talis* victoriae scio, tamen vobis probari spero.

For *talis* read τελείας (through *telias*).

Ep. 807. 3 = ad Att. 16. 15. 3 :—

quamquam enim †*postea* in praesentia belle iste puer retundit Antonium, tamen exitum expectare debemus.

I do not think that *potest et* would have been thus corrupted, but I would suggest (α)ϕτοσία, i.e. ἀπρωσίq : 'the boy' has made no mistakes so far.

B.—CORRUPTIONS (OR LOSSES) OF LATIN WORDS.

Ep. 12. § 9 = de pet. cons. lib. § 9 :—

quod †*tinianus* umbram suam metuit, hic ne leges quidem.

Read quod *ille lanius*, &c.

Ep. 16. 1 = ad Fam. 5. 6. 1 :—

non satis credidi homini prudenti tam valde esse mutatam voluntatem †*tuam*.

Read *totam*.

Ep. 19. 2 = ad Att. 1. 13. 2 :—

a quo nihil speres boni rei publicae, quia non vult; nihil *speres* (*al. metuas*) mali, quia non audet.

Both words are interpolations. The whole sentence is better without a verb.

Ep. 19. 5 = ad Att. 1. 13. 5 :—

τοποθεσίαν quam postulas Miseni et Puteolorum includam†
orationi meae. A. d. iii. Non Decembr. mendose fuisse animad-
verteram.

We may remove the trouble of the dative *orationi*, of the notion of including a *τοποθεσία* in a speech, and of the awkwardness of the next sentence, by reading *τοποθεσίαν* q. p. M. et P. includam. Orationi meae <adscriptum> a.d. iii. N. D. m. f. animadverteram. Cicero will enclose (with this letter) a sketch of the topography of M. and P. He says he was wrong in attaching the date 'Dec. 3' to his speech.

Ep. 27. 5 = ad Att. 2. 1. 5 :—

Qua de re cum in senatu ageretur, fregi hominem et inconstantiam eius reprehendi, qui Romae tribunatum pl. peteret, cum in Sicilia †aeditilitatem (al. hereditatem) sepe dictilasset (al. hereditasset).

For *se pe di ctitasset* or *se pehere ditasset* read *se praeda ditasset*, and emend the whole with cum in Sicilia <in> aeditilitatem *se praeda ditasset*, 'seeing that it was for the aedileship (and the expense of its shows) that he had enriched himself with plunder in Sicily.'

Ep. 32. 2 = ad Att. 2. 5. 2 :—

videte †civitatem (al. vitam) meam.

The sense is approximately *vilitatem*, but for *vide tecuitatem* read *vide deciduitatem*, i.e. 'see my decline in value' (cf. deciduus).

Ep. 41. 2 = ad Att. 2. 14. 2 :—

Basilicam habeo, non villam, frequentia Formianorum. †Ad quam partem basilicae tribum Aemiliam.

The Formiani belong to the Aemilian tribe. But the Aemilii were famous for their building and rebuilding of

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the Basilica Aemilia at Rome. Read therefore *at quam paratam* basilicae tr. Aemiliam! i.e. 'How addicted the Aemilian tribe is to a basilica!' *paratam* = *aptam*, and either word might be correct, *partem* being for *paratam* or *quamptm* for *quam aptam*.

Ep. 44. 1 = ad Att. 2. 17. 1:—

†Turbatur Sampsicramus.

It is true that *turbat* is the right sense, but whence *turbatur*? For TVRBATVR read TVRBATVI, i.e. *turbat vi* Sampsicramus.

Ep. 57 = ad Att. 3. 2:—

Si †*ruce* (al. *iter*) haberem.

Read si *hic te* haberem [*iter* from *ic te*].

Ep. 102. 2 = ad Q. F. 2. 3. 2:—

qui ut peroravit—nam in eo sane fortis fuit, non est deterritus, dixit omnia atque interdum etiam silentio, †cum auctoritate peregerat†—sed ut peroravit, surrexit Clodius.

I suggest . . . etiam silentio, *quod auctoritate <antis>* per *exegerat*: 'silence, which he had exacted for the time being by his auctoritas.' [*quod* > *quom* > *cum*, and *antis* lost after *-tate*.]

Ep. 109. 5 = ad Fam. 5. 12. 5:—

cuius studium in legendo non erectum Themistocli fuga †reditusque retinetur?

Read . . . *reditusque spe*, the cause of the loss being obvious. Cicero is, of course, glancing at his own case.

Ep. 120. 1 = ad Q. F. 2. 7. 1:—

quod me admones de †*non curantia*, &c.

I think *Urania* is right, but *noucurantia* is from *nuncia-*

urania, i.e. *nuntia Urania*. Urania played this part in the poem.

Ep. 144. 7-8 = ad Att. 14. 16. 7-8 :—

Britannici belli *exitus expectatur*. Constat enim aditus insulae †*miratos* mirificis molibus. Etiam illud iam cognitum est, neque argenti scrupulum esse ullum, &c.

Surely the sense of the whole passage requires Britannici belli *exitus* <*perexiguus*> *expectatur*. Next the alliteration in *miratos mirificis molibus* betrays a poetical quotation—a fact which explains *molibus*. As for *miratos*, I do not think it would be so natural a corruption from *muratos* as from the archaic form used by the poet, viz., *moeratos* mirificis molibus.

Ep. 144. 8 (14) = ad Att. 4. 16. 8. (14) :—

Paulus in medio foro basilicam iam paene †*texerit* isdem antiquis columnis: illam autem †*quam* locavit facit magnificentissimam.

Though the Basilica Aemilia was at the middle of one side of the Forum, this could not be meant by *in medio foro*. Nor would Atticus need to be told where the Bas. Aem. was situated. It is now well known that Paulus was rebuilding and enlarging the Bas., bringing the front out to the Forum on ground formerly occupied by tabernae. Cicero puts it that P. is 'almost' building 'in the middle of the Forum.' But *texerit* is nonsense. Cicero wrote *exserit*, and this 'extension' is faced with the same old columns which once stood further back. After *autem* insert <*partem*>.

Ep. 148 = ad Q. F. 3. 1. 23 :—

. . . cum ad illum scribas, nihil te recordari †*de se de epulis* illis quas in Tusculano eius tu mihi ostendisti.

Anicius is evidently, according to Cicero, a person to be mistrusted. It is not clear for exactly what reason—

apparently some incapacity or indolence. I suggest *de desidiaculis*, i.e. 'those little instances of laziness (or carelessness).'

Ep. 153. 4. = ad Fam. 1. 9. 4 :—

ego me, Lentule, †*initio rerum* atque actionum tuarum non solum meis sed etiam rei publicae restitutum putabam.

How can *rerum* be correct? *Lentule* stands rather baldly; the other faults are set forth in the note. For *ini-* read *mi*, i.e. ego me, *Lentule mi*, and for -ORERVUM read OPERVUM. We then get ego me, Lentule *mi*, *vi operum* atque actionum, &c. [Naturally *inivio* became *initio*.]

Ep. 154. 1 = ad Att. 4. 18. 1 :—

nunc ut opinionem habeas rerum, ferendum est.

With this reading it is no wonder that a lacuna is assumed. But in reality the only fault lies in *rerum*. Read nunc, ut opinionem habeas, *regnum* ferendum est. The *opinio* is not *mea*, but (as often) that of Rome in general. 'If you want to know what is thought, we shall have to put up with an autocrat' (viz. Pompeius).

Ep. 157. 1 = ad Fam. 7. 16. 1 :—

quod in Britannia non nimis φιλοθέωρον te praebuisti, plane non reprehendo: nunc vero in hibernis †*iniectus* mihi videris: itaque te commovere non curas.

usque quaque sapere oportet: id erit telum acerrimum.

For INIECTVS read IIVRECTVS, i.e. *unus iureconsultus*. 'You are, I believe, the one great legal light.' Cicero is constantly twitting Trebatius on this subject. The emendation is proved by Ep. 161 legi tuas litteras, *ex* intellexi te Caesari nostro valde *iure consulto*. Est quod gaudeas te in ista loca venisse ubi viderere. That *unus* was often

and it actually stands (unrecognized) in another passage which I will emend, viz.—

Ep. 299. 5 = ad Att. 7. 8. 5 :—

ex illa autem sententia †*relinquendae urbis movet hominem*, ut puto.

Read . . . *una* r. u. m. h., ut puto, <*ratio*>: 'one consideration only.' [*ratio* lost after puto.]

Ep. 158. 1 = ad Att. 4. 19. 1 :—

quin tu huc advolas et invisis illius nostrae rei publicae germanae †*putavi de nummis* ante comitia tributum uno loco divisim palam, inde absolutum Gabinium; dictaturam †*fruere* (*fluere*) iustitio et omnium rerum licentia. Perspice aequitatem animi mei et †*ludum* et contemptiōem, &c.

Read . . . et invisis i. n. r. p. germanae *putamina*. *Vide* nummos a. c. t. u. l. divisos palam, inde abs. Gabinium; dictaturam *influere* iustitio et o. r. licentia. Perspice a. a. m. et *sudum* et contemptiōem. 'The husks of the genuine republic' explains itself. After the corruption to *putavi de* the ablative *nummis* . . . *divisis* would follow. A dictatorship is 'coming in on the tide.' (*in* lost after -m). *sudum* = 'serenity.'

Ep. 160. 8. = Q. F. 3. 9. 8 :—

Ciceronem et ut rogas amo et ut meretur et debeo. Demitto autem a me, et ut a magistris ne abducam et quod mater Porcia †non discedit, sine qua edacitatem pueri pertimesco.

It is objected that the mother's name was Pomponia, not Porcia, and that *non* is obviously wrong. But *mater* here (as elsewhere) means 'nurse'. Porcia had 'mothered' the boy till now, but she is about to depart. The old editions absurdly give *Pomponia*, as if Quintus would require to be told his own wife's name. For *non* read *Non*. (i.e. *Nonis*), the date of the lady's departure.

Ep. 197. 1 = ad Fam. 8. 3. 1 :—

... tua medius fidius magis quam mea causa cupio. Nam
†*mea*, si fio, forsitan cum †*locupletiore referam*; sed, &c.

I do not see how *mea* (sc. causa) can be tolerated for quod ad meam quidem causam attinet. Caelius means that the office will cost him too much. Read Nam *nimia* ... cum *locupleti onera feram*. [*ni* lost between -*m* and *m*-, and *locupletioneraferam* misread.]

Ep. 200. 5 = ad Att. 5. 11. 5 :—

Sed ego hanc, ut †*singuli* dicunt, ἀνεξίαν in unum annum meditatus sum. Proinde pugna ne, si quid prorogatum sit, turpis inveniar.

I do not think *siculi* a natural conjecture, nor do I find the explanation satisfactory. The reference (in the note) to *rôle* is correct, as *meditatus* shows, and also the allusion (in *turpis*) to failure. I take ἀνεξίαν to be 'want of ἐξίς,' i.e. of practised skill in a certain part. With this interpretation read ... ut *scaeniculi* dicunt.

Ep. 203. 3 = ad Att. 5. 13. 3 :—

de aqua, si curae est, si quid Philippus aget, animadvertes.

The note states the difficulty. Read ... si *cui* curae est.

Ep. 223. 1 = ad Fam. 8. 8. 1 :—

Sempronium eo usque perago, ut Vestorium quoque interponam et illam fabulam narrem, quemadmodum tibi pro beneficio dederit, si quod iniuriis suis† esset, ut Vestorius teneret.

Read, I think, si quod *iniuriis suis <ius>* esset, i.e. 'that if there were any legal right to his own wrong, V. might take advantage of it.' *Quod* requires a noun. The 'legal Romans' would certainly think it a good joke for anyone to treat a legal right as a 'wrong' to some one, or to make a beneficium out of conceding it.

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Ep. 223. 5 = ad Fam. 8. 8. 5 :—

. . . de consularibus provinciis ad senatum referrent, neve quid prius † *ad* ex Kal. Mart. ad senatum referrent.

Surely *ad* = $a^{\bar{d}}$ = *aliud*. [I first thought of $\bar{a}.$ $\bar{d}.$ $\bar{r}.$ ex Kal. Mart., i.e. neve quid prius *alia de re* ex Kal. Mart.; but I do not know whether this abbreviation is allowable.] In the same section qui eorum CCC(LX) iudicibus essent should be qui eorum <in> CCCLX, &c.

Ep. 241. 1 = ad Fam. 15. 14. 1 :—

Sed tamen, quod ab eo egregie diligi sensi, multo amicior ei sum factus. †Itaque quamquam profecerunt litterae tuae, tamen, &c.

The insertion of <*aliquid*> after *quamquam* is good for the sense; but I can see no reason for its omission. Rather read *Idque* for *Itaque*. In the previous sentence *te* has been inserted after *quod*, i.e. quod <*te*> ab eo . . . But it would be more readily lost after *egregie*, and I would insert it there.

Ep. 242. 5 = ad Fam. 8. 6. 5 :—

legem . . . alimentariam, quae iubet *aediles* metiri, iactavit.

Since *metiri* alone is very bald, and the aediles might be taken for granted, I should read quae iubet *edulia* metiri. [Those who metiuntur are rather the vendors.]

Ep. 252. 23 = ad Att. 6. 1. 23 :—

Bene mehercule †*potuit* Lucceius Tusculanum, nisi forte—solet enim—cum suo tibicine.

The question is one of money difficulties and of parting with estates. For *potuit* read *optinuit*. But *tibicine* has nothing to do with a flute-player: it is a 'prop': i.e. L. has done well to keep hold upon his Tusculanum, unless, as usual, he has only done so with the aid of his prop (or

financial supporter; whether a money-lender or not, I do not know).

Ep. 299. 3 = ad Att. 7. 8. 3 :—

sed id [viz. the behaviour of Dolabella] φιλοσοφώτερον διευκρινήσομεν, cum sciemus quantum *quasi* sit in trientis triente.

Should not *quasi* be *causae*? 'How much motive (or justification).'

Ep. 302. 2. (fin.) = ad Fam. 5. 20. 2 :—

Itaque huic loco primum respondeo, me, quamquam iustis de causis rationes referre properavi, tamen te expectaturum fuisse, nisi in provincia relictas rationes pro <re>lati haberem †*quamobrem*.

Read nisi in p. rel. rationes pro relatis haberem *iam ad urbem*, i.e. 'I considered them as already rendered to the capital when once they had been deposited in the province.' The order is correct (not pro relatis iam ad urbem haberem), since the last words are those with the emphasis.

Ep. 336. 1 = ad Att. 8. 5. 1 :—

nam, quod at te non scripseram, postea audiui a tertio miliario †*tum eum isse*

πολλὰ μάτην κεράσσειν ἐς ἡέρα θυμήναντα.

I think *timuisse* weak in itself and unlikely to have been corrupted. Rather *detumuisse*: 'he calmed down' (after much useless fury). [In this letter Pollicem servum a pedibus meis Romam misi contains a little joke on *pollex* (= 'great toe'). This accounts for a *pedibus*. But we should certainly omit *servum*, which was an adscript by somebody who thought an explanation required.]

Ep. 356. 2 = ad Att. 9. 2A. 2 :—

Qui hic potest se gerere non perdit? †Vita, mores, ante facta, ratio suscepti negotii, socii, vires bonorum aut etiam constantia.

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The change to *vetant* makes the last words difficult, an ironical application being overstrained. I do not think *vita* should be ejected, and would get rid of the awkward irony by reading . . . *perdite*? *<Itane> vita*, mores, &c., i.e. 'do his life, character, &c., so suggest?' The verb is easily supplied, and *itane* was easily lost between *-ite* and *vita*.

Ep. 362. 2 = ad Att. 9. 7. 2 :—

pergratumque mihi tu fecisti; †a quo et diligi me et quid rectum sit intellegi scio.

The lost words before *a quo* need not be so many as those supplied by Lehmann. Rather *pergratumque mihi tu fecisti* *<apud eum>*, *a quo*, &c.: 'you have done me a great service with him.'

Ep. 391. 1 = ad Att. 10. 8A. 1 :—

Sic enim volo te tibi persuadere, mihi neminem esse cariorum te excepto Caesare meo, meque illud una iudicare, Caesarem maxime in suis M. Ciceronem reponere.

Remove the abruptness by reading *Caesarem <enim> maxime*, &c.

Ep. 403. 1 = ad Att. 10. 17. 1 :—

Pridie Idus Hortensius ad me venit scripta epistula. †Vellem cetera eius. Quam in me incredibilem ἐκρένειαν!

I think . . . *epistula*. *<Talia>* vellem cetera eius.

Ep. 408. 2 = ad Fam. 8. 17. 2 :—

Proelium exspectatis; quod firmissimum †haec. Vestras copias non novi: &c.

Read *quod firmissimum aeq<uis>*. Vestras, &c. A fight is the strongest course when forces are sufficiently matched. *AEQVISVESTRAS* lost *VIS* and left *AEQ* to be treated as (*h*)acc.

Ep. 472. 7 = ad Fam. 9. 16. 7 :—

Tu autem quod mihi bonam copiam eiures nihil est: tum enim, cum rem habebas, quaesticulus te faciebat attentiores: nunc, cum tam aequo animo bona perdas, †*non eo sis* consilio ut, cum me hospitio recipias, aestimationem te aliquam putes accipere.

Apart from any grammatical question, the sense is the opposite of *non eo sis*. Read . . . *moneo <eo> sis* . . .

Ep. 472. 10 = ad Fam. 9. 16. 10 :—

Itaque puto me praetermissurum. Salis enim satis est, †*sanniorum* (*sannionum*) parum.

Cicero will not buy the villa. Atticus has written to him jocosely, but with a keen eye to business. I should read *salis enim satis est*; *sannio sum* parum, i.e. 'I can joke, but I am not sufficiently a fool (buffoon, or zany) to buy.'

Ep. 799. 1 = ad Att. 16. 11. 1 :—

de Sicca est ut scribis. †*Asta ea aegre me tenui*†. Itaque praestringam sine ulla contumelia Siccae aut Septimiae.

For *ASTAEAAEGRE* read *ASTACTAAGERE*, i.e. *ast acta agere metui*. 'It is an old story,' and Cicero is afraid of being stale. The change to *me tenui* is an adaptation to *aegre*.

C.—SOME GUESSES UPON OTHER PASSAGES.

Ep. 10. 2 = ad Att. 1. 1. 2 :—

†sane facile eum libenter † $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{nunc ceteri} \\ \text{nunciteri} \\ \text{nunctiteri} \end{array} \right\}$ consuli acciderim.

We may keep *acciderim* in the sense 'cut down,' 'cut away,' and conjecture

sine faece eum libenter nunc $\tau\eta\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\varphi$ *consulatu* acciderim.

‘I should unreservedly be glad to cut him out of the way by (letting him get) the consulship for this year.’

Ep. 19. 1 = ad Att. 1. 13. 1:—

accedit eo quod non [est notum], ut quisque in Epirum proficiscitur. Ego enim te arbitror, caesis apud Amaltheam tuam victimis, statim esse ad Sicyonem oppugnandum profectum.

The context, and the same thought elsewhere, point to . . . non est notum <ubi sis>, ut quisque, &c.

Ep. 22. 3 = ad Att. 1. 16. 3:—

Maculosi senatores, nudi equites, tribuni non tam faerati quam,
ut appellantur, aerarii.

I believe that, in the prose speech of Cicero's day, the pronunciation of the *genitive* of nouns in *-ius*, *-ium*, was *-ī*, but the nominative plural of adjectives in *-ius* was *-ii*. The gen. of *aerarium* was *aerari* in ordinary speech, but in publicists' or legal language it retained the older pronunciation *-ii*. Thus *tribuni aerarii* properly = 'tribunes of the aerarium,' and this was the official pronunciation; but outside of official language *aerarii* would be the plural of *aerarius*. Cicero wrote, I think, *tribuni non tam aerarii quam, ut appellantur, aerarii*. This explains the use of *ut appellantur*. He thus means 'tribuni, not so much of the public purse as, true to their name, with no purse at all.'

Ep. 24. 5 = ad Att. 1. 18. 5 :—

habet dicis causa promulgatum illud *†idem de Clodio.*

Perhaps . . . *illud* δημῶδες *Clodi*, i.e. 'this popular antic of Clodius.' The adaptation to *Clodio* would follow the corruption with *de*. [Otherwise il<um> lud<um> δημῶδη.]

Ep. 25. 2 = ad Att. 1. 19. 2 :—

Nam Aedui, fratres nostri, pugnam $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{pueri in alam} \\ \text{puer malam} \end{array} \right\}$ pugnarunt.

I do not think *permalam* would have been thus corrupted.

Perhaps pugnam $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{περὶ Μαλέαν} \\ \text{or ὑπὲρ Μαλέαν} \end{array} \right\}$ pugnarunt.

They have had a very tough fight.

Ep. 30. 21 = ad Q. F. 1. 1. 21 :—

primus lictor

Would *privus* lictor have any likely sense ?

Ep. 34. 1 = ad Att. 2. 7. 1 :—

Orationes autem a me duas postulas, quarum alteram non libebat mihi scribere, †quia abscideram, alteram ne laudarem eum quem non amabam.

Read . . . *quia <aliqua>* abscideram . . . ?

Ep. 107. 1 = ad Att. 4. 4b. 1 :—

Offendes designationem Tyrannionis mirificam in librorum meorum †bibliotheca.

Apart from variants, I do not think it natural to say 'in the library of my books.' Probably διαθέσει, with δια- misunderstood as the well-known compendium for βιβλιο- (cf. 112. 2 Tyrannio mihi libros disposuit.)

Ep. 110. 1 = ad Att. 4. 6. 1 :—

communi †fueris nonne.

Qu. communi *ferris* πνοῇ? i.e. 'you have to go before the wind like everybody else.'

Ep. 123. 2 = ad Q. F. 2. 8. 2 :—

Sic fit, εἰ δ' ἐν αἰῶ ἐξήσας. . . .

I suspect this to be from some play concerning Medea. Cicero elsewhere has allusions to a discussion between Medea and Corinthian women; and it is tolerably certain that the original was not our *Medea* of Euripides. I take

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αἶψα to be Αἶψα, i.e. *Colchis*. Probably διέζησας also should be read. In *numquam enim dicam* ἐὰ πάσας there is probably a reference to excuses or pretences (σκήψεις, προφάσεις), but Cicero will not be so blunt as to use whatever noun stood in the Greek text.

Ep. 126. 2 = ad Fam. 7. 23. 2 :—

Sed tamen erant (sc. Musae) aptius bibliothecae studiisque nostris congruens.

It seems to me that *erat* would never have become *erant* in this sentence. The easiest noun to be supplied in connexion with either *tamen* or *erant apt-* is *anathema*, i.e. ἀνάθημα.

Ep. 127. 1 = ad Fam. 7. 1. 1 :—

neque tamen dubito quin tu ex illo cubiculo ex quo †*tibi Stabianum* perforasti et patefecisti sinum, &c.

What need is there of *tibi*? If we were to read τοῖχος *Stabianum*, we should get the sense 'your wall on the Stabian side,' i.e. looking towards Stabiae. τοῖχος is used in a sense similar to that in connexion with ships, where it is used of the lee-side and the weather-side. *patefacere* (cf. ἀνοίγειν) of opening up a view.

Ep. 142. 1 = ad Q. F. 2. 14. 1 :—

calamo < . . . > et atramento temperato . . . res agetur.

The word <*optimo*> would be more easily lost than <*bono*>, but I suspect that the best word is <εὐτμήτω>. The loss occurred in *calamo* <*eutmeto*> et atramento.

Ep. 155. 4 = ad Q. F. 3. 5. 4 :—

ΑΜΠΩ ΕΙΣ vero ad ea quae ipse ne cogitando quidem consequor, tu, qui omnis isto eloquendi et exprimendi genere superasti, a me petis?

Quintus had asked his brother to supply him, or help him, with passages for his poem. Cicero calls these (I think) 'padding.' The word might be ἀναπληρώσεις.

Ep. 211. 5 = ad Fam. 8. 9. 5 :—

Pompeius tuus aperte Caesarem et provinciam tenere cum exercitu et consulem. Ipse tamen, &c.

A conceivable loss is that in . . . *aperte* <non *feret*> C. et p. t. cum ex. et consulem <esse>.

Ep. 220. 2 = ad Att. 5. 19. 2 :—

Filiolam tuam tibi iam †Romae iucundam esse gaudeo.

One may guess at iam 'Ρωμαί <ζουσαν> i.e. 'now talking Latin.' The little daughter of Atticus is treated as a little Greek.

Ep. 228. 1 = ad Att. 5. 20. 1 :—

Inde in oppidis †*iis* *que erant* mirabiliter accepti Laodiceam . . . venimus.

Since *iis* (better written *is*) is in any case not required, the easiest correction would be . . . in oppidis, *si quae* erant, . . . This does not, of course, doubt their existence, but = quaequae.

Ep. 263. 2 = ad Fam. 2. 12. 2 :—

Diogenes tuus, homo modestus, a me cum Philone Pessinuntem discessit. Iter habebant ad Adiatorigem

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \dagger qua\ omnia \\ quamquam\ omnia \\ quamquam\ nec\ omnia \end{array} \right\}$	nec benigna nec copiosa cognorant.
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Read . . . *quia mecum omnia* . . . [*q** = *quia*, and *necomnia* points to *mecum*]. This reading will account for the following explanation.

Ep. 296. 4 = ad Att. 7. 5. 4:—

De re publica cottidie magis timeo. Non enim boni†, ut putant.

I do not like the change to *putantur*, still less the insertion of *consentiunt*. One may suggest either non enim boni <ita boni> ut putant, or non enim boni <ita consoni> ut putant.

Ep. 318. 1 = ad Att. 7. 20. 1:—

cave enim putes quicquam esse minoris his consulibus: quorum †ego spe audiendi aliquid, &c.

I do not feel that the double genitive is absolutely impossible, but only that it is very unlikely. Though *ego* and *ergo* are often confused, *ergo* does not seem very natural. Perhaps quorum *ex o<re>* spe audiendi, &c.

Ep. 337. 3 = ad Att. 8. 6. 3:—

Spero etiam, quoniam adhuc nihil nobis obfuit, nihil mutasse†
nec legentia hoc quod cum fortiter et diligenter tum etiam mehercule†.
Modo enim audiui quartanam a te decessisse.

Probably a hopeless passage, but, if guessing is permitted, perhaps we may attempt, e.g., Spero . . . nihil mutasse *T. nec Terentiam* <in> hoc, quod cum fortiter et diligenter tum etiam mehercule <celeriter agendum>. Modo enim, &c. *T* = *Tulliam*, and the reference would be to her matrimonial affairs.

Ep. 367. 4 = ad Att. 9. 11. 4:—

post fugam nostram numquam †iam nostrum earum (sc. litterarum) intervallum fuit.

The conjecture *tam longum* is too far from the text. Perhaps *tam νοσερόν*.

Ep. 373. 4 = ad Att. 9. 15. 4:—

Mandata Caesaris ad consules et ad Pompeium, quae rogas. nulla habeo: et descripta †attulit illaestiva.

We can but guess, and my guess is—et descripta ἀττικιστὶ λίαν (ἴσθιν) αἰσχρά, i.e. 'and the proposals which I write out in Attic (so that the tabellarius may not read them) are too disgraceful.' This would refer to some private enclosure or addition not preserved in our letter. Cicero here writes in Greek, as he does elsewhere concerning Philotimus, Terentia, and his domestic affairs. For Greek enclosures mentioned in the letters, but not included in the text, cf. Ep. 173 (= ad Fam. 7. 18) Graeculum tibi misi cautionem chirographi mei. The text is a corruption through *attuliti liā eschra*. [Otherwise et quae scripta attulit L. λίαν αἰσχρά.]

Ep. 398. 5 = ad Att. 10. 12. 5 :—

qua re vi aut clam agendum est, et, si vi, †forte ne cum pestate : clam autem †istis.

A guess is si vi, *Fortuna συμπειστία* : clam autem εἰς τις, i.e. 'if I attempt the former line, Fortune must be persuaded to favour me ; if I adopt the other, I shall have to persuade some individual to help me. The latter course is therefore the easier.'

Ep. 521. 1 = ad Fam. 13. 26. 1 :—

L. Mescinius †ea mecum necessitudine coniunctus est, quod mihi quaestor fuit.

I doubt *ea . . . quod . . .* The relations implied are usually expressed by *πία*.

Ep. 544. 1 = ad Fam. 13. 16. 1 :—

P. Crassum ex omni nobilitate adolescentem dilexi plurimum, et †ex eo cum ab ineunte eius aetate †per me speravissem, tum praeclare existimare coepi *ex his* iudiciis quae de eo feceras cognitis.

The difficulty of *ex eo* will be removed and the other corruptions explained by . . . et *ex eo* <*exitum*> cum ab i.e. aet.

302 *EMENDATIONS IN CICERO'S EPISTLES.*

ὑπερφυῆ speravissem, tum pr. ex. coepi *exisse*, iudiciis, &c., i.e. 'I hoped for a remarkable outcome from him . . . and now I begin to think that his outcome has been brilliant, since . . .'

Ep. 794. 4 = ad Att. 15. 13. 4 :—

de Bruto te nihil scire dicis, sed Selicia venisse M. Scaptium, eumque †*non qua pompa*, ad se tamen clam venturum sciturumque me omnia.

I think APOMPA contains all that could be made of ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, while *nonqu* is the remains of *nunciare*. i.e. eumque *nuntiare* ἀπόρρητα. This gives a point to *tamen* and *clam*. I do not see why Selicia should not be 'the lady in the case' who learns State secrets.

Ep. 395. 3 = ad Att. 10. 10. 3 :—

Temptabo, †*audēam*: nihil properare, missurum ad Caesarem, †*clamabo*. (*clam abibo* Wesenberg).

I would read *temptabo* αὐθάδειαν, nihil properare, m. ad Caesarem; <re> clam abibo. The loss of *re* after *Caesarē* was natural enough.

T. G. TUCKER.

MELBOURNE, June, 1909.

NOTES ON THE ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

IT is too much to say that not a single stone of the original College now survives. There is upstairs in the Library, close to the entrance, the coat-of-arms of Queen Elizabeth carved in stone in bold relief. This stone was set—not over the entrance of the old College, as we might have expected, but—on the south gable of the west front, where the Provost's lodgings were, where Dinely saw and described it in 1692. There is also a fragment of a tile (in my possession) stamped with POL^o, which Sir Thomas Drew, who found it under the site of the Graduates' Memorial Building, considers to have belonged even to the previous monastery.

The first picture of the College is a coloured plan sent to Lord Burghley when the building was either just planned or in progress. Lord Salisbury kindly sent me a facsimile of this; and I had it photographed (of course greatly reduced) for the frontispiece of the second edition of my *Epoch in Irish History*. How far this plan utilized the old monastery, and how far the building was wholly new, we cannot tell. Two facts are certain. The monastery, suppressed by Henry VIII, had fallen into much decay; the steeple over the main entrance, which faced the river, was retained in the new plan, in which it is called a "sea-mark," that is, for vessels coming up the Liffey.

The next plan of the College is that on Speed's map of Dublin (1610), which shows that the plan sent

to Burghley had been really carried out. We now come upon a great interval in the representations of the College, which hitherto I have been unable to bridge over. But our successes in the last few years make me hope that we shall obtain light even on this period. It is not likely that any new building or re-building of the College was undertaken till Strafford's time, when he made it fashionable, and the aristocracy sent their sons there. One great negative fact is of interest and importance. The students prevented Alderman Arthur, who got a lease of the east end of College Green, from building houses upon it, close outside the west wall of the College.¹ There is clear evidence that by the endowments of King James (1615) the College was becoming rich, and there was such an increase of students as to make the original quadrangle insufficient. But the earliest efforts to meet this difficulty were not by new buildings. First of all, Challoner and other friends of the College obtained from the city a grant of the house of correction (bridewell), set up some years before on a site close to Trinity Street (until lately the office of the *Independent*). This was made fit for students, and remained so till 1641. Some years later it became the College of Physicians. Secondly, in Robert Ussher's and Bedell's time, students whose parents lived in Dublin got leave to reside with them—a great novelty in those days, and one that led to considerable troubles. Thirdly, when the pressure was still increasing, the Lords Justices Cork and Loftus (1629) seized two Roman Catholic religious houses, established in spite of the Lord Deputy's proclamation. One was called St. Stephen's Hall, between Cook Street and Bridgefoot Street; the other Kildare Hall, in Back Lane. The sites of both are still easily to be identified.² The policy of these acts is plain. The increase

¹ *Epoch*, pp. 201 sq.

² *Epoch*, pp. 213-15.

of students was to be met by establishing various halls outside the College. Probably it was expected that pious founders would either endow them or build new houses, and have them raised to the rank of Colleges in the University. This policy was reversed by Strafford, who encouraged the previous owners of the halls to recover their property from the College. These owners professed to have only leased them to the religious orders. On the other hand, he made good this loss by subscribing money, and making others subscribe, to build additional chambers inside the College. Hence the earliest extensions beyond the original grant were 1636-40. We know that they reached north and north-west, for the brass commemorating Baker's benevolence (1640) was seen on his building by Dinely. This brass is preserved in the Library. But we have no picture or plan of these early additions for a generation to come. During the Cromwellian times another brass tells us that Henry Jones (Vice-Chancellor), brother of Colonel Michael Jones, adorned the then Library with windows, benches, and stairs (probably the stairs leading up from the west end of the present Library to the gallery, transferred from the older building). But there was no large influx of students during these troubled times. With the Restoration and the Act of Settlement, securing the College in all its possessions, its prosperity was renewed. During the reign of Charles II, particularly through the enlightened policy of the great Duke of Ormond, Dublin city rapidly exceeded its old bounds; many enlightened French settlers brought new industries; and the College was not slow to profit by these wholesome changes. Subscriptions for new buildings appear again in the List of Benefactions about 1680; and after the harsh treatment and intended plunder by James II, these benevolences increase rapidly towards the close of the century.

The recently recovered sketch by Dinely shows these

enlargements in progress. In addition to Baker's and other additions dating from before 1641, we see the new west front partly erected from its north end. We have large subscriptions for a new and larger Hall in the last decade of the century. This Hall, which was on the site of the former Hall, formed with the Chapel the north side of the original quadrangle. The Chapel was also rebuilt on a larger scale, and consecrated in 1685.¹ We may assume that the west front, which appears as one of the illustrations round Brooking's map of Dublin (1728), was finished in the earliest years of the century. It was built of brick, and shows a style very like the present Kilmainham Hospital, which was then about twenty years old, and was said to be from a design by Wren. There were also three sides of a new quadrangle called Library Square, in the same style, most of which was intact up to twenty years ago, when the east side was refaced with new bricks and bedizened with silly gables, and the north side taken down to be replaced by the Graduates' Memorial Building. The west side of the Library Square ran so close alongside the east line of the original quadrangle that we cannot but infer the intention of removing the old building was already there. But the Provost's lodgings and the Library occupied the south side of this quadrangle, the Hall and Chapel the north side. The removing of these and replacing them with dignified successors was a grave matter, and not lightly to be undertaken. Seeing that they lasted till after 1761, when they must have seemed very much in the way, we may also allow for some *pietas* toward the cradle of the now splendid College. The commencement was made with the Library. I suppose the three sides of the New Square which afforded lodgings were last finished, and in brick; for I find in Rocque's

¹ Cf. Stubbs's account of Provost Marsh in his "History," pp. 116, 117.

map (1757) that the western (or front) square is already called the Old Square. The extravagantly bold design of filling the fourth side with a Library building in stone, and of such vast proportions that all the books the College possessed would not fill one-tenth of it, must have been growing for some years. We do not know who was the moving spirit of it in the College. There may have been complaints that the great Ussher Library, taken from Cork House, where Cromwell had designed to make it a public library for the city, and given by the Duke of Ormond's advice to the College, was badly housed, and useless in the old Library. The second Duke of Ormond, also a magnificent person, now Chancellor, may have suggested it. At all events the foundation-stone was laid in 1709, and the architect was Thomas Burgh, who had come over with King William, and who was the government architect of that day in Ireland.

The List of Benefactions (now printed in the supplemental volume of the Calendar) shows that a crowd of people gave money towards new buildings during William III's reign. But it is very hard to make out what buildings were undertaken, and in what order. There is certainly a new Hall subscribed for; but whether this was the rebuilding of the old Hall (which Marsh undertook) or whether it was a new undertaking is not clear. Marsh certainly speaks as if the rebuilding of the old Hall was imminent in 1684. Other donors paid for a new 'bay' of buildings, and apparently to complete a large square in front (west) of the old quadrangle.¹ The whole square

¹ Brooking's map (1728), which gives the brick front, also shows that much of the building only projected in 1692 had been carried out. The curious result was that there were three quadrangles practically one behind the other, though of different sizes—first,

the "old Square," or front Square, on the west, then the original quadrangle, then the new or Library Square. But there were also some buildings on the north side of the original quadrangle which spoilt the symmetry of the College.

seems to have been finished ; but it was not long standing before a new and grander policy began, which caused all these buildings to disappear ; yet after they did, the old quadrangle still survived. The Library Square, built early in the century—probably indeed begun before its opening—was much more lasting, as I have already told.

The reason of the great change in the middle of the eighteenth century is obvious enough. The great Library, first begun in granite, was rising into prominence, and dwarfed the other buildings both in size and quality : for brick was thought lightly of at that period. Then it also happened that the nation undertook a splendid Parliament House over against the College, with massive pillars and pediments, and a dome on the roof (begun in 1724). How could the rapidly rising and now wealthy College be content with a brick front ? It must surely harmonize with Sir William Pearce's great building in College Green. All Ireland—at least the landed class there—was growing rapidly richer. The splendours of Palladian architecture moved the imagination of men. The first classical specimen in Trinity College was the Printing House, erected for the liberal Bishop Stearne. What is important to note regarding this charming little front is that the architect was Richard Cassels. This most able man was building houses for the aristocracy—e.g., Tyrone House in Marlborough Street—and was commonly suspected to be the real designer of the Parliament House, for which Pearce got the credit, and large complementary grants from the House. The suspicion seems to me ill founded, now that we know more of Cassels' work. He made such an impression by his small work (1734) that he was employed (1750) to design the great oak staircase leading up to the Library (the lower story was then an open cloister) and also finish the flat ceiling of the building in large panels (not with elaborate stucco ornaments, as in the staircase). He

had also designed the new Dining Hall and kitchen, which went to replace the older and meaner buildings. This Hall fell as soon as it was finished ; but the bricklayer, not the architect, bore the blame. It was only from a note of the Bursar that Mr. Cassels had made himself responsible for some small repairs, that I came to the knowledge that he was the architect employed by the College. This was of the greatest importance, for there can be no doubt that we have the same ideas and the very same style of decoration in all the great buildings then erected, and appearing in Scalé's plan of 1761.¹ The great front of the College—probably the finest college front in Europe—and the Provost's House (excepting the study added ten years later by another hand) are monuments of an artist whose name never appears in the official records of the College. The exterior of the Provost's House was apparently copied from that of General Wade, which we see in the *Vitruvius Britannicus* ; but the decorations within, and those of the Regent House over the main gate, are unmistakably the design of Cassels. There remained the curved way from No. 1 into the Provost's House and its study, and also the Theatre and the new Chapel, which complete the great Parliament Square as it now stands. The Theatre—a noble specimen of decoration in the Adam style—was designed by Sir William Chambers, and decorated by Stapleton (1787), one of the famous Dublin stucco-workers whom the Georgian Society is now rescuing from most undeserved oblivion. The Chapel, twenty years later, and not consecrated till 1798, shows the return from the ornate

¹ Bernard Scalé was a collaborator with Rocque, and published a fine plan of the College in 1761, of which apparently only a single copy remains. The reason for this plan seems to be this : that on all Rocque's large sheets the College comes at the edge ; and

there is not a single view of the whole building in any one of them. All the sheets put together make an enormous map. So I suppose the College desired a separate and complete plan on one sheet. This is, of course, only my conjecture.

decorations of Stapleton and Thorp to wainscoting and simple walls, with no ornament but rosettes in the ceiling. The name of its architect I have not yet discovered. This curious difficulty in finding out the designers of Dublin buildings arises, as Gandon tells us, from the fashion of the Irish aristocracy "to be their own architects." They drew amateur designs, and got clever workmen to carry them out. We may be sure that even more often they came to an architect with their ideas; and he let them believe that amended ideas or reconstructed plans were still their own. But of all this we shall have more to say in the volumes of the Georgian Society.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

A FRAGMENT FROM ARISTOTLE.

[The following paper contains a sort of *τέμαχος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους δειπνῶν*—a portion of his tract on Memory; and its object is to exhibit this in a form fitting it for comparison with the corresponding work of a modern empirical psychologist. It is assumed that readers will be acquainted with the writings of Professor James Ward, W. James, Stout, Wundt, or Höffding on the subject of Psychology. Anything of importance below not substantially derivable from the *De Memoria* or some other of its author's treatises is enclosed in square brackets.]

MEMORY in full exercise is a mental appearance related vicariously to a past experience as its likeness, present to a person who thereby (sc. through such presentation) recognizes this experience, as past and as his own, or says within himself, 'this experience was formerly mine.'

I.
Memory as
actualized,
or full me-
mory.

Here the essential points are :—

- (a) An appearance present to a subject ;
- (b) implying a past experience, sensible or intellectual ;
- (c) which is thereby recognized by the subject through the likeness: [cf. Wundt's 'assimilation,' to which all recognition is reducible in the end] ;
- (d) as having been his own experience formerly.

In full memory the subject lives (so far as possible) his experience over again. It is a light turned on the path behind him. [One can see

Definition
of memory
as faculty.

words define memory (as distinct from certain of its aspects) biologically or physiologically, or speak, e. g., of the memory of a plant. To borrow a remark of Aristotle's elsewhere, one might as well attribute vision to a mirror or a standing pool. Memory can only be defined psychologically, as it reveals itself to introspection.

Reproduction.

Memory as mere faculty is (452^b10) the existence in the mind of a movement, capable under certain conditions of reviving such appearances. The process whereby these conditions are fulfilled, resulting in the return of the mnemonic appearance, is that of reproduction.

[For Aristotle, memory as mere faculty, e.g. one's faculty of calling up the proof of a certain proposition or the picture of a certain face, prior to exercise resembled what we might compare to a jet of lighting gas turned down very low, but not extinguished. Forgetfulness, if complete, would resemble the same gas turned off altogether.]

II.
Memory
appear-
ances as
distinct
from mere
appear-
ances.

Memory, being necessarily related to a past object or event, is distinct from perception. In perception the object or event is present, and one has an immediate impression of it. In memory it is past and only its 'appearance' survives from the *αἴσθημα*, or original impression, which is a likeness of the object or event. Such appearance is essential for memory, but does not constitute it. In itself the appearance is a product of the presentative (or representative) faculty, and remains a mere presentation, unless accompanied by recognition and by definite or indefinite reference to past time and to one's own experience. Appearances before the mind may be mere appearances: they may or may not be referable to a subject's own past experience. Doubt on his part, or even error, on this point is possible regarding them. It is not uncommon for a man to say to himself in effect: 'Have I had an experience corresponding to this appearance?' and soon it may be that, by a flash of intuition, he remembers;

its connexion with his past becomes plain to him. The appearance is no longer regarded as isolated, but as relative to some experience of his, as its likeness. Or he may remain in doubt about the matter, and conclude by saying to himself, 'perhaps 'tis only fancy.'

Hallucination of memory, too, is possible. As one may fail to recognize in the appearance a real likeness to a past experience, so also one may imagine he remembers something when he does not; which happens when he mistakes a mere appearance for a likeness, and hastily or blindly refers it to his own past. He deceives himself. This form of hallucination was habitual in Antipheron of Oreus.

A general question of great importance and difficulty arises at this point. An appearance as such is the work of imagination, yet this appearance is all that is given as present in memory. Its presence as such is certain; but its evidential value is another matter. Is it the appearance of anything? if so, of what? Some people take appearances as witnesses to future experiences—as presentiments. This is wrong; for, though there may be a science enabling us to predict the future, we cannot hastily admit belief in prophecy. But how can a mere appearance witness any more to the past than to the future? This appearance to the mind may *per se* be a hallucination—the coinage of the fancy—believed, however, by its subject to refer to a past experience of his—one which he fancies he can date as having occurred to him at a particular time. Setting aside such abnormal cases, and turning to what occurs normally, we ask—What are the vouchers by which a mnemonic appearance commends itself as a witness to objective past experience? Its vividness is not enough, as may be inferred from the vividness of hallucinations, dreams, and fever-images.

Hallucination of memory.

III.
How does a present appearance enable us to pick up again and know a past experience?

The
mnemonic
appear-
ance is
a likeness
of some
past ex-
perience,
which it
represents
in its set-
ting of
circum-
stance and
of time.

The first voucher is that it is not a 'mere' appearance, but refers itself, or is thought of in relation, to something in the past, as its likeness. This reference is intuitively perceived. The subject, in virtue of the appearance which bears this character of a likeness, is immediately reminded more or less cogently of something in his own past. Thus the appearance claims recognition as a 'reminder': and on this claim its title to credit as a witness to the past is primarily based.

The next voucher is the manner in which the experience to which the appearance is relative appears before the mind once more in the setting of place and circumstance in which it occurred: its reinstatement, as it were, in an objective environment and order.

The third voucher is the claim of the appearance (when it can make one) to connexion with a definite time past. Now the past is, for empirical psychology, no abstraction—no mere empty time, but a concrete series of events experienced by the subject in a certain order. The appearance may be referred vaguely or definitely to the past. Seen as the likeness of an experience which takes its place in the order and setting of events, and which is referred to a definite time past, the appearance justifies itself psychologically as a memory image. Consciousness is satisfied, and there is no higher court of appeal. When one remembers, one knows that one remembers, for he lives—or seems to live—his past experience through once more. [Verification by repeated experience, however, is sometimes required and often possible; and Aristotle must have relied on this as the ultimate test of correct memory. When we doubt our accuracy in remembering distant things, we revisit their places to test our memories. In the same way, though we cannot revisit the past, we may check our memories of past events by revisiting past scenes, by consulting records, or by comparing our memories with those of others.]

We do not, as a rule, mistake mere appearances for memories, because we can and do check such appearances; just as we do not often mistake mere appearances for percepts, because the appearances of one sense check those of another; e.g., those of sight check those of touch, and so prevent illusions.

Appearances being essential to memory, the power by which we have appearances (viz. imagination, or the presentative and representative power generally) is, so far as they are concerned, the power by which we remember; and, reference of the appearance to a past being essential to memory, the power by which we have mnemonic appearances is, so far as such reference is concerned, also the power by which we distinguish former and latter, or perceive succession, whether in time only, or in space and time. This, too, is the same power by which we perceive motion, including all forms of change. It receives contributions from all the special senses, and is therefore a primary or central power of perception. All memory of sensory experiences is based directly on residual traces in the organism, capable of yielding appearances of these. Memory of intellectual experiences, also, e.g., of mathematical or philosophical theories, depends, though indirectly, on such appearances; because even higher thinking is impossible without sensory aid, if only from the central sense. Were there no appearances involved in higher thinking, its results (even if it could take place and yield results) could not be remembered. Such appearances are, however, involved even here, owing to the nature of such thinking. In geometry, we construct a figure of some magnitude, either on paper, or mentally, in order to theorize; and though the geometrical truth holds independently of this or any particular magnitude, it is on the surviving appearance, the schema of the figure with its magnitude, that memory directly fastens when it preserves and restores the geometrical theorem. So, too, in philosophy :

IV.
The
mnemonic
schema-
tism.

we cannot think of eternal truths without connecting them with time and continuity. The reason is that the objects of higher philosophical thinking are, strictly speaking, theorems—matter of speculation ; we cannot think of them except by ‘contemplating’ them as in time, thus giving them continuity, which we envisage as a line.

Thus all past experiences whatever are remembered by appearances present to the mind ; but, while in the case of past sensory experience the appearance is related directly to the sensible object through the original *αἴσθημα*, in the case of past intellectual experience it is related only indirectly to the object, and directly to the spatial or temporal schema under which the object was envisaged to our thought.

V.
Memory as
faculty—
the psy-
chological
implica-
tions of
reproduc-
tion.

Memory
in simplest
form.

Recur-
rence of
appear-
ance after
lapse.

Certain characteristics, which, being discoverable only by introspection, are psychological, belong to mnemonic reproduction in general. An experience cannot be remembered till it is past, and then only through an appearance in the mind. This appearance, even when freshest, is but the relic of a sense-impression, which fades more and more with lapse of time. The time elapsed since the occurrence of the impression may be long or short. If it be very short, the appearance that witnesses to the experience may continue adequate to the impression, and so memory may be uninterrupted. Thus there may be memory without reproduction.

If, however, the time elapsed be long, so that other experiences have succeeded, the impression of the former is temporarily eclipsed. The appearance through which it should survive may have become blurred and faint ; but it does not pass away beyond the power of restoration. A root or seed from which the full mnemonic appearance may spring up again abides somehow. The mind is full of such roots or seeds. In general, when reproduction commences, the mnemonic appearance at first only partially coincides with or resembles the original impression. Such

partial coincidence, however, may be sufficient to awaken memory without effort, so that the whole experience may reappear vicariously before the mind unsolicited. The process by which the full appearance is developed is that of mnemonic reproduction.

If there be no coincidence at all, we cannot possibly succeed in remembering. None of the appearances before the mind [whether arising solely from within, or solicited externally, e.g., by examination questions] remind us of anything to the purpose. When this is the case, if we wish to revive the image of the past experience, we must, if it was a sensible impression, undergo it again; if it was a theorem which we learned or excogitated, we must learn or excogitate it once more. There is no other help for it. Such, however, is not mnemonic reproduction. This depends on and requires the existence of a residual something as an inner, i.e. psychic, spring, or point of origination, for the revival of the full appearance of the past impression. If we must have recourse to external aids for this revival, we have totally forgotten. Hence, mnemonic reproduction should not be described merely as the re-instatement of an appearance which had passed from our minds.

Neither the appearances which subserve memory nor, indeed, any mental appearances whatever come before the mind as simple or isolated units. All are complexes, and related to one another in a psychical continuum. There is no such thing for empirical, i.e. scientific, psychology as a *χρόνος ἀναισθητός*—an empty instant of time. We are always having sensory or intellectual experiences—always having appearances—whether we wake or sleep. But, when we theorise about these, we must attend to them severally and separately; and even in having them at first the same is the case, for distinction is the fundamental function of perception, which is itself defined as a *δύναμις κριτική*. It is a function of distinction and comparison; but empirically

Remem-
bering is
distinct
from re-
learning
and re-experi-
encing.

VI.

General
psychical
conditions
of repro-
duction.
The psy-
chical con-
tinuum :
appear-
ances not
simple nor
isolated ;
their order
reflected
from expe-
rience.

distinction comes first. Thus, though the appearances are habitually spoken of as they are attended to, namely as members of a series ($\tau\acute{o}$ ἐφεξῆς), this should not imply belief in any absolute discreteness between the members of such series. All the appearances, and all the 'series,' too, are connected in one psychical tissue, as it were.

In the next place, mnemonic appearances tend to settle into an order corresponding to the temporal or logical order of the objective experiences to which they are related, and to re-emerge into consciousness in the same order. We say 'tend,' for mechanical succession differs from moral or customary succession. The carriages of a railway train if pulled follow one after another mechanically, and in a necessary order; but the mnemonic train is not of this sort. The order which prevails in it, and somehow reflects the order of original experience, while based primarily on the original experience, is dependent also on psychical custom or practice, and holds good for reproduction only in the majority of cases, or as a rule—not necessarily.

The order of succession established among the appearances may be based merely on the chronological succession of the experiences, or it may be determined by an internal nexus, as in logical sequences of ideas, e.g., in concatenations of geometrical theorems.

VII. Modes of reproduction classified according to (a) order of succession; Owing, among other reasons, to the continuity of the psychical tissue, and the tendency of the appearances to settle into an order corresponding somehow to that of the experiences, reproduction is determined in general by the relations of (*a*) succession, (*b*) similarity, (*c*) contrariety, (*d*) contiguity among the experiences remembered.

Presentations which have become latent tend, when they re-emerge, to reappear successively in the order of the corresponding objective occurrences.

When the appearances which corresponded to full and fresh memory have disappeared from consciousness, they

may (unless we have totally forgotten) be revived by a process long or short, easy or difficult, according to the conditions of each case, which are very various. Full memory may involve the re-emergence of a long train of appearances, or only of a single appearance, as sometimes when we remember a proper name. If a long train be involved, the revival of one member of the series may be enough to recall the remainder. This is generally so when the appearances succeed one another in a comparatively simple sequence, according to a firm inner nexus, as in logical or mathematical deductions. But as such successions of experiences are few, so also are the correlative trains of appearances. The successions of ordinary experiences are not so simple, and, as a rule, they involve a considerable element of disorder. Though their correlative appearances participate in this, yet the temporal succession of the latter when they recur corresponds in the main to the temporal succession of the former. The memory train tends to run in the same track and direction as the train of events; a prior when revived tending to awaken a posterior appearance, and so on in the order of events until full memory is reinstated.

Of two appearances which simply represent similar experiences either indifferently tends to revive the other; the reason of which is that the movements involved in either are identical with those involved in the other. Thus the movements involved in the appearance of any one equilateral plane triangle as such are identical with those involved in the appearance of any other. ^{(b) Similarity;}

Of two contrary experiences, the appearance of the one tends to revive that of the other; for contrary experiences to be cognized as such must have been together before the mind, and their appearances being together in consequence, either of these is, as it is. ^{(c) Contrariety;}

Thus one part being given, the other and therefore the whole tend to follow by a process of redintegration.

(d) Conti-
guity.

The term 'contiguity' includes two things which it is scarcely necessary to distinguish by name—contiguity in time and contiguity in space. The latter, of course, finds its psychological expression solely through the former, appearances being for psychology related to one another only in time. The mere contiguity (without any necessary order of succession) of the appearances in the memory series, due to temporal contiguity of the original experiences, accounts for the power which, in some cases, either one of them, on being awakened, has of awakening its neighbour; while, in other cases, the determination of an order in which they tend to do this—the prior awakening the posterior, and not conversely—seems due to some necessity in the order in which the successive events were attended to in the original experience.

[Cf. Wundt (H. and A. Psych., p. 296, E.T.):—'The result of all this is that there are two fundamental forms of connexion between ideational elements: connexion by likeness, and connexion by contiguity': and notice the unjustly disparaging account which the great modern psychologist gives (p. 265) of Aristotle:—'Aristotle had distinguished four kinds of memory in terms of the logical opposites of similarity and contrast, simultaneity and succession, just as he had arranged the fundamental qualities of all natural bodies under the rubrics of the contraries, hot and cold, moist and dry.']

In connexion with the subject of dreaming and other illusions, we may notice the effect of an 'appearance' in actively assimilating given sensory presentations to itself. [Aristotle does not pursue this in his account of memory.]

VIII.
The
memory
of time.

Memory of an experience is not complete unless two general conditions are fulfilled. We must not only recover a full presentation of the experience, but also

come to know how long ago, and when, it took place. These two conditions are not psychologically independent of one another. The full re-envisagement of the experience tends to bring to mind the knowledge of its date; and the knowledge of the date (inasmuch as time for psychology is not an abstraction, but a plenum) tends to the re-envisagement of the experience. The power by which we remember is, as has been stated above, that by which we perceive motion and succession, or lapse of time, generally. But how do we perceive lengths of time past? In a way analogous to that in which we perceive the magnitudes and distances of objects in space. It must be borne in mind here that there is no such thing as perception of absolute magnitude, whether of an object or of its distance. All perception of magnitude is purely and from the outset relative. [Cf. 448^b13 τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου τὸ μέγεθος ὀρᾷ καὶ τὸ τετράπηχυν πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ' οὐ φαίνεται ὅσον, and cf. also the uses of κρίνει, which fundamentally imply this character of relativity attaching to all perception.] All so-called perception of magnitude or distance is due to inference performed with such rapidity that we do not notice it. Seeing an object at a distance in space, we infer its distance from its appearance; so, looking back through the past [memory of visible objects is for Aristotle as for Ribot vision in time], we infer from the given presentation of the object its distance in the time perspective. If an object known to be of great size [Aristotle is assuming an already developed faculty, and an acquired experience] looks very small, we infer that it is very far away. Similarly, if the memory presentation is very faint, we may sometimes infer that the experience took place long ago. To state the matter more in detail. We have in mind a presentation of the object, which presentation we may call *a*, and a knowledge of the object presented, which as known we may call *A*, with its usual size, &c. We have also in mind a presentation of th-

distance of the object, which presentation we will call *b*. We complete the proportion thus:—As the presentation of the object is to the real object known, so is the presentation of its distance to its real distance; or $a : A :: b : B$. We have, in short, a general formula for calculating distance, when given the presentation of a known distant object, and the ratio of such presentation of distance to real distance in general. To illustrate otherwise. The retinal image proceeding from a fly on the window-pane is of the same size no matter what I take it to present; but if I mistake it for the presentation of a black ox, I place this object far off in a field; if I take it for the fly, I place the latter object only a few feet away. Similarly, to determine the size. If an object of distinguishable and known shape but unknown size is placed at a known distance, the presentation of distance, the real distance, and the retinal presentation of the object are given. If the distance is great, I may infer that the object is a dog; if small, that it is a puppy. For I know, roughly of course, that objects vary in apparent size according to the distance at which they are seen; appearing small if the distance is great, great if the distance is small.

Something analogous to this happens in the determination of lengths in the time-perspective. Given the presentation of a certain event, and a knowledge of this event, together with a presentation of its distance in the time-perspective, I may, by applying the general ratio between such presentations and their objective correlates, infer the real length of time past. I can, of course, only infer roughly in this as in the other case—that of magnitude or distance in space. In both the process is intuitive or instinctive, and not one of which we are or need to be distinctly conscious in ordinary experience. The presentation of a past known event contains, in the ratio spoken of, its time mark, as the presentation of the distant known object has, in the analogous ratio, its distance mark. [Into the

minuter characterization of these time and distance marks, or into the question of their origin, Aristotle does not enter. He only states his theory in outline.] The process described is, at all events, that which gives us, so far as memory goes, our knowledge of the dates of past events. Memory is less full and perfect if it does not enable us to say definitely when a thing occurred, e.g., that it occurred the day before yesterday; though we may really remember that the thing occurred, even when unable to assign its date accurately.

All that has been said hitherto is applicable to memory in general, and to reproduction, whether voluntary or non-voluntary. When voluntary, and accompanied by conscious effort, it is named reminiscence or recollection.

IX.
Reminis-
cence
or recol-
lection.

The process of reminiscence is initiated by an act of will. We search for a missing idea, using some starting-point from which to track it up. This starting-point is a reminder, but necessarily imperfect at first; otherwise it would revive full memory at once, and then no feeling of effort would be perceptible, such as usually accompanies reminiscence. The given starting-point must be psychologically related in some way to the appearance we wish to revive; and the general modes of its relationship have been already described, reducing themselves in the last analysis to likeness or contiguity.

If we wish to revive an appearance, and cannot do so at once, we instinctively or deliberately employ artifices suggested by the facts stated in VII, above. We start in search of it from whatever now presents itself to the mind as having been antecedent to or like it, or as having been contiguous with it in thought: the guiding assumption being that the antecedent will excite its consequent, the like will call up its like, the contiguous its neighbour.

Having chosen a starting-point, the process is usually short and simple if this starting-point is something really like, or contrary, or contiguous to what we want. It is not

so if we depend only on the order of succession for our clue. In this case we hunt as it were along a series of interconnected appearances or along various such series, hoping sooner or later to revive the appearance which we look for. The possibility of success ultimately depends, of course, on whether we really remember or have totally forgotten it. [If we remember it, there is a feeling or notion within us that tells us so; we open on a scent which is not utterly cold. This feeling or notion—of the real relationship between the appearance with which we start and the still unrevived and obscure appearance which full memory implies—is one very hard to understand or explain. It is a feeling of anticipation more or less confident, prompting and inviting the effort of recollection. Such feeling is probably induced by the subtle perception or sense of relationship—of resemblance or contiguity—between the present appearance, as yet inadequate to memory, and the appearance which shall restore full memory. We hold one end of the chain, but can only dream, so to speak, as yet about the other.]

Supposing, however, that the requisite inner spring exists, the chief thing is to start from an appearance which is really so related as to form the beginning of a train leading up to where we wish to go. Systems of mnemonics seize on this capital fact, and aim at providing as it were general starting-points—good centres from which to arrive at any station. If we are lucky in our starting-point, this opens up a succession of appearances forming a longer or shorter train which ultimately brings us to the appearance which we desire, and then the experience which we seek to remember presents itself clearly and fully before our minds once more.

X.
Difficulties
in the way
of remi-
niscence.

But difficulties often arise from the fact that in our developed experience, starting from the same initial point or appearance, we may travel in thought in any of several

different directions; and even when we commence by taking a true direction, after we have pursued it for some way, the current of our ideas may be diverted in a false direction by the operation of obscure disturbing influences.

If there were but one path from the starting-point to the goal, the case would be simple. The mind having travelled along this in its original experience would naturally travel along it again in the effort of recollection. But, as has been stated, it often happens that there are many paths, while only one of them is the right path. Besides this, the path that would lead to our goal may not be the most recent of these, or the most frequently travelled. Thus it often happens that though we have chosen the proper starting-point, yet as soon as we leave it to pursue our way to the desired goal, we take a wrong direction, especially if this be one in which the mind has travelled recently or frequently from that point. Frequency generates custom, and custom is a second nature. What we frequently think of we remember with ease and rapidity. Therefore in reckoning our chances of recollection when we proceed from a given starting-point, even though this be a genuine starting-point, we must take account of whether it may not be a long time ago since we took this same path before, and whether we may not have taken this only once, while we have taken other paths frequently and recently from the same point to other goals. Moreover, the unforeseen collateral influences above spoken of may switch off the memory train from its course; thus, we try to remember a name, and approach nearer and nearer to it, when suddenly another name partly like it starts up before the mind, and we either pronounce this other name or blunder upon a compound of both names.

We have seen that reminiscence or recollection differs from memory in implying voluntary effort, but there are other differences. Many persons remember retentively,

(a)
Many
paths.

(b)
Recency
and
frequency.

(c)
Switching
off.

XI.
Differ-
entiae of
reminis-
cence.

yet cannot recall their experiences promptly when they desire to do so. Though their memories are tenacious, they are slow of recollection. Besides these, again, there are two other differences between recollection and memory. Memory is, as it were, the presupposition or basis, and also the culminating point, of recollection. If no memory existed, i.e., no inner spring or point from which to start the process, we could never recollect; and when recollection has succeeded, its result is the reinstatement of full memory. Secondly, while memory, as mere retention, does not necessarily imply the possession of reason, this is not true of reminiscence. Many of the lower animals have memory, but only man possesses the faculty of reminiscence. This is because man alone has reason, which the effort of reminiscence involves. The process of recollection—a process of searching for an appearance, or developing a faint or obscured appearance—is like the process of deliberating on the means of accomplishing a desired end. In the latter case, starting from the idea of the end one gets back by a series of inferences to a knowledge of the conditions which being given this end would be achieved. In the former case, starting from some given appearance, one gets back by an inference, followed by a process of searching, to a memory of objective experiences sufficient to explain the peculiar nature of the appearance which solicited the effort of recollection.

XII.
Memory
and re-
miniscence
involve a
corporeal
process.

The experiences that accompany protracted or unsuccessful attempts at reminiscence are fatiguing, like those accompanying bodily effort. For this, among other reasons, we may conclude that memory and reminiscence have a physical seat in a bodily organ, viz., that of the central sense.

Far as the philosophy of Aristotle is from materialism.¹

¹ If we may still venture to use a term which physical science will soon have rendered obsolete for the purposes of philosophy.

his empirical psychology clothes itself in purely material language. This should surprise no student of Aristotle. Abstraction is indispensable for scientific progress. All departmental sciences must employ it, but philosophy has to guard them against being misled by it while employing it. To it is due the one-sidedness of empirical psychology, with its seemingly final acceptance of the materialistic view of life and mind. This acceptance, is, however, only provisional, and none ever saw more clearly than Aristotle that empirical psychology, with its materialism, must remain an inchoate or imperfect study until completed and corrected as part of a higher system of thought.

JOHN I. BEARE.

NOTES ON THE NINETEEN LARGER DECLAMATIONS ASCRIBED TO QUINTILIAN.

LEHNERT'S edition of the nineteen Quintilianean Declamations (Teubner, 1905), which followed, and to some extent is based upon, the *Handschriftliche Grundlage* of Dessauer (Teubner, 1898), has revived some degree of interest in these almost forgotten exercises of the schools of declamation, dating perhaps from the second, perhaps from the fourth, century A.D.

One point there is in them which makes them more interesting—their difficulty. It is not that the language in which they are written is, in any real sense, unusual or extraordinary; the actual number of strange words or usages is inconsiderable; and we may feel sure that a very marked deviation from classical diction would have prevented their ascription in the MSS. to such a master of style as Quintilian. Rather it is the form and arrangement of the arguments, especially the unnatural requirement at short intervals of a *sententia*, or pointed statement of a general kind, intended to sum up and clinch the declaimer's assertions, so to speak, by an epigram, but in which the epigram is often so obscurely stated as to produce, instead of extra clearness, increased perplexity.

In addition to the two works above mentioned of Dessauer and Lehnert, I have consulted the two Munich dissertations of Hammer (1893) and Becker-Speier (1904). In the present year the literature of the Declamations has been materially enlarged by Reitzenstein's *Studien zu*

Quintilian's Grössen Deklamationen, Strasburg, Trübner, 1909, in which a great number of passages are examined, and in which Reitzenstein has been assisted by two scholars of distinction, Plasberg and Rousselet.

Lehnert bases his text mainly on two MSS., *Bambergensis* M. iv. 13 (B), and *Vossianus*, Lat. quarto 111 (V), each perhaps as early as the tenth century. A Bodleian MS., Selden B. 36, is thought by Dessauer to be of the twelfth century. I have collated this MS. in several of the Declamations; but the exact relation of the numerous MSS. of the work to each other cannot yet be thought to be quite settled, and a lengthy monograph would be required, perhaps, to determine this point adequately. At present the Grundlage of Dessauer seems the most trustworthy authority. It is unfortunate that the premature death of this admirable scholar has left us only imperfectly acquainted with his latest views.

Declam. II. 21 (p. 38, 24 Lehnert):

tarda et trepida sunt officia seruorum.

tepida, which is found in MS. Sorbon. 629, suits the passage better: 'half-hearted,' 'languid.'

II. 23, p. 39, 24 L.:

quanta et dii deaeque pietatis audacia est ire rursus in flammas
BV Seld.

quantae for *quanta et*, a variant of some MSS., *may* be right; but *quanta etenim* may also be suggested.

III. 5, p. 45, 21-23:

The double *neque, sed neque te militaris aetas fefellit . . . neque illa libido fuit saltem uitiis usitata* is in reciprocal connexion, and should be so printed. Lehnert makes *neque illa libido* the beginning of a new and independent clause.

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IV. 2, p. 68, 22 L.:

quin immo hoc quod uos constantiam putatis infirmitas est: quod ad suprema confugio animum meum noui. Nouissima uictae mentis integritas est in mea potestate, breui non habebo nec mortem.

uictae seems to be right against *uitae*. 'Do not suppose that my resolution to die rather than kill my father, as the astrologer says I must if I live on, is any proof of firmness: it is irresolution. In finding a refuge in death, I recognize the prompting of my feelings. The last surviving remnant of sanity in a mind that can no longer hold out is still in my own control: a little while, and death itself will be beyond my grasp.'

IV. 10, p. 77, 7 L.:

Omnis nos hora per tacitos fallentesque cursus applicat fato, et in hac turpissima perpetuitatis cogitatione districti per exigua festinantis aevi momenta praemorimur.

Manil. iv. 16. Nascentes morimur finisque ab origine pendet.

IV. 14, p. 80, 15 L.:

paulatim deinde hoc quod stupemus animus ausus diligenter adtendere in arcana naturae sacro misit ingenio.

The fact that *sacro* is found in both B and V, as well as in Seld., is against the reading of Lehnert *sacrum misit ingenium*, though Firmicus, in a passage in his treatise, *de err. prof. relig.*, in which parts of this declamation are repeated almost verbally, has sic paulatim quod stupebat animus ausus diligenter inquirere et statim in arcana fictarum ac uanarum superstitionum sagax misit ingenium. With Hammer I believe *se* to have fallen out; but I would insert it, not as he does before, but after, *sacro*.

[Reitzenstein, however, follows Lehnert here, p. 36 of his *Studien*.]

Ib., p. 81, 6 :

nuntiantur origo tempestatum lassitudo uentorum, quod sidus immodicos solis ardores, quod serenas minetur hiemes.

The correction *seueras*, though admitted by Forcellini, ought not to hold its ground, since Vergil's *Umida solstitia atque hiemes orate serenas* looks like the original whence the declaimer was borrowing : and *minetur* need not mean more than 'portend.'

IV. 15, p. 81, 20 L. :

atquin in eo.

So Lehnert, following, I suppose, BV. Seld. has *atquin eo*, which points to *atqui in eo*.

IV. 16, p. 82, 21 L. :

†languido iam† uergentis in procliue mundi: hebescentibus tardior membris similis senectae iuuenta pigrescit.

Hammer's conj. *languet iubar* is accepted by Lehnert : but the sense of *iubar* is rather strained, and the letters *oiam* are somewhat remote from *iubar*. I offer *languet* (or *languit*) OS *iam uergentis i. p. mundi* the face of heaven grows milder as it begins to slope downward. So in Manil. iii. 537, *caeli nascentis ab ore*, where see my *Noctes Manilianae*, p. 105, with the similar passages there cited.

Ib. 25 :

natalem monstri mei diem.

This appears to mean 'the birthday of my monstrous existence,' a strange piece of Latin.

V. 2, p. 90, 7 Lehn. :

relaturus uobis iudices ordinem †nam hic† (so BV) malorum meorum euentum.

Lehnert offers *ordine omnem hic m. m. e.* Another view would be that *nam hic* was originally a v. l. for *hic namque*,

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which introduces the comparison of the two brothers nine or ten lines below. This variant, perhaps written in the margin, was shifted from its place to where it now stands in BV and, as I have found on inspection, Seld. Beyond this, conjecture is of course precarious.

V. 3, p. 90, 26 L. :

hunc †serie laudatumque semper,† illum iam quadam miseratione diligerem.

The obelized words look wrong. Possibly *serie laudatum atque semper*, or *serie semperque laudatum*. But the adverb *serie* for *serio* has little authority.

V. 12, p. 98, 28 L. :

hunc primus nascendi locus illum gratiorem †prior fecit infantia.

He is speaking of the special causes which endear one child more than another to their parents. One is loved as being the first-born, another because his years of infancy are more recent. Hence I suggest *propior*, 'nearer,' i.e. than the children born earlier.

V. 14, p. 101, 12 L. :

non fratrem tibi praetuli sed quod in te †fratri praetulissem.

Fratri would be clearer. 'It was not your brother that I preferred to you, but that quality in your brother which, had you possessed it, I should have preferred equally in yourself.'

V. 17, p. 104, 8 L. :

ille ad singulos ardentis corporis motus in sua supra uincla uersatur.

Dessauer would insert *tabe* after *uincla*. This, I think, is wrong : the sense is " shifts his position, and falls down upon his chains."

V. 18, p. 105, 17 L.:

nescio quantum pudori quantum ~~ad~~ficiat adfectibus meis inter tam impares aequata condicio.

Is *adficiat* a misprint for *adiciat*, which Seld. gives rightly?

V. 23, p. 109, 28 L.:

exclamaret alius hoc loco.

Manil. v. 1. Hic alius finisset iter signisque relictis . . . Non ultra struxisset opus.

VI. 4, p. 112, 11 L.:

Inicit errantem corpori manum mulier.

Erranti, drifting to and fro, would be clearer. I do not see why the *hand* should be called *errans*; the body of the dead man would be fitly so described.

VI. 2, p. 112, 20 L.:

Conpara dolorem! quanto minore causa excaecata est! huius iudices ~~poenae~~ ab ipsa morte repetite~~t~~ crimen ego sum. ego et alligavi filium meum et infamaui.

Plasberg has acutely emended *repetite* into *repetitae*. I would complete his emendation by changing *poenae* to *paene*. *Huius* is the wife who wept herself blind in grief for her husband falling into the hands of pirates. She had almost reached death's door,—as the declaimer says, was almost reclaimed from the actual grasp of death (*paene ab ipse morte repetitae*). 'Let her compare our respective causes of sorrow. *Her* grief did not reach death, but stopped short at blindness. *My* grief was to be the real cause of hers. It was I who when arrested by pirates wrote to my wife and son, asking to be ransomed, the result of which was that our son took my place against his mother's wishes, and died in a loathsome dungeon; then

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his body was thrown into the sea, drifted to our coast, and was refused burial by his mother !'

The words *Huius crimen ego sum*, as Plasberg and Reitzenstein agree, are to be constructed together. 'Of her unhappy position, the guilty cause is myself.'

VI. 3, p. 113, 27 L. :

ille amabiliſ infans, ille blandus puer, ille iuuenis etiam ante hoc crimen †piissimus.

Seld. gives *pulsimus*. Could this be *dulcissimus*? The superlative *piissimus*, however, recurs in x. 19, *iuuenis piissime, iuuenis indulgentissime*.

VI. 4, p. 114, 26 L. :

Quicquid †humanarum †ratio ualet contulit.

Perhaps *humana rerum ratio*, 'all that is humanly possible.'

VI. 6, p. 126, 20 L. :

Curua litora et †immensum sideribus fretum.

Remensum Ascensius, *emensum* Schulting. If *immersum sideribus* could mean 'plunged into by the stars,' there would be no lack of palaeographical parallels for the change of *immensum* to *immersum*.

VI. 7, p. 117, 9 L. :

Et sane aduersus prima uerba orbitatis animo aestimantem fefellerunt.

In the 11th section of this declamation (p. 121 Lehn.) we find—nobis uero aduersus exanimem genuit (sc. natura) non solum miserationem. From this I would supply after *aduersus* in VI. 7 not *cadaver*, but *exanimem*. 'And true it was that the first words addressed to the lifeless body by the now childless mother were not such as might naturally be expected.'

VI. 8, p. 117, 27 :

Inanis domi libitina plangitur, derisus dissignator redit,
refertur rogos.

The four first words are a remarkable description of a mock funeral ceremony, accompanied by lamentations, but in which no corpse was forthcoming.

VI. 9, p. 118, 18 L. :

Iam mei miserere †cuius solius†.

So BM ; but the margin of M adds ' uel cuius soles quod melius est.' Lehnert accepts this. I will mention as possible, perhaps not more, my own conjecture, *cuius* [IVS] *solius* [est]. At any rate *solius* seems likely, recalling, as it does, such parallels as *cui soli cuncta impetrare potestas* in Statius, S. II. 1. 228.

VI. 18, p. 127, 17 L. :

saepe de auribus questus sum sonum flagellorum gemitumque
caesorum quamuis implexis obrutae comis acciperent dura metus
sui exempla.

My chief difference here from Lehnert is in placing the omitted relative before *quamuis*, not before *sonum*, as he has done. ' Often I had to complain of my ears, and moan over the noise of scourges and the cries of men under the lash, a sound which [QVEM] *quamuis impl. o. c. acciperent*, all covered as they were with matted locks of hair, they could not but listen to—cruel specimens of their own approaching fate.' *Implexis* of B seems better than *impexis*, ' unkempt,' of the Sorbonianus and several other MSS. V and Seld. have *amplexis*, which points in the same direction. The mood of *acciperent* is determined by *questus sum*.

VI. 19, p. 128, 2 L. :

Eo labore oportet incumbere.

This is the reading of the primary MSS., and should not be altered to *ei labori*, as Lehnert prints.

VIII. 9, p. 154, 4 L. :

Medicina quid praestas nisi ut iuxta te nemo desperet ?

This personification of the art of medicine occurs also in the hexameter poem *Aegritudo Perdicae* 139 (Bährens, P. L. M. v., p. 118), and cf. Declam. XIV. 6, p. 270, 18 L., uideo cur sibi Medicina permittat corporum uitia membrorumque morbos infusis medicaminibus expellere. So in Declam. VIII, p. 165, 24 L., de quibus tu aegris impotissima Medicina mentita es ?

VIII. 10, p. 155, 5 L. :

uidimus igitur frequenter ad uitam post conclamata suprema redeuntes, plerique conualuerunt neglegentiae bono, quosdam explicuit quicquid alios fortassis occideret.

Manilius will recur here to anyone familiar with the *Astronomica*, iv. 71, Ex ipsis quidam elati rediere sepulchris. 73, Ecce leuis perimit morbus grauiorque remittit. Succumbunt artes, rationis uincitur usus. Cura nocet, cessare iuuat, mora saepe malorum Dat causas laeduntque cibi pereuntque uenena.

VIII. 17, p. 161, 4 L. :

rationi sufficit quod aliquando iam facta ex unius hominis inspectione ad totius intellectum naturae medicina profecit.

If the tradition of MSS. is right, the construction would seem to be—facta inspectione ex unius hominis [natura] medicina profecit ad totius intellectum naturae. But this is so awkward as to make the excision of *ex* highly probable.

Ib. p. 161, 19 L. :

non est opus ut exspectes quando super unius hominis patientiam
‡explicit profuturorum magna diuersitas.

Explicitur seems a natural conjecture—'You have no need to wait for the moment when, beyond the patience of any single man, the vast variety of possible remedies shall be unfolded.' *Explicitur*, as one remedy after another comes into view.

IX. 12, p. 177, 24 L. :

uolo, iudices, ommissa omni contentione ‡scilicet hic agere.

I should prefer *si licet*, which is given by V. The apologetic character of *si licet* seems to agree better with *uolo*.

X. 10, p. 197, 20 L. :

habet prinilegium suum mater infelix.

Prinilegium seems here to mean 'prerogative.'

Ib. 23 L. :

uiri forsitan quomodo fortior sexus sit.

Quodam modo would be more usual.

X. 13, p. 199, 24 L. :

fili, indulgentissime adolescens uidi te nec semel uidi. Certum est fixum est eripi non potest, ‡quatenus impius pater et hoc tibi auferre conatur, ut te uenisse non cedam.

Lehnert makes *quatenus* begin a new sentence, but I do not grasp his meaning. In all the other five passages cited in his Index where *quatenus* is followed by an indicative, it means 'since.' One of these, XII. 17, is a close approximation to that before us—*Quid in nos conuertis etiam alienae ciuitatis famem? quatenus nobis computandum est, 'since we must set up a calculation.'*

X. 13, p. 200, 1 L. :

itaque das mater infelix graues nimiumque poenas.

i.e. graues nimiumque graues.

X. 15, p. 207, 19 :

nunc, opinor inquit, arcana mea tenebrae adiuuate ¶me digna.

Two remarks may be made here—(1) *opinor* is to be connected with *inquit*, 'now, I fancy him saying,' not with *nunc*, as Lehnert prints; (2) *me digna* is not, as Dessauer thought, *medica*, a very flat and pointless conjecture, but in all probability *Paeligna*. 'Come, darkness, help my secret rites of Paelignian magic.' Hor. Epod. 17, 60, Quid proderat ditasse Paelignas anus? where Acron notes *ut magicam discerent*,¹ Porphyrio, *quasi canidia dicat se paelignas anus donis ditasse ut ueneficiorum artes se docerent*.

X. 19, p. 202, 1 L. :

mox in ipsam dicitur incubuisse pronus urnam et inter ossa et inter cineres uerba clusisse.

The *magus* whom the father employs to lay his son's spirit, and prevent it from continuing to visit the mother, is here described as bending forward over the urn containing the ashes, and shutting in amid the bones and ashes certain magic words. Does the word *clusisse* imply that the words were *written* on some substance, and so enclosed? or is the meaning of the word satisfied by supposing that the *magus* bends over the urn muttering his magic words into the midst of the bones and ashes? In the second poem of the pseudo-Vergilian Catalepta there is a similar difficulty.

Tau Gallicum min et psin et 'male illi sit!'

Ista omnia ista uerba miscuit fratri.

¹ *discerem* would make better sense.

The substances used by Cimber to poison his brother appear to be combined with *words* of cursing, 'male illi sit!' (as Bücheler writes the passage), and so Conington on Geor. II. 129. In Declam. XIV. 4, 'the Elixir of Hatred' poison is mingled with unholy spells and deadly prayers: which shows that in the magic of that time actual poisons were habitually conjoined with magic formulae and solemn words of execration.

Perhaps the description later on in X., 'the Enchanted Tomb,' (X. 19) *ut ferrum tuum refigas, ut uerba tua resoluas* 'that you should unfasten your iron clamps, loose your magic words,' points rather to the latter interpretation, i.e. the words were not written, but merely muttered into the urn.

X. 16, p. 203, 8 L.:

pessime parentium qui liberos suos sepeliunt flere contenti ut obiter ab rogo siccis oculis reuertantur.

Should not *ita* or *sic* be added before *flere*?

X. 17, p. 204, 3 L.:

donec in alia fata saeculo †pugnante transmigret.

I suggest *purgante*.

XII. 12, p. 228, 13 L.:

Maiores enim nec laedi quidem r. publicam impune uoluerunt †ideoque existimo hoc etiam esse comprehensum.

in eoque, 'and under that formula intended this point to be included as well.'

XIII. 17, p. 262, 18 L.:

inter animalia quae non uerba coniungunt, non uerba rationis inuicem †negant.

regunt Obrecht, which is hardly probable. Far better is Reitzenstein's *non rationes inuicem nectunt*, omitting *uerba*. I had thought of *non uerba rati*.

XIV. 7 fin., p. 271, 22 L. :

Aequiore animo ¶feras ut meretrix uelit adamari.

Feras to my feeling is inappropriate, as the declaimer is addressing a *meretrix*, and after an indignant description of her life and character, would not be likely to appeal to her in support of a statement so adverse to her profession. I would write *feram*, which would suit with the dignity of the occasion.

XIV. 12, p. 275, 18 L. :

Si patior miser illas ¶lupanarium insultationes illa ¶corporalium maledicta conuicia.

(1) The citations from Cyprian and the glosses quoted in the *Archiv für Lateinische Lexicographie*, viii., ix., x., xi., by Dessauer, Wölflin, Sonny, and others make it almost certain that a form *lupana*, = meretrix, existed ; if it did, *lupanarum* in Declam. XIV. 12, which is found in good MSS. where others have *lupanarium*, may = luparum or scortorum. It might be said, indeed, that the *personal* character of the immediately following *corporalium* (whatever the explanation of the word) would agree better with *lupanarum*, if personal, not local, 'houses of ill-fame.' I am, however, inclined to consider the fact that in the preceding sentence, *tum frequenter lupanari deducebat pudor*, *lupanar* is not doubtful, and that *lupanarium* XV. 4, XV. 7, XV. 10, *lupanari* XV. 9, all seem to mean a place, as almost decisive against *lupanarum* = scortorum in XIV. 12.

Coming to the much-disputed *corporalium*, or *corporarium*, for which Gronovius suggested *compotantium*, Becker-Speier *concorporarium* nearly = contubernarium (see B. Speier's *Pseudo-Quintiliana*, p. 84), I think the required word may be *coponarium*, frequenters of wine-shops. Both *cauponarius* and *cauponalia* = tabernaria (fem. nominative, occur in Götz, Thes., p. 192 : the latter would be a possible outcome of a form in *-alis*, *cauponalis*.

XIII. 18, p. 263, 16 :

iam ne alia parte opus tessel gemina frons ceris imponitur.

Read *cesset*, a favourite word with the writer of these Declamations. In the sentence preceding this *parum* is perhaps a mistake for *apum*. The genitive would depend on *ex inchoatis*, 'no part of what the bees have begun.'

XIV. 3, p. 267. 15 L. :

sine enim iudices †pro communium† quae ad corrumpendas expugnandasque mentes excogitant ingenia meretricum, placuit experimentum et in me temptatum est quantum quis amare quantum quis posset odisse.

Lehnert prints his conjecture *pro communibus*, but the ablative for the genitive is not commended by ordinary rules of palæography. I look on *communium* as correct, and suggest that *pro* is an error for *par*, 'an attempt like those ordinarily devised by loose women.' For *par* followed by a genitive the Lexicons supply a good many examples.

XV. 1, p. 277, 13 L. :

alioquin si profecisset remedium et a pristino furore iam liber †animo intellectum sanitatis admitteret.

I suspect *animo* to be a corruption of *animus*, probably through an abbreviatory symbol.

XV. 3, p. 279, 5 L. :

quae prima igitur medicamenti pariter ac dantis integritas est, non †negatura porrexit.

Perhaps *necatura*, with no intention of killing; but I would not deny that the meaning might be: she handed to her needy lover a drug which, if accused of intent to poison, she had no thought of denying, because it had already been found to cure in other cases.

342 NOTES ON QUINTILIAN'S DECLAMATIONS.

Ib. 7 L.:

ne quas admitteret amplius preces, ne querellis adsistentis, ne lacrimis moueretur.

To many readers will recur the well-known passage of Lucretius II. 359, *completque querellis Frondiferum nemus adsistens*, where the same participle *adsistens* is used of a cow that has lost her calf, and takes her stand by some woodland copse, filling the place with her cries.

XV. 4, p. 280, 16 L.:

profer corporis notas in quas se noxiae potionis uagus feruor effuderit, ubi †depasta senectus† uisceribus saeuitura consederit.

One of Reitzenstein's pupils, M. Rousselet, has most ingeniously corrected this into *depastis enectis*. Reitzenstein accepts this, and no one will deny its cleverness. Still, *enectis* seems a rather unusual word for the occasion, since after preying upon and killing the vitals, the potion would have ended its work, and could hardly be described as *saeuitura* any longer.

I suggest that *senectus* is used in an unusual way of the virus *in its decline* in opposition to its *feruor* at the outset.

XV. 8, p. 284, 2 L.:

quicquid non parentum †mirae castigationes.

Lehnert prints *minae*; if *mirae* is the reading of all MSS., *irae* would seem to be the word.

XV. 9, p. 284, 19 L.:

finge te nullum huius adfectus sentire †cruciatu id† amare te pauper saltem non pudet?

Perhaps *cruciatum*; SED *amare te*, p. s. n. p.?

Ib. 24:

quem cotidie poscit ultra rationem in dies demensus.

Burmah conj. quem [cibus]: possibly not *cibus* but *panis* is the word wanting. Or is *demensus* sufficient in

itself to convey this, as, from the frequent distributions of bread at Rome, might well be the case?

At any rate *poscit* seems an error for *pascit*.

XV. 9, p. 285, 1 L.:

aduersus feliciū oscula tantum amplexusque meditans.

Perhaps aduersus [census] feliciū.

Ib. 2 L.:

unde tibi calamitatis huius non potest nec uenia contingere, de uoluptate miser es.

For love is more venial if *cum laetitia*.

XV. 11, p. 286, 21 L.:

The declaimer is passing in review the lamentable results of love as recorded in mythology, e.g. the stories of Myrrha, Narcissus, &c. Then he adds:—

mortalium ferarumque †uultus usque in monstrosa fecunditatis onera perlatos.

Obrecht offered *fetus*, Klotz (accepted by Lehnert) *coitus*, both unlikely on grounds of palæography. *Vultus* may be defended, as he is speaking of monstrous births in which the features of animals are traceable. A well-known passage of Manilius will occur to readers of the *Astronomica*, Man. IV. 101:

permiscet saepe ferarum

Corpora cum membris hominum. non seminis ille

Partus erit. quid enim nobis commune ferisque?

Quisue in portenti noxam peccarit adulter?

Astra nouant formas, caelumque interserit ora.

XV. 14, p. 289, 18 L.:

illud pronuntiationis anceps.

‘The well-known uncertainty of a verdict.’

344 NOTES ON QUINTILIAN'S DECLAMATIONS.

XVI. 2, p. 292, 24 L. :

tali certamine coimus ut si quid accidisset uni, alteri †deberet exemplum.

Probably *deberetur*.

XVI. 3, p. 293, 9 L. :

tam plena confessione laudantur.

‘with such complete acknowledgment.’

Ib. 11 L. :

homines quorum †omni casus fama custodiebat.

Probably *omnis* : whatever happened to the two friends was in the custody of public rumour. *Omnis* is the actual reading of a Leyden MS. (J in Lehnert's edition).

XVI. 6, p. 295, 25 L. :

Dii deaque quam longe est lex quae retinet hominem qui †poenae non uenit.

I think *paene* should be written, ‘who all but remained away.’

XVI. 6, p. 296, 13 L. :

si credimus esse in rebus humanis et alterum adfectum† amicitiae si quam† mihi uidetur natura excogitasse ut coire inuicem possit totum hominum genus.

amicitiae, †QVAM SIC† mihi u. n. e. Besides this tie of relationship, there is another similar feeling, namely friendship, which I hold to be designed by nature to bring all mankind into reciprocal union.

XVI. 8, p. 298, 14 L. :

iam non corporis nexus haerebat nec aliud quam resederant pondere catenae.

This may be compared with the very similar description, v. 19, cum repente miseras manus uelut recidentis amplexus posuit in sinu meo.

The difference is slight—in v. 19 the manacled arms fall back unable to support the weight of their chains ; in xvi. 8 the chains settle down again to their former position. Thus either *residentis* in the former, or *reciderant* in the latter place, would be possible. In such a case it would be interesting to know whether any MSS. support such an alteration ; but Lehnert's *apparatus criticus* is hardly extensive enough to form a conclusive opinion.

XVII. 3, p. 304 :

tandem miseritus mei, miseritus patris, cum de praeteritis prospicerem iurgia tam longa quam uitam, captaui fateor omnem (hominem B, hominis V) occursum, quem mihi uidebar exasperare praesentia, exorare dum morior.

Lehnert here has wrongly followed Dessauer, who inserts *uitaui* after *uitam*. It is tolerably clear that *exorare* depends on *captaui* (as a few lines below *captantis aliquid deprehendere*); 'looking forward from the past to a series of life-long quarrels (with my father), I was eager to beg off, by dying, any possible meeting with him.'

XVII. 6, p. 306, 2 L. :

iam non miror quid sit circa quod in patientia deceptae crudelitatis exaestuât.

Read *inpatientia*, and cf. XVIII. 2, ignoscite inpatientiae quae contra callidissimam dissimulationem libertate doloris exaestuât.

XVII. 7, p. 306, 29 :

uos adhuc in suprema nostra praecipitat auctoritas, †qui filium occidere uocatis plerumque grauitatem.

The connexion of the clauses would be better and grammatically more distinct if *qua* were substituted for *qui*.

346 NOTES ON QUINTILIAN'S DECLAMATIONS.

XVII. 12, p. 311, 17 L.:

uerum de inpatientia mea fatendum est, eadem mente nolui
mori cum abdicares qua non bibi cum iuberet.

inpatientia here seems to mean 'wilfulness.'

XVII. 17, p. 316, 4 L.:

Dum respondere ꝑcogissetis quem et reddere iterum litigare
defendi.

I offer cogis et ISDEM MEMET reddere.

There is no reason for suspecting *reddere*, which should not be altered to *redire*: all that is wanted to make *reddere* intelligible is a dative, which may be found without trouble in *is quem*, a corruption of *isdem*, 'while you forced me to answer to your summons, and show myself to the same people as before.' But the passage is interesting palæographically, as illustrating one of the commonest errors of MSS., the gemination of a letter at the beginning of a new word from the end of the preceding word: COGIS ET thus becoming COGISSET.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON A PASSAGE IN EURIPIDES' HYPsipYLE.

THE fragments of this play recently published by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt have naturally given rise to much comment. In particular, a passage which the editors printed with an emendation of mine has excited Professor Robert (of Halle) to write a long article in *Hermes* about it, defending the text of the papyrus, which contains, in perfectly clear writing, the statement that the Argo brought the twin sons of Hypsipyle to the Colchian land. Here is the passage:—

- ΥΨ. αἰαὶ φυγὰς ἐμέθεν ἄς ἔφυγον,
ὦ τέκνον, εἰ μάθοις, Λήμνου ποντίας
ὅτι πατέρος οὐκ ἔτεμον πολὺν κᾶρα.
- ΕΥ. ἦ γὰρ σ' ἔταξαν πατέρα σὸν κατακτανεῖν ;
- ΥΨ. φόβος ἔχει με τῶν τότε κακῶν· ἰὼ
τέκν', οἶά τε Γοργάδες ἐν λέκτροις
ἔκανον εὐνέτας.
- ΕΥ. σὺ δ' ἐξέκλεψας πῶς πόδ' ὥστε μὴ θανεῖν ;
- ΥΨ. ἄκτὰς βαρυβρόμους ἰκόμαν
ἐπὶ τ' οἶδμα θαλάσσιον, ὀρνίθων
ἐρῆμον κοίταν.
- ΕΥ. κακεῖθεν ἦλθες δεῦρο πῶς ; τίνι στόλῳ ;
- ΥΨ. ναῦται κώπαις
Ναύπλιον εἰς λιμένα ξενικὸν πόρον
ἄγαγόν με δουλοσύναι τ' ἐπέβασαν, ὦ τέκνον,
ἔνθα δὴ ναιων μέλεον ἐμπολάν.
- ΕΥ. οἴμοι κακῶν σῶν.
- ΥΨ. μὴ στέν' ἐπ' εὐτυχίαις.
ἀλλὰ σὺ πῶς ἐτράφης ὅδε τ' ἐν τίνι
χειρί, τέκνον ὦ τέκνον ;
ἔνεπ', ἔνεπε ματρὶ σῇ.

- EY. Ἀργώ με καὶ τόνδ' ἦγαγ' εἰς Κόλχων πόλιν.
 YΨ. ἀπομαστιδίον γ' ἐμῶν στέρνων.
 EY. ἐπεὶ δ' Ἰάσων ἔθαν' ἐμός, μήτηρ, πατήρ,
 YΨ. οἴμοι κακὰ λέγεις, δάκρυνά τ' ὀμμασιν,
 τέκνον, ἐμοῖς δίδως.
 EY. Ὀρφεύς με καὶ τόνδ' ἦγαγ' εἰς Θράκης τόπον.
 YΨ. τίνα πατέρι ποτὲ χάριν ἀθλίῳ
 τιθέμενος; ἔνεπέ μοι, τέκνον.
 EY. μοῦσάν με κιθάρας Ἀσιάδος διδάσκεται.
 > τοῦτον δ' ἐς Ἄρεως ὄπλ' ἐκόσμησεν μάχης.
 YΨ. δι' Αἰγαίου δὲ τίνα πόρον
 0 ἐμόλετ' ἀκτὰν Λημνίαν;
 ° EY. Θόας κομίζει σὸς πατήρ τέκνω δύο.
 ° YΨ. ἦ γὰρ σέσωσται; EY. Βακχίου γε μηχαναῖς.

It struck Prof. v. Wilamowitz first, and then others, that the form of the Argonaut legend here implied must have been wholly different from that in Euripides' *Medea*; and Robert has endeavoured (*Hermes*, XLIV, pp. 376 sq.), with the help of this text, and a picture on an archaic vase, to recover for us this divergent form. But his argument is so full of assumptions which seem to me false, or wild, that I cannot but join in the controversy (however foreign controversy is to my habits) for the sake of common sense.

It seems quite probable that Euripides, with the license assumed by the great tragedians, did not scruple to adopt different versions of the legend in his two plays on the subject. On one point it must have seemed to him necessary. With Hypsipyle at Nemea (even though a slave), he could not bring Jason and Medea to Corinth without violating all probability in keeping Hypsipyle wholly ignorant of her husband's later adventures. She is represented as always thinking of the Argo and its heroes. Had Jason been settled even for a time at Corinth, the ignorance of Hypsipyle expressed in the

text would seem absurd. But there were versions of the legend which brought Jason back to Thessaly. This form of the story did not necessarily get rid of Medea ; nor do I think, with the Germans, that her existence is inconsistent with present fragments. Prof. Robert is very ready to bring in Euripides' delicate psychology when it suits him. Where was there better room for it than here where the sons are giving their mother the briefest account of their own fortunes? Was it not the very duty of affectionate children, who had just found their long-lost mother, to keep silence regarding this other painful adventure—a reticence which seems to me almost implied in the cold, laconic way in which their father's death is mentioned? The statement that the Argo (not their father) brought them home agrees with this in its evasiveness.

But I am not here primarily concerned with the Medea adventure, which may or may not have been consistent with my reconstruction of the story. The wonderful line in the text above cited says that the twin children were brought by the Argo to Colchis. The statement that the Argonauts, going on their wild adventure, should carry away with them from their mother two babies (and, of course, their wet-nurse) in their fifty-oared boat—probably undecked—for no purpose that any critic can suggest, compelled me to doubt the text, and suggest the emendation that the Argo brought them home to Iolkos (ἐς Ἰωλκὸν πόλιν). The similarity in early script between *Iω* and *Ko* seemed to me to offer an easy explanation of the blunder of a scribe, especially as Colchis was so prominent a name in the legend. But this neither my friend v. Wilamowitz nor Prof. Robert will accept. Here is the reconstruction proposed by the latter. Jason, who has formally married Hypsipyle at Lemnos, carries off his twin infants with him in the Argo!!! When he arrives

in Colchis, having no Medea to help him, and having, moreover, offended Athena, who desires to give the glory to Herakles, he is swallowed by the dragon, under her supervision (according to the vase picture). Orpheus, who is on the spot, adopts the babies, and brings them overland (!) to his home in Pieria.

I can imagine no wilder speculation, and will dispose of the picture first. In it Jason, a perfectly limp and dead figure, is represented coming head foremost out of the dragon's mouth, with Athena looking on. I say coming out, because I can conceive no artist representing a man as being swallowed heels foremost. Nor would the artist have taken care to make Jason limp and dead if he were being actually swallowed by the monster. If, therefore, the picture is reasonably interpreted, it means that Jason was saved, not by Medea's wiles, but by the interposition of Athena, who compelled the monster to spit out his prey, and then brought Jason to life again.

At all events, he came back in the Argo with the fleece, and called at Lemnos to see his wife and children. For his marriage to Hypsipyle is conceived as a formal and solemn marriage to a royal princess; and his sons are in no sense *bastards*, as Robert once calls them for the convenience of a bad argument, which I need not here refute. But the Argonauts found Lemnos in a terrible state. During their absence, which need not be conceived as longer than a year, the women had risen and massacred the men. Hypsipyle, who had hidden and saved her father, had only escaped instant death by flying to a lonely shore, where she was taken off by pirates, no one knew whither. Her nurslings were left behind (one legend says in the care of a sister). What adventures the Argonauts had with the Lemnian women, whom they found in this plight, need not here concern us. All we are here told is that they took off Jason's children, and brought them home. After

the lapse of some time, however, Jason died. Then Orpheus, who need not at all be imagined as *flugs zur Stelle* (Robert), finding them without father or mother, adopted them. I should imagine this adoption as taking place when they were growing boys rather than as very little children.

I leave it to any candid reader to judge which reconstruction of the legend is the more probable.

But I must say a word concerning the objections Prof. Robert brings against my view. (1) He thinks it would be an unmotherly proceeding for Hypsipyle to run away, and leave her infants in the lurch. The fear of instant death may serve as an excuse even for a heroine, especially as Statius reports that she put them under the charge of her sister Lycaste before she fled. (2) The great psychologist should have put words of excuse into her mouth when alluding to her flight. I need hardly answer this very subjective suggestion. (3) If the children were still at Lemnos when she fled, how could she tell them of this flight as if it were news? Of course it was news; and she even uses the plural *φυγάς* to imply the various adventures of her flight. All the Lemnian women could know and tell the children was that she had disappeared. (4) Hypsipyle is represented as ever singing about the Argo and the dragon which *guards* the fleece. Hence, neither she nor the chorus is supposed to know the result of the expedition. And why should they? Hypsipyle was carried off into slavery before the return of the Argo; and what she sang were the songs of the day when Jason was with his ship at Lemnos. The present tense merely gives more vividness to the picture. (5) We are told that when Hypsipyle suddenly hears of the Argo having returned to Lemnos and brought away her children, she utters no cry of wonder or triumph, but merely exclaims that, in any case, they were taken from the mother's breast; and

this is called a selfish or unnatural utterance. Here again I will not assume that any of us can tell what Euripides ought to have written. The psychology of the present utterance seems to me quite easy to defend. (6) The line which describes them as nurslings implies that they were infants when the Argo took them off, and therefore took them to Colchis, and not to Iolkos on the Argonauts' return. Why so? How old were they when Jason left the island? Certainly very young: possibly not even born, according to this form of the legend. In any case we need not assume more than a year for the adventure, and so they may well have been nurslings when the Argo returned. But the line would indeed be psychologically wonderful if Hypsipyle meant by this remark to express her feelings at the wanton and useless carrying off of her infants by the Argonauts on a wild and desperate adventure.

I know very well that every reconstruction of the story can only be probable, and that there are difficulties in adopting any version. But when there is a balance of probabilities, I think that Prof. Robert's theory is so much worse than mine that the emendation I have made should be accepted. We shall never agree in our subjective opinions. I take the line telling Hypsipyle, in answer to her question, that the Argo had taken away the boys *as news to Hypsipyle*; Robert takes it as announcing something she already well knew. I take her answer to be: 'And even so, even though to their father's home, yet away from their mother's breast.' Robert: 'And yet they were nurslings at the breast when carried off' (with her consent, and on the wild-geese chase of the Argo to Colchis); and so on through the whole passage.

But let so much suffice.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

THE LATIN WRITERS OF MEDIÆVAL
IRELAND.—SUPPLEMENT.¹

THE present paper is intended as a supplement to the work I published in 1907 (*HERMATHENA*, xiv, pp. 519–29). In compiling it I have derived much assistance from the following articles :—Turner (*Catholic University Bulletin*, Washington, 1907, pp. 382 sq. and 562 sq.); Gougaud (*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, Louvain, 1908, pp. 21 sq. and 255 sq.); Gougaud (*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Jan., 1909, pp. 57 sq.),² and Esposito (*Irish Theol. Quart.*, April, 1909, pp. 181–185).

(A).—WRITERS OMITTED IN PREVIOUS ARTICLE.

1. Vinniaus or Finnian, fl. s. vi or vii, author of the *Poenitentiale Vinniai*, first printed by Wasserschleben (*Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche*, 1851, pp. 108 sq., cf. also p. 10), who attributed it to St. Finnian of Clonard (fl. s. vi–vii). According to Seebass (*Zeits. für Kirchengeschichte*, 4, p. 437), it is more probably the work of St. Finnian of Moville (d. 589); and this view is adopted by Schmitz (*Die Bussbücher*, 1888, p. 498), who has reprinted the tract.

2. Cogitosus, d. c. 670, a monk of Kildare, wrote a *Life of St. Brigid*, published by Colgan (*Acta Sanctorum Hiberniae*, ii, 1647, p. 518) from a MS. in the monastery of St. Amand in Flanders. It is also printed in Migne

¹ This supplement was originally prepared for the 1908 issue of *HERMATHENA*; but, as it could not be published therein, it has been entirely re-written so as to include the most recent work on the subject.

² In this article the Abbé Gougaud has made a number of corrections to my previous paper. As the *Irish Theological Quarterly* is easily procurable, I have not thought it necessary to reproduce them here.

(*Patrol. Lat.*, 72, col. 775). Extracts from it are given by Windisch (*Irische Texte*, i, 1880, p. 39). Cf. also Hardy (*Descriptive Catalogue*, etc., i, 1862, p. 106), and Graves (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1863, viii, p. 269). According to Hardy (*loc. cit.*, p. 108) there is a MS. of this work at Rome, *Bibl. Vallicellan.*, No. xxi., ff. 203-207, saec. ix. Cf. also Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, 1905, p. 256.

3. Laurentius Scottus, fl. s. vii, author of a poem printed by Bartsch (*Zeits. für Roman Philol.*, ii, p. 216) and by Dümmler (*Anzeiger für Kunde der Deutschen Vorzeit*, 26, p. 80). It is found in the *Codex Turicensis* c. 68 of saec. ix-x (*vide* Dümmler, *Poetae*, i, 1881, pp. 164, 631).

4. Cellanus, d. 706, Abbot of Péronne, author of (a) a letter to Aldhelm preserved by William of Malmesbury, and (b) a set of thirty-seven verses found in a MS. at Florence. They have been published by Traube in his valuable paper, *Perrona Scottorum* (*Sitzungsberichte der K. B. Akad. zu München, Phil.-Hist. Classe*, 1900, pp. 469 sq.).

5. Adananus, fl. s. viii, author of the so-called *Scholia Bernensia* on Vergil's *Bucolics* and *Georgics*, preserved in three MSS. The best edition is that of Hagen (*Jahrb. für Class. Philol., Vierter Suppl. Bd., Heft. 5*, 1867). Cf. also Teuffel (*Roman Literature, E. Tr.*, 1900, ii, p. 497). M. D'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. Cel.*, 1900, 21, p. 111) identifies him with the celebrated Adamnan of Hy.

6. Colmanus Scottigena, fl. s. vii-ix, author of thirty-seven hexameters, printed from a MS. in the British Museum by Prof. Kuno Meyer (*Ériu*, 1907, iii, p. 186).

7. Ferdomnach, d. 846, the scribe of the Book of Armagh, author of a piece of verse on fo. 18 r^o of that MS. It has been printed by Stokes (*Tripartite Life of St. Patrick*, 1887, ii, p. 348, cf. also i, p. xc, and Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, 1905, p. 252).

8. Moengal or Marcellus, d. 864, an Irish monk of

St. Gall, is said by Cooper (Appendix A, Suppl., p. 7) to be the author of a Homily preserved in a MS. in the Library of Bremen.

9. Electus Scottigena, travelled on the Continent c. 855-901, author of (*a*) a letter printed by Dümmler (Mon. Germ. Hist., Epistolae vi, 1902, p. 196), and (*b*) three poems published by Traube (Mon. Germ. Hist., Poetae, iii, 1896, p. 690).

10. Aldelmus, fl. c. 896, "Frater Johannis Scotti," author of a short table of Dominical Letters contained on fo. 42 r^o of the Paris MS., Bibl. Nat., 12949 (Cousin, *Fragments de Philosophie du Moyen Age*, 1855, p. 259; Traube, *Neues Archiv*, 1893, 18, p. 104).

11. Dunchat, fl. s. ix, "Pontifex Hiberniensis," teacher in a monastery at Rheims, compiled a long commentary on Martianus Capella, which has not yet been printed. It is preserved in a ninth- or tenth-century MS. in the British Museum and in two later MSS. at Paris. In the course of a visit to London early this year I made a study of this British Museum MS., the results of which, together with a full account of all that is known about Dunchat, will be found in my forthcoming article in the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, Bd. vii, Heft 2.

12. Chilienus, fl. s. ix?, author of a metrical Life of St. Brigid, found in the Monte Cassino MS., No. 283 (saec. x). It was printed by Colgan (*Acta SS. Hib.*, ii, 1647, *Trias Thaum.*, p. 582 sq.) from this MS., a Vatican MS., and a Barberini MS. (Cf. also Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue of British History*, i, 1862, p. 108).

13. Probus, d. 948?, author of the Life of St. Patrick, published by Colgan (*loc. cit. supra*, ii, p. 51 sq.). Cf. also Reeves (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1861, vii, p. 514), Hardy (*loc. cit. supra*, i, p. 66), Stokes (*Tripartite Life*, i, pp. cxxxi, cxxxviii, and ii, p. 676), and Bury (*Life of St. Patrick*, pp. 273 sq.).

14. Thomas de Hibernia, d. 1269–1270, a learned Franciscan, who studied in Italy under Peter de Hibernia (Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, ed. 2, t. iv, 1732, pp. 302, 321). He wrote the *Promptuarium Morale Sacrae Scripturae*, printed “ex MS. Bibliothecae FF. Minorum Araecoeli in Capitolio,” by Lucas Wadding, with the *Moral Concordances of St. Antony of Padua* (4to, Romae, 1624). It has been drawn upon by Neale (*The Moral Concordances of St. Antony of Padua*, 2nd ed., 1867).

15. Thomas Hibernicus, fl. c. 1306, must be carefully distinguished from the preceding. He studied in Paris and became a member of the Sorbonne. About 1306 he took the degree of Bachelor of Theology. He was still alive in 1316 (Quétif et Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, t. i, 1719, pp. 744 sq., Sbaralea, *Suppl. ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci*, 1806, p. 679). He has left the following works:—(a) *Manipulus Florum*, a series of extracts from more than thirty-five different authors, extant in a large number of MSS., among them his own autograph copy, finished in 1306 (Paris, Bibl. Nat., MS. No. 16533, cf. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des MSS.*, etc., ii, 1874, p. 176). During several centuries this work enjoyed a great popularity, and was printed many times (Piacenza, 1483; Venice, c. 1490; Lyons, 1558, 1567; Antwerp, 1568, 1572, 1575; Geneva, 1593, 1622; Paris, 1622; Lyons, 1678). (b) *Tractatus de tribus punctis Christianae Religionis* (Sorbonne MS. 594, dated 1316). It was printed at Lubeck in 1496 (Hain, *Repert. Bibliogr.*, ii, pt. i, 1831, p. 41). (c) *Commendatio Theologica* (Sorbonne MSS. 594 and 1010). (d) *Tractatus de tribus hierarchiis tam angelicis quam ecclesiasticis* (Sorbonne MS. 1010). (e) *De tribus sensibus Sacrae Scripturae*. (f) *In primam et secundam Sententiarum* (MSS. in Sorbonne Library).

16. Malachias Hibernicus, fl. c. 1310, an Irish Franciscan, is the author of a curious book, in sixteen chapters, called

Libellus septem peccatorum mortalium, or *Tractatus de veneno*. It is found in MS. Cotton Vitellius C, xiv, ff. 57-65 (British Museum), and also in several other MSS. It was printed at Paris in 1518 by Henricus Stephanus (4to, 50 pp.). Nothing is known of the author's history (Wadding, *Ann. Min.*, ed. 2, vi, 1733, p. 176; Quétif et Echard, *Script. Ord. Praed.*, i, 1719, p. 742; Sbaralea, *Suppl. ad Script.*, etc., 1806, p. 507).

17. Johannes Clyn, d. c. 1349, a Franciscan friar in the convent at Kilkenny, wrote *Annales Hiberniae* from the earliest times to 1349 (Sbaralea, loc. cit. supra, p. 405). They were published by Butler (*Irish Arch. Soc.*, Dublin, 1849).

18. Marcus Hibernus, fl. s. xiv?, also a Franciscan, compiled a work, *Historiae Hybernicae*, which is said to be found—"Parisiis in Navarr. cod. MS., fol. Membr." (Quétif et Echard, loc. cit. supra, i, p. 743). I have not been able to find any other reference to him.

Besides the authors mentioned above, a number of other mediæval Irishmen are credited with Latin writings, but on such doubtful authority that I have not thought it worth while to include them in the present article.

(B).—ADDITIONS TO PREVIOUS ARTICLE.

1. The history of St. Sechnall has been recently studied by Anscombe (*Ériu*, 1908, iv, p. 74). Cf. also Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, pp. 246, 292.

2. A handy little French translation of St. Patrick's genuine works has been recently published by M. Dottin (Paris, 1908). To the list of probably spurious works of St. Patrick may be added one which appears to have escaped the notice of the biographers of that saint—an account of miracles and marvels in thirty-two hexameter lines printed by Riese (*Anthologia Latina*, i, pt. 2, ed. 2, 1906, p. 269).

9. An excellent general account of St. Columbanus has been given by E. Martin (Saint Colomban, Paris, 1905).

(a) The commentary of St. Columbanus on the Psalms is not an original work, but a translation of the Greek commentary by Theodore of Mopsuestia, as pointed out by Mercati (*Rendiconti della R. Istituto Lombardo*, serie ii, 1896, 29, p. 406).

(b) The *Regula Coenobialis*, and also the *Regula Monachorum*, have been re-edited by Seebass (*Zeits. für Kirchengeschichte*, 1896, 17, p. 215, and 1895, 15, p. 366).

(c) Seebass has also reprinted the *Penitentie* (*loc. cit.*, 1893, 14, p. 480).

(d) As for the *Instructiones sive sermones* attributed to Columbanus, Seebass regards only four of them as genuine. These he has re-edited (*loc. cit.*, 1892, 13, p. 513; 1893, 14, p. 76).

Consult also Seebass (*loc. cit.*, 1886, 8, p. 459; 1897, 18, p. 38; also *Neues Archiv*, 1891, 17, p. 243; 1896, 21, p. 739).

10. Wassersleben has shown (*Die Bussordnungen*, etc., p. 61) that Cumman, author of the *Paschal Epistle*, is a totally different person from Cummean, author of the *Penitentie*, which tract he has reprinted (*loc. cit.*, p. 460, sq.). Zettinger (*Archiv für Kathol. Kirchenrecht*, Dritte Folge, 1902, 6, p. 538) is inclined to attribute this latter work to Cumine, Abbot of Iona (657-669), who could not have written the *Paschal Epistle* (Fowler, *Adamnani Vita S. Columbae*, 1894, p. lxxix).

15. Laidcen or Lathcen has recently been studied by the Abbé Gougaud (*Rev. Cel.*, 1909, 30, p. 37), who thinks that he was probably not the author of the celebrated *Lorica*, which is in some of the MSS. ascribed to a certain Gillas or Gildas. On the other hand, he undoubtedly wrote the "*Egloga de Moralibus Job quas Gregorius fecit*,"

extant in MSS. at St. Petersburg, Karlsruhe, and Munich, and which is shortly to be published by Dr. Holder.

16. There is a complete copy of St. Aileran's *Interpretatio Mystica* preserved in the *Collectaneum* of Sedulius Scottus at Vienna (Cod. Memb. Theol. cix, saec. x). It contains the last thirty-six lines from the place where the St. Gall MS. (No. 433, saec. ix) breaks off. This latter MS. is, however, fuller in other places. The last lines were transcribed from the Vienna MS. by MacDonnell (*Proc. R. I. Acad.*, 1861, vii, p. 369).

17. Tirechan's work on St. Patrick has also been edited by Hogan (*Analecta Bollandiana*, 1883, lli, p. 35; cf. also Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, 1905, p. 248 sq.).

18. Cumine's *Life of St. Columba* has been reprinted in Metcalfe's edition of Pinkerton's *Lives of the Scottish Saints* (vol. i, 1889, pp. 49 sq.). The original MS. from which Mabillon first printed it has disappeared, and no other is now known to exist (but *vide* Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue*, i, p. 166). M. D'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. Celt.*, 12, 1891, p. 284) thinks that this Cumine or Cummeneus Albus cannot have lived before the ninth century, and therefore was not the Abbot of Iona (d. 669) with whom he is usually identified.

19. The text of Muirchu's work on St. Patrick has been discussed by Bury (*HERMATHENA*, 1902, xii, p. 172; also *Life of St. Patrick*, p. 255).

20. (a) The most recent and best edition of Adamnan's *De Locis Sanctis* is that given by Geyer (*Itinera Hierosolymitana*, 1898, pp. 219 sq., ap. *Corp. Script. Eccles. Lat. Vindob.*). The tract has been translated into English by Macpherson (*Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society*, 1889).

(b) Reeves's edition of the *Vita S. Columbae* was reprinted in 1874, with additional notes and an English translation (*Historians of Scotland*, vol. vi).

(c) Adamnan appears to be the author of the *Canones*

Adamnani, printed from two Paris MSS. by Wasserschleben (*Die Bussordnungen, &c.*, 1851, pp. 120 sq.).

Consult also Geyer, Adamnanus Abt von Iona (*Programm, Augsburg, 1895*).

25. The commentary on Isaiah compiled by Joseph Scottus is also found in the St. Gall MS., No. 254 (s. ix), pp. 2-252. In Scherrer's catalogue (*Verzeichniss der Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek von St. Gallen, 1875, p. 95*) it is wrongly attributed to Bede. There was a copy of this work in the ancient monastic library of Corbie (cf. the twelfth-century catalogue of that library published by Becker, *Catalogi Bibliothecarum Antiqui, 1885, p. 185*).

26. (a) Corrections and additions to the edition of Dicuil's astronomical treatise which I published in 1907 will be found in my forthcoming paper in the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, Bd. vii, Heft 2.

(b) The most recent general account of Dicuil's geographical knowledge has been given by Esposito (*Dublin Review*, October 1905, pp. 327-337).

27. (b) The unpublished grammatical tract by Clemens Scottus, *Expositio de Barbarismo et Metaplasmo*, is found in the *Codex Leidensis Vossianus*, No. 33, ff. 159-170 (Keil, *Grammatici Latini*, iii, 1860, pp. 389 sq.).

(c) Clemens was also the author of eighteen elegiac verses printed by Dümmler (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Poetae*, ii, 1884, p. 670), from which it appears that the Emperor Lothaire was his pupil.

29. (a), (b), (c) The nine letters of the different Dungals have been reprinted by Dümmler (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Epistolae*, iv, 1895, p. 568 sq.).

30. A general account of the career of Sedulius Scottus has been given by Pirenne (*Mémoires de l'Acad. de Bruxelles*, 8vo series, 1882, vol. 33, No. 4); and Traube has worked out the history of the so-called "circle of

Sedulius" (Abhl. der K. B. Akad. zu München, 1891, Bd. 19, Philos.-Philol. Classe, Abth. 2, pp. 346 sq.).

On Sedulius' knowledge of Cicero's Epistles consult Mommsen (Hermes, 13, 298).

The Commentariolum in Artem Eutycii is derived from Macrobius and Priscian. There is an excerpt from it in the Codex Monacensis, 6411 (saec. x), with the subscription Theodosius Macrobius (Keil, Halle Ind. Lect., 1875, p. v). MSS. of the entire tract are at Zürich (Cod. C. 99, saec. ix) and Paris (Bibl. Nat., No. 7830, saec. xii, on which see Roger, *Revue de Philologie*, &c., 1906, p. 122).

On Sedulius' unpublished commentary on Donatus, found in the Tours MS., No. 843, ff. 75-101, saec. xiii, consult Thurot (*Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscriptions*, etc., Nouvelle Série, t. vi, 1870, p. 242), and Collon (*Catal. Général des MSS. des Bibl. Publ. de France, Départements*, t. 37, 1900, p. 615). Cf. also *Catalogi MSS. Angl. et Hibern.*, tom. 2, 1697, p. 75.

On the *Proverbia Graecorum* see Dümmler (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Epistolae*, vi, 1902, p. 206).

Traube (loc. cit. supra, p. 348) regards it as certain that the Codex Boernerianus at Dresden was written by Sedulius. It contains the Greek text of the Epistles of St. Paul, with a Latin interlinear version. The Greek psalter of Sedulius has been studied by Berger (*Histoire de la Vulgate*, 1893, p. 411).

A work of Sedulius entitled *Expositio Cathegoriarum* was formerly preserved in the library at Toul. It is now apparently lost.

33. The dedicatory epistles prefixed by Joannes Scottus Eriugena to his translations of Dionysius and Maximus, and to his *Liber De Praedestinatione* have been reprinted by Dümmler (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Epistolae*, v, 1899, p. 630 and vi, 1902, p. 158). His philosophical system developed in the *De Divisione Naturae* has given rise to a vast

amount of discussion in modern times. A catalogue of more than fifty books and articles dealing with it will be found in Baldwin (*Dictionary of Philosophy*, 1905, iii, pt. 1, p. 197), and the list is by no means complete. The following may here be added:—Schmitt, *Zwei unbenutzte Handschriften des Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Progr., Bamberg, 1900); Draeseke, *Johannes Scotus Erigena und dessen Gewährsmänner etc.*, Leipzig, 1902, and also in *Zeits. für Wissen. Theol.*, 1903, 46, p. 563; Whittaker, *Apollonius of Tyana, etc.*, 1906, pp. 123–164; Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*, ed. 2, 1906, pp. 491–496.

The *De Divisione Naturae* has been translated into German by Noack (2 vols., Berlin, 1870–76). No English version of it has yet appeared. There is, however, a manuscript translation of it in two volumes by the late W. Larminie, preserved in the National Library, Dublin.

According to Güterbock (*Zeits. für vergl. Sprachf.*, N. F. 13, p. 103) Joannes Scottus is author of part of the glossary to the books of the Old Testament contained in the *Codex Reginae* 215 (saec. ix) in the Vatican, and also in the *Codex Bernensis* 258 (saec. ix).

A MS. at St. Gall (No. 274, saec. ix) is said to contain a short tract by Joannes on the Categories of Aristotle with their Greek and Latin denominations (Scherrer, *Verzeichniss, etc.*, p. 104).¹

With regard to the Greek scholarship of Joannes Scottus, it may be mentioned that Sandys (*HERMATHENA*, 1903, xii, p. 428) has shown that he was very probably acquainted with a work by so obscure a writer as David the Armenian.

His knowledge of Cicero has been studied by Schwenke (*Philologus*, Suppl. v, 1889, p. 404).

¹ I have recently made a study of this MS. in the Stiftsbibliothek at St. Gall. It does contain a few sentences by Joannes, which I hope to publish before long.

The Florence MS. from which R. Peiper published the Life of Boethius by Joannes has been described with a facsimile by Vitelli and Paoli (*Collezione Fiorentina di Facsimili Paleografici*, 14, Florence, 1884). An Oxford MS., the Codex. Coll. Corp. Christi No. 74, fo. 1 r^o-1 v^o (saec. xi), contains a brief Life of Boethius, which was tentatively attributed to Joannes by Coxe (*Catal. Codd. MSS. qui in Coll. Aul. Oxon. adservantur*, Pars ii, 1852, Coll. Corp. Christi, p. 27). Thanks to the kindness of the Librarian of Corpus Christi College, I have been able to procure photographs of this MS., from which it is evident that this Vita is a totally different work from the one printed by Peiper; and though it may possibly be founded on the latter, there is nothing in the MS. to warrant its attribution to Joannes Scottus. I hope, moreover, to publish it before long.

The important and hitherto unpublished commentary of Joannes Scottus on Martianus Capella, which is found in a ninth-century Paris MS. (No. 12960), and also in part in a MS. at Berlin (cf. Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, 1906, pp. 11, 81), has been studied by Narducci (*Bulletino di Bibliografia e di Storia delle Scienze Matematiche e Fisiche*, t. 15, Rome, 1882, pp. 523 sq.), and by Traube (*Neues Archiv*, 1893, 18, p. 103).

36. The sixteen hexameters by Dubduin were reprinted by Keller in his article on *Irish Illuminated MSS.* (*Eng. Trans. in Ulster Journal of Arch.*, 1860, 8, p. 215), from the St. Gall MS. No. 10. (See also Dümmler, *Neues Archiv*, 1885, 10, p. 341.)

37. The Chronicle of Marianus Scottus was printed in a very mutilated form at Basel in 1559. This edition was reprinted by Pistorius (*Vet. Script. Rerum Germanicarum*, tom. i, Frankfort, 1613), and also by Struvius (tom. i of his edition of Pistorius, 1726). The text is, however, so defective that the first two books must be regarded as still

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unpublished (cf. Hardy, Descriptive Catalogue, ii, 1865, p. 46). Waitz, in editing the third book for the *Monumenta Germaniae* of Pertz, was thus justified in regarding his edition as the *Editio Princeps*.

38. The three astronomical tracts said to be extant under the name of Marianus of Ratisbon in the library there (Houzeau et Lancaster, *Bibliographie de l'Astronomie*, t. i, 1889, p. 1448) are probably nothing more than portions of the work prefixed by Marianus of Fulda to his chronicle.

MARIO ESPOSITO.

ANALECTA VARIA.

PART I.

I.

CODEX Laudianus Latinus No. 86 ; Memb. 4to. This is a valuable MS. in the Bodleian, written in various hands of the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries.¹ The following rhythmical poem occurs on folios 95 v^o-96 r^o, written in a twelfth- or thirteenth-century hand.

[Carmen de Oedipo.]²

- Diri patris infausta pignora, ante ortus dampnati tempora;
 Quia vestra sic iacent corpora, mea dolent introrsus pectora.
 Fessus luctu, confectus senio, gressu tremens labante venio.
 Quam sinistro sim natus genio, nullo capi potest ingenio.
 5 Cur fluxerunt a viro semina, ex quibus me concepit femina ?
 Infernalis me regni numina produxerunt in vitae lumina.
 Si me numquam vidisset oculus, hic in pace vixisset populus.
 Si clausisset haec membra tumulus, hoc malorum non esset
 cumulus.
 Oh in quanto dolore senui ! hanc animam plus iusto tenui.
 10 Viri fortes et nimis strenui quam nefanda vos nocte genui !
 Ab antiqua rerum congerie cum pugnarent rudes materiae,
 Fuit moles huius miseriae ordinata fatorum serie.
 Cum infelix me pater genuit, Tesiphone illud non renuit.
 Alimenta dum mater praebuit, ferrum mihi parare debuit.
 15 Incestavi matris cubilia vibrans ferrum per patris ilia.
 Quis hominum inter tot milia perpetravit unquam similia ?
 Turpis fama Thebani germinis mundi sonat diffusa terminis ;
 Quadrifidi terrarum liminis tangit metas vox nostri criminis.
 Me infami reum luxuria infernalis foedavit furia.

¹ It is fully described by Coxe (Catalogi Codd. MSS. Bibl. Bodleianae, Pars ii, 1858, col. 37).

² The words in brackets are added by myself.

- 20 Si deorum me odit curia, confiteor non est iniuria.
 Me oderunt re vera superi, patentibus hoc signis comperi.
 Necesse est me luctu deteri ; O utinam nil possem fieri !
 Scelus meum dat famae pabula, de me sonat per orbem
 fabula.
 In patente locatum specula refertur meum crimen per saecula.
- 25 Solacio levantur ceteri, consolator me solum praeteri.
 Umbram sontem istius miseri abhorrebunt etiam inferi.
 Nomen meum transcendit Gargara ; me Rodope me norunt
 Hismara ;
 De me Sirtis miratur barbara ; scelus meum abhorrent
 Tartara.
 O quam male servastis filii constitutas vices exilii !
- 30 Caro nitens ad instar lili quid de vobis captem consilii ?
 Si pudore carerent aspera, minus esset sors nostra misera.
 Sed pudenda Thebarum scelera mare clamat tellus et sidera.
 Quod dolore nondum deficio ex innato procedit vitio.
 Gravi demum pressus exitio, mortis horam iam solum sitio.
- 35 Cordis mei vulnus aperui quando mihi oculos erui.
 Supplicium passus quod merui, iure meum regnum deserui.
 Parentelae oblitus celebris, in cisternae me clausi tenebris.
 Instar agens naeniae funebris, in maerore vixi ac tenebris.
 Ibi dignae indulgens domui, meum in vos virus evomui.
- 40 Ut gladium linguam exacui, inprecansque vobis non tacui.
 Quod petebat vox detestabilis, ira complet deorum stabilis.
 Cruciatu est ineffabilis quem patimur, gens miserabilis.

The same poem is found in another Bodleian MS., Cod. Canon. Lat. 37 fol. 59 r^o; but the writing has become so much effaced that no collation is now possible. Cf. also Meier, Catal. Codd. MSS. Bibl. Monast. Einsidlensis, tom. i, 1899, p. 26.

II.

Cod. Canonicianus Latinus, 72, Membr. 4to. This MS., also in the Bodleian, was written in the thirteenth century. On fol. 82 r^o occur :

(a) Versus Scientiarum.

- Philosophia docet inquirere quid sit honestum,
 Quid mare, quid caelum, quid homo, quid terra, quid aer.
 In septem partes sapientia dividit artes,
 Quarum virtutes scire necesse putes.
 5 Grammaticae cura recte loquor absque figura.
 Rectoricae studio verba polire scio.
 Servatrix rerum perhibet dialitica verum.
 Invigiles numeris, sic arithmetica eris.
 Cursus astrorum claudit liber astronomorum.
 10 Terrarum stadia metiri geometria.
 Dat modulos scire musica docta lyrae.

(b) [Versus de septem artibus.]

- Quicquid agant artes ego semper praedico partes.
 Frustra doctores sum cohibere sorores.
 Est mea discendi ratio cum flore loquendi.
 Rerum naturas et earum signo figuras.
 5 Explico per numerum quid sit proportio rerum.
 Invenire leges per me modulamina vocum.
 Astra vias quasi poli varias mihi vendite soli.

(c) In baptismo triplex est uncio; in pectore, ut ratio, quae est in corde doceatur habere distinctionem boni et mali; inter scapulas ut ferat domini iugum suave; in fronte ut habeat memoriam dominicae passionis. Et sic patet et manifestatur ordo tocus baptismi per haec scripta.

III.

Cod. Oxon. Canon. Lat., 37, Membr. folio. This is a MS. of the thirteenth century containing the Satires of Juvenal. Folio. 59 r° contains:

(a) The last twelve lines of Juvenal's Fifteenth Satire, with many interlinear and marginal scholia. The following is a collation of these lines with the edition of Jahn and Bücheler (Berolini, 1886):

Sat. xv, l. 163, rabida ed., rapida MS.; 167 Adsueti ed., Assueti MS.; 168 Nescierint ed., Nescirent MS.; 168 gladios

ed., gladio MS.; 170 occidisse ed., ocidisse MS.; 170 brachia ed., brachia MS.; 173 cunctis ed., cuncti MS.

(b) "Haec sunt nomina Musarum viiii.

Polimia, plurima recordans," etc.

(c) "Virtutes philosophi medias esse dixerunt, et inter plus minusve esse locutas. Verbi gratia quattuor sunt principatus virtutes; iusticia, fortitudo, prudentia, temperantia," etc.

(d) Partly illegible: "Ixion fuit gigas volens concumbere cum Iunone," etc.

(e) A piece of verse in six lines:

"O dives, dives, non omni tempore vives."

Lines 2, 4, and 6 are illegible.

(f) Another piece of poetry in six lines:

"Vinea culta fuit, cultores praemia quaerunt."

Lines 2, 4, and 6 are now illegible. It is identical with the piece printed by Hauréau (*Notices et Extraits des MSS.*, 1878, t. 28, pt. ii., p. 378), and wrongly attributed to Hildebert of Lavardin by Beaugendre.

(g) The poem on Oedipus printed above (No I). Now practically illegible.

IV.

The mediæval Latin versions of the Alexander Romance were carefully studied about fifty years ago by Julius Zacher. In 1859 he published at Königsberg a short tract entitled "*Alexandri Magni iter ad Paradisum.*" This publication has now become so extremely scarce that it is quite impossible to procure a copy of it. My sole knowledge of it is derived from M. Paul Meyer's excellent work (*Alexandre le Grand dans la Littérature Française du Moyen Age*, t. ii, pp. 47-51), published in 1886. Two MSS. were employed by Zacher for his edition—one at Paris (Bibl. Nat., lat. 8519), the other at Wolfenbüttel.

Besides these M. Meyer enumerates five others (loc. cit., pp. 50, 395): at Oxford, Corp. Christi Coll., 82; at Madrid, Bibl. Nat., F. 152; at Auxerre, No. 7; at Cambridge, St. John's Coll., G. 16; and at Pavia, University Library, cxxx D 22. In re-editing the tract I have had the use of two MSS., the Codex Coll. Corp. Christi Oxon., 82, of the twelfth century, which I call A; and the Codex Trin. Coll., Dublin, E. 5, 20 of the fifteenth century, which I designate B. The existence of this latter MS. was apparently quite unknown to M. Meyer. A full description of both these MSS. will be given further on.

As regards the origin of this very curious tract, Zacher and Meyer point out a remarkable similarity to an episode in the Talmud, and Meyer admits the Jewish origin as very probable. This receives confirmation from the Dublin and Pavia MSS., in which the tract is attributed to a certain Salomon, Didascalus Iudaeorum. Concerning this personage I have not been able to obtain any information. The oldest MS. containing the "*Iter ad Paradisum*," the Oxford MS., A, dates from the twelfth century; and M. Meyer thinks the tract must be attributed to the first half of this century. It was drawn upon by Pfaffen Lamprecht and by the compiler of the *Gesta Romanorum* (vide Meyer, loc. cit. pp. 49, 356 sqq.).

The Dublin MS. (B, fol. 9 r^o) commences with the words: *Refert Salomon Didascalus Iudaeorum de Alexandri Magni regis Macedonum profectioe versus Paradisum sequentem historiam Alexander nobili, etc.*

The Oxford MS. (pp. 184-186) begins: *Incipit epistola de itinere Alexandri ad Paradisum.*

1. [Postquam Alexander, Philippi filius, universum orbem praeter Indiam solam suae ditioni subegerat, proposuit ut et ipsam peragraret. Qua tandem nimio labore suae ditioni subacta],¹ nobili et multiformi praeda onustus, se cum suis copiis

¹ Verba in uncinis inclusa sunt omissa in B, et sic infra.

a finibus eius¹ subripiens et compendiosas agens diaetas, proximis fovebatur mansionibus in promunctoriis fluminum mari adiacentium, indulgens quodammodo quieti ad recreandum exercitum suum post multimodae et periculosae fatigationis incommodum. Qui quocumque locorum divertisset bene² atque honorifice suscipiebatur, [omnimodoque famulatu ab universis honorabatur, tum pro sui liberalitate et gratia], tum pro compescenda et evadenda suorum bonorum direptione. Satagebant enim principem beneficiis pervenire ut comites eius benivolos atque pacificos³ experirentur,⁴ quos adversarios et raptores fore arbitrabantur.

2. Hoc ordine devenit ad fluvium latissimum,⁵ in cuius ripa offendit navim amplae magnitudinis⁶ velis et remigiis necnon diversis armamentis omnique compositione instructam⁷ et ad laborem firmissimam. Sciscitatus de nomine fluvii didicit hunc esse Gangem vel⁸ Phison cuius origo est Paradysus voluptatis.⁹ Cernebat etiam arborum folia¹⁰ permaxima tectis domorum supposita, quae per amnis¹¹ decursum effluentia¹² longissimis virgis¹³ attingunt incolae,¹⁴ quaeque sole¹⁵ siccata et in pulverem tusa¹⁶ gustum miri saporis praestant utentibus. Horum omnium seriem edoctus, insuper de creatione et situ loci ait cum suspirio : ‘ nichil profeci in hoc¹⁷ mundo, totius meae¹⁸ ambitionis questum vilipendo, nichil huius voluptatis participium promeruerō.’ Statimque suorum copiis tuto in loco stabilitis, assumpsit quingentos clipeos electae iuventutis acris ingenii¹⁹ totiusque periculi imperterritos et continui laboris exercitio promptissimos,²⁰ dispositisque victualibus ad totius aestatis decursum sufficienter,²¹ conscensa navi se prosperis²² credidit flatibus. Consumpta vero iam²³ mensis unius navigatione nimia cum difficultate contra impetum furentis fluvii; nam ad eius originem, si fas esset, totis animis intenderant praetingere, vires iuvenum, qui se²⁴ invicem cohortantes voluntarie labori ingerebant certatim, ceperunt lassescere. Cumque²⁵ ulterius progrediendi iam²⁶ nulla suppeditaret facultas, nam crebris inundationibus cassati²⁷ fatigabantur, et incredibilis fluctuum sonitus paene

¹ Indorum B. ² benigne B. ³ pacificos et benevolos B. ⁴ invenirent B.
⁵ magnum atque lat. B. ⁶ magnae amplitudinis B. ⁷ constructam B.
⁸ qui et A. ⁹ paradysus vocatur B. ¹⁰ folia arb. B. ¹¹ amnis B. ¹² fluentia B.
¹³ virg. long. B. ¹⁴ incol. atting. ¹⁵ soli B. ¹⁶ tunsa B. ¹⁷ hoc om. B.
¹⁸ que A. ¹⁹ animi B. ²⁰ promptissimos A. ²¹ om. B. ²² prosperis se B.
²³ vero iam om. B. ²⁴ om. B. ²⁵ que om. B. ²⁶ om. B. ²⁷ quassati B.

omnium auditus¹ adeo debilitabat, ut nullus² vocem comparis, nisi altius inclamantis, advertere posset. Tandem die tricesima quarta eminus conspicantur³ quasi aedificium civitatis mirae altitudinis et longitudinis. Quo cum nimia difficultate pervenientes, flumine suos impetus⁴ quodammodo propter litora cohibente, sonitusque fragorem mitius producente, litoris angustia tellusque lutea secus materiam⁵ iter pedestre vetabat.⁶ Quapropter urbis latus, quod absque termino porrigebatur ab aquilone in meridiem,⁷ paene triduo non absque taedio navigavere explorantes sicubi forte pateret aditus ad ingrediendum.

3. Materiae⁸ illius magna erat aequalitas, nullus⁹ turribus seu propugnaculis in giro consurgentibus, sed¹⁰ tota superficies adeo veteri musco erat obducta ut lapidum¹¹ nulla pateret compositio vel iunctura. Tercia vero die perbrevis fenestrellae interius munitae additus apparuit, quem cunctorum intuentium labores et taedia quasi spe magni profectus relevavit.

4. Statimque Alexander nonnullos suorum in scapham deponens, si forte pulsantibus quispiam aperiret,¹² mandata sua incolis¹³ preferenda eis tradidit. Qui ad locum venientes et graviusculè¹⁴ impingentes aditum patefieri clamitabant. Mox interius quidam pessulum solvens blanda voce sciscitabatur ab eis qui vel unde forent, causamque¹⁵ sibi intimari tam insolitae [et inauditae] exactionis postulat. At illi: "sumus," inquit, "legati¹⁶ non cuiuscumque principis sed regis regum Alexandri invictissimi cui omnis mundus obtemperat,¹⁷ [quem omnis potestas expavescit].¹⁸ Haec ex consulto primatum suorum mandat regia nobilitas: quod gentium genus quarumve legum huius loci sunt incolae, quantae copiae, qua confidunt securitate, quis rex eorum vel qua spe subsistit, qua fiducia gloriatur, quibus viribus nititur?" "Postremo," [inquiunt], "imperat dominus [Alexander] si spe vitae, si corporis salute, si temporum quiete cupitis perfrui, ne extollamini per insolentiam, sed omnibus gentibus consuetudinarium¹⁹ persolvatis ei tributum."

¹ auditus omnium B. ² nullius B. ³ conspicantur eminus B. ⁴ om. B.
⁵ macheriam A. ⁶ vetabat iter pedestrium B. ⁷ austrum B. ⁸ macheriae B.
⁹ nullisque B. ¹⁰ om. B. ¹¹ lapidis B. ¹² appareret B. ¹³ loci eis add. B.
¹⁴ gravius B. ¹⁵ et causam B. ¹⁶ om. B. ¹⁷ milites add. B. ¹⁸ quem et omnis mundus obtemperat B. ¹⁹ ei add. B.

5. At legationis auditor in nullo verborum motus, hilari facie mitique affatu exactoribus respondit¹: “ne fatigemini plurima minarum exaggeratione² [seu multiformi exactione], sed patienter praestolamini me quantocius ad vos reversurum.” Quo dicto clausit [fenestram], et post duas ferme horas³ denuo patefatiens, operientium se aspectibus reddidit, proferensque gemmam miri fulgoris rarique coloris, quae quantitate et forma humani oculi speciem imitabat, exactoribus obtulit eisque dixit: “mandant loci huius incolae reddi⁴ quocumque modo sive dono sive tributario debito [Alexander] decreveris, prodigii commonitorium in hunc suscipe, quem⁵ [tibi] caritatis intuitu mittimus⁶ lapidem qui [terminum] tuis cupiditatibus⁷ poterit imponere. Nam cum virtutem et naturam eius didiceris, ab omni ambitione ultra cessabis. Noveris etiam tu tuisque non expedire hic ulterius demorari.⁸ Quoniam si fluvijs hic vel modico⁹ spiritu [procellae] afflatur, procul dubio naufragium incurretis cum detrimento vitae vestrae. Quapropter te sociis restitue et deo deorum pro tibi collatis beneficiis age gratias¹⁰ ne ingratus esse videaris.” His dictis conticuit, obseratoque aditu recessit.

6. At illi festinato navim repetentes Alexandro gemmam cum mandato detulere.¹¹ Ille vero, ut vir sagacis animi rei considerans eventum, vimque verborum perpendens, celeri reditu ad nota se contulit littora, suorumque revisit contubernia. At illi de optato sui ducis adventu gratulabundi, et eventus eius seriem edocti fortunae laudum solvunt libamina, quod incolumem meruerunt recipere de cuius vita gravi succubuerant diffidentiae. Compererant enim¹² [ab] expertorum relatione multimoda furentis fluvii pericula, aerae incertitudinem aquarumque gravissimam inundationem, cursus velocitatem et vehementiam undarum, intolerabilem strepitum,¹³ gaudebantque post multam desperationem suarum virium rectorem felici auspicio omnia haec¹⁴ superasse.

7. Inde vero progredientes, in Susis civitatem opulentissimam devenere. Suscepitque cum omni honorificentia ut decebat regiam

¹ respond. exact. B. ² aggeratione B. ³ fenestram add. B. ⁴ regi B.

⁵ suscipe in hoc quod B. ⁶ tibi mittimus B. ⁷ terminum add. B.

⁸ immorari B. ⁹ afflatur spiritu add. B. ¹⁰ sic B, age gratias om. A.

¹¹ detulerunt B. ¹² nempe B. ¹³ strep. intol. et B. ¹⁴ haec omnia B.

magnificentiam,¹ munificentissimos² omnes maxime maiores natu experti sunt. Plerique enim [procerum] imperialem nobilitatem donis praecipuis honorabant, non minus ipsi regio munere amplificati recedebant.

8. Sequenti vero die sapientissimis³ quibusque Iudaeorum atque Gentilium in quibus erat spes certae responsionis, secreto⁴ sibi ascitis, seriem sui eventus replicando cum illis rei misterium ventilare cepit. At illi de propositis nulla certitudine praediti, quod solum poterant felicitatem viri laudabant, eventum magnificabant, potentiam extollebant, tempusque redimentes ambiguitati operam dabant. Quod Alexander aegre ferens, molestiam mentis⁵ maxima probitate dissimulabat, et ignorantiam hominum simplicitatemque nullo tempore⁶ contemptu denotans, personas donis regiis honorabat.

9. Erat [autem] in [illo] loco senex quidam decrepitus, Iudaeus, Papas⁷ nomine, qui annosae vitae debilitate fessus nusquam locorum nisi duobus in gestatorio se ferentibus converti poterat. Hic amicorum relatione cognoscens regis adventum, eumque pro misterio lapidis incerto anxietate plurima perturbari,⁸ petiit se aspectibus eius praesentari. Quo viso Alexander nobilitatis⁹ suae consuetudinariam honorificentiam canis reverendis exhibuit,¹⁰ et senem¹¹ iuxta se decenter collocans, congratulabat diuturnae vitae¹² [suae et] speciosae [viri] formae [et] honestae gravitati,¹³ susceptoque¹⁴ [sermone qui] ei familiaris¹⁵ [et desiderabilis cum senibus erat], de antiquitatis notitia cepit percunctari. Quo de singulis satisfaciente, Alexander considerabat in viro¹⁶ adiacentis ei sapientiae [pelagus] ingressusque suae professionis seriem multiplicitem laborum eventusque sui prosperitatem cepit proponere.¹⁷

10. At Iudaeus, audita eius prospera navigatione, et eventus supra modum humanae aestimationis admirans, protensis sursum manibus ait coram omnibus: "O rex quantum caeli deo¹⁸ debeas modis omnibus perpendere non neglegas.¹⁹ Nulli enim mortalium huic simile concessit. Non est fatalis eventus, sed divinae largi-

¹ magesfatem regiam B. ² munificentissime B. ³ sapientibus B.
⁴ secretae B. ⁵ mentis om. A. ⁶ tempore om. A. ⁷ nomine Papias B.
⁸ turbati A. ⁹ nobilitati B. ¹⁰ exhibuit A. ¹¹ senemque B. ¹² vitae
diuturnae B. ¹³ gravitati honestae B. ¹⁴ que om. B. ¹⁵ familiariter B.
¹⁶ pelagus add. B. ¹⁷ exponere B. ¹⁸ deo celi B. ¹⁹ negligas A.

tatis munus. Memini enim¹ me puero nonnullos iuvenum viribus ingenioque praeditos navigationem hanc assumpsisse, non ullo modo pervalsisse urbis illius moenibus applicare, et [tamen] paene omnes inutiles extitisse. Plerique enim² laboris nimietate viribus exhausti fluctibus sunt absorti, plerique caeci, plerique surdi, plerique membrorum omnium³ tremore multati, perpetualiter sunt periclitati. Dein⁴ alii [atque alii] diversis temporibus hanc fatigationem aggressi, sed frustra moliti sunt. Quoniam diversis passionum generibus omnibus⁵ debilitati vix evaserunt, terminumque huic inutili negotio ante tempora multa posuerunt. At tu qui⁶ fatorum moderamine [cum tuis] incolumis⁷ furentes fluctus superasti, urbem omnis hospitis ignaram apprehendisti, responsa omnium mortalium insueta⁸ suscepisti, revera permissu seu⁹ moderatione divina aut magni prodigii gratia.¹⁰

11. Huiusmodi propositionibus Alexander animaequior redditus a priorum ambiguitate, respondit exhilarato corde: “nequaquam fallit scriptura protestans quoniam in antiquis est sapientia. Assertio tua, O Iudae, quodam spirituali misterio consonat relationi veridicae quam mihi¹¹ destinaverunt urbis illius incolae. Quapropter ob¹² illius [de quo suspicaris] prodigii indaginem, consultis huius loci sapientibus, grandi coartabar taedio.” Mox aperiens lapidem qui manu latebat: “en,” inquit, “propositionis huius initium et summa.” Quem Iudaeus suscipiens diuque¹³ considerans, “hic est,” ait, “vere prodigium et commonitorium [regiae dignitati] non contempnendum.¹⁴” At Alexander, “quoniam,” [inquit,] “in nullo¹⁵ discrepas a datoris huius sententia, [ne diutius me suspensum truces]. Si quid nosti super hoc, edissere ut rumpas ambiguitates meae ignorantiae.” Ad haec Iudaeus: “quamvis,” ait, “dictis¹⁶ veridicis plerumque fides adhibeatur, tamen in diffinitione novae actionis facilius persuadere potero visus quam auditus. Lapis hic modicae quantitatis est sed immensi ponderis, ita ut eius gravitati nichil queat aequiparari. Nunc igitur¹⁷ coram me deferatur statera ponderis et libra auri.”

¹ enim om. A. ² nam pler. B. ³ omn. tremore memb. B. ⁴ atque add. B.
⁵ omnibus om. A. ⁶ quo A. ⁷ incolume te et cum tuis B. ⁸ negata B.
⁹ vel B. ¹⁰ magna prodigia contingere B. ¹¹ michi B. ¹² ad B.
¹³ et diu B. ¹⁴ reg. dignit. add. B. ¹⁵ inquit add. B. ¹⁶ ait add. B.
¹⁷ ergo B.

12. Quibus praesto factis, imposuit uni vasculo staterae lapidem et alteri aureum nummisma; quod lapis praeponderans post se traxit in altum. Additis etiam duobus et tribus ac¹ quatuor [nummismatibus], novissime tota libra auri insuper et quantum statera capere poterat,² ne uno quidem momento valuit lapis a gravedine sui ponderis moveri. Dein quaesita et reperta statera, quae capatior³ in loco inveniri poterat, trabibus est appensa et multa auri imposita⁴ centenaria, quae [ut] primum nummisma pari modo celeri impetu⁵ lapis post se traxit,⁶ ac si pro tanti auri pondere levissima penna videretur imposita.

13. Quo spectaculo Alexander supra altitudinem humanae aestimationis attonitus, ait; "hoc mediocriter in admirationem me commovet. Quod tantillae gemmae brevis substantia manibus attractata paene nullius est ponderis, staterae vero appensa tantae videatur gravitatis. Unde quoniam evidens experientia sufficienter persuasit oculis, quod nullo modo auribus suggerere sufficit ad fidem assertio cuiuspiam narrationis. Edissere iam voce misterium huius novitatis."

14. Ad⁷ haec Iudaeus; "patienter," ait, "sustine, O bone rex, donec evidens operatio suae propositionis executionem determinet et sic demum indagine competenti misteriorum seriem verbis aperiam." Sumptaque minori⁸ statera, qua ponderis ordinem initiaverant, in parte una lapidem iniecit, eumque subtili terrae pulvere operuit, et in alteram⁹ [partem staterae] aureum unum posuit. Qui [aureus] statim inferiora petens lapidem post se facili motu traxit. Expositoque aureo, plumam levissimam iniecit. Quae pari modo lapidem pondere superavit.

15. His¹⁰ paene ex sensu factus Alexander, "fateor,"¹¹ inquit, "nichil me unquam in rebus humanis huic simile vel mente concepisse vel auditu comperisse vel visu didicisse." Ad¹² haec Iudaeus: "sufficiat," ait, "iam actionis assertio, et nunc quod in his latet,¹³ pandat evidens verborum executio." At¹⁴ Alexander, "quoniam," inquit, "de urbe quam vidi eiusque incolis et eorum conditione non minima me movet ambiguitas, quaeso ut de singulis mihi satisfacias.

¹ et B. ² pot. stat. cap. B. ³ capatiore B. ⁴ impos. auri B.
⁵ imp. cel. B. ⁶ trahxit A. ⁷ At B. ⁸ maiori B. ⁹ altera B. ¹⁰ hiis B.
¹¹ fateor me B. ¹² at B. ¹³ evidens illorum pandat executio add. B. ¹⁴ ad hec B.

16. His¹ perlibatis, et in faciem eius universis intendentibus, Iudaeus hac voce solvit silentium,² "quod³ vidisti, O bone rex, urbis nec dici debet nec est, sed materia solida et impenetrabilis omni carni, quam in terminum ulterius progrediendi statuit universorum conditor⁴ spiritibus carne solutis, et ibidem corporis⁵ resurrectionem praestolantibus; fruuntur autem ibi quiete opaca, quam deus illis disposuit. Sed non perhenni, quoniam post iudicium recepta carne cum creatore suo regnabunt in aeternum. Hii spiritus humanae salutis avidi, commonitorium felicitati⁶ [tuae] hunc lapidem destinaverunt⁷ ad commonendum te et compescendos inordinatos et indecentes tuae ambitionis conatus. Et revera quid [etiam commode] praestat, insatiabilis cupiditas quae crebris mentem consumit curis, nulli credens suspitione torquetur et diffidentia, et homo rationalis omni exhaustus quiete servi sui servus turpis effectus anxietate custodiendi noctes pervigiles diebus continuat.

17. At tu si propriis sedibus contentus patrimonii tui sufficientia delectareris, numquam ad defectum regii honoris pertingeres, dum quiescenti tibi et curis omnibus exuto quaestus et divitiae famularentur totius regni, et omnium thesaurorum copia tua repletet gazophilatia. Nunc vero nec tuis nec extraneorum copiis contentus immensorum thesaurorum tuorum egestate deprimeris, nulla sufficientia satiaris, sed cum grandi vitae tuo periculo et non absque tuorum detrimento extranei⁸ aeris pondere oneraris. His⁹ commonitionum promulgationibus prodigii summa continetur, quod lapidis huius natura testatur. Hic quem ad modum videtur forma et colore¹⁰ humanus est oculus, qui quandiu vitali potitur luce, totius concupiscentiae aestibus agitatur, [et] novitatum multiplicitate pascitur, et auro [sibi] redivivam famam subministrante nulla prorsus satietate compescitur. Et¹¹ quo amplius multiplicando proficit, eo sollertius exaggerandis insistit; sicut in praesentiarum mirifici ponderis nova¹² operatio probavit. At ubi vitali motu subtracto materni¹³ caespitis visceribus commendatur nullius¹⁴ utilitatis usibus patet, nichil delectatur, nichil

¹ hiis B.² silent. solvit B.³ quam B.⁴ deus vestrorum add. B.⁵ carnis. corr. B.⁶ felicitate B.⁷ destin. lap. B.⁸ et deterior add. B.⁹ hiis B.¹⁰ videtur add. B.¹¹ ex B.¹² novi B.¹³ maternis B.¹⁴ usibus add. B.

ambit, nullo affectu mutatur quia non sentit. Unde et penna levis, quae etsi modicae tamen cuiuscumque utilitatis est, hunc lapidem terrae pulvere coopertum¹ pondere superavit. Te igitur,² O bone rex, te³ inquam, moderationem totius prudentiae, te victorem regum, te possessorem regnorum, te mundi dominum lapis iste praefigurat, te monet, te increpat, te substantia exilis compescit ab appetitu vilissimae ambitionis. Quod salva gratia tua, domine mi rex dixerim, et si forte regum honoris normam⁴ invectiva oratione excessi, exactionis tuae imperio coactus insipientiae meae cessi.⁵”

18. Mox Alexander morarum impatiens in oscula ruit senis, regisque muneribus onustum remisit ad propria imprecans prospera vitae eius et saluti. Ipse vero finem omni cupiditati imponens omnique ambitioni liberalitati et honestati vaccabat, et, ut regiam magnificentiam decebat,⁶ in suis munificus et in cunctis extitit largifluus.

19. Indeque⁷ secedens per locorum compendia suae ditioni subacta, decenterque diversis atque necessariis iusticiarum ordinationibus, [tandem] per⁸ circulum alterius semis anni devenit Babiloniam. Ubi iam quasi patriae redditus per multimodos laborum agones⁹ indulgere cepit securitati atque quieti, dimissionem¹⁰ concedens viae comitibus omnibus secundum qualitatem cuiusque probitatis auri argentique multiplicitate dictatis.¹¹

20. Cumque omni malorum suspitione posthabita, nobili floreret magnificentia et regali iocum daretur gratia, ab uno domesticorum suorum quo nichil minus suspicabatur mortifero infectus est poculo, sicut in responsis acceperat in India ab arboribus solis et lunae.¹² Cumque vim veneni in se gustantis vicina iam morte sentiret, accitis iuvenibus secum ab infantia,¹³ ut decebat regiam magnificentiam, educatis, regnorum suorum iura divisit, constituens monarchiae suae terminos et militum cohortes¹⁴ pacis et concordiae

¹ oportum B. ² ergo B. ³ ergo B.

⁴ formam B. ⁵ praecessi normam B.

⁶ magnif. dec. reg. B. ⁷ itaque B.

⁸ post B. ⁹ agones laborum B.

¹⁰ missionem B. ¹¹ ditatis B.

¹² On the prophecy of the trees of the sun and moon concerning Alex-

ander's death vide the *Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem*, published by Kübler in his ed. of *Iulius Valerius* (Lipsiae, 1888, p. 214), and Meyer (*Alexandre, etc.*, t. ii, 1886, p. 185).

¹³ nobiliter add. B. ¹⁴ cohortibus B.

ad invicem incrementa affirmans, veritatis et honestatis atque liberalitatis studium omnibus inculcans, et¹ imitationem sui in omni probitate cunctos instruens, valeque dictis singulis, diem clausit extremum.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MSS.

A, Codex Oxoniensis Corp. Christi Coll. 82, Membr. in folio max. saec. xii. A full, though not perfectly accurate, description of this MS. has been given by Coxe.² It has also been studied by Paul Meyer.³ Besides the *Iter ad Paradisum* printed above, which occupies pages 184–186, inclusive, it contains: Quintus Curtius, the *Epitome* of Iulius Valerius, the *Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem de situ Indiae*, the letters of Alexander and Dindymus, an anonymous letter on India, and several other works not relating to the Alexander Romance. On page 187 of the MS. we have the last part of the second reply of Alexander to Dindimus, king of the Brahmans, as printed by Kübler in his edition of Iulius Valerius (pp. 186–189). As Kübler (*loc. cit.*, p. xxv) regrets bitterly that he had not the use of this MS., I give here a collation of this page of the MS. with Kübler's text: p. 186, l. 3 confirmo Küb., confirma A; l. 5 Nec Küb., ad non A; l. 7 arborum om. A; l. 12 vos Küb., vobis A; l. 17 philosophia Küb., phylosophia A; l. 24 solae Küb., solam A; ll. 25, 26 ista quia non habet Küb., illa quia non videt ut cupiat, ista quia non habet ut cupiat A; p. 187, l. 1 nullus Küb., nullis A; l. 2 assentior Küb., absentio A; l. 3 incestus vel adulterii inflammatur Küb., incesto vel adulterino flaminatur A; l. 8 voluntatis Küb., voluptatis A; l. 16 vos om. A; l. 18

¹ et ad imit. B.

² Catal. Codd. MSS. qui in Collegiis Oxoniensibus adservantur, 1852, pars ii, Coll. Corp. Christi, p. 29.

³ Alexandre, etc., t. ii. pp. 20, 31, 50, 381; vide also Zacher, *Pseudo-Callisthenes*, 1867, p. 41, and Kübler, *Iulius Valerius*, 1888, p. xxv.

constat vos Küb., vos constat A ; l. 20 Rationibus Küb., rationalibus A ; l. 25 quas Küb., quibus A ; l. 25 sopitas Küb., sopita A ; l. 26 mundi om. A ; p. 188, l. 7 fatiscunt Küb., fatescunt A ; l. 9 rebus Küb., rerum qualitatibus A ; l. 10 immutatur Küb., inmutatur A ; l. 12 audaciam om. A ; l. 12 astutiamque Küb., astutiam A ; l. 14 poscit Küb., poscat A ; l. 16 aerumnarum Küb., erumpnarum A ; l. 17 contrahimus Küb., contraimus A ; l. 21 Quorum Küb., quarum A ; l. 23 ita Küb., in A ; l. 24 ut Küb., et A ; l. 25 tribuat familiare Küb., tribuit famulatus A ; l. 26 sapienter Küb., enter A ; p. 189, l. 1 ministratur Küb., monstrantur A ; l. 5 praestentur Küb., praestantur A.

On page 188 of the MS. begins the first Book of Caesar's Gallic War: Iulii Celsus Constantinus¹ vir consularis legi commentarius Cesaris consul factus belli Gallici liber unus incipit. A collation of this page of the MS. with Dübner's edition of Caesar (tom. i, Paris, 1867, pp. 1-4) is here given: p. 1, l. 1 *divisa in partes tres* Düb., *in tres partes divisa* A ; l. 3 *Hi* Düb., *hii* A ; l. 9 *important* Düb., *inportant* A ; l. 10 *Quibuscum* Düb., *cum quibus* A ; ll. 16 *continenter* Düb., *continue* A ; p. 2, l. 1 *quotidianis* Düb., *cotidianis* A ; l. 5 *oceano* Düb., *oceanum* A ; l. 5 *finibus* Düb., *fines* A ; l. 6 *septentriones* Düb., *septentrionem* A ; l. 10 *Hispaniam* Düb., *Hyspāniam* A ; l. 11 *spectat* Düb., *spectant* A ; l. 13 *M. Pisone* Düb., *P. M. Pisone* A ; p. 3, l. 1 *Helvetium* om. A ; l. 5 *bellum* Düb., *ut bellum* A ; l. 17 *ad eas res conficiendas* Orgetorix deligitur add. A ; l. 17 *Orgetorix* Düb., *his* A ; l. 18 *legationem* Düb., *ad legationem* A ; p. 4, l. 1 *obtinuerat* Düb., *optinuerat* A ; l. 3 *Dunmorigi* Düb., *Donnmorigi* A ; l. 4 *Aeduo* Düb., *Heduo* A ; l. 5 *obtimebat* Düb., *optinebat* A ; l. 15 *damnatum* Düb., *dannatum* A ; l. 18 *millia decem* Düb., *decem milia* A.

¹ On this personage vide Dübner's preface (tom. i, p. xiv).

B, Codex Trin. Coll. Dublin. E. 5. 20. As the description of this interesting codex given in the printed catalogue¹ is extremely scanty, I have thought it advisable to give here a complete description, following the method adopted in modern catalogues of MSS.

It is a paper MS. of small quarto size, measuring 20·5 cms. by 14 cms., almost wholly written in a straggling fifteenth-century hand, abounding with contractions. Not counting the blank fly-leaves inserted by the binder, it contains 236 unnumbered folios, with an average of 32 lines to the page. The initial letters are frequently coloured in red. The contents are:

fo. 1 r^o: A few almost illegible traces of an older handwriting—perhaps of the thirteenth century.

fo. 1 v^o: Blank. fo. 2 r^o: An incomplete index to the contents of the MS. fo. 2 v^o: Blank. Folios 1 and 2 are of parchment.

fo. 3 r^o–7 r^o: *Leges S. Edwardi per Wilhelmum conquestorem Angliae confirmatae.*

fo. 7 v^o–8 r^o: *De fundatoribus quarundam Ecclesiarum in Anglia.* fo. 8 v^o: Blank.

fo. 9 r^o–12 v^o; *Salomonis didascali de profectione Alexandri Magni versus Paradisum.*

fo. 13 r^o–32 v^o: *Anonymi historia Angliae.* Incip.: *Rex quidam fuit in Norfolchia Castor nomine.* A few marginal notes. ff. 33 and 34: Blank.

fo. 35 r^o–37 r^o: *De Palmistria.* Incip.: *Signa pertutaria in viro.* fo. 37 v^o–38 v^o: Blank.

fo. 39 r^o–43 r^o: *Incipit providentia predestinacionum hominum et mulierum per xii signa quae sunt in quolibet mense per annum extracta per astronomiam.* With marginal notes.

fo. 43 v^o–45 r^o: *De mirabilibus Britanniae.* Incip.:

¹ Abbott, Catalogue of MSS. in the 1900, pp. 105, 532.
Library of Trinity College, Dublin,

Insula Britanniae cui quondam Albion nomen fuit. At the end of this tract comes a short addition written in another hand: Est etiam lapis quidam in Anglia in comitatu Norfolchiae, etc. fo. 45 v^o: Blank.

fo. 46 r^o–88 r^o: The Itinerarium of Marco Polo; in a different handwriting, with marginal notes.

fo. 88 v^o–109 v^o: On the mythology and poetry of the ancients; illustrated with coloured diagrams. Incip.: De fabula Phaetontis. Sol Phebus et Apollo idem sunt. In a different hand. The diagrams are coloured in yellow. On fo. 108 v^o and 109 r^o is a curious map comprising part of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Aegean, the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Euxine, with their respective islands.

fo. 110 r^o–176 v^o: A series of extracts from various classical authors: Cassiodorus, Seneca, Petronius, Terence, Sallust, Boetius, Macrobius, Cicero, Quintilian, Caesar, Sidonius, Vegetius, Josephus, the Gesta Ianuentium et Treverorum, Papias, Agellius (i.e. Aulus Gellius), Orosius, Trogus Pompeius. fo. 177 r^o–180 r^o: Blank.

fo. 180 v^o–182 r^o: A piece entitled, Destructio Thebanorum.

fo. 182 v^o–186 v^o: De morte Claudii Caesaris.

fo. 187 r^o–188 r^o: Incipit dialogus Scipionis Africani et Laelii Senatoris de delatore cavendo vel poenis confutando.

fo. 188 v^o–189 r^o: Collatio inter Senecam et Lucium de amico fido. Incip.: Lucius Annaeus Seneca cum quadam die in penetralibus aedium suarum solus sederet, etc.

fo. 189 v^o–191 r^o: Exhortatio ad senatum ad praecavendos dolos Simonidis rempublicam invadere cupientis. Incip.: Ad vos cives Romani, ad vos cultores iusticiae, etc.

fo. 191 r^o–192 v^o: A short piece beginning: Prima

ingenii experimenta Marcus Annaeus Lucanus Cordubensis in Neronis laudibus dedit, etc. Then follow the Arguments to the ten books of Lucan's *Pharsalia*.

fo. 193 r^o: A curious diagram coloured in red, entitled *Tabula de Qualitatibus*. fo. 193 v^o: Blank.

fo. 194 r^o–198 v^o: *Apocalypsis Magistri Walteri Mapae invectiva in omnes status Ecclesiae*.

fo. 198 v^o: A short piece beginning: *Sicilia ab Italia modico freto distinguitur*.

fo. 198 v^o–199 r^o: Another short piece apparently belonging to the preceding: *Mons Ethna in Sicilia*, etc. fo. 199 v^o: Blank.

fo. 200 r^o–232 v^o: *Prologus in libro Haimonis Episcopi qui dicitur Christianarum rerum memoria*. Incip.: *Quantum eruditionis quicumque*, etc. It is divided into ten books with many marginal notes,

fo. 232 v^o–234 v^o: *Incipiunt proverbia Varronis ad Papirianum senatorem urbis Romae*. *Dii essemus nisi moreremur*.

fo. 234 v^o: A few lines scribbled in a later hand: *Quatuor sint modi*, etc. fo. 235 r^o–236 r^o: Blank.

fo. 236 v^o: A few more lines in the same hand.

V.

The following poem in rhyming verses on the capture of Acre by the Crusaders in 1191 is found in a MS. preserved in the library of Oriel College, Oxford, No. 2, Membr. in folio, written towards the end of the twelfth century. Its contents are¹:

ff. 1–184: *Isidori Hispalensis Origines*.

ff. 184–186: *Epistola Iohannis regis Indiae ad Emanuelem Imperatorem C Pol. de Imperio suo*.²

¹ Vide Coxe, *Catal. Codd. MSS.* source for the history of the legend of Coll. Aul. Oxon., etc., 1852, Pars i, Prester John, has been edited from Coll. Oriel, p. 1. many MSS., including this one, by

² This curious tract, our principal Zarncke (*Abhl. der K. Sächsischen*

ff. 186 v^o—187: Fabula de caballo aeneo Laterani posito sine pelle, etc.

fo. 187: The poem on the capture of Acre, without any title in the MS.

fo. 188: The following sentences:

(a) Venefrede merita nos ducant ad celestia.

(b) Nichil autem peius quam per potestatem peccandi libertatem habere, nichilque infelicius male agendi infelicitate.

(c) A few more lines now quite illegible. The writing of this MS. is somewhat trying to decipher by reason of its smallness; and in this connexion I should like to record here my sincere thanks to Dr. James and to Father Edmund Nolan, of Cambridge University, for their kind assistance.

[S]abato post Domini resurrectionem,

[P]hilippus, rex Franciae, veniens Aconem.

[T]otam mentis operam et intentionem

[C]irca villae posuit expugnationem.

5 [S]ecus Turris igitur Maledictae latus

[E]rigit petrarias illic Hospitatus,

[A]liasque machinas necnon apparatus,

[Q]uorum murus corruat ictibus quassatus.

Dumque muros dissipat impletque fossata,

10 Quae profunda fuerant admodumque lata,

Instrumenta plurima sunt ibi cremata,

Aliisque variis modis dissipata.

Interim rex inclitus Angliae Ricardus,

Qui per famam redolet, ut odore nardus,

15 Metuendus hostibus sicut feris pardus,

Ciprum iter verterat licet suis tardus.

Nam tyrannus insulae, turbo pieattis,¹

Tribus ibi navibus regis naufragatis,

Gesellschaft, Phil.-Hist. Kl., Bd. vii, xiv).

1879, No. 8, pp. 909-924). It is also found in another Oxford MS., Coll. Corp. Christi No. 86, fol. 91 v^o (saec.

¹ Litterae in uncinis inclusae in codice desiderantur.

² Sic cod. pro pietatis.

- Homines recluserat manibus ligatis,
 20 Equis victualibus armis usurpatis.
 Sed a rege reddere cuncta postulantur.
 Negat, pugnat, vincitur, figit,¹ vinculatur,
 Digna factis ultio digne compensatur,
 Captivator hominum modo captivatur.
 25 Vicis castris urbibus Cipri subiugatis,
 Plene licet faveant, rex addenda fatis
 Cogitat calcaria nondum ergo datis
 Ventis intrat pelagus fluctibus iratis.
 Dum Aconem satagit iter maturare,
 30 Navi magnae contigit molis obviare,
 Quam Aconem comperit velle rex intrare,
 Et Turcis praesidia maxima portare.
 Ad hanc ergo galeae cunctae congregantur.
 Sonant tubae classica, timpana pulsantur,
 35 Exeruntur gladii, arcus sinuantur,
 Et ad instar grandinis spicula vibrantur.
 Ad² Turci de caveis, ut de castro forti,
 Ictu nostros lapidis, ut tormento torti,
 Sudibus et iaculis tribuentes morti,
 40 Metum nostrae maximum ingerunt cohorti.
 Sed per vocem regiam sese resumentes,
 Turcos vexant acrius supereminentes,
 Iaculorum verubus caveis figentes.
 Nostros tantum reprimunt igne perfundentes.
 45 Sed dum navis rumpitur rostris galearum,
 Ignis sudes iacula profuere parum.
 Nam dum illos sorbuit puteus aquarum,
 Esca fiunt volucrum atque beluarum.
 Armis potentissimi periere mille,
 50 Quos si forte moenia recepissent villae,
 Numquam hos devinceret iste rex vel ille,
 Nec occurrens Grecia tota cum Achille.
 Versus Acon igitur malus incurvatur,
 Oculis navigium aequora furatur.

¹ Sic cod. pro fugit.² Sic cod. pro at.

- 55 Christianus populus gaudens gratulatur,
Et confusus ethnicus dolet et turbatur.
Instrumenta protinus iubet praeparari,
Sed ne vacet interim, comitis praeclari
Flandrensis petrarias poscit sibi dari.
- 60 Omnes flebant obitum eius tanquam cari,
Ruptis propugnaculis muros turres strarat,
Parte sed ex altera, quam iam explanarat,
Primi muros ordinis alios quassarat,
Rex Francorum scandere civitatem parat.
- 65 Milites appositis scalis ascendebant,
Sed hos igne liquido Turci perfundebant,
Et his murum insimul sese oponebant,
Aliunde neminem quoniam timebant,
Nam suum rex Angliae castrum expectabat.
- 70 Nec de suis interim quisquam dimicabat.
Illuc omnis Asiae manus inclinabat,
Ubi sola Franciae virtus inpugnabat.
Miles strenuissimus inclitus et fortis,
Marescaldus Franciae, militum cohortis
- 75 Rector, ibi subiit dirae iura mortis.
Quem planxit exercitus lacrimis obortis.
Duxit ergo cedere Gallica iuventus,
Sed hinc non efficitur segnior vel lentus.
Nec est primo diruto muro rex contentus.
- 80 Ad stragem alterius ordinis intentus.
Eminebat ibidem Turris Maledicta,
Quondam solo nomine, nunc re maledicta,
Super [? to]nsa machinis, subtus facta cripta,
Qua defensa civitas olim, est nunc victa.
- 85 Nam quadris lapidibus undique sublatis,
Omnem iam amiserat robur firmitatis,
Columpnis et postibus subtus coaptatis,
Ruitura funditus tantum concrematis.
Lapsus turris igitur territi timore,
- 90 Pessimo in dubiis rebus sug[g]estore,
Turci contumaciae posito furore,
Civitatem offerunt supplicantum ore.

- Ablata restitui cuncta Christianis
 Cum captivis postulant reges a paganis.
 95 Dum fit controversia super his inmanis,
 Hanc diremit Marchio doctus in mundanis,
 Procurandam enim hanc per Marchionem
 Reges ordinaverant compositionem.
 Ad tollendam igitur hanc dubitationem
 100 De promissis tribuunt sese cautionem.
 Urbem supellectilem arma reddidere,
 Captivos cum navibus quotquot habuere,
 Urbis inter moenia quadringentos fere,
 Vestes tamen¹ retinent quas iam incisere.
 105 Saladinus etiam ad vota nostrorum
 Dans electos milites centum, aliorum
 Captivorum corpora mille quingentorum,
 Cum ducentis milibus reddit aureorum.
 Lignum quoque redditur pretiosae crucis,
 110 Lignum in quo calicem passionis trucidis,
 Ebiberunt viscera gloriosi ducis,
 Suggestente principe tenebrosae lucis.
 Iuramento placuit pactum confirmari,
 Et vexillis regiis turres titulari.
 115 Tunc videres pueros senes gratulari,
 Et victori Domino laudes modulari.
 A natali Domini mille ducentorum
 Novem minus spatium fluxerat annorum,
 Acon fere circulis obsessa duorum
 120 Idus quarto Iulii redditur annorum.
 Postquam reges moenibus urbis sunt potiti,
 Arma victualia vades sunt partiti,
 Quamque diu foveant intendentes liti,
 Stimulatae² federa pacis sunt obliti;
 125 Dum enim rex Angliae protegit Guidonem,
 E contra rex Franciae fovens Marchionem,
 Illi suam tribuit terrae portionem,
 Parat hic ad propria dum reversionem.

¹ Vel tantum.² Sic cod. pro simulatae.

- Imminebat terminus datus a paganis,
 130 Quo dare sponponderant crucem Christianis,
 Nec vult plebem sinere cor iniqui canis,
 Induratum redimens tempus verbis vanis.
 Coram tabernaculis igitur Turcorum,
 Iugulari corpora clarus rex Anglarum.
 135 Plus quam tria milia iubet captivorum,
 Pro reddenda vadium cruce relictorum.
 Inhumane carnifex cepit desevire,
 Quodque scire nefas est, taedium audire.
 Ita vidi plurimos aureos sitire,
 140 Ut aurum in viscera vadant exhaustire.
 Nec illorum sufficit stercora lavari,
 Sed iubentur corpora flammis concremari,
 Tunc videres cineres cribro ventilari,
 Et ab hisdem rutilans aurum sequestrari.
 145 Nam haec plena plurimis dolis gens per ora,
 Aureos reconderant in interiora,
 Quos emittens postea per inferiora,
 Assumebat iterum sero vel aurora.
 At plures corrigiis arcus incurvabant,
 150 Illorum lateribus quas excoriabant.
 Raptum fel ab epate reliqui portabant.
 Quo pleni nequitia Turci redundabant.
 Talia conspiciens quisque gratulatur,
 Quod in illos Dominus sic se ulciscatur.

The above interesting piece forms lines 729-882 of the long poem published by Count Riant at Lyons in 1866,¹ and attributed by him on very slender grounds to a certain Heimer or Haymarus Monachus. As pointed out by Stubbs,² this poem forms an invaluable commentary on

¹ Haymari Monachi de expugnata Accone liber tetrastichus, Lugduni, 1866. I am indebted to Dr. R. L. Poole of Oxford for this information. Count Riant's book is, however, now extremely scarce, only 200 copies

having been printed for private circulation. Another text has been given by Stubbs (*Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Hovedene*, iii, 1870, pp. cv, sqq.).

² Loc. cit. supra, p. cv.

the portions of the *Itinerarium Regis Ricardi*, and of the chronicles of Roger of Hoveden and Benedict of Peterborough, with which it corresponds.

In conclusion I should like to state that my best thanks are due to the Librarians of the Bodleian, Corpus Christi, and Oriel College Libraries, Oxford, and to Mr. De Burgh of Trinity College, Dublin, for the use of the MSS., or photographs from them, employed in the above work.

MARIO ESPOSITO.

O'CLERY'S GLOSSARY (II.)

IN a paper published in HERMATHENA, 1907, I showed that a number of quotations (fifty or so) which occur in Michael O'Clery's well-known Glossary may be traced to the *Dindsenchas*. I have since noted some further instances of his borrowing from the same source which it may be worth while to set down here.

Five quotations from the *dindsenchas* of Ceilbe¹ have already been identified in my former paper: five more may probably be added. (I give O'Clery's entries in full from Miller's edition in *Rev. Celt.*, vols. iv and v.)

1. *ruadh* .i. *rúamann*. "tlacht ní thigh gan ruadh ge raibh," .i. ní thigh dath ar bith gan ruamann.

The quotation is from ds. of Ceilbe, 7: see Todd Lect. x. 54.

2. *righe* .i. *imdheargadh*. "tuar righe" .i. tuar imdheargaidh.

Cf. ds. of Ceilbe, 29:

a thoisc dobo thúar rige.

The following entries probably come from the same source, though the lemma is too slight to admit of certain identification:—

3. *rú* .i. *rún*. "a rú" .i. a rún.

Cf. ds. of Ceilbe, 39:

a rú co crích nír cuired.

¹ The author of this composition was Maurice Mac Fadden O'Mulconry, not Maurice Mac Fadden, as stated in HERMATHENA, 1907, p. 474. I take the opportunity to correct another blunder (*ibid.* p. 466): the traditional compiler of the *Dindsenchas* as a whole was Amairgen, not Athairne.

4. **nóis** .i. oirdheirc. "do noisigh" .i. do oirdhearcaidh.
Cf. ds. of Ceilbe, 44 :

a nemláthar donóisig.

5. **faichill** .i. tuarastal "go bfaichlibh" .i. go dtuarastlaibh.
Cf. ds. of Ceilbe, 71 :

Cairpre Niafer co faichlib.

To the three quotations from the ds. of Ailech already identified (HERMATHENA, 1907, pp. 467, 470) add the following :—

6. **gibhis** .i. gleann. "gibhis glaine" .i. gleann glan.
Cf. ds. of Ailech, ii. 38 (Todd Lect. vii. 45) :

gibis glaine ór, is leis ind inis uile.

Under the word *aighe* O'Clery cites a line from the metrical ds. of Bend Boguine : see HERMATHENA, 1907, p. 466. He also quotes the prose legend in the following entry :—

7. "**fiadhaigis siol na mbó**" .i. dochuadar a bfiadhán.
Cf. Rev. Celt. xvi. 153.

I have suggested (HERMATHENA, 1907, p. 476) that O'Clery's glosses on *libhearn* and *libheadhain* may be based on two lines in the ds. of Loch Rí. He certainly quotes this poem in the following gloss :

8. **mual** .i. mullach. "ar mual an mhaighe" .i. ar mullach an mhaighe.

This is taken from ds. of Loch Rí, 55 : see LL 212 b 1 :

ni thuca ar mual a maige a fíal cía nonergaire.

In the following instances O'Clery's quotations come from other parts of the *Dindsenchas* :

9. **é** .i. truagh. "é do dhíol a dhaoir fhir" .i. as truagh do dhiol.

Taken from ds. of Áth Fadat i. 25 (Todd Lect. x. 152).

10. "**easnadh na gaoithe**" .i. osnadh na gáoithe.
Cf. ds. of Tond Clidna ii. 45 (Todd Lect. x. 212):

Esnad na gáithe gairge
ocus anfad na fairrge.

11. **gubha** .i. caoineadh. "**gné gubha**" .i. gne cháointe.
Cf. ds. of Carn húi Néit, 23 (Todd Lect. x. 218):

mind sluaig cen gné nguba.

A commonplace tag like this might easily be found elsewhere; but the next instance is undoubtedly drawn from this same composition.

12. **gor** .i. gairidheacht. "**Lugh ba gor gach namsoin**"
.i. Lugh dorinne gairidheacht no maith isin amsoin.
From ds. of Carn húi Neit, 43.

13. **fiadh** .i. biadh .i. "**ubhall ba fó fiadh**" .i. ubhall ba maith an biadh.

Cf. ds. of Mag Mugna, 5, 6 (Todd Lect. x. 144):

Dercu ocus cnú chumang cfar,
ocus uball, ba fó fiad :

14. "**ell for Fhionn**" .i. greim no báoghal ar fhionn.
From the prose ds. of Cenn Cuirrig : see Rev. Celt. xv.
443 :

Imraidi iarum Cuirrech modh nod-gabad eill for Find.

15. **meis** .i. olc. "**go na bíodh achd meis 7 ceis**" .i. nach bíodh achd olc 7 ceasacht.

From ds. of Mag Mucrim, 23 : see LL. 162 b 28, where *meiss* is glossed ".i. donus" and *cheiss* ".i. doblath."

16. "**cía baoi dhe**" .i. gibe dobhi dhe.

Cf. ds. of Mag Luirg 23 : LL 211 b 4 :

Tallsat a chend, cia búi de.

17. **gual** .i. teine. "**fir nach fallán gnuis fri gual**."

From ds. of Tailtiu 35 (LL 200 b 29); LL reads *fil*, but most of the manuscripts have *fir*.

18. **treana** .i. lamhchomairt, no bualadh bas. "**treana Tailltean**" .i. bualadh bas no égcáoine do bhíodh a dTailtin.

Cf. ds. of Taitiu 163 (LL 201 a 30) :

trena Taiten tair théite
oc promad na fian-chéite.

19. *foirtghealla* .i. *foirgheall* .i. *fiadnaisi*. “*Páttraig foirtghealla gach rí*” .i. do ní fiadhnaisi ar gach rígh.

From ds. of Taitiu 169 (LL 201 a 33).

20. *cfa* .i. *fear*. *mo chia* .i. *mo fhear*. “*rosgaoil go comhláir mo chía ar reilg Odhráin airdía*” .i. do sgaoil go comhshocair.

Also :

comhlair .i. *comhshocair*. “*do sgaoil go comhláir*” .i. *comhshocair*.

From ds. of Coire Breacán 83-4 (BB 398 b 46, with *i relic* for *ar reilg*).

21. *glinnidh* .i. *foillsigh*. “*glinnidh dóibh an ghairm*” .i. *foillsigh doibh*.

From ds. of Mag nÁi, 3 (BB 386 a 26).

22. *gall* .i. *coirthe cloiche*. “*druim re gailleachaibh*” .i. *druim re clochaibh*.

From ds. of Odba 3 (BB 405 a 13).

23. *faescal* .i. *fadhb*. “*suas do chuireadh a fhaescal*” .i. *a fhaidhb*.

From ds. of Sliab Fuait (LL 204 a 26).

24. *iomarchur* .i. *unfairt*. “*an t-each do gní an iomarchur*” .i. do ní an unfairt.

From ds. of Tuag Inbir (LL 153 a 13).

25. *tiamdha* .i. *mall*. “*nir gníomh tiamhdha*” .i. *nir ghníomh mall*.

Cf. ds. of Faffann 14 (Todd Lect. ix. 66) :

nír gním tiamda téith-mire.

26. *or* .i. *imeal*. “*or in or*” .i. *imeal go himeal*.

Cf. ds. of Faffann 17 :

Rosír hÉrinn or i n-or.

In either of these last two cases, taken by itself, it might be doubtful whether the lemma was not derived from some other source; but when they are taken together, the presumption in favour of the identification is greatly strengthened. The same remark applies to the following four articles, all of which seem to refer to the *dindsenchas* of Odras, which is found in the Rennes MS., the Book of Lecan, and three other codices:—

27. *uais* .i. *usal*. “*uais inghean*” .i. *inghean usal*.

Cf ds. of Odras 1 :

Odras, *uais* in *ingen*,

where the Book of Lecan reads *uais ingen* against the metre.

28. *tuamann* .i. *borb*. “*tarbh tuamann*” .i. *tarbh borb*.

Cf. ds. of Odras 25-6 :

Dairis boin in buaball *tarb tuamand nár teiged*.

29. *grog* .i. *gruag*. “*grog dub*” .i. *grúag dhubh*, no *grugánach*, no *gruamdha*.

Cf. ds. of Odras 18 :

Odras *groc-dub gnóach* (*groc-dub* rhymes with *collud*).

Ibid. 50 :

in *groc-dub cen glicce* (*groc-dub* rhymes with *collud*).

30. *loghdha* .i. *lagsaine*. “*gan loghda*” .i. *gan lagsaine*.

Cf. ds. of Odras 58 :

treá luinde cen logda.

There remains a puzzling gloss which requires fuller discussion. O'Clery has the following entry :

31. *mana ma* .i. *lámhagán*. *gan mana má* .i. *gan lámhagán*.

It will be observed that *mana ma* is twice over printed as two separate words. What is to be made of such a form? Is *mana-ma* a compound? or is *mana* a genitive dependent on *ma*? In either case, what is the real meaning? A passage from the *dindsenchas* of Loch Dachæch will

perhaps supply an explanation. The legend tells how this lough (now Waterford Harbour) derived its name from Dachæch, daughter of Cicul Glicerlun: see Rev. Celt. xv. 432. Lines 43-46 of the metrical version (as printed in Todd Lect. x. 184) run as follows:—

Desin atá | ó ainm na mná | in comainm-se | for loch Dachæch.

This seems to be the true reading; but it is found in only two MSS.: instead of *ó ainm na mná* one MS. has *inmanama*; BB reads *ceand manama*, while the Rennes codex ("R") has *cin mana ma*. This last is evidently, I think, a simple scribal corruption of the true text, and is the starting-point for BB's reading. R is followed by the Book of Hy Maine (*cen mana ma*) and a Stowe MS. "S," which has *gan mana ma*. This latter MS. was written after the publication of the Glossary by another member of the O'Clery family. I think, then, that this corrupt reading is the source of O'Clery's lemma, and that *mana ma* is a *vox nihili*. A difficulty, however, remains as to O'Clery's explanation. He glosses *mana ma* by the word *lámhagán*, which Miller translates 'glove,' no doubt on the authority of O'Reilly. But I question whether *lámhagán* really ever had any such meaning. The word is found as *lamaccan* in the medieval tract on Latin Declension, edited by Stokes in 1860, where it is equated with *remigacio*; but Stokes suggests that *remigacio* is a mistake for *reptatio*, and in his Appendix (p. 164) asserts, on Mr. S. H. O'Grady's authority, that *lámhagán* is now applied to "a child's first attempt at creeping on all fours." The word occurs with this sense in *Cóir Anmann* (BB 254 a 16). This agrees with the meaning "groaping" (*sic*) given by O'Brien. O'Reilly adopts O'Brien's explanation, but adds on his own account a second meaning, 'glove.' Dinneen has *lámhacán* and *lámhancán*, 'creeping on hands and feet'; but also *lámhagán*, 'a glove, groping,' which is evidently copied from O'Reilly. The proper word for 'glove' is, of course, *lámainn*; and I do not

believe that *lámacán* or *lámhagán* ever had this sense; whereas the meaning 'groping,' 'feeling one's way,' is sufficiently guaranteed, and is corroborated by the Scotch Gaelic *lámhagán*, 'handling or fingering' (Highland Society's Dictionary). This, then, is no doubt the sense that O'Clery intended. Finding before him the reading

desin atá | gan mana má | in comainm se | for loch Dachæch,
he assumed that the second line was one of the numerous tags so common in Irish poetry, such as *cen gó*, *cen meirbe*, meaning 'without error, deceit,' &c.; and *mana* suggesting to his mind the Latin *manus*, he arrived at the explanation 'gan lámhagán,' 'without groping or fumbling,' i.e. 'without uncertainty.'

If I am right, we have a curious instance of the way in which error slowly broadens down from lexicon to lexicon. O'Clery has the initial mistake, "mana má .i. lámhagán." O'Reilly, following him, adds two fresh mistakes: he has 'manama, a glove,' and 'lámagán, a glove, groping.' Dinneen follows him with 'lámagán, a glove; groping'; and finally O'Neill Lane's English-Irish Dictionary gives "Glove, lámáinn, mainéog, manama lámagán."

I hope to discuss on a future occasion the other sources from which O'Clery has drawn. For the present I shall only refer to two of these which so far as I know have not been noted. One is the elegy on Niall Núi-giallach, of which Meyer has edited two versions, one, in the Festschrift on Whitley Stokes, from the Yellow Book of Lecan; and the other, which is fragmentary, in *Otia Merseiana* ii. 88, from Rawl. B 502. Lines 17, 18 of this poem run thus in YBL (Meyer's text, Festschr., p. 4):

A dét gela, a beoil deirg
nocho cursaigtis a feirc.

But the Rawlinson manuscript reads for the second line:

nád contursaig fo chomfeirg.

Cf. O'Clery's gloss:—

dearsaigh .i. dúsachth. amhail adubhairt Torna Eigeas,

no a mhac ag moladh Néill a ndalta. "A dhéid gheala a bheóil deirg, nád condearsaigh fo choimfheirg .i. nar dhuisigh fa fheirg."

Another gloss is evidently taken from the same poem:—

abhraid .i. fabhradha. "abhraid dhubhdhaimh" .i. fabhradha amhail daol.

This is from line 9 (Festschr., p. 3).

Abrat duib dáin comáilli.

The other source to which I wish to draw attention is the Ode to Brian na Murtha O'Ruairc, which is printed in Hardiman's "Irish Minstrelsy," vol. ii., p. 286. According to Hardiman (p. 428) this poem was composed by Seán mac Torna O'Maolchonaire in 1566. It is a particularly elaborate specimen of the archaizing style; and Hardiman assures us that it "is classed by Irish scholars among the best specimens of the ancient style of composition," no doubt on account of its erudite obscurity. For the sake of the unlearned vulgar it is accompanied by a glossary made, according to Hardiman, by Thaddeus Ruddy or O'Rody. O'Clery quotes O'Mulconry's Ode under the words *caimper* (cf. Hardiman, p. 298, line 5), *dlomhadh* (296, 10), *innthiomh* (292, 10), *iomdha* (288, 3), *iris* (298, 6), *riústac* (288, 9), *sgoth* (294, 2), *sitheal* (294, 12), *tiomghaire* (296, 10). He seems also to have copied a great many of O'Rody's glosses: as, for example, those on *deacmaic* (cf. Hard. 292, 11), *ruire* (292, 5) *eargna* (296, 5) *teadnas* (296, 6), etc. O'Rody appears to have been a precocious scholar. Assuming that Hardiman is right in saying he was born in 1623, he must have drawn up this glossary before he was twenty, if O'Clery borrowed from it in the year 1643. It is possible, however, that the two men drew from a common source.

E. J. GWYNN.

ON TRANSFINITE NUMBERS, AND SOME PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE STRUCTURE OF ACTUAL SPACE AND TIME.

I.

THE modern theory of transfinite numbers is based on the following generalization of the ordinary conception of number:—An aggregate (*Menge, ensemble*) of entities has a number when it may be correlated with another aggregate by a one-to-one correspondence between the members of the aggregates.¹ The two aggregates are then said to have the same cardinal number or potency (*Mächtigkeit* is Cantor's word) or to be equivalent. This number is the common property possessed by the two aggregates and all equivalent aggregates, and is known to us by such correlations. Hence non-finite numbers (called *transfinite* by Cantor) and finite numbers are brought under the same conception—a philosophical unification that was impossible so long as numbers were naïvely regarded as the products of successive counting.

A.

Finite and transfinite numbers are sufficiently distinguished by either of the following definitions:—


1. An aggregate whose number is finite cannot be correlated with any part of itself; this is the same thing as saying that the number of a finite aggregate is always greater than the number of a part of the aggregate,² or

¹ In the rest of this article two such aggregates will be spoken of as 'correlated' with each other.

² This must not be confounded with

the assertion that the whole is greater than the part, which is a truism for all aggregates.

that the aggregate is never equivalent to a part of itself. *A transfinite number, on the other hand, is the number of an aggregate that may be correlated with a part of itself.* In such an aggregate a part exists that is equivalent to the whole, possessing the same number. The paradox disappears if we notice that while "the part is greater than the whole" is a truism, "the number of the part is greater than the number of the whole" is sometimes false. Suppose m and n are the numbers (finite or transfinite)



of two aggregates M and N ; if M and N are equivalent, then $m = n$; but if, in whatever way the members of M are correlated with those of N , there are *always* some members of N left out of the correlation, then n is greater than m . By this the numerical relation of 'greater' is defined, and clearly 'greater' as applied to numbers and 'greater' as applied to aggregates have *different meanings*.

Two examples ought to satisfy any reasonable being that this conception of transfinite number is unconsciously used even in elementary mathematics :—(1) It is possible to project a line into a part of itself, thus exhibiting a one-to-one correspondence between the points of the whole line and the points in the part. In the accompanying figure the line AB is projected into $A'B'$ from the point O_1 , and $A'B'$ is projected into ab from the point O_2 . Thus the whole is projected into the part, and it follows that the number of points on AB must be equal to the number of points on ab ; both, in fact, possess the number of the continuum (see below). It is a child-like subterfuge, compatible only with solipsism, to say that the points do not exist until they are considered or 'taken' by the observer; the distinct definite possibility of taking each point must exist before it is taken, for, otherwise, the whole of geometry becomes an arbitrary fiction. It is of course allowable to assert that the number of points on a line is finite, but in this case the projection is incomplete, and ordinary geometry must be revised. (2) Similarly the number of all finite numbers is a transfinite number (Cantor's Aleph-Null), because the series 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . is equivalent to the series 2, 4, 6, 8, as may be seen by doubling each term of the former series, and the latter series is at the same time a part of the former series.

2. The distinction between finite and transfinite may also be expressed as follows, in the case of aggregates whose members may be arranged in serial order. *If the whole aggregate and every part of the aggregate have a first member and a last, then the number of the aggregate is finite, otherwise it is infinite.* Kant (thesis of first antinomy) wrongly assumed that the time-series up to the present must be finite, because it has a last member; but even had it a first member as well as a last, it would not

necessarily be finite. In this thesis Kant assumes unjustifiably, that past time contains a finite number of instants, on the grounds that it has a last instant, and then argues that it is a contradiction to say that it is infinite.

The first of the above distinctions gives a positive definition of the transfinite and a negative of the finite; the second gives a positive of the finite, and a negative of the transfinite. It may be shown that the two distinctions are equivalent.

The following is the natural primitive objection against the possibility of an aggregate having the same number as its part:—"If an aggregate contains *actually distinct* entities that are *qualitatively identical* (e.g., marbles of the same shape, size, and substance, or points in a line or area), then, if they be permuted in pairs in any way, the whole aggregate must remain the same. Suppose now we have an aggregate M containing distinct members qualitatively identical (e.g. points on a line AB); let N be another like aggregate, possibly overlapping M , and containing members of the same quality as N (e.g. points on a line CD); let the number of M be the same as that of N ; then we may imagine each M interchanged with an N . M and N are now qualitatively the *same* as they were before their members were changed; therefore N cannot be *part* of M , for, were this so, the whole would be identical with the part." The numerous self-contradictory and inconsistent assumptions made in this objection may be left to the reader to discover. It assumes, for example, that a group is unchanged if its members are permuted. and confounds the identity of an aggregate with the identity of its number. It reveals also this truth that an aggregate cannot be supposed to have any definite number unless its members are objectively related either amongst themselves or to some common object. If all the members

are qualitatively identical and wholly independent, then either the number of the aggregate is *one*, or the members belong to different universes, and it is useless to speak of them as a plurality. Further, the examples of marbles and points are illusory; difference in *position* in time or space is difference in *quality*, and number springs from difference as much as from identity.

It cannot, indeed, be proved directly that the transfinite involves no contradiction, but it may be accepted as in the highest degree probable, since careful analysis has failed to reveal any inconsistency, and skilled mathematicians and logicians have accepted the theory. To this must be added that mathematicians, since the time of the Greeks, have unconsciously used the transfinite, in holding that Space and Time are unlimited, and that their parts are infinitely divisible. To reject Cantor's theory is to assert that Time contains a finite number of instants, and Space a finite number of points. The attempt to escape by asserting that this number is indefinite (unless this means *unknown*) can only be compared to the tactics of the ostrich; it clearly originates in the vain attempt to apprehend number by intuition, which is incapable of grasping even finite numbers of any size.

B.

Transfinite cardinals.—The following is a brief summary of a few of the elementary results in the calculus of transfinite *cardinals*. 'Greater' and 'less' are defined precisely, so as to be applicable to the transfinite as well as to the finite, in accordance with the well-known laws of relation. Addition, multiplication, and exponentiation are defined from fundamental logical principles, and the commutative, associative, and distributive laws hold good.

The two best-known transfinite cardinals are \aleph_0 and \mathfrak{c} . \aleph_0 is the potency of the natural finite numbers; it is also

the number of rationals between 0 and 1, and is the smallest transfinite cardinal. c is the number of the continuum, i.e. of the points on a straight line as conceived by Euclid and modern analysis. Arithmetically it may be defined as the number of the irrationals between 0 and 1. The irrationals are limits of converging series. c is also the number of points on the whole line, in any area in the whole plane, or in n -dimensional space ($c^n = c$).

The following relations hold where m is a finite integer:—

$$\aleph_0 + m = \aleph_0; m\aleph_0 = \aleph_0; \aleph_0^m = \aleph_0; c = 2^{\aleph_0} \text{ and is } > \aleph_0; \\ c + m = c; c + \aleph_0 = c, mc = c, c\aleph_0 = c, c^n = c.$$

Order Types.—A transfinite cardinal number can be identified only by the order-type by which an aggregate may be arranged ‘in simple order,’ i.e. so that every member is before or behind any other member. The best-known transfinite order-types are ω , that of the positive integers in natural order; $^*\omega$, the reverse of ω ; η , that of the rationals between 0 and 1 in their usual order; and θ , that of the continuum, the real numbers from 0 to 1. These order-types, though having the origin mentioned, are defined by certain general conceptions independent of their particular applications. All aggregates that may be arranged by the same order-type have the same cardinal number, and conversely. The same aggregate may have different order-types (e.g., the rationals between 0 and 1 may be arranged in order η or ω), but this is not true of finite aggregates.

ω is defined as the order-type of any simply ordered aggregate N possessing the following properties: 1. N has a first member. 2. N has no last member. 3. Any part of N lying between any two members is a finite

aggregate. $^*\omega$ is defined by interchanging 'first' and 'last' in the definition of ω .

η is defined as the order-type of any simply ordered aggregate R possessing the following properties: 1. The number of R is \aleph_0 , i.e. it is 'enumerable.' 2. There is no first and no last member. 3. Between any two members lies another, i.e., the series is 'compact' or 'everywhere-dense.'

θ is defined as the order-type of any simply ordered aggregate K possessing these properties: 1. In K there exists an aggregate R of order-type η , so that between any two K 's there lies an R . 2. K is closed, i.e. every sequence in K has a limit which is a member of K . 3. K is dense-in-itself, i.e. every member of K is the limit of a sequence in K . (A sequence is defined as an aggregate of order-type ω or $^*\omega$. Let S be such a sequence in K ; then p is said to be a limit of S , if (a) p does not lie between any two members of S ; (b) between p and any member of S there lies another S .)

\aleph_0 is identified as the cardinal number of an aggregate, possessing the order-type ω . c is the cardinal number of an aggregate possessing the order-type θ . The above definitions of ω , η , θ are shown by Cantor to be unique, i.e. any two aggregates possessing one of these order-types are equivalent.

'Addition,' 'multiplication,' 'greater,' and 'less' may be suitably defined for order-types, and on this account order-types are called ordinal numbers.

Cantor further postulates the existence of a series of transfinite cardinals (Aleph-numbers) and ordinals, each greater than its predecessors. Of this series little as yet is known. ω is the smallest transfinite ordinal.

[In writing the above brief and inadequate sketch of a portion of Cantor's theory of the transfinite, I am chiefly indebted to Cantor's exposition in *Math. Ann.* xlv., xlix., and to Hobson's *Theory of Functions*, chaps. i. and iii.

I recommend either of these as a good introduction to this profound subject. I have also referred to Young's *Theory of Sets of Points*, to two articles by Huntington in *The Annals of Mathematics* on *The Continuum as a Type of Order* (July-October, 1905), and, of course, to Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. Dedekind's theory of number is virtually the same as Cantor's, though his terminology is quite different. See *Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?* by R. Dedekind (Eng. trans. called *Essays on Number*).]

II.

The philosophic investigation of the ultimate structure of Space, Time, and Matter must in future keep in touch with the modern theory of the Transfinite and with non-Euclidean methods in Geometry.¹ Both of these are generalizations of orthodox mathematical conceptions, which are themselves generalizations of more primitive perceptions of Space, Time, and Number. The only *essential* tests of the actuality of a generalization are absence of contradiction, and verification by perceptual observations of different kinds by different persons. It is clear that such verifications can never be complete, and our perceptions are so limited that many different generalizations may be verified thereby. Practically, therefore, and for economic reasons, the most obvious and simplest generalizations are accepted by scientists; on this account we prefer the Copernican Astronomy, the Dynamics of Newton and Galileo, and Euclidean Geometry to any more complex hypotheses that might agree with the most accurate observations possible. This is the truth in Poincaré's doctrine that different geometries are conventions, but it is an error (that of Pragmatism) to suppose that they are all true, except in the sense that we do not know *a priori* which is true. The old *a priori* theory, whether intuitional or rational, is now exploded—a

¹ Non-Euclidean methods do not assert that actual space is non-Euclidean; they treat all Spaces, in-

cluding Euclidean, as hypothetical structures logically definable.†

result due primarily to a confluence of Cantor-Dedekind logic with non-Euclidean Geometry.

The theory of the transfinite has a very practical meaning, because it is required to justify the common belief that Space and Time are actually unlimited, infinitely divisible, and continuous; we are no longer compelled to fall back on the Kantian doctrine that the material world is undetermined as regards quantity or number, since this doctrine is based on the erroneous supposition that its opposite is self-contradictory; nor can we accept the Hegelian dogma that an infinite *Menge* of actually existing parts is a false and unreal abstraction.¹ Both those views are due to allowing imagination to usurp the place of reason, the old error of 'psychological philosophies'; an error from which Kant, and even Hegel, when dealing with Number and Quantity, seem to have been unable to escape.

ACTUAL SPACE AND TIME.

Spaces have been distinguished as psychological, physiological,² and mathematical; the developed mathematical conception will serve as a starting-point. Now, Space is either a simple whole, containing no parts, or it is a *complex of distinct inter-related entities*;³ in the first case it is pure abstract Being, and there is nothing to know about it; we are therefore obliged to accept the second alternative. These entities must, moreover, be invested with the category of simplicity, but they are not necessarily points; definite lines, planes, and volumes may be conceived either as simple parts or as complex wholes—they are, in fact, *both*. A philosophical theory of Space

¹ See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, on Quantity, chap. I., A. *sub fin.*

² See Mach, *Space and Geometry* (Eng. trans.).

³ This is true on any theory of Space, realistic, rational, or intuitional.

must start with a set of these simples (say points) as indefinable, together with a few indefinable relations; any defined group of these related entities would then be conceived as a complex whole, but this complex whole (say a line) is also simple, as having a specific character different from anything else. In this way certain of the simple parts of Space are represented as complex groups of other simple parts. We might start with volumes, areas, or lines as our simples, and define points as complexes—the last is done, e.g. in reciprocational geometry.¹ Simple and complex are not mutually exclusive, since every actual entity has both properties. The simple non-complex (the atom) is non-existent, and the complex non-simple appears, on analysis, to be the same conception, and to vanish into nothing. Any entity accepted by mathematicians as having a distinct meaning and existence may provisionally be accepted as ‘simple’; I am therefore justified in assuming provisionally that actual Space is a complex of inter-related entities called points, while recognizing that this is an unavoidable abstraction, since actual Space is filled with heterogeneous matter.² In like manner, I shall assume that actual time is a one-dimensional complex of entities called instants, postponing for the present the consideration of the relation between instants and their eventual content.

Compactness of Space and Time.—A series is said to be compact when no two members of the series are *next* to

¹ When lines are taken as simples, points are defined as intersections of two lines; when volumes or areas are taken as simples, points and lines are defined as limits of volumes or areas, &c.

² It is almost certain, as Descartes

and Leibniz believed, that the structure of Space and the structure of matter are inseparable problems; but we shall have to wait long for a genius who will combine the two by a satisfactory hypothesis.

each other, i.e. when between any two there lies another. Thus the rational numbers form a compact series, and so do the real numbers. The compactness of Space is here taken to signify that there are no points *next* to each other; of Time, that there is no instant directly preceding, or directly succeeding, any given instant. Pure mathematicians have, I believe, always assumed (unconsciously) that Space is compact; and the compactness of Time is a presupposition of modern dynamics. It follows that the *number* of points between any two points on a straight line, and the number of instants between any two instants, are not less than the transfinite number \aleph_0 . But the axiom of compactness is not given by *a priori* intuition, as Kant supposed, nor by reason, as Leibniz thought; it is partly a generalization of intuitional experiences, partly verified by the dynamical axiom that uninterrupted motion at different velocities is possible, and is partly a device for explaining unknown causal agencies. We cannot imagine two points next to each other, but we can conceive it; intuition merely fails to present to us an example of it, but it does not present us with the universal truth of the compactness of Space or Time. The axiom as regards Space appears to be a hypothetical generalization of experiences like the following:—If two luminous ‘points’ are perceived as distinct, we perceive that there is a distance or extension between them; if no such distance is perceived, the ‘points’ are either apprehended as *one*, or as a short luminous line; though closer or microscopical scrutiny may show that there are several parts where we only perceived one (the *minimum visibile*). The *minimum visibile* itself has, I believe, the appearance of extension—not merely of intension. These things may be verified by looking at light through one or more pin-holes, and gradually receding until a pin-hole is only just visible, or until two pin-holes run into each other. If

the *minimum visibile* is extended, intuition does not even assure us of the existence of points. *The axiom of the compactness of Space is thus a hypothetical extension beyond experience of a law never refuted by experience.* It can only be justified by the admission that the transfinite number \aleph_0 is actualized. The objection raised by some (following the Kantian method) that the number is neither finite nor infinite, but indefinite, means either that we do not know *a priori* what number of points, finite or transfinite, lies between two points—with which I agree—or it means that only so many points exist as the geometer chooses to imagine. The latter view leads to the absurd conclusion that the objects and laws of geometry are arbitrarily created by the observer at the moment of observation. The idea that endless subdivision is only a possibility is a lame device, since the possibilities of subdivision are *actual* properties of Space, and must again be either finite or infinite in number. In the case of matter the possibility doctrine is accepted by Hegel, following Aristotle, and Kant's solution is quite similar. It originates in the naïve assumption, quite unconscious in Hegel, that all that *is* can be presented in a single perception.

The subdivision of actual Space and the subdivision of Matter raise, I believe, equivalent problems. Admitting this, we see that the compactness of Space is assumed as a device for explaining unknown causal agencies by spatial movements of molecules, and physicists claim the right to assume that subdivision is not limited *a priori*. On the other hand, it is not fully recognized that in any given volume there may be a transfinite number of material particles (centres of force), though this is indeed assumed by Hertz in his highly philosophical system of Dynamics.¹

The compactness of Time is also assumed as a device

¹ Hertz's Dynamics, sect. 5.

for explaining the causality of change (cf. Kant). It is, however, by no means certain that there is no least change of a phenomenon, and the interpolation of states only shifts the difficulty without abolishing it. We cannot understand change, we can only describe it.

The strongest argument—and one I believe hitherto overlooked—for the compactness of both Space and Time is dynamical, being derived from the possibility of uninterrupted motion at different velocities. Experience seems to give numberless instances of this possibility. A little psychology, indeed, proves that these experiences may be deceptive, but they need not be rejected if they can be made consistent. *Uninterrupted* motion of a body or particle is most simply described as the occupation in spatial order of different positions in different instants. In moving over the space S during the time-interval T , the body occupies a different position in S at each instant in T ; and, conversely, it occupies each position in S at some instant in T . If the first condition is not fulfilled, the motion is interrupted, for the body must remain at some of the positions in S for two or more instants. If the second condition is not fulfilled, the body must *jump* one or more positions, but we may provisionally reject this case. It follows that the number of instants in T is equal to the number of instants in S . If this number is finite, it is clear that the body could not move over S in a smaller time than T without jumping, and that, if it takes a longer time than T to move over S , its motion is interrupted.

It follows that, *if the number of points in a spatial distance is finite—and Space therefore non-compact—uninterrupted motion is possible with only one velocity, and this is the maximum velocity for any kind of motion.* Now the consequent of the above hypothesis is quite conceivable, and it may be true—though it is not imaginable—but we are not obliged

to accept it, and it is commonly rejected. If it were accepted, the fundamental laws of Dynamics—especially Newton's first law—would have to be modified. But its rejection is justified only by admitting the actuality of the conception of transfinite numbers. If both S and T contain \aleph_0 elements, then the positions in S and the instants in T may be correlated by a one-to-one correspondence, which is actualized in uninterrupted motion by the occupation by a body of all the successive positions in S at different instants of T . If S_1 is a part of S , and S a part of S_2 , the number of positions in S and S_1 may be \aleph_0 , and therefore the positions in either may be correlated with the instants in T , whose number is also \aleph_0 ; in this case uninterrupted motions with different velocities are possible. It must be remembered that, though the cardinal number need not be greater than \aleph_0 (the cardinal number of natural finite numbers), the order must be different from that of the natural numbers (ω), which do not form a compact series. The order-type might be that of the rationals (η), but is not necessarily as great as that of the continuum (θ).

Continuity.—The conception of the Continuity of Space and Time, of which the straight line is typical, is described by Dedekind¹ somewhat as follows. A straight line contains all the rational points starting from an arbitrary point O —i.e. if we take any unit, there are points on the line corresponding to whole numbers and fractions. But the straight line contains also the irrational points, which are interpolated as follows:—If all the rational numbers are divided by any rule into two classes, J and K , such that every J is less than every K , then there exist on the straight line points corresponding to these numbers, viz., two classes L and R , such that every L is to the left of

¹ *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen* (English translation entitled *Essays on Numbers*).

every R . Now, Dedekind's axiom asserts that *there exists on the line one point, and only one, that is not to the left of any L , and not to the right of any R* . If this point is a member of L , it is to the right of every other L ; if it is a member of R , it is to the left of every other R ; if it is not a member of either L or R , it corresponds to an irrational number and is interpolated between L and R . For example, let J be the class of rationals whose squares are less than 2, and K the class of rationals whose squares are greater than 2; then, according to Dedekind's axiom, there is one point between these two classes—this is symbolized by $\sqrt{2}$. The irrationals include real non-rational roots of algebraic equations and also transcendental numbers (like e^x , $\sin x$), both of which are defined by known laws of approximation. Suppose $u_0 + u_1 + \dots + u_n + \dots$ is a convergent sequence having no rational limit. Let L be the class of rationals such that if x is an L , then an integer r can be found so that $u_0 + u_1 + \dots + u_r$ is greater than x ; then the remaining rationals are the class R , and Dedekind's axiom asserts that there exists a point between L and R . This point, or more generally the number corresponding to it, may be defined as the limit of the sequence.

The above axiom contains the whole secret of 'incommensurables.' It may be shown with the most elegant logical precision, far exceeding the evidence of intuition, that irrationals and rationals together obey the ordinary laws of arithmetic, the operations being suitably defined. Euclid assumes a general form of it in his doctrine of proportion in the unexpressed axiom that any three lines have a fourth proportional. In Cartesian geometry, in the drawing of graphs, it is widely assumed in the axiom, for example, that if a pair of rational points can be found on opposite sides of a line P on the curve $y = f(x)$ so that the distance between the points is smaller

than any assignable rational, then the curve cuts P in the neighbourhood.

The generalization of Dedekind's axiom, expressing the continuity of Space, as a whole, as assumed in the integral calculus, is the following :—If the finite numbers with which we are dealing represent definite spatial entities of any kind (volumes, areas, angles, distances, positions, &c.), there exists in Space one spatial entity, and one only, of the same kind, corresponding to the limit of every convergent sequence.

Cantor's exposition of Continuity is substantially the same as Dedekind's, but more general and free from intuitional terminology. It is defined by the order-type θ (see p. 403). The single limit to every sequence is equivalent to Dedekind's unique point.

The ordinary mathematical conception of the straight line and Space presupposes the actualization of this number c , and assumes that one-dimensional Space and Time, in their natural order, possess the order-type θ .

Are actual Space and Time continuous in the above sense? There are only four possibilities naturally suggesting themselves. 1. The number of points on any line AB is finite. 2. The number is equal to \aleph_0 , and the ordinal arrangement is that of the rational numbers (η). 3. The number is equal to c , and the ordinal arrangement is that of the continuum (θ). 4. The number is greater than c . Space would then be super-continuous. The last hypothesis assumes the existence of infinitesimal segments, which are rejected in Dedekind's axiom, as well as in the axiom of Archimedes, which asserts that if AB , CD are any two lengths a *finite* integer may be found so that $n AB > CD$. In this case the irrational points, and possibly the rationals also, will be represented by sets of points instead of by single points. The first of these alternatives has been considered in reference to compactness.

The fourth is never assumed by mathematicians or by *a priori* intuitionists, and though it may be actually true, it is, I believe, incapable of verification or refutation. It will be conceded that the second and third alternatives are the most interesting to consider. For convenience we may fix our attention on Dedekind's axiom as the definition of continuity.

The *a priori* intuitionists, following the Greeks, claim that the continuity of Space is made self-evident through geometrical construction. Given the rational points on a line, we can construct (they say) the irrational: e.g. the point corresponding to $\sqrt{2}$ may be formed, in the well-known way, as the intersection of the line with a circle. [Let $OA = 1$; draw AB perpendicular to OA and equal to it; with O as centre and OB as radius, describe a circle cutting OA in C , then C is $\sqrt{2}$.] But the possibility of the construction unfortunately assumes the conclusion which the construction professes to prove, viz., that the circle cuts OA . There is no immediate evidence for this of an *a priori* nature. The intuitionist may assert that it is obvious. I reply that it is obvious that the intuitionist is deceiving himself. Practical mathematical experience is satisfied with the admission that we may approximate to such a point, and analysis shows *that there may be no actual spatial limit to such approximation*. The pure Space of the intuitionists is a beautiful dream, an idealization of the fragmentary suggestions of experience. The most accurate investigations of which man is capable are quite consistent with the assumption that no single point separates the classes L and R in Dedekind's axiom (discontinuity), or that several such points exist (supercontinuity), forming together an infinitesimal segment.¹

¹ c is defined as the cardinal number (or potency) of the rationals and irrationals between 0 and 1. Since the number of the rationals is \aleph_0 , the number of irrationals is c ($c = c + \aleph_0$). Suppose κ points on the actual straight

That geometrical construction is a broken reed is further shown by its limitations. Numerical equations of finite degree may be approximately solved to any required degree of accuracy, but that there exist single points on the axis of x corresponding to the assumed limits (algebraic numbers) of these approximations, cannot be established by geometric construction, nor is it self-evident. The existence of points corresponding to trigonometrical functions cannot be shown to be self-evident; much less can points corresponding to transcendental non-trigonometrical numbers like e^x , $\log x$, &c., or any arbitrary converging series.

On the other hand, there is no evidence against Dedekind's axiom. If a pair of points, of which one belongs to L and the other to R , may be found such that their distance is less than any assignable quantity, it is natural enough to assume that there either exists one point separating L and R , or several points forming an infinitesimal segment I . The second alternative it is natural to reject, because we generalize our intuitions of Space so as to apply them on a scale, however small, just as astronomy and molecular physics assume that general dynamical laws are independent of size; it then follows that if I exists, its points are in linear order; and yet the distance between any two is zero, since I lies between L and R . Hence it is concluded there is only one point in I .

The continuity of Space is, then, a useful and simple hypothesis, and to reject it would make geometrical reasoning cumbersome and inelegant, and would apparently yield no practical advantage. The applications of geometry do not, of course, assume this hypothesis.

line correspond to each irrational or converging series, then the line contains nc points; if n is finite or less than c , $nc = c$. If n is transfinite and

greater than c , $nc = n$. Thus for some cases of super-continuity the number of points is c , for others it is greater than c .

Philosophy further cannot accept it as a dogma, since it is not self-evident either to intuition or to reason.

The continuity of Time is deducible from the continuity of Space, if the possibility of uninterrupted motions at different velocities is admitted. This connexion has been discussed above in reference to compactness. Such motion implies an actual one-to-one correspondence between a space-distance S and a time-interval T . Hence the order-types and cardinal numbers of S and T must be the same. Therefore, if S is a continuum, so is T .

III.

There are other interesting problems connected with the above. Are there outer limits to Space, Time, and Matter? The intuitive imagination, in dealing with this question, struggles in a hopeless contradiction, for it constantly sets up limits and knocks them down again. The contradiction proves that intuition cannot give us a proper knowledge of Space and Time. If Space and Time are merely forms of intuition, they are self-contradictory; therefore we should accept the natural and simplest solution that they are *not* merely forms of intuition. Kant, strangely enough, draws the exactly opposite conclusion, but this, besides being unnecessary, is a relapse into Berkeleianism. The only satisfactory way of considering the above problem as regards Space is to determine what forms of geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean, are verified by our limited experiences. Astronomy and the microscope have verified, on a large and small scale respectively, that Space is approximately Euclidean, but no absolute solution can be given.

What is the relation between actual Space and Matter? It seems that the answer to this will be a more logical revival of the doctrines of Descartes and Leibniz.

REGINALD A. P. ROGERS.

CORRECTIONS OF HORACE'S *SATIRES*, BK. II,
AND AN EMENDATION OF THE *CULEX* 368.

HORACE, *Satires*, Book II

I.—ii. 9 *seq.* :—

leporem sectatus equone	10.
lassus ab indomito uel (si Romana fatigat	10.
militia adsuetum graecari) seu pila uelox	
molliter austerum studio fallente laborem	
seu te discus agit, <i>pete cedentem aera disco</i>	
cum labor extuderit fastidia, siccus inanis	
sperne cibum uilem; nisi Hymettia mella Falerno	15
ne biberis diluta.	

SMALL wonder that Lambinus said of this passage. "totus hic locus videtur claudicare." The best that he could do with it was to supply *lude pila* after *laborem*, and to carry the sense of *agit* back over it to the previous clause. Lambinus obtained symmetry at the expense of lucidity: his modern successors have preferred to rest on the easier couch of anacoluthon. They take the words in italics as an address, superfluous in any case, either to one who is engaged in, or to one who is attracted by, the exercise of the quoit. Prepossessions apart, it is incontestable that the connexion of thought between "*leporem—agit*" and "*sperne cibum uilem*" e. q. s. is intimate, and should be obvious. After "*leporem sectatus*," "*equo lassus ab indomito*," "*uel (si Romana fatigat militia a. gr.) seu pila—uelox seu te discus agit*," a third perfect participle, or its equivalent, is necessary, in order that we may pass to the conclusion in "*cum labor extuderit fastidia, siccus inanis sperne cibum uilem*." Just as the first half of the context

posits that you must have had your fill of the Roman exercise of your choice, so the second half must posit that you must have had your fill of your choice among Greek exercises if for these is your preference. This participle or its equivalent has to be obtained, *coûte que coûte*, if the passage is to regain coherence; but the cost should be kept as low as possible.

Let us, then, consider how much of the tradition is superfluous or worse. First, no fault can be found with "seu te discus agit," if only it be properly understood. As I have pointed out,¹ *discus* means *studium disci*, and *agit* is used as in Prop. I. 13, 28 "te tuus ardor *aget*." Further, these words or their like are required to provide a second alternative in the field of Greek athletics. The flaw, then, is in the conclusion of the line. There is evidently no ground to suspect this of graphical corruption; it makes perfect sense, though that sense is out of place. If, then, they are not the words of the poet, they are an interpolation. Interpolations are hardly ever destitute of motive. A motive must be sought for here; and the hypothesis which I am about to submit will supply one. I suggest that under the verse

molliter austerum studio fallente laborem

there stood originally the verse

seu te discus agit ludo satiatus utrouis,

or one of similar form and meaning, and that the scribe's eye slipped from the *ludo* he was about to copy to the *studio* immediately above, which resembled it, so that he copied the rest of that line twice. In exactly the same way the eye of the scribe of Lucretius I. 1022 sq. strayed from the *quaeque* in 1023 to the *quaeque* in 1022; and he wrote down "nec quos quaeque sagaci mente locarunt"

¹ "Flaws in Classical Research," p. 12 (Proc. of the British Academy, 1908).

in place of "nec quos quaeque darent motus pepigere profecto." Next came the "improver," who, taking his cue from *discus*, substituted for the obviously impossible repetition of "studio fallente laborem" the present ending of the verse.

The supplement does not profess to be certain; but *ludo* is required by sense and the theory of the corruption, and *utrouis* by the sense. *satiatus* I have taken from Tibullus II. 1. 51 sq. "agricola adsiduo primum *satiatus* aratro | cantauit certo rustica uerba pede."

2.—*Ib.* iii. 11 :—

quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro,
Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos?
inuidiam placare paras virtute relictā?
contemnere miser.

The variant for *tantos*, which stands in the scholion at Pers. III. 21, neglected in the last Teubner edition, might perhaps be regarded as negligible if the MS. tradition were satisfactory. But its weakness is apparent, nor does it reassure us to discover that commentators disagree hopelessly about its interpretation, some explaining it as "tam praestantes," others as "tam grandes," others again as "tot." Now *quin tu*, on the one hand, may very well have come from *quanti*, and *tantos*, on the other, from *tantī*, while the confusion of *tantus* and *quantus* is of the commonest. *tantī* with a stop after *educere* would make excellent sense: "Will you leave virtue and propitiate envy at such a price?" The removal of the word to the following sentence will restore to the first one the concinnity which Bentley desiderated when he proposed *Archilochō*.

3.—*Ib.* 1. 142 :—

Pauper Opimius argenti positi intus et auri.

So the MSS. and the editors almost without exception, in flagrant contradiction of the facts; for Opimius was

not poor, but rich and miserly. Peerlkamp's correction "argento posito intus et auro" cures the evil, but does not account for its appearance. Besides, we look for a preposition to play the same part as *inter* does at *Carm.* III. 16, 28 "magnas inter opes inops." Insert *in* before *posito*, and Peerlkamp's proposal becomes acceptable. Its use can be exactly paralleled from *Ep.* II. 2, 12 "meo sum pauper *in* aere," "poor, but not in debt": and the elision from v. 134 of this satire "an tu reris eum *occisa* insanisse parente." The corruption can now be accounted for; *in* written *ĩ* became *i*, which was tacked on to *argento*, and then *auro* and *posito* accommodated to the supposed genitive.

4.—*Ib.* v. 79:—

uenit enim magnum donandi parca iuuentus
nec tantum ueneris quantum studiosa culinae.

magnum donare means 'to give a large amount': for example, 'a cool thousand,' as we say; though editors appear to think it may stand for *multa donare*. But apart from this 'chary of giving a large sum or large sums' is not a natural expression. The line, however, only needs repunctuation to set it right:

uenit enim (magnum) donandi parca iuuentus.

magnum is a parenthetical insertion like *indignum* (which, indeed, has been proposed here) in *Ov. Am.* i. 6. 1, 'Iani-
tor (indignum) dura religate catena.' Its sense is that of *S.* i. 4. 9 sq., 'in hora saepe ducentos, | ut magnum, uersus dictabat,' 'an important matter.' The error seems to have arisen from a wish to provide *donare* with an object; but the absolute use of the verbal noun is quite unobjectionable. Compare, *si tanti est*, *Prop.* iii. 12, 13, 'nulla est *poscendi*, nulla est reuerentia *dandi*.'

5.—*Ib.* vi. 59:—

Perditur haec inter misero lux non sine uotis.

This is the only place in a text of the classical era where *perdere* has to provide a passive from its own resources. Ignatius and Augustine are cited to support its use by Horace. We might as well quote Dickens to substantiate a suspicious reading in Shakespeare, or, to come nearer to our text, defend “cumque” in *Carm.* i. 32 fin. by the Christian verses which Pope Honorius the First in the seventh century had engraved on the great door of the Vatican (as is done in *Archiv f. lat. Lexicographie*, xv. 578). But *perditur* owes the retention of its ill-gotten place not so much to its own merit as to the demerits of its rivals. Common sense perceives that the author suffers when *perditur* is exchanged for *porgitur* or *proditur*.

To avoid this loss, I offer what will strengthen rather than weaken the Horatian force of expression—the compound *disperit*. Attention to the context will show that the gravamen of the poet’s complaint is that his day is wasted in a number of trivial *reculae*; and for this waste or dissipation *disperit* is the most appropriate word, as we may see from more than one passage: *Lucr.* III. 702 sqq. “*dispertitus enim per caulas corporis omnis | ut cibus, in membra atque artus cum diditur omnis, | disperit*”; *v.* 1421 sq. “*et tamen inter eos distractam sanguine multo | disperiisse.*” So in *Cic. Agr.* i. 2, the active *disperdere* is coupled with *dissipare*. Here the corruption may have arisen from a gloss or other importation of the vulgar form, or simply from anagrammatism.

POSTSCRIPT to iii. 11. *quanti!* ‘at how great a cost!’ is also possible, and perhaps preferable to *tanti*.

CULEX 368.¹

In the piece of versification which some have attributed to the youthful genius of Virgil, there occurs a line which has, not without reason, been regarded as desperate. In the previous one the name of Curius Dentatus is added to the roll of the military heroes of Rome—

hic Curius clarae socius uirtutis.

This verse ends with *et ille*; and the next line stands thus in the MSS.—

Flam(m)inius deuota dedit qui corpora flammae.

This 'Flamminius' or 'Flaminius' who consigned to flames a body or bodies (for in poetry the plural is ambiguous) is otherwise unknown. Hence the line has been variously corrected. Nicolas Loensis proposed *Caecilius* for *Flaminius*, and *lumina* for *corpora*, taking the allusion to be to L. Caecilius Metellus, the rescuer of the Palladium in B.C. 241. Professor Ellis also (*American Journal of Philology*, xxvi. 437 sqq.) refers the line to the same story, reading *flaminio*, the dative of *flaminium*, constructing this dative with *deuota*, and explaining as follows:—'the hero who devoted his body to his priestly function, and delivered it to the flame, thereby endangering his claim to retain his priestly office, owing to the damage his body had sustained.' Professor Ellis is aware that Metellus was *pontifex*, and not *flam:m*; but he is of opinion that *flaminium* can be used in the sense of *sacerdotium*.

That is Professor Ellis's positive contribution to the solution of the problem. He has also a negative one, to which I come next. This is a criticism of Professor Housman's emendation in *Classical Review*, xvi. 345, which

¹ This note was originally communicated to the Cambridge Philological Society on March 5th, 1908.

runs as follows:—*graminibus deuincta gerit qui tempora Flamma*, 'Flamma, who wears the grass crown round his brows,' the allusion being to one Calpurnius Flamma, a military tribune, who gained the *corona graminea* by a heroic achievement in Sicily during the Punic wars.

This proposal is impugned on two grounds—the first, that this Flamma's performance was 'obscure'; and the second, that the emendation cannot be accepted, because out of six words in the line it leaves but one unaltered. Professor Ellis's first objection cannot be sustained¹; but his second is just, and, in fact, anticipated by the emender himself, who thus hurls his admission at the German adversary:—

"Six words in the verse, and I have altered five of them, so willkürlich, so unmethodisch, so subjectiv-ästhetisch is my criticism."

Of the five changes which he makes, two are easy and probable: *tempora* and *corpora* are words perpetually confused; and that the nominative of the proper name *Flamma* might with the greatest facility become the dative of the common one, everyone will allow. But *deuincta* is not particularly like *deuota*; so it is supposed to have come from *deuota* in 370. There is no reason on earth why *graminibus* should have become *Flamminius*, so its author would 'not wonder if a verse beginning with *Fabricius* had been lost between 367 and 368, and *Flaminius* were a mixture of *Fabricius* and *graminibus*'; and for the change of *dedit* to *gerit* he has nothing better to say than that it was probably a deliberate alteration consequent upon the other changes. This forward accumulation of improbabilities has obscured the real acuteness and propriety of

¹ Professor Housman quotes four passages, and more could have been given. One of these, Livy, Epit. xvii., is a host in itself. Out of seventeen lines allotted to the book by the summarizer, this incident has five. ;

the remainder of his restoration, which I would accept without demur, subject to the following modifications:—

Instead of *graminibus* I would write *gramineus*, instead of *deuincta* the two words *dis uota*, and I would retain *dedit*. *Gramineus* became *Flaminius* because it was taken for the subject of *dedit*; and ‘grassy,’ as the name of a person, was clearly unsuitable. The *Fl* most probably came from the end of the line. There were actually *Flaminii Flammae*. *Dis uota*, if read as one word, could not fail to become *denota*, the nearest Latin compound. Words are wrongly distributed at several places in the MSS. of the *Culex*, e.g. *cerbero* (-a) *numquam* for *Cerberon unquam* (270); *graues tuos* for *grauest uos* (295). And *d̄uortia* is written *deuortia* at 304.

The line will then run—

gramineus dis uota dedit qui tempora Flamma.

I pass to its explanation:—*gramineus* is used in a pregnant sense, ‘adorned’ or ‘wreathed with grass,’ not difficult to parallel for derivatives in *-eus*. See besides *aureus* and *argenteus*, used so even in Livy, x. 39, 13 ‘*auream olim atque argenteam Samnitium aciem a parente suo occidione occisam*’ (*aurata* scuta had just preceded), *ferreus* Propertius, iii. 12, 12 ‘*ferreus aurato neu cataphractus equo*,’ *pampineus* ‘wreathed in vine-tendrils,’ ‘*ratis pampinea*’ id. iii. 17. 26, *stamineus* in ‘*rota staminea*’ ‘fastened with a woollen thread’ id. iii. 6, 26. This meaning accounts for the construction of *tempora*, a ‘Greek accusative’ of part concerned, for which compare Propertius, iv. 8. 24 ‘*armillatos colla*¹ *Molossa canes*,’ and Statius, *Siluae* iii. 3. 3 ‘(Pietas) *uittata comam*.’ I come next to *uota dedit*. It is now matter of common knowledge that in Latin *dare* had the senses both of *διδόναι* and *τιθέναι*. At Tibullus i. 5. 16

¹ Less well constructed in apposition to *canes*.

'uota dedi' is apparently used for 'uota suscepi,' which is the usual meaning of *uota facere*, though for an instance of *uotum facere* in the sense of *uotum soluere* Mr. Warde Fowler refers me to C. I. L. III. 6253. But here it must be understood of 'paying a vow,' 'reddere uota.' Compare Ovid, Trist. iv. 2. 55 sq. (a reference which again I owe to Mr. Fowler), addressed to *Caesar triumphans*

inde petes arcem et delubra fauentia uotis
et dabitur merito laurea uota Ioui.

The construction of *tempora* with an adjective at some distance from it, in a context where no ambiguity is involved, is a phenomenon well known to students of Latin poetry.

J. P. POSTGATE.

LAUD'S MANUSCRIPT OF APULEIUS.

IN Helm's edition of the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius (1907), there are three places (p. 106. 5 : 108. 2 : 119. 1) in which mention is made of a Cod. Oxon. (called O by Hildebrand). All of these give excellent readings; and one of them (108. 2 *inserens*) seems almost certain, owing to the rhythm of the sentence. Two are found (as would appear) in the Oxford codex only: the other (119. 1 *opibus*) is recorded as existing in a MS. which belonged to Pareus¹ and is now, I believe, at Eton. This latter MS. seems to be a '*gemellus*' of the Oxford codex. Though the latter has been examined by Price, whose edition was published in 1650, and also by Jacob Gronovius, and a large number of its readings recorded in Oudendorp's great edition—from which they have passed to Hildebrand's—I thought it might not be unprofitable to look at the MS. cursorily to satisfy myself that it had no independent value beyond having the emendations of some unknown but clever scholars: and that seems the only value that the manuscript has. That it is derived ultimately from the Florentine MS. (F) is plain from the rubric at the very beginning of Book I.—viz. *Lutii Apuleij madaurensis methamorphoseon qui asinus aureus intitulatur liber primus Incipit feliciter. Salustius Rome emendauit* (see F at end of Book ix) *uel Apuleij platonici Mada. metha. incipit primus*: and there is nothing to lead one to think otherwise in any part of the codex which I have been able to examine.

¹ For Pareus, see Dr. Sandys's *Hist. of Class. Scholarship*, ii. 362.

The manuscript is No. 55 of Archbishop Laud's collection, and is now in the Bodleian. It contains the *Metamorphoses* only. It has 75 fol., each page of which contains about fifty lines of Helm's edition, so that a fol. contains about 100 lines. The space on each page occupied by the actual script is 7 by $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches. The titles at the beginning of each are in red by, I think, the first hand of the codex. Nearly every sentence, too, has a red dot to indicate its commencement.¹ There are also indications in red of the several parts of the story, e.g. 98. 4 *Indignatio Veneris* : 100. 3 *Psiche contempta a procis*. The MS. is attributed to the fourteenth-century : and this may be right.

It is annotated by three—perhaps four—hands. One (A) is a fairly clear but very minute hand, which writes grammatical notes. These I have not been always able to read ; but it is fairly certain that no assistance will be gained from them. The following are a few specimens (as far as I can read them) :—107. 6 “Suggestus -tus -tui a suggero -is est replicatio uestium uel aliorum pannorum quae sub principe geritur.” 127. 19 (the text gives *redam*, an error for *taedam*) “Reda a redo -is genus uehiculi ad eundum habilis et cum quatuor rotarum uel potius sic dicitur a rota quia rotas habuit nam antiqui uocabat [*sic*] illam rotam.” 1. 1 “Ymethus est insula quae dulcis dicitur propter nimios flores quibus semper abundat unde Ouidius üij Met. [= 7. 702] Vertice de summo semper flor-entis Ymethi,” after which a reference to Seneca [Phaedra 23] follows. 100. 16 “Millexii] i.e. apollinis sic dicti quia uel per mille annos fuerat uel mille populi ipsum colebant uel a cultore oraculi sic dicto.” On 275. 16 ff. he has

¹ Occasionally the sentences are wrongly divided, e.g. 108.17, *Tan-dem* begins a sentence : 112. 16 there is no stop between *mortalem* and *nuntio* : 126. 14 *Haec* begins a sentence. In 112. 10 *et* begins a sentence, as does 12 *certe*, 14 *et*, 15 *si texeris* and *si profanaueris* : 16 *nuncio* is joined to *mortalem* : 120. 17 new sentences at 17 *iam* and 19 *et*.

"Hic Lutius Apuleius qui diu in asinam speciem transformatus rosis comestis et assumptis ad propriam humanam speciem rediit," where note *Lutius Apuleius*.

A second annotator (B) writes a rather sprawling hand. He nearly always contents himself with appending in the margin rare words found in the text, e.g. 101.9 coragium : 113.15 incertans : 127.12 stellio : 139.16 diales : 151.21 causa finalis. In 146.16 he notices *toti dei*. At 115.10 (*septacula*) he has *coeptacula*. At 126.13 over *bonas* he has *boans*.

A third is a very clear and beautiful hand (C),¹ which professedly corrects the MS. from the received text. On 110. 4-6 where the words *quae* to *monilia* are omitted, it has "Hiatus uide uulg." To take a few examples. 110.13 the text gives *noctes* : C gives *uoces*. 112. 8 *lacrimae* Cod. : *lamiae* C. 112. 20 *semet nescit rudimento* Cod. : *sarcinae nescia rudimenta* C. Sometimes the Cod. gives the right reading, and C is in error, e.g. 139. 4 *muniebant* Cod. : *mouebant* C : 143. 7 *recolens* Cod. : *recalcans* C.

There is perhaps a fourth hand (D)—though it may possibly be the same as A—who writes glosses over words in the text: e.g. 106. 11 certatim] cum certa experientia : 109. 5 lautitiis] delicatis cibis : 111. 13 nec dum] i. non dum non adhuc : 120. 6 increbruit] offuscauit.

The following is the account of O which Price gives in the Preface to his ed. of the *Metamorphoses* : "Sequentes Libros contulimus cum uno tantum MS. Codice quem a nobis olim acceptum Gulielmus nuperus Cantuariæ Archiepiscopus (vir litteris ornandis attentissimus) donavit Oxoniensi Bibliothecæ. Ex eo penu instructissimo interventu Cl. longeque doctissimi viri, Patricii Iunii, illius ad nos fluxit temporaria usura." According to Bosscha, in his ed. of Oudendorp (iii. 541), Price bought

¹ In the collation given below, I have, all, given the marginal readings of B in some few cases, but by no means in and C.

the MS. in Venice in 1629. On the first page of the MS. is written *Liber Guil. Laud Archiepiscopi Cantuar. et Cancellar. Universit. Oxon.* 1637. The MS. called π by Hildebrand—otherwise called “Codex Anglicanus sive Parei sive Etonensis” (see Hildebrand Introd. lxxiv)¹ appears to be the most closely related of all the members of its class to the Oxford Codex.²

Both belong to the same class as the two Wolfenbüttel MSS. (G 1. 2) and the Dresdensis (D) (cp. Hildebrand lxi ff.). This may be seen from the following omissions: 103. 19–104. 1 (ed. Helm) [uel certe deus]: 110. 4–6 [quae . . . monilia]: 125. 24–25 [quae sola . . . eius]: 130. 13 [sacrarium miserandae]: 182. 8–14 [uerum paulo . . . cruciabat]; also from the following agreements: 110. 18 Incipit: 114. 13 confecto: 125. 11 Veneri lauanti natantique: 126. 12 cruciaries] pollueres: 126. 25 sagiptas (G 1. 2. O): 134. 11 frequenter (also in F): 140. 4 mutantium: 140. 7 praestantes] minantes (so F, as altered): 140. 13 ridens. There are very many more agreements, but they need not be mentioned.

¹ Some of the readings of π in the *Met.* were sent by the learned Cambridge scholar Wasse (see Dr. Sandys' *Hist. of Class. Scholarship*, ii. 412) to Oudendorp, who often quotes it as ‘Par.’

² The only MS. of Apuleius noticed by Dr. M. R. James, Provost of King's, in his *Catalogue of Manuscripts at Eton College* (1895), is No. 147. It contains a number of pictures which Dr. James describes at length (pp. 76–80). It belonged to Bernardo Bembi, as is explicitly stated on fol. 122 b. He was father of the great Pietro Bembi, and was the owner of the celebrated MS. of Terence. The Eton MS. contains the *Metamorphoses* and the *Florida*.

At the beginning of the notes on the *Florida* in Bosscha's Oudendorp,

Bosscha mentions, as one of the authorities for the *Florida*, a Codex Bembinus whose readings are due to Erycius Puteanus (see Dr. Sandys, op. cit. ii. 305). It is no doubt the same Bembinus as that which Hildebrand calls β , of which some few readings were sent to Elmenhorst (his ed. published 1621) by Puteanus, with a complaint that he had lent his full collation to a friend who had lost it (Hildebrand lxxiv). It would accordingly appear that π (the Pareus) and β (the Bembinus) are one and the same book, viz., the Eton Codex, No. 147. But until I can see that Eton Codex—which I hope to have an opportunity of inspecting at no distant date—I can say nothing positive.

Subjoined is a collation of the first hand¹ of the Oxford Codex of the Cupid and Psyche (Met. iv. 28-vi. 24) with Helm's 1907 edition. The double square brackets indicate that the word or words enclosed are omitted in O. I have added π to a few cases in which the agreement of O and π (as its readings are recorded by Hildebrand) is striking.²

Mere diversities of spelling have been rarely noticed, such as assimilations (e.g. *arrepto* for *adrepto*), *e* for *ae*, *h* added or omitted (e.g. *honustus* or *ordeo*), *th* for *t* (e.g. *thorum*), *y* for *i* (*Zephirus*), *Psychem* (for *-en*), *dampnum*, &c. O always has *formosus*, nearly always *cuntus* (for *cunctus*), and *imo* for *immo*.

96 17 conspicua

97 1 priore 2 [eam] 3 [uenerabantur] adorationibus crede-
rentur (π) 8 stellarum 10 sic in immensum 14 Cidon
15 Citharea 16 sacra die praeferuntur 16-17 [templa
praetereuntur] 18 uiduae] in die (*corr. by C*)

98 2 [et] 7 dixerit 7, 8 en] Hem 7 initialis] unalis
(*qu. = uernalis*) 13 circumferre puellam morituram 17 [eam]
21 sagiptis 26 psychem nuncupatur

99 1 obstende (*in margin ostendit by C*) 5 parentis et plenam
6 seueriter] uerenter 7 effici fragrantissimo 10 infirmi
12 oculis 16 et statim *inserted* moratus 17 corum
18 hypidus 19 Salatia 19 pallemioniam passim 20 per-
sulcantes conca sonanti 22 [inimici]

¹ In a very few cases mention is made of the other hands.

² Here are a few more: 1. 1 Milesio sermone [isto] O: π is reported to have isto, but qu. ? : 1. 6 [accipe] 27. 5 faciemque : 18 muscis] immistis : 19 uirgulis] uirgultis O ; uirgultis π : 28. 4 discurrunt : 5 undantur umbram O ; undantur umbram undam π (as re-

ported): 52. 7 [caelum] [securae] ; 53. 7 [omnibus] ; 53. 8 quibus] in quibus ; 53. 12 [densitate] ; 53. 20 [salutaris] ; 54. 25 habeatis ; 56. 11 adiectum ; 57. 16 cachinabat ; 58. 2 ferro ; 58. 4 subsidua ; 59. 1 abiecto ; 61. 11 lateris ; 61. 22 enim] ens. (So O, not *enim* as Hild. says ; F. also has *ens.*) : 184 10, ad nuptias.

430 LAUD'S MANUSCRIPT OF APULEIUS.

100 1 currus 3 prospicua 5 [laudatur ab omnibus]
8 positum (π) mirantur. Omnes enim due 10 diffamare
12 corpore animi audacia 16 and 19 millexii (-e) 17 [a]
uictime 21 rex, siste] subsiste 23 mortali (*above line* mascali
by A)

101 1 quod]qui 2 [et] 5 piger ac tristisque 9 coragium
10-11 cinerem arcēscit 11 gigie 12 Ludii modum] lidium
13 ullulatu nupta 14 afferte (π) 15 congemens 16 ei
dicitur (π) 18 psychem 20 perducitur 21 physiche
24 adhortatur

102 6 et gentes et 8 [iam] 10 periisse 11 nuptias
istas 13 detracto uenientem qui totius orbis exitio 19 [prae]-
luxerant extinctas 22 astrusi noctis se 23 trepi-
dantem

103 2 uibratis leuata 3 uehens 7 Sychem herboreis
rosidi 12 probe 14 sciens 15 te] se 16 et]de
18 [aliis] 19 prorsus magnae artis *inserted* [uel certe deus]

104 1 effetauit 4 super] semper 8 cubiculum 9 balnee
13 prius 15 proletante miratur 16 orrea 21 uolun-
tate uisendi 24 lapsitudinem

105 1 familie 6 cenatorum 14 modulatae] in modum
auribus 15 ut] et chorus] quorum 16 pareret 17 demens
(*corr. by C*) 18, 19 pro tanta] prompta (*corr. by C*) ignorantur

106 2 prospere statimque 5 redditum] rerum 10 cog-
nouerant 12 affatimque 14 ius] ille¹ 20 respondeas
23 sese facturum

107 1 dilapsa 6 posse 7 uberrime (π) 9 accumbens
12 perfida (perdia *in marg. by C*) 13 amplexus] aspectus
14 parabo (*in marg. pareto by C*) 23 curiositate] cupiditate (π)
24 pensum deiciat 27 [et] 28 quicunque] *over this is*
written what looks like omnem qui *by A or D* atque

108 1 suasoria] sua sororia 2 iungens] inserens (ingerens
F φ) cogentia] cohibentia 5 Ueneris usus 8 per-
cuntate 10 deflebant plangebant] percutiebant (π)

¹ Here π is reported to have *et nihil auribus nihil sentiebat*.

11 ululatibus cauthisque 13 delapsa 14 praecurrit
15 miseris 16 quam] quare 19 praecepti 21 eas
23 lacrimine (*whence Oud. conj. lacrimulae*) pro letante

109 2 animas et cum locumque 4 populosam] populos
atque 7, 8 nutriuerunt 8 [satis] 9 [curioseque]
10 [quisue uel qualis] ipsius] eius 11 Psyche tñ (*or perhaps*
tā) [illud] [ullo pacto] 12 [uel . . . exigit] 13 spetiosum
lanoso 16 labe] labile (*in marg. -be by C*) 19, 20 redeunt[es]
redeunt habes (*habe is underlined and in marg. by D or A he*)
20 fragrant[es] 23 hem 24 progenitae 25 En] sub-
stineremus

110 1 exteriores (π) 4-6 [quae nec monilia] 6 ueste
7 splendidant 10 consuetudine ut in affectione 11 roborata
13 sperat uoces] noctes (*corr. by C*) 15 dein] deinde
16 seris 18 Incipit [etiam] 19 hec 20 substineo
22 cathaplasmatibus 24 medicae

111 1 substinere 2 collapsam 4 obstentationis 7 exhibi-
larique 8 deiecto (π). At 12 [salute] (*added in marg. by C*)
13 necdum 20 firmiores redeamus] fortiores reddamus uel
firmiores¹ 21 duobus 23 merebant 24 si pauentes
quoque redulcerato] reuulnerato 25 prorsus 26 concedunt
26, 27 [dolum . . . insontem] (π)

112 4 congregientur 8 post hanc (π) lacrimae (*in marg.*
Lamiae by C) 10 id] ideo 14 infantillus (*i by a different hand*)
20 sarcinae nesciae] semet nescit (*sarcinae nescia C in marg.*)
21 incrementum locupleti

113 3 imminet] et 7 sorores tue urgemur 8 misere
11 inter nociuum (*in marg. internecium by B*) hodium 12 cal.
cati 13 more 17 documento nunc] nec 19 fungatur]
fugantur 20 tue salutem redde conspectu (π) 21 cinameos
22 teretia 22 meis per pectus] perparatus (*with per partus*
written above it by B) 23 quos calorem 24 suplicis erogatus]
recreatus

¹ Oud. says: "Par Guelt pr. *fortiores* uel *firmiores reddamus*." He appears to be in error as regards G 1, which reads exactly as in O: see Hildebrand. Therefore we may conclude that π also agrees with O.

432 LAUD'S MANUSCRIPT OF APULEIUS.

114 5 [se] facturum 9 cum] animi 13 incunctatae]
in caritate confecto 14 praedam] domum 16 adulantur
17 [ita ut] pridie 19 [nos] 20 infantis aurei] in tantis
aureis qui] quod (π) 24 lapsitudine

115 1 uaporosis] uapore roseis 2 tucetis oblectant 3 thibias
4 coros 10 secta cuia] septacula (*in marg.* coeptacula *by* B)
18 redeunt] requierunt (π) altercantur 21 quem] qui¹
senectute formauit 23 mendacio

116 1 utrumque 4 adierit 6, 7 quam colorales² fallicias
8 inflamatis 9 turbatis mattutinis 11 hec haustu (*in marg.*
hoc astu *by* C) 19 Pythicae] psiche 22 eam bestiam de pastu
redeuntem 23 uadum

117 1 alimoniorum 2 praegnatione in tua 3 oppimio
4 [est] extimatio utrum pro sororibus pro 12 prorsus] quod
rursum 16 lurido 16 ternata semianimi subscerpens
20 uidetur 22 nouis 24 maritum

118 1 de] de sui 2 periculi tanti 4 corrumpit 5 Tunc
napte 6 macchine 9 [ne] 10 nullum 12 apulsu
16 tabule 17 sulcaturos intraens 21 minuens caecae] in uia
eris Eae (*qu.* ecce) 22 tui] animi oportunitatem lumine
24 eleuata nixu

119 1 praestolabimus (*with gloss* queremus) [manibus]
sociis] opibus (π) 7 pernici 10 similis defluctuat
12 facinorum 14 [est] 15 bestiam] serpentem bestiam
18 aderat primusque 20 fati] furi (*whence Oud. conj.* furiarum)

120 2 mutuauit 3 thorum 5 aspectum 8 deterrita
aspectu 9 descendit 11 temerariis 12 lapsa (π)
13 recreantur 14 genialem ambrosia 16 decorditer (π)
19 penne rosidae candidant alis 20 plumellae tremule]
temere 21 inquiete 24 sagipte 25 curiose pertractat

¹ Hildebrand reports "*candenti* desideratur in O." This is not so. It is written quite plainly. He may have meant the Dorvillianus, in which the word is omitted according to Ouden-

dorp.

² π is reported to have *cum coloribus*. In O there is a gloss *cum coloribus factas* by A.

121 1 rimatur 2 sagictam puncta 3 nixu 6 flagrans
7 ac] atque 9 sautia 16 inustus confestim exiliuit 17 detecta
oculis 18 aduolauit 20 euentionis

122 3 deuictam 5 sagiptarius 10 pernitiosi 11 ad
tutum 14 [uisu] 18 se[se] 20 uolamine 22-23 h Echo
montanam deam] hic canam deam 23 omninedas retinere
25 hyrcuosus sautiam 28 opilio

123 4, 5 nimio amore 5 [te] 6 acersito te 11 numine
12 cum aliquam] ante quam 13 die labente] delabente 19 quo]
quo (*qu* = quomodo) 23 conscio] consilio 24 mirum] uirum

124 2 uoluntate corporis (*in marg.* uoluptatis copia *by* C) 3 silicet
4 humerum 5 tu] tum obi] abi 6 diuerte 8 [iam mihi
confestim arreat] his 10 affaret 11 uexane 12, 13 uafre
concin nato] praeconcinato 14 conscendit 16 [me] 20 cautum
21 lasceratis bestiisque] atque bestiis

125 3 fallacia 7 circuibat at *inserted* 9 gania¹ 10 prope
11 Ueneri lauanti natantique propter assistens 12 uulnerum
13 iamque] quamquam omnem] eamquam 15 audite
16 secesseris hic per 19 *no lacuna* ingluuies 20 squallentium
21 filium 24 prome agedum] pro meo gradu (π) 24, 25 [sola
. . . quae] ingenuum

126 1 sine 5 puella [illum] 6 capere 7 uel] per
8 succumbam 9 [si] 13 bonas (*above line* boans *by* B)
16 dominae] deum 17 [meam] cruciaries] pollueres
17-19 [uerum . . . inimicam] 22 meliorem [me]
24 pinnulas (π) 25 sagiptas

127 5 parici diam 6 percusisti 7 maximum[que] 8 quinni
pellicatus 9 luxus 12 stellionem *or* steliionem 14 aut
15 adhibendum est *inserted* 18 pharetram 19 taedam] redam
21 latam (*in marg.* litatum *by* C) 22 prostrinxi 23 derasi (π)
25 se[se] [et] 29 prorsus] protinus

128 1 uiolentiam 2 uoliticam 4 fata 5 [non] 6 talem
dominam 7 reliquit 8 quidem] quoque 9 oramus] damus

¹ Note by A, "cignus qui uehit currus ueneris."

434 *LAUD'S MANUSCRIPT OF APULEIUS.*

12 bellule] uetule 13 luxus 22 praeuexis alterorsus] alte
rursus 23 capescit

129 2 [intenta et quanto magis] 3 uxoris 9 gnauiter
12 uidet *inserted* 14 [et] 16 phana [et] 17 neglegere
20 exclamauit ain] an

130 1 sui numinis 4 ubere 5, 6 multiuagis 7 istam]
tuam letiferas 9 draconum tuorum 10 sulcania 13 heleus
in his Acthicae [sacrarium miserandae] 14 psyche
17 uires] res 21 antiquum] auctum (*corr. by C*) 23 aedibus]
pedibus 24 optime 25 depulsa 27 solerti

131 1 [het] 3 dei 4 fuerant cunta dicata 4 amplexam
6 et coniuga] coniugaque Sami quae sola] sano querula
8 siue] tamue (π) frequentatas seues 11 [inclitis . . . moeni-
bus] 12 Zygiam] ziziam 13 sis] sic 16 praegnantibus
19 nurum meam (π) 20 [tuis] (*added by C*)

132 10 [et] 11 qui] quod 12 illic] inuie reperia
16 construi 18 limae] luen (*in marg. limae by C*) 24 con-
strepenti] cum strepitu.

133 2 operis 3 nec] ne cernulum¹ (*or cenulum*)
4 etiam et] 5 Arcadi] archas 7 praeteriit 11 que possint (π)
15 domum protinus 18 exequiebatur 21 Martias indicinie
(*in marg. indicinia by B*) 23 a pulsu 25 arrepserat
26 substulit 27 eius

134 1 famulatione 2 exclamauit 3 cera 5 substinerimus
7 habes isti datura silicet attutum 9 renitentem 11 letissimum
solent frequenter 12 cupideque (*corr. by C*) 14 quo
16 concedet 18 herile 24 quo 25 audietur

¹On this word, after some grammatical statement, which I do not understand about *cernulum*, A has the following:—"Cessauit autem se Venus a Ioue quod si Iupiter inquisiuisset illam puellam et iuuenisset non representauisset Veneri sed concubisset cum

ea." In my collation I find *cenulum*. Oud. gives *cernulum* as the reading of O. He seems to attach some weight to the reading: "acute magis quam uere," he says. I confess to being unable to conceive its possibility.

135 3 at per hec 6 editis] dictis dilloricat 9 commis-
 tisque 12 ipsam 13 discernere (-ere *underlined*) 15 appro-
 babo 17 nuptiali nec 18 moli] more (*corr. by C*)
 19 consternata 20 ruricola certatim 21 grautier (n *by a*
different hand) 23 curam (cunctam *probably by C, certainly not*
by the first copyist) 24, 25 uxori lepidae puellae

136 1 sepe[dum populorum undae] 6 flagrans balsamo (π)
 totum[que] 8 nequissima] femina (*in marg. nequissima by C*)
 10 frusto 13 luxuria 15 nox est exanclata 16 commode
 [caelum] 19 auriq[ue] colore] auricole (*with cole underlined*
C gives colore)

libenter
 137 3 uolenter (libenter *by A*) 4 functura] sumptura
 ripis (π) 6-7 uaticinatur 9 istius ore formidales 10 quoad
 [de] solis mutuata 11 efferō (π) cornu[que] 13 pecunia
 17 attigui 18 nemoris 19 connexis obherescit 20 aus-
 cultans (*not auscultatus*) [in] penitendo

138 2 Veneris (π) 3 meruit] mostrauit 5 me] tamen
 (me *added above line in red after praeteriit*) praeteriit 8 ardui]
 alti 9 fusche conceptaculo 10 inclusa pauca cocciti
 11 [de] scaturigine 12 [hauritum] inista deferēs 14 cominuta]
 communita
 comminuta (commonita *probably by B*) 16 cumulum certo
 in[uentura]¹ pessimo 17 fine 18 nam[que] 19 salubritate
 20 medii faucibus 21 quod (π) 22 exarto

139 1 proserpuit et (*without lacuna*) 2 inconniues 3 additi.
 pupillis 7 mutata ipsa in lapide 11 supremi] primi
 13 pugillitorem (pugillitorem π) 14 Phrigium 17 sperasque
 20 uel saltem fando (π)

140 1 degeratis 2 Stigiam 3 sed abreptam com-
 plectam 4 mutantium 6 nolentes 7 praestantes] minantes
 commentum 10 Veneris citata retulit 11 [uel] 13 renidens]
 ridens² 15 grautier 16 papula pissidem (*and so except 143. 23*)
 18 diriget 19 de] ad

¹ π is reported to have *inuentura* in full. This is the most serious deviation of π from O which I have found.

² π is reported to have *maga* for *magna* in l. 13: and *conferēs* in l. 18.

141 7 quidni] quid tum 10 daturam 11, 12 prorupit
13 quid[que iam] 19 traenarum 20 monstratur cuius de
22 Orci 23 polente 24 concreptas at]et

142 1 continuaueris 2 simile decidenti 4 [cum]
5 Caron (*and so l. 7*) 7 [uel] 8 Ditis et pater set]et
14 senes 15 tradas 17 testrices 18 [tibi] 19 haec]
huius 21 polentatium perdita] impedita (*corr. by C*)
22 haec] huius 24 conantibus oblacterans 25 frustra
27 effrenatum 28 predam

143 5 offertur 6 naute seruaueras 9 hoc] hec
11 diuina formositate abditum curiosius (*no lacuna*) 13 perspicua
14 trenarum 16 amica (*corr. by C*) 17 supernatans testricum
19 penetrauit 20 amplexans (π) 23 piscidem

144 2 atque] et 4 [mentem . . . curiositate] 5 inepte
ego formositatis diuine 8 tibi (π) 9-10 quod statim
cohoperculo reuelato 12 conlapsa post se (*corr. by C*) 15 cubili
19 sychen 21 [prouinciam] quod 22 mandatum est exequere
grauiter 23 pinnas] plumas

145 2 armilem 3 celo 7 filii [deum] 9 conuulneratis
(G D π) 13 pecunia 14 attamen 15 manus meas
17 *and* 21 ac] at 21 quis cetu 24 sullimi 25 ^{albo} aluo
(*corr. by C*) (albo *by B*) 26 sim] sit scitis] satis
27 caleratos (o *by C*)

146 2 pedibus 6-7 tuo statu inquam 10 ambroxio
15 Iunone Uenus Iupiter (*but there are lines both over and under*
Uenus) 20 Musae quoque canora 21 *No lacuna* citharam
22 superingressa 22-23 scenas ibi sic concinnatas 23 corum
24 [aut] Satirus 25 ducerent

Looking through the MS. elsewhere, the following readings of O struck me as being worth recording:—
42. 14 surridens : 79. 13 direxissent : 84. 24 sublicae]
sullimes : 148. 15 penetrantes qua : 156. 16 conqueror
quam (*not* quamquam) nec : 170. 6 feminas [parans]

uolutatas aduersa : 171. 23 mansuetos ac mansues : 222. 4
[atque] : 251. 27-252. 1 at ille nequam ut posset de me
suaue prouenire lucro suo tantum consensum annuit :
273. 7 alio genere facium lumine.

These and such-like readings are more or less interesting : but they cannot pretend to be a genuine tradition. On the whole, I cannot feel that a full examination of the entire codex would do more than bring to light some tolerable emendations or interpolations of medieval scholars.¹

¹ For example (within a few pages). *ferro* for *serio* : 59. 1 *abiecto* for *abrepto*.
54. 24 *iudicum* for *iudicii uestri* : 58. 2

L. C. PURSER.

REMARKS ON TUCKER'S *EMENDATIONS IN*
CICERO'S EPISTLES.

PROFESSOR TUCKER has chosen a most important and suggestive subject, and has treated it with characteristic brilliancy, learning, and acumen. His conjectures, like those of the late Arthur Palmer, are always fascinating, even when we are unable to accept them. Professor Tucker once paid a high tribute to the Dublin school of classical criticism, when he said to the present writer, in a talk about classical matters—these talks were too few (perhaps two or three)—that the Dublin critic was as a rule careful not to neglect the question whence arose the (presumably erroneous) tradition of the MSS. In Professor Tucker's paper this point of view *va sans dire*. The copyists of Cicero's correspondence were very ignorant of Greek. It would be easy to illustrate this ignorance from a reference to the critical notes of the Dublin edition; and it would be neither uninteresting nor uninformative; but every reader who may be expected to read either Professor Tucker's paper or these few observations on it will be able to do this for himself, and (if he is fond of *res critica*) he will find it a labour which "physics pain." I now offer a few remarks on some of the most interesting of Professor Tucker's comments.

Ep. 22. 13. The suggestion of *φακὴ μύρον* for *fabam minimum* labours under the difficulty that the proverb of adding unguents to lentil is in itself an unnatural expression. It is justified in 25. 2 by the theory that there is a pun on *Lentulus*; but it is dangerous to assume a more general application.

Ep. 27. 9. The emendation *αὐχμωδέστατα enim* for *ac modeste tamen* is very brilliant. The MS. reading is most probably corrupt; and the suggested words are such as Cicero might well have used. "Meagreness" of style is called *αὐχμός* by the Greek writers on rhetoric.

The same judgment may be passed on other very brilliant conjectures: e.g. *ΥΛΙCΤΑ* for *iudicata* ep. 37. 3; *εἰδικὰ* as antithetic to *γενικώτερον* ep. 365. 6; *ἐν αἰνιγμοῖς ῥητοῖς* (by a prearranged cipher) ep. 46. 1; *ὄκνον* for *hoc non* ep. 46. 5; *χόρτος* for *hortus* ep. 12. 3 *fin.*; and *χόρτον* for *hortum* 466. 4; *σιττύβοις et opere* ep. 124; *Διὸς* for *eius* ep. 314. 2; *ἔξιν* for *ex* ep. 475. 2; *ὑποτύπωσιν* for *ut possim* ep. 436. 3; *τελείας* for *talis* ep. 916. 3; *ἀπτωσίᾳ* for *postea* ep. 807. 3.

In ep. 397. 2 *παραγοητευτέον* does not commend itself to me as much as our *πόρον κλεπτέον*, where the construction would mislead the copyist. It has misled the eminent Latinist Boot in Att. ix. 4. 2, where he corrects *πόλεμον ἐπακτέον* to *πόλεμος ἐπακτός*, adding *accusativi causam non intellego*. He understands *ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀσκητέα*, but not the equally normal *τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκητέον*. May one suggest that the optionalising of Greek may have a bad effect on the editing of even Latin texts?

The suggested Greek words to be added to the text in epp. 156, 186, 252, 365, 386 (*recta* is a very great improvement) would all largely help the sense; they are all taken from late Greek philosophic writers, with whom Cicero was very familiar; and their technical vocabulary would prove a very perplexing puzzle to copyists whose knowledge of Greek was small and narrow.

In the case of the corrections and insertions here brought together, it may be said that in many cases they may well be held to restore the very hand of Cicero; and in all they present a text which might have emanated from the great *littérateur*.

A good case could be made for the theory that in the original archetype all the Greek words were written in Roman characters.

The latter part of the paper, devoted to corruptions or losses of Latin words, does not interest me quite so much as that portion which deals with Greek words; partly (perhaps) because the views therein propounded are likely to approximate more closely to the comments of other critics; partly, too, because they do not rest on any common basis, or illustrate any common form of corruption. But this portion of the article is full of interest and value. If I do not pick and choose the comments which seem to me most attractive, it is because this course would involve considerable repetition of a paper appearing in this same volume.¹

¹ I am not reviewing the paper. I owe it to the kindness of the Editor of *HERMATHENA* that I have been permitted to express my admiration of a piece of critical work which cannot be neglected by future editors of the correspondence of Cicero, or future editions of existing commentaries.

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REVIEWS.

Appendix Vergiliana siue Carmina Minora Vergilio adtributa, recognovit et adnotatione critica instruxit R. ELLIS, Litterarum Latinarum Professor Publicus apud Oxonienses. Oxonii, e typographeo Clarendoniano. 1907.

THE *Appendix Vergiliana* cannot be said to be either easy or delightful reading. But it appears to have had its attractions for scholars, as its corruptions are so numerous and deep-seated, and have accordingly called for the best powers that ingenuity, taste, and learning can bestow. Since the Revival of Letters these poems have been handled by scholars, and, after all their labours, work still remains to be done in abundance. It is natural, then, that a Latinist of such great and varied attainments as Professor Robinson Ellis should undertake the editing of this volume; and he must feel no little satisfaction at having given what will probably be allowed by most scholars to be the best text which is now extant. Not that even his text is final; he would be the last to say that it was; the many *obeli* which appear are evidence of this; but his text exhibits the mature judgment of a veteran and exceptionally learned scholar in Latin poetry, with his learning carefully applied to each several difficulty—in some cases with no little success. Thus, in Culex 366, Professor Ellis has restored for ever (from the Corsinianus) the right reading *cui cessit Lydi timefacta potentia regis*, as this reading could not have been corrupted from the mss. *legitime cessit cui facta*, &c., though the reverse process is explicable. In some cases we would that Prof. Ellis had removed the *obeli*. Thus, in Culex 139, perhaps Scaliger's *motibus* for *montibus* might have been adopted, especially as, a little further on, in line 167, Prof. Ellis rightly adopts *motibus* for *montibus* against almost the whole weight of authority. Again, in l. 138 *edila pinus | proceros decorat siluas hirsuta per artus*, why obelize *decorat*? The tallness of the pine is sufficiently indicated by *proceros* (which emendation of

Heinsius for *proceras* Prof. Ellis, with true instinct, has adopted), and does not require *superat*.

It is not to be supposed that Prof. Ellis has merely applied his great acumen and learning to the text which has been handed down by other scholars from the well-known mss. of the various poems. He has also expended much labour in searching for mss. hitherto unexamined, and bringing these aids to the restoration of the text. Thus we have seen what signal service his study of the Corsinianus has rendered to Culex 366. In the Ciris he has used a Vatican Codex 353 with satisfactory results. In the Est et Non he has used, in addition to the Bembine, three new mss., the chief of which is the Basilicanus H 36 of the Archives of St. Peter's at Rome. He has also examined several new mss. of the Maecenas. So that even on the ground of the positive information which we have gained as to these new mss., Prof. Ellis's edition is deserving of gratitude. But, of course, its value is much greater owing to the wide scholarship and critical ingenuity which he has brought to bear upon the poems.

Coming on to some details, we feel sure that Professor Ellis is on the right way in his conjecture (Culex 21) *bona sors securaque lucra, tenesque* for † *bona secura sil cura tenentis* † of most mss. *Sors* comes from a thirteenth-century Harleian ms. (T) which presents the following: *agrestum bona^{sors} sil^{...} secura^{sors} sil^{...} cura tenentem*, and may perhaps lead to this arrangement of the lines :

Et tu, sancta Pales, ad quam uentura recurrit
Agrestum *bona sors securaque cura* tenentem
Aerios nemorum cultus siluasque uirentis.

The rustics are sure to give a good quota of their produce to Pales, and untroubled for their safety can take trouble in her worship, as she holds, &c.

We are not sure that in Culex 61 *quae (curae) lacerant avidas inimico pectore mentes* it is necessary to obelize *inimico pectore*. The personification is not too artificial; and *inimico pectore* is Vergilian (Aen. 11. 685). In the next line for *fuertint* Professor Ellis most ingeniously conjectures *feruent*, which is nearer the mss. than Schrader's *fulgent*. There can hardly be a doubt that *Boethique* is right in 67. The youthful poet must have thought that the word could be a disyllable, possibly deceived by such analogies as are occasionally found. Thus Manilius (1. 736) has *Phaethontem* as a trisyllable; but there the two syllables are short. Or perhaps the poet thought that the great caelator's name was *Boëthus*. But whatever the explanation, it is well-nigh impossible to suppose that some other name (such as *Rhoeci*, conjectured by Lachmann on Lucr. 2.1061) would have been corrupted into that of an artist, who, though distinguished, was not likely to have

been known to the copyists. In l. 92 Professor Ellis reads *quolibet in requiem uictu ut contentus abundet*, which may be right, as it closely follows the mss., only altering *ut requiem* into *in requiem*. But the expression "food for rest," food sufficient to ensure rest (if this is the meaning), is somewhat harsh. I think *requiem* is corrupt, and that we should read *quolibet inque diem uictu*. The simple life did not look further than the day's needs; cp. Moretum 120 *pulsoque timore iam famis inque diem securus Simylus illam*. In 95 *Fontis Hamadryadum* may be a corruption for *Fons et*. In l. 140 Professor Ellis most ingeniously for *et laeta cupressus* reads *et fleta cupressus*, referring to Statius Silv. 5. 5. 30 and Theb. 4. 461 *plorata cupressus*. This seems better than even Heinsius's *nec laeta*. Excellent also is his reading in 166 (of the serpent) *obuia uibranti carpens grauis aere linguae* (for *lingua*). For *aer* in the sense of *spiritus*, Leo refers to Silius 6. 275. The difficult line 168 Professor Ellis rightly obelizes *tollebant aurae uenientis ad omnia uisus*. He gives many conjectures of scholars, most rather wide of the tradition. Bährens gives still more. Leo reads *tollebant irae uenientis ad omnia uisus*, which is probably right in detecting the corruption to lie in the word *aurae*; but there does not seem a place for 'anger' here, as the serpent is not represented as being attacked. Perhaps (though the rhythm is unusual) we might read *tollebantur et aduenientis ad omnia uisus*. The writer seems to use *ad omnia* = *undique*: cp. *in omnia* l. 233 (where I should prefer to retain the mss. reading, and not alter to *ostia* with Professor Ellis) and l. 242. Leo gives many examples of similar vague uses of *omnia*: a good one is Lucan 3. 390 *tenuit flagrantis in omnia belli Praecipitem cursum*. For the corrupt *arent* in l. 221 Professor Ellis conjectures the rare and stern word *lurent*, which might easily suffer corruption. In 226 Professor Ellis reads *ex rure* (so Bembus for *et iure*) *recessit iustitiae prior illa fides*, but conjectures *euicta*. If a participle of this kind were used, a more satisfactory one would be *extrusa*. But the more probable reading (though it is a tame one) is *nec iure* = *et iniuria*.

At 245 *otia quaerentem frustra †siblite puellae Ite quibus taedas accendit tristic Erinys Sicut Hymen praefata*, Professor Ellis reads *frustratibus ite puellae*. But the word is very rare, and the plural use, I fancy, unexampled: nor is it very near the tradition. It is hard to think that *frustra* is wrong. If elision such as *frustra sibi*: *abite*, *puellae* is not allowable, we may read *frustra*: *simul ite puellae* with Voss. But Prof. Ellis seems happy in his alteration of *accendit* into *accendi*. In 248 he reads *densant* for *densas*, making *Poenae* (v. 233) the nominative. But that is very far away: no one would understand it. Rather I think the text is right, and the passage runs on, faulty in grammar but plain in sense, that as the Erinys has united death with bridals in the case of the Danaides, so it has united marriage with the grave in countless other instances,

in whole serried troops of them, as in the case of Medea and Procne and Philomela. But if that is too bold, read *densat* with Ascensius rather than *sequor* for *super* (Birt) or than supplying a line like *atque alias scelerum facies iam cernere cogor* with Leo. Most excellent is, in 274, Prof. Ellis's *ecfossasque domos* for *nec fossasque*. In 281 *steterant amnes* is repeated from l. 278; perhaps *steterant* is sound, and led to the introduction of *amnes*, the word expelled being *tigres*: cp. Georgics 4. 510. At 288 I think *diuæ* is for *dīua* and is vocative: "the fixed law of death, O goddess, could not, could not be changed to life by any prayer." You, wife of Dis, were persuaded actually to restore Eurydice to be brought to life; but there was the greater law—the law of death—that would not allow itself to be broken; and thus, after all, Eurydice fared not back to life. *Fas* is often found with the genitive in Tacitus; e.g. Ann. 1. 42; the *in* is similar to the use of that preposition with *mutare*. In 309 Leo's *ui daret* is closer to the tradition (*uidere*) than Bährens' *truderet*. For *uagis* in 311 (if we do not adopt *iugis* from Bembus) perhaps *ignes* is more probable than *sudes*. The tautology in the next line is not objectionable, considering the repetition of *Ida*, and the fact that the fire was the principal feature of Hector's attack on the ships. In 311 Prof. Ellis most brilliantly reads *Ida parens feritatis* for *potens*, referring to Il. 8. 47, where *Ida* is called *μήνηρ θηρῶν*—a parallel quoted by Heyne to defend *potens*. I do not understand *concidit* in 326 if *arma* is retained. If we could read *tradidit*, the sense would be plain. Commentators generally alter *arma* to *alma* (Bembus), or *alla* (Ascensius), or *firma* (Leo), or *hirta* (Ellis's conj.): but it would seem that *arma* is the word which is necessary when the contest for the arms of Achilles is alluded to. At 334 it would appear from Prof. Ellis's note that Voss's ms. had the reading generally ascribed to Ribbeck *Tantaleæ generamen prolis Atrides*; but it is possible that there is a slip here, and that what the Vossianus had was *generamen probis*. Thus Ribbeck had so much guidance that no very great meed of praise need be given him. In the lines about Curtius 363 f.

Curtius et mediis quem quondam sedibus urbis
Deutum †bellis consumpsit gurgis in unda,

Prof. Ellis perhaps rightly obelizes *bellis*. Yet it is hard to withstand the allurements of Wakefield's *tellus*. Heyne reads *gurgitis unda* and Wakefield *gurgitis haustu*, of which possibly *unda* might have been a gloss (*haustus* is already in Heyne's ed.). I should prefer to read *tellus*, and *gurgis ut unda*, "as the sea with its wave": the earth closed over him as the sea closes over a drowning man.

In 371 Prof. Ellis has a curious reading—

Scipiadæque duces quorum deuota triumphis
Moenia sub lappis Libyæ Carthaginis horrent.

The mss. give *rapidis*, which is obviously corrupt, as it will not scan. The reading of Professor Ellis seems to mean that the walls of Carthage are overgrown with weeds (*lappae* occurs in the Georgics i. 153, and means 'burs'), and still shudder at its disaster. The emendation, which shows much learning, is a variation of Haupt's *veprelis* and Naeke's *harundinibus*. (It is to be noticed that in B the letters *ni* are written by a second hand above the *-di* of *rapidis*, which would point to a reference to turnip-fields.) Preferably to these I should read *rueribus* with Hertzberg, if it did not seem to me probable that all these scholars are on the wrong scent. I think that *rapidis* is a gloss which has extruded the original word, and that the original word was *fulmineis*. Roman poets when they mentioned the Scipios in connexion with the destruction of Carthage, frequently make allusion to them as 'thunderbolts of war'; for the Scipios loved to attribute their name to the σκηπτρός: see Lucretius 3. 1034, *Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror*, and Munro's learned note, where he refers to Verg. *Æn.* 6. 842, and Silius 7. 106. That *rapidis* is a word which might fairly have been used as a gloss on *fulmineis* may be gathered from Verg. *Æn.* 1. 42 *Ipsa Iouis rapidum iaculata e nubibus ignem*.

Two of the most attractive of all Professor Ellis's emendations are in l. 378 ff.:—

Cum mihi tu sis causa mali, nec conscius adsis,
Sed tolerabilius cures [mss. *curis*]. Haec immemor audis ?
Ut tamen audieris, dimittes omnia uentis.

The words in l. 379 he takes as *lentius advertas* 'do not distress yourself about,' and this makes good sense. The emendation of the next line for the mss. *et tamen ut uadis* is singularly happy, and is more idiomatic than Haupt's *et tamen etsi audis*, though the latter seems nearer to the tradition.

In the *Ciris* Professor Ellis has some excellent emendations. In l. 12 the introduction of *sophiae* is most probable, and the addition of *secutum* (we should prefer *secula*, agreeing with *sapientia* l. 14) quite possible; though we should have wished that he had at least mentioned Heinsius's reading of l. 14 *Si mea iam summam sapientia langeret arcem*, cp. Hor. *Carm.* 3. 3. 10 *Hercules enisus arces attigit igneas*. It is hard to believe, with Heyne, that *pangeret* could mean 'figeret,' 'eductum collocaret.' The Corsinianus reads *mea*; and it is from Professor Ellis that we have learned to appreciate the consideration which should be paid to that codex. In 128 the corruptions of the mss. give high probability to Professor Ellis's *morsilis* as the adjective to be supplied with *fibula* cp. Verg. *Æn.* 12. 274 *laterum iuncturas fibula mordet*. This seems better than the word I had thought of, viz. *rasilis*, which is applied to a *fibula* in Ov. *Met.* 8. 318, Stat. *Theb.* 7. 658. In 189 he does well, I think,

to read *tanto sceleris* (his own conjecture for *tanto scelere*) rather than follow the old edd. in altering to *tanti*; cp. l. 455 *tantum . . . malorum*. In 308 Professor Ellis's great learning gives us the appropriate *Hyrtacios* (Hyrtacus is a town of Crete) for the entirely unsuitable *Hyrcanos*. Similarly, much is to be said in favour of his reading in 384 *Rhauci . . . moenia* (Rhaucus being also a town in Crete), the honour of which learned emendation he shares (as he tells us) with Unger. Most ingenious is 321 *quae tenuis patrio praesit suspensa capillo*, which is virtually the reading of R (*praesit*: AV. give *pressit*). In 426 *pactae* instead of *captae* is well deserving of consideration (though of course Scylla was by right of war 'taken captive' with all the other inhabitants of the city), as is also his suggestion to introduce the word in place of the corrupt *natique* in 531. With the addition of Prof. Housman's *ea* in place of *et* (he also conjectured *pactique*), that line seems satisfactorily restored. Highly attractive is *ne tu* in 441 for *nec et*. The second hand of A—who appears to have been an emender of some parts—had suggested *tu*, but he does not seem to have made the further necessary alteration to *tumulabis*, which remained for Professor Ellis. In 512 he rightly reads *fraglans* for *flagrans*, though, with perhaps undue modesty, he forbears to add a reference to his own detailed and interesting Excursus on Catullus, p. 346: cp. Wölfflin in 'Archiv,' iv. p. 8.

For the desperate line 5, Prof. Ellis conjectures *dum mea auens ratio for tum ea quaeret eo dignum sibi quaerere carmen*, which can easily bear comparison with any other conjecture. In 48 perhaps we should read *exterrita multis* for *exterruit amplis*, which is nearer the tradition than *magnis* (conj. Bährens), though Aen. 3. 307 might suggest this latter. The last word in 47 after *exordia* is perhaps *prima*: cp. Aen. 4. 284. The desperate corruption in 56, 57—

Longe alia perhibent mutata membra figura
Scyllaeum †saxo monstra infectata uocauit

So R. A gives *monstra saxosum* (superscriptum in *saxa* A²) *infectata* (superscr. *conuersa*) *uocauit* (superscr. *ri*): and V *monstra in saxum conuersa uocari*—is thus restored by Prof. Ellis—

Scyllaeum monstro saxum infestante uocari,

and by Bährens—

Scyllaeum monstro saxum infestasse uoraci,

Haupt having suggested *infestare uoraci*. There is much to recommend *uoraci*; Prof. Ellis refers to Ovid Ibis 385; but *infectata* is not very likely to have come from *infestare* or *infestante*. I would suggest

Scyllaeum in saxum monstra intractata uocari

'changed into the Scyllan rock was called an unconquered monster,' and refer to what Homer says, Od. 12. 223:—

Σκύλλην οὐκέτ' ἐμυθεόμην, ἄπρηκτον ἀνίην,
and ib. 118—

ἀθάνατον κακὸν ἔστιν,
δεινὸν τ' ἀργαλέον τε καὶ ἄγριον οὐδὲ μαχητόν,
οὐδέ τις ἔστ' ἄλκή.

For *intractatus* used of an unbroken horse cp. Cic. Lael. 68. The word is Vergilian in the sense of 'untried' Aen. 8. 206. The plural *monstra* may refer to Scylla's many heads: cp. Verg. Ecl. 6. 75.

Haupt's reading of 67 *siue illam monstrum* (-o codd.) *genuit graue Echidna* (*genuit graue* codd.) *biformis*, is probable. Hyginus (p. 12. 16 ed. Schmidt) relates that Echidna and Typhon produced Scylla. But the corruption does not seem a likely one. Prof. Ellis considers that the *ena* of *grauena* is a remnant of the original word, and points to the name of a fish, as the names of many fishes in Greek end in -αῖνα, e.g. *μύραινα*, *φώκαινα*, &c. He suggests *glauaena* or *glaucaena*: but as these words do not seem to occur elsewhere, the conjecture is hazardous. In the description of Scylla in Lycophron 47 she is called *ταυροσφάγον λέαιναν*, which prompts to some such guess as *Siue illa a monstro generata leaena biformi*. But such is too audacious. However, I cannot persuade myself that the ordinary reading in the previous line *siue Crataeis* is not right. For this Prof. Ellis reads *Hecataeis*: and no doubt Hecate is reputed by some (e.g. Acusilaus) to have been the mother of Scylla. But it seems that the author of this poem considers that Scylla's mother was one of two (*siue est neutra parens* 68), and he explicitly represents Crataeis as one, and the second is alluded to in line 67, so that there is no room for a third. I am aware that Apoll. Rh. 4. 829 considers that Crataeis is only another name of Hecate: but if our author meant this, he would surely have indicated it in some such explicit manner as Apollonius (*νυκτιπόλος Ἑκάτη τήν τε κλείουσι Κράταιν*).

Prof. Ellis defends the ms. reading in 75 *ut cum cura suae ueheretur coniugis alto* (so V: R gives *lue* and *A lue*), interpreting *cura suae coniugis* as 'Neptunus, amor et deliciae coniugis suae Amphitrites.' On such a phrase as this there could be no better judge than Prof. Ellis. Yet to describe a husband by the circumlocution 'the beloved of his wife,' especially when the wife was plotting against the husband's love, seems somewhat artificial and inappropriate. It would seem that we should read with Loensis *cura sui*. . . *coniugis* 'when Scylla set forth over the deep, Scylla, the beloved of her (Amphitrite's) spouse.' She was a land maid (72); and Amphitrite did not get her opportunity of vengeance until Scylla went forth to sea. But how are we to account for the -e in *suae* or

sue? Possibly (if considerations of rhythm do not bar the conjecture) by reading *eueheretur*, a not uncommon word for putting to sea. In 84 I confess to a partiality for Scaliger's *uolorum auertere poenam*, it being so much nearer to the tradition (*uolorum uertere*) than Sillig's *uoto interuertere poenam*; and also for the same scholar's *nouisse* for *non esse* in 91, cp. 258. In 94 perhaps *allaria* may be defended as meaning the offerings on the altar; see the note of Servius on Ecl. 5. 66, and possibly Lucan 3. 404 *structae diris altaribus arae*. See also Furneaux's note on Tac. Ann. 16. 31. One cannot with confidence give up Heinsius's emendation *reicere* for *dicere* in 118: cp. Ecl. 3. 96 and Hor. Sat. 1. 6. 39 (*deicere*); it seems to suit so well with *retundere*; but Prof. Ellis has not been able to adopt it, and reads *icere*. What the corrupt *lawro* in l. 121 has come from, it is hard to say: perhaps *flora* (cp. 387 *coma Sidonio florens deciditur ostro*)—a word very little used in literature (the dict. quote Gellius 3. 9. 3, and so Hertz reads), but attested by the glosses and by the proper name *Florus*. The highly corrupt line 161, which describes Cupid's arrows—

heu nimium †terret, nimium tirintia uisu†—

is doubtless rightly obelized: but one feels sure that it is a mere oversight that Prof. Ellis has not at least mentioned the conjecture of Heinsius *heu nimium tereti* (so the second hand of A), *nimium penetrantia nisu*, though we should prefer to read *terebrantia* instead of *penetrantia*, as a more expressive word, and one likely to lead to the corruption. To what legend Prof. Ellis refers in his emendation of l. 197 *uagi laris ante uolucres*, is uncertain. He says:—“*Volucres uagae ante nec certam sedem tenentes cum se eis Scylla adiunxerit non iam uagabuntur.*” The mss. give *uagae laudate*, over which the second hand of A has written *blandeque*. If this is an emendation, it is a tolerable one; but in the face of Prof. Ellis's emendation, judgment must be reserved.

In 249 he reads *sordibus et scora* *patrio tabescere tali*, saying *scora* is for *scoria*, and compares *scaurarius*. The word means the slag of minerals—and is a “*uox plebeia*” tolerable in the nurse. I should prefer a different “*uox plebeia*,” viz., *psora* “itch.” Prof. Ellis conjectures *intortos*, i.e., *crispos* for *intonsos* in 284. Perhaps some mention, in the notes at all events, might have been made of Wakefield's most probable conjecture *insontes*, noticed by Prof. Housman. But that most certain emendation (286) of Prof. Housman (which he himself said ought to have been made long ago), *o bis iam exitium crudele meorum* for *obsistam* is deservedly introduced into the text by Prof. Ellis. In 302 I confess to preferring *montis abisses* (Scaliger's emendation of *montibus isses*) to that of Prof. Ellis, *montis ibi isses*: and after *ferunt* perhaps we should add *te*. The locus classicus on Aphaea is Pausanias 2. 30. 3. Cp. also Callimachus Hymn. 3. 190 ff., and Antonin. Liberal. 40

about this flight of Britomartis from Minos. All three passages notice that Britomartis leaped into, or was concealed in, δίκρυα, which accounted for her name Dictynna. Hence it certainly looks as if some verse to that effect, with a reference to nets, has been lost. Cp. Skutsch, Gallus u. Vergil, § 13, p. 57 ff. For the double form of the myth cp. Skutsch, Aus Vergil's Frühzeit, p. 78 note.

That the first word of l. 326,

Perdere saeua precor per flumina elythiae,

contains *Per te*, and that *flumina* might stand for *lumina*, were points already indicated by Scaliger. Perhaps the line ran some way thus:—

Per te, saeua, precor, per lumina et Ilithyiae.

As Iuno *Lucina* was another name for Ilithyia, the use of *lumina* is appropriate. But it may be suggested, as a bare possibility, that *flumina* may be right, and due to some confusion on the part of the poet. The chief seat of the worship of Ilithyia in Crete was Amnisus (Hom. Od. 19. 188: Strabo 10. 478: Paus. 1. 18. 5); and the poet may perhaps have supposed that it had something to say to a river (*amnis*).

In 356 *laudanturque bonae pacis bona* Prof. Ellis alters to *nouae*. That is a little awkward, as *nouus* in a slightly different sense occurs in the next line. Scylla kept insisting on "the blessings of blessed peace." I feel no difficulty in the repetition of the word—indeed it seems forcible. At line 444 Prof. Ellis conjectures *men famulas* (for *alias*) *inter famularum munere fungi*, where again the repetition is not without effect—that she was not allowed to do a slave's work among slaves.

Kroll seems to have made an excellent suggestion on l. 361,

Cum Ioue communes †qui non habueret nepotes,

in proposing to read *cui non placuere*. Possibly it might be improved by reading *ualuere* ("have had no weight in his judgment"). Unger, however, has adopted a different path, and reads *cui non datum habere*; and following on this, Prof. Ellis reads *qui non dat habere*. All one can say about 374 is that *magno* is corrupt. The 'great Jupiter' can have had nothing to say to these kinds of rites. Scaliger conjectured *magico*; but even this is doubtful: and *frigidula sacra* still awaits correction. In 385 there does not seem to be any force in the subjunctive *gaudeat: et cineri*, &c. We should read with Bothe *gaudebat: cineri*; or, perhaps better, *gaudet: at et cineri*, "but even to one's buried bones his country is sweet"—even though the nurse is too aged to get much pleasure in life by a return to her native country, yet that her dust should be Cretan earth might bring her some pleasure in death.

For *Ergo metu* in l. 386, Prof. Ellis well mentions Heinsius's *ilerum*. In l. 403 there seems to be a misprint *plantas* for *palmas*. For *secum* in 469 we should perhaps read *ecce*, printing the line thus—

Et notas ecce (heu frustra) respectat Athenas.

For the corrupt 471 *hinc uenus illi Sinius* Prof. Ellis, with signal learning, thinks we should perhaps read *genus illi Sunius*, and that it is a Latinizing of τὸν γυνὸν τὸν Σουνιακόν (Herod. iv. 99), and that *genus* can be used as a masculine word (Nonius 207). Perhaps all one can say with safety is that the reference is to Sunium, as Heyne had seen: *hinc uenit illi Sunion* might suit the generally unelevated nature of the narrative. Nothing in Prof. Ellis's book is more ingenious than the explanation of the reading of the mss. other than B, which gives *undis* in 481. R has *aegros*, A *egros* and V *aegram*. He supposes that these variants arose from an Anglo-Saxon gloss *ēgor ēgar*; but it is strange that such a common word as *undis* should have a gloss. In the passages of Aldhelm quoted by Mr. Napier in his *Old English Glosses*, it is to the rare words *cataclismus* and *dodrans*, in the sense of 'flood-tide,' that the gloss is appended. In 506 B (the best ms. in this part of the poem) gives *nouamque acies* (ARU give *nouamque aciem*) obduxit squalida pellem, for which Prof. Ellis reads *nouam maciesque*, perhaps rightly. Yet the position of *-que* is awkward after the second word in the clause. I should propose *nouamque lues*, on which rare word there was a gloss *macies*. The old correction of *uidemus* in 524 (which conceals an adj. qualifying *taurorum* in 525) was *nitentum*. This has the support of *Æn.* 3. 20. Prof. Ellis reads *uigentum*, which may be right; but it appears to give an indication of activity which is not so appropriate as *nitentum* for sacrificial animals. Surely in 534 Prof. Housman's emendation *unum quem duplici stellarunt sidere diui* (for *stellarum sidere uidi*) might have been mentioned, if not read; for though one may feel some difficulty in accounting for the presence of *munere* in either line 533 or 534 unless it was originally in one or the other, still the emendation is most simple and picturesque. The line as it stands certainly presents a strange ablative and an unusual expression (*stellarum sidus*). It may be remarked that 448-453 should come after 480, rather than after 477 as Sudhaus (Rh. Mus. (1906), p. 33) suggested.

Prof. Ellis gives us two emendations in the *Moretum*, neither of which is perhaps imperatively required, but both of which are ingenious. In l. 99 for *inserit* he reads *interit* 'he pounds into the mixture.' The word is found in Cato, Varro, and Pliny, not to mention the well-known proverb *Tute hoc intristi*, etc. (Ter. Phorm. 318); and it is more suitable in culinary matters than *inserit*. Equally ingenious is *quem tertis recipit manibus* (120)

from *tercis* of a Bodleian ms. The variants adduced by Prof. Ellis tend to show that the ordinary reading *laetus* exhibits an advanced stage of corruption. The form *tertus* for *tersus* is, however, somewhat rare, occurring in two passages of Varro, and read by Bücheler and Lindsay in Plaut. Pseud. 164 and Stich. 745; but it is condemned by the grammarian Probus (see Heraeus in 'Archiv,' xi, p. 310). It is possibly a form used in ordinary speech. In the difficult line 15 et reserat *clausae* (*clausa* Traguriensis and other mss.) quae peruidet ostia *clauis* Prof. Ellis reads *plausa* . . . *clauis*. No doubt *clauis* is right; and it also is found in the Traguriensis: but *plausa* is hardly the word to indicate the noise made by inserting a key into a lock; *crepitare* or some such word would be more appropriate; *plaudere* rather signifies a noise made by a flat surface. Perhaps we should read *clausi*. The Latins seem to have used *clausum* without any further addition in the sense of a locked-place, a shed, as we might say the 'locker' or 'lock-up': cp. Columella 12, pref., § 3 nam et fruges et cetera alimenta terrestria indigebant tecto et ouium ceterarumque pecudum foetus atque fructus *clauso* custodienda erant; also 7. 6. 5 sed numerum huius generis maiorem quam centum capitum sub uno *clauso* non expedit habere. I do not feel sure that Bücheler and Bährens are not right in reading *fontes* for *frondes* in 45, on account of tepidas super ingerit *undas* in the previous line: and in retaining *providus aeris*, the reading of the best ms. in 60, instead of *providus heros*. Vergil, no doubt, has learned how to round a verse (as Persius would say) with *heros*; but, though tolerable in an epic, it should only be adopted here if the tradition imperatively demands it, and the tradition is better for *aeris*. Just as *ricula curae* is mentioned in 66, Simylus is *providus aeris* here. It is not quite clear what *adessus* means in 99 sale durus *adesso* (or *adeso*) caseus; or what the same word means in Martial 13. 84 Hic scarus aequareis qui uenit *adesus* ab undis Visceribus bonus est, cetera uile sapit. The Thesaurus classifies these passages under the heading 'de rebus acribus'; but can the passive have this signification? The variants here are not unlike the variants in Æn. 9. 537 et postibus haesit *adesis*. (This is said to mean 'which were being now (or thereby) consumed.') There the best mss. give *adessis* (see Ribbeck and Priscian I, p. 520. 7: 522. 3 ed. Keil); and Prof. Ellis here reads *adesso* (cp. Neue-Wagener 3. 549). That form may well be right; but the Paris ms. called E gives *adesto*, and why not retain that? We find *comestus* often: cp. Neue-Wagener 3. 550; and supine *estum* is acknowledged by Priscian (l.c.). *Estus* is according to Georges ('Wortformen' s. v.) a 'forma plebeia'; and, if so, may rank beside Prof. Ellis's *tertis* in 120. But be this as it may, a mention in the notes might have been made of *adusto* (Ascensius). We might perhaps adopt that conjecture here, and the old emendation *obesus* in Martial.

However far from ultimate perfection the *Dirae* and the *Lydia* may still be, there is no doubt Prof. Ellis has done them good service. His supposition that *tua* in l. 41 should be printed in inverted commas in reference to the use of that word in the previous line, is most attractive. Perhaps we should read l. 40 cum tua cyaneo *resplendeat* aethere silua with a full-stop there, and read 41 as a parenthesis (non iterum dices, crebro 'tua,' Lydia, dixti) "You will not call it again, you often have called it in the past, 'your'" wood." This will avoid the artificiality of putting a speech into the mouth of the wood. Prof. Ellis reads

cum tua cyaneo resplendens aethere silua
non iterum discet nec ero 'tua,' Lydia, dici.

the meaning of which is not quite plain, and which is rather far from the tradition. In 66 Prof. Ellis conjectures

Nil est quo *pergam* [for *quod perdam*] ulterius (maris omnia) diris.

The MSS. give *merita omnia ditis*. That *quo pergam* is right I think probable. 'If Neptune will not hear you, appeal to the rivers; one cannot go further.' As to the conclusion of the line no satisfactory solution has been obtained. The prosaic one of Putsch *merito omnia dicitis* seems the least unsatisfactory. Excellent is Prof. Ellis's *pui* for *tui* in 83. It is much more likely to have been corrupted than *boni* (Bährens). If we can suppose the soldier, Lycurgus, to have been an old man, Prof. Ellis's restoration of l. 10 *seni* for *senis* is satisfactory. But can we? In 21 I confess to preferring either *uerna* of Heinsius, or even *amoena* (conj. Bährens), as a correction of *auena*, to Prof. Ellis's *lena*. But he is certainly right in adopting Scaliger's *ardor* in 44. Line 52 should, I think, run thus qua Volcanus agros *pastos* (so Heinsius and a Vatican MS. for *pastus*) Iouis ignibus *urget* (for *arcel*); the country is still smouldering after being ravaged by the fires from heaven (*ignibus aetheriis* 35). For *pastus* applied to places wasted by fire see 43 (cp. ἐπινέμεσθαι): and for *urget* cp. Hor. Carm. 1. 22. 20. Prof. Ellis reads qua Volcanus agros *pastus* Iouis ignibus *arcel* with the MSS. perhaps rightly; but the sense is not quite plain. Does it mean 'where Vulcan, after having been glutted with ravage, has not devastated the fields (keeps the fields from the fires of Jove), let there be a Syrtis'? But is not the imprecation rather that the fields be first all wasted by fire and then all flooded? (cp. 46 qua nostri fines olim, cinis omnia fiat). In 69 the MS. reading *rimantibus*, though a picturesque one for the sense of penetrating, seems not quite strong enough. Could the original have been *manantibus* which lost one -an-, and then, in order to be metrically possible, extended to *rimantibus*. In l. 74 Prof. Ellis most ingeniously reads *cogulet* for *coculet* of the MSS. He says *cogulet* for *coagulet*. This is certainly

better than the Vulg. *occupet* (or *occubet*); and the word is excellently descriptive of frog-spawn; but it would seem to imply that the *arguti grylli caua* (the holes of the clear-voiced cricket) were liquid, for you can only coagulate a liquid. Perhaps we might read *concacet* 'befouls.' In l. 76 one feels some surprise that neither Ribbeck, Bährens, nor Prof. Ellis even mentions the reading of the Aldine edition, *spumantes* for *fumantes*. The *s* might easily have been lost after the *s* of *altis*. For *spumare* of rivers cp. Verg. *Æn.* 11. 548. I confess to thinking we should read *spumantes*. In the *Lydia* (l. 79), Prof. Ellis has in his conjecture mentioned in the notes, not by his reading in the text, hit on the right path of emendation, viz., that *cordis* is a corruption of *sordes*: and if we adopt *mei* for *moae* from the Brit. Museum MSS. *b*, we get the reading *lantam, uita, mei sordes fecere rapinam* 'my misery has made such a spoil of me,' has in fact taken so much out of me, 'ut maneam quod uix oculis cognoscere possis.' In l. 68 Prof. Ellis reads *clam dea* for *grandia*, perhaps rightly—certainly cleverly. Heinsius saw those words (*dea clam*) in *mecum* in 66, for which Bährens reads *moechum*. Prof. Ellis rightly obelizes *gaudia*. This word, which occurs four times in this short poem, 20, 45, 59, 65, and three of these times in the fifth foot, has driven out the true word, which a comparison with Catull. 64. 332 induced the old editors to suppose was *bracchia* altering *grandia* to *candida*. This is possible; but the imitation is not certain (see Riese on Catull. l. c.). The reference seems to be to the amour of Venus with Anchises rather than with Adonis: cp. *heros* l. 75. It is strange that the name is not mentioned. One might suggest (66) *et tecum* (so Gronovius for *mecum*), *Anchisa* (for *tenera*, the similarity to *gauisa* having caused the omission, and the gap being stopped by *tenera*), reading *clam dea* and *bracchia* in l. 68; but no certain correction has yet been attained. In l. 13 it would seem that *uenerem spirantia* (Eichstad) for *uenerem stipendia* or *stipantia* is an attractive emendation: cp. Hor. *Carm.* 4. 13. 19. Prof. Ellis adheres to the reading of some MSS. *stipantia*, perhaps rightly; but it requires illustration, which no doubt he can produce. The desperate passages *Dirae* 93–96 and *Lydia* 43–45 still await final emendation, though they, especially the latter, have been acutely handled by Prof. Ellis. All I can say is that I think, owing to *quae dicere longum est* (46), *estis* contains either *scitis* or *nostis*. The latter Wernsdorf says is in the margin of Pithœus' edition. A plausible reading is Sillig's *omnis* (*uos scitis*) *secum*, &c. But the passage (as aforesaid) is not yet emended.

There is nothing to be remarked about the *Copa* except that in l. 33 Prof. Ellis obelizes †*formosum*† *tenerae decerpens ora puellae*. He conjectures *per morsum*, after Oudendorp's *fer morsum*. But either of these indicates an amount of excitement which would not harmonize with the *dolce far niente* of the whole situation. *Formosus* is not to be thought of. It is, however, worth consider-

ing whether Bücheler is not right (Rhein. Mus. xlv. 324) in defending *formosum* as a neuter used adverbially, like *perfidum ridens*, *pavidum blandita* (Ov. Met. 9. 569); and it may be evidence that the author of the *Copa* did not, like Vergil, Ecl. 9. 23, shrink from endeavouring to translate the untranslatable τὸ καλὸν πεφλαμένε of Theocritus 3. 3; see Gellius, who says, 9. 9. 4, that in comparing Vergil's and Theocritus' *Bucolica* he found that Vergil omitted *quod Graecum quidem mire quam suave est, uerti autem neque debuit neque potuit*. He continues in § 7: *Illud quoque alio in loco animadvertimus caute omissum quod est in Graeco uersu dulcissimum*. [Then he quotes Theocr. 3. 1-3.] *Quo enim pacto diceret τὸ καλὸν πεφλαμένε, uerba hercle non translaticia, sed cuiusdam natiuae dulcedinis?* But if this is so, the translation is not very happy, as *formosum decerpens* would, I think, mean that the act of kissing the girl made a pretty picture. Can the Theocritean words be translated into English either? In l. 36 Bücheler takes *ista* with *coronato*, comparing for the construction *ferrum cingitur*.

In the *Priapea* 2. 9 (*mihi glauca oliuo duro cocta frigo*: so B¹) Prof. Ellis has adopted the good conjecture *caduca*, omitting the *duro*, and reads *mihi caduca oliua cocta frigore*; and also in 18, Ribbeck's conjecture *trux stat ecce mentula* for *crux* (*a*)*estate ementula*. Is. Voss had already conjectured *trux*. The same scholar very learnedly suggested in 3. 2 *fomitata* ('lopped,' 'rough-hewn') for *formitata*; and it might, I think, be read. The glosses recognize *fomitata* (corr. O. Müller from *formitata*), interpreting it *fomitibus exassulata*; *defomo ἀποπλεκῶ*: cp. Festus, p. 75. 10. In the next line Prof. Ellis rightly retains the deponent *nutrior*, as it is acknowledged by Priscian and found in Vergil (G. 2. 425); though *nunc tuor* of Scaliger is tempting, protection being the obligation of Priapus, cp. 2. 5, where we must read *tuor*. For the inexplicable *rhoso* in *Catalepton*, 5. 2:

Ite hinc, inanes, ite rhetorum ampullae,
Inflata *rhoso* non Achaico uerba,

Prof. Ellis conjectures *Soso*, who seems to have been an inhabitant of Ascalon and a Stoic of a sort. The vulg. is *rorē*. Bücheler (Rh. Mus. 38. 514) defends *rhoso* as a form of ῥοῦν which Photius interprets τὸ ἡδυσμα, and says is found in Solon (frag. 141). This is the Syrian *rhun* (he tells us), called σουμάκι by the Byzantines, and used by tanners. He thinks *rhus* might have been Latinized into *rhosus*. This is very learned; but it is almost incredible that such a rare word would have escaped corruption; and we do not find the word elsewhere in Latin. I would suggest *suaso*, which was a kind of a dye or pigment: cp. Festus 303 *suasum colos appellatur qui fit ex stillicidio fumoso in uestimento albo*. Plautus [Truc. 271] "*suaso infecisti, propudiosa, pallulam*." *Quidam autem legunt insuaso* [cp. Festus, p. 111]. *Sunt qui omnem colorem qui*

fiat inficiendo suasum uocari: quod quasi persuadetur in alium ex albo transire. (This derivation is, of course, mere popular etymology. The word is probably connected with *sordes*, *sordidus*, *surdus*: cp. Vanček, p. 1228.) *Ampulla* is a jar used for unguents or pigments, like *ἀγκυθος*: both it and *ampullor* are used by Horace in reference to the inflated language of rhetoricians: see Wilkins's note on Ep. 1. 3. 14. In the next line Prof. Ellis has definitely settled the reading by writing *et uos Selique Tarquitique* for *se liquit argutique* of M. He compares Cic. Acad. ii. 11 for *Selius*; cp. Cic. Fam. 7. 32. 2. Haupt has the credit for *Tarquitique*, though Bährens tells us that Is. Voss states that he found it in an old ms. Prof. Ellis is happy, too, in reading in 6. 4 *abiuit?* *ei* for *abitit et* or *habitet* of the MSS. Also his reading of *uiri* (vocative) for *bibi* in 11. 3 is worthy of consideration. Most excellent is his emendation 13. 6, *et lingua qua mas sim tibi* for *qua assim* or *qua adsim* of the MSS.

I cannot quite grasp why the editors alter *pulcra* in 13. 19. Bährens alters to *pulla*; Haupt and Ribbeck had altered to *spurca*. Prof. Ellis retains *pulcra*; but from his punctuation he seems to take it as acc. with *Cotythia*. May it not be vocative, 'my beauty' (ironical): cp. 17 *quid palluisti, femina?* Lines 31 and 32 are thus given by Prof. Ellis *exaestuantēs dote soluis pantices Os crusque lambis sauiis*. This is somewhat far from the MSS. The only suggestion one may venture to make on the corrupt passage is that perhaps *dote* stands for a vocative *lote* or *laute*, the latter word being applied to those who fare sumptuously, and may be here used ironically for one who fares grossly. The Brussels ms. has *docte*. In 14. 9 we might perhaps read *marmoreusque tibi et tibi millecoloribus alis*, the compound adjective being used like *millemodus*, *millepeda*, though it is to be confessed that the word does not appear to occur elsewhere.

It is with pleasure that we see that Prof. Ellis notices in the Maecenas the attractive suggestions of our late Professor of Latin, Arthur Palmer, in 31 (*maluerat* for *malus erat*, generally altered into *maius erat*) and 39 (*discinctus* for *defunctus*). This latter emendation had also occurred to Birt, as Prof. Ellis notices. For the corrupt *non oblita tamen sed †repetitque senes* (of Charon's boat) in v. 8, Professor Ellis ingeniously proposes *cil* (for *sed*) from *cio*: but this word seems generally to mean 'stimulate,' 'encourage,' and does not quite fitly go with *senes*. In l. 19 Prof. Ellis reads *Berytus* (the MSS. give *beritus*, *berithus*, *peritus*), saying (American Journal of Phil. ix. 267), "Berytus is applied in 20 with an easily understood extension of meaning to the thing signified—in other words, to the Berytian shell." The whole Syrian coast seems to have been famous for shells. But the reading of Prof. Ellis,

uincit uulgaris, uincit Berytus harenas,
litore in extremo quas simul unda mouet,

leaves the couplet in a somewhat loose connexion with what goes before and follows. The common alteration is to *berillus* (Aldus), and there is something to recommend it. It might easily have been corrupted to *beritus*; and it is appropriate in reference to Maecenas, who was a connoisseur in precious stones. Prof. Ellis objected (op. cit. p. 267) that *berillus* is masculine, so that we cannot read *quam* in the next line: but $\phi\chi$ read *quas*; and this is adopted by Professor Ellis in his edition. Names of precious stones are usually feminine, but *berillus* and *chrysoberillus* are undoubtedly masculine (cp. Neue-Wagener i³, p. 940) in Latin ($\beta\acute{\eta}\rho\upsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ is feminine in Greek), though the new Thesaurus gives *beryllus* as feminine in Latin. If we adopt Birt's conjecture *ueluti* for the second *uincit* in l. 19, and put a comma at *eras* in 18, we have a well-connected couplet. In the sportive letter to Maecenas which is attributed to Augustus and found in Macrobius, Sat. 2. 4. 12, referred to by Professor Ellis, (op. cit. p. 271), Maecenas is addressed as *adamas Supernas*, *Tiberinum margaritum*, *Cilniorum smaragde*, *iaspi Iguuiorum*, *berulle Porsennae*, *carbunculum Hadriae*, &c.

For the corrupt *exorientis* in l. 56 (the use of the word for the simple *Oriens* cannot be defended by Verg. Georg. 1. 438 or Prop. 3. 5. 27) Prof. Ellis conjectures *acta* or *uix orientis*. Perhaps *usque*. Burmann conjectures *ecce*, referring to Ovid A. A. 1. 177. I had thought of *sos* for *suos*; but no such archaic forms are found in the Elegy. It is worth considering whether Pierson may not be right in thinking we should read *extremas . . . aquas*. In l. 61 it seems probable that *tirsos* has supplanted some word, as line 63 looks like the first reference to the *thyrsus*; but it is difficult to say what that word was. We might expect something indicating the *nebris*. Bährens suggested *subducere uestem*; but some more definite article of attire seems to have been named: *subducere*, however, is attractive. Could the word lost have been something indicating the trailing of his *tunicae solutae*, something like *subducere tractus*? Or was the word simply *sursum*? If *bacha* in 62 stands for *bracchia* (as is generally held, and is probable, though not certain), no doubt *purpurea* must be altered, as 'purple snow' is impossible. Perhaps the original word was *Sithonia* (cp. Ovid Am. 3. 7. 8) corrupted into *Sidonia*, which was glossed by *purpurea*. But it is simpler to suppose that the word intruded itself from l. 60. The new Thesaurus seems to have made a slip in taking *purpurea* with *bracchia* (II. 2157. 37). In l. 90 Heinsius has well suggested *digna referre* for *signa referre*: for *digna* cp. Lydia 26 (129) *tauro Ioue digna uel auro . . . mea sola puella est*. This is better than Scaliger's *signifer esse*. In l. 91 for *sacerdos*, a strange term to apply to Ganymede, Prof. Ellis conjectures *satelles*. This is another case, I think, in which the gloss has expelled the original word. Scaliger noticed that the term *sacerdos* is applied to Ganymede

because the acolytes who served the wine in sacred rites were called *camilli*. This would lead to the supposition that the original word was *camille*, on which *sacerdos* was a gloss. This seems to offer a more likely reason for the corruption than *iacentem* of Heinsius. Nor can one cordially assent to the emendation of Heinsius in 160 (16)—

Hoc mihi contingat, iaceam tellure sub aequa,
Nec tamen hoc ultra †*te potuisse* uelim,

where he reads *te doluisse*—a reading adopted by Ribbeck and Bährens, though it may perhaps be regarded as a reference to such common expressions on tombstones as (say) Orelli 4626 *de qua nullum dolorem nisi acerbissimae mortis eius acceperat*. Prof. Ellis suggests *nec tamen hoc ultra non* (or *nil*) *potuisse uelim*, which (if I understand it aright) would require *nam* rather than *sed* at the beginning of the next verse. I should prefer to read *te posuisse*, 'I would not desire that you should put aught beyond this on my tomb,' *hoc* being the traditional *sic tibi terra levis* (indicated by *iaceam tellure sub aequa*, l. 159; and compare 141-2 *tellus levis ossa teneto*, *Pendula librato pondus et ipsa tuum*), which was such a common inscription that it was often abbreviated into STTL. In the last line of the Elegy, *proprio*, a reading approved by Ribbeck, Riese, and Bährens, seems probable, especially if, as Wernsdorf says, it is found in the Cod. Leidensis (see also Ribbeck). If this reading is adopted, there will be good reasons for welcoming Prof. Ellis's ingenious reading in the previous line, *cur* (for *cum*) *deus in terris? diuis*, &c.

In conclusion it must be said, as was said at the beginning, that Prof. Ellis's text of and annotations on the Appendix Vergiliana are the best extant. If we have here and there ventured on an opinion which is not his, it is with a strong suspicion that further acquaintance with the poems and their commentators would prove our opinion to be untenable or anticipated, and that in many cases they had been tried before the keen critical judgment of Prof. Ellis and found wanting. Prof. Ellis's well-recognized scholarly instinct, his immense learning, great ingenuity and life-long familiarity with Latin poetry must render any disagreement with him, however slight, in the fullest sense *periculosae plenum opus alee*.

L. C. P.

Aristotle on the Art of Poetry: a revised text, with critical Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, by INGRAM BYWATER, Honorary Fellow of Exeter and Queen's Colleges, Oxford. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909.

THIS edition of the *Περὶ Ποιητικῆς* has long been expected; and, now that it has appeared, impartial and competent critics will admit that it was well worth waiting for. The introduction contains a clear and complete account of the sources of the text, and, as far as possible, of its history, with the *subsidiâ* on which a critic has to rely if he wishes to examine or emend it. The value of Σ, as inferred from A. V., and the value of A. V. itself, are discussed with cool and convincing knowledge and judgment, and the importance of both, which seems to have been somewhat exaggerated, is reduced within reasonable proportions. The transcendent authority of A° is vindicated; the position of the *apographa* is explained; and the general characteristics of the treatise itself are set forth with admirable terseness and lucidity.

The translation and notes are in keeping with the introduction—serviceable to serious scholars in all the points in which help is usually sought for or expected. The version makes no pretensions to any qualities not properly required in it. It does not aim at 'fine writing.' But how much better it is for that! We find no *cincinnati*—not a trace of the use of the *calamistri* so often held to be indispensable for the decoration of translations: none of the prettinesses or polish which appeal so effectively to persons of the merely English-reading type. What then? Aristotle himself did not employ such artifices. He aimed at uttering in the aptest possible terms that which appeared to him necessary to say in his workmanlike effort to expound the secret causes of the charm of poetry, to classify and compare the kinds of poetry, and to formulate the practical rules to be followed by those whose natural gifts might induce them to seek instruction in the art of writing poetry. Mr. Bywater, taking his cue from his author, gives us a translation which, for fidelity, logical and grammatical directness of expression, mastery of the idiom of literary criticism, and freedom from verbiage and other vanity, commends itself—to us at all events—as almost unsurpassable.

The notes are very copious; and yet we cannot find a single one which, as we study it, seems to be surplusage. Mr. Bywater's great learning gives him a singular advantage in the illustration and exegesis of the *Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*, which, from its varied allusiveness as well as its multitude of direct references to Greek literature, makes a singularly heavy demand upon the learning of an editor. Mr. Bywater responds easily to this demand, being peculiarly well acquainted, not only with ancient Greek literature, but also with the commentators, ancient and modern, who have helped

with contributions towards the work which he has completed. It is characteristic of him that he tries to trace every fruitful suggestion for the emendation or elucidation of the text back to its origin, with the result that spurious originality vanishes before him, and that some emendations and renderings which we, in our simplicity, were in the habit of ascribing to men of the present or the last generation, turn out to have been anticipated by scholars of two centuries ago. This acquaintance with the history of scholarship on its inner side is a rare and valuable accomplishment, not to be hoped for except as the reward of years of diligent study. In fact, only egotism can blind us to the general reasonableness of the presumption that, if we looked, we should see that, in matters of classical hermeneutics, much of what we think our best work has been better done before us, and that much of our attempted or boasted originality is mere futility and waste of time. Mr. Bywater's acquaintance with the labours of his predecessors imparts to his own work a freshness and soundness which cannot easily be overestimated. His natural caution, both in emendation and in original efforts of exegesis, entitles his opinions in such matters to the highest respect. His critical edition of twelve years ago already contained many of his most important suggestions for the improvement of the text; and we must here, in a short notice, limit ourselves to general statements on this as well as on several other topics. We confess, however, that his defence of *οὕτω* in 1451^b13 seems as just as it is resolute; his adoption of *ἀν εἴη* 1451^b23 seems necessary; his *ὅτι* for *τινὰς*, 1455^b22, seems good; while the same may be said of *τέταρτον ὄψις*, 1456^a2. His addition of <τὸ> in 1461^a14 seems obviously right, and reminds us, if we need to be reminded, of the fine grammatico-logical sense which governs his work as a critic and expositor. We might cull many specimens of admirable exegesis from his notes. His unwearying thoroughness of interpretation appears not only in the pages where he deals with the fascinating *κάθαρσις* problem (which has never been explained quite so succinctly and clearly as by him), but in many minor cases,—e.g. pp. 350–52 on 1461^b24.

In only one place have we, in reading his notes through (as we have done with religious scrupulosity), found our allegiance to his opinions in danger of giving way. This was in 1461^b29, where he keeps his *ἢ <πρὸς> ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτική*. We incline to think that, though he makes out the argument very well with <πρὸς>, it can be explained at least equally well without it. Of course *οἱ βελτίους θεαταί* means, for the purpose of the passage, *οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι*, whose æsthetic 'intelligence' is 'higher,' and who therefore less need the aid of *σχήματα* or merely external *μίμησις* of any kind. Thus they are identical with the *ἐπαικεῖς* of 1462^a2, whose characteristic mark—the point essential for the argument—

is that they do not need such *σχήματα*. The difficulty of the passage 61^b26—62^a4 (*πότερον—χείρων*) seems to arise from the fact that in it two strands of reasoning are twisted into a single argument. Aristotle is occupied in showing (from the opponent's point of view) that *ἐποποιία* is *βελτίων*, and also that *τραγωδία* is *χείρων*. Although the opening clauses—from *εἰ γὰρ* to *ἀεί* (^b27–8)—point to the former, the conclusion that thereupon begins to emerge is the latter. Translating with strict regard for the article, as indicating the logical subject, in the clause *τοιαύτη δ' ἢ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστὶν ἀεί*, and rendering this clause (not “and the less vulgar is always that which addresses the higher public,” but) “and that which addresses the higher public is always the less vulgar,” let us adopt an arrangement of the premisses a little different from that of Mr. Bywater. He makes the case against tragedy “an enthymeme *ἐκ σημείων* : the inferior art is one that addresses an inferior public ; tragedy addresses an inferior public : it must therefore be the inferior art.” This—unless the first of the above propositions be a definition, and therefore ‘ simply ’ convertible—is a fallacious syllogism—a mood of Fig. 2 without a negative premiss ; but it seems to us that Aristotle does not intend to exhibit the reasoning of the friends of *ἐποποιία* as formally inconclusive in this weak way. We venture to suggest that the two series of premisses would run better if arranged each in the form of a sorites, as follows :—

1. *ἐποποιία* (or its *μίμησις*) is addressed to *θεαταί* who less need *μίμησις* :
the *μίμησις* addressed to *θεαταί* who less need *μίμησις* is addressed to *οἱ μᾶλλον αἰσθανόμενοι* :
that addressed to *οἱ μᾶλλον αἰσθανόμενοι* is addressed to *οἱ βελτίους* :
that addressed to *οἱ βελτίους* is less *φορτικὴ* :
that which is less *φορτικὴ* is *βελτίων* :
∴ *ἐποποιία* is *βελτίων* [a conclusion not expressly drawn].
2. *τραγωδία* (or its *μίμησις*) is addressed to those who more need *μίμησις* (*ἢ μὲν οὖν τραγωδία τοιαύτη* ^b32) :
that which is addressed to those who more need *μίμησις* is addressed to *οἱ ἥττον αἰσθανόμενοι* [implying that those for whom *τὸ ἅπαντα μιμῆσθαι* is necessary stand lowest in *αἴσθησις*, and that the *μίμησις* they need is *λίαν φορτικὴ*. The correlation between greater need of *μίμησις*, in various degrees, and the possession of smaller æsthetic faculty is parenthetically proved in *ὥς γὰρ . . . αὐλῶσιν* ^b29–32] :
that which is addressed to *οἱ ἥττον αἰσθανόμενοι* is addressed to *οἱ χείρους* :
that which is addressed to *οἱ χείρους* is *μᾶλλον φορτικὴ* :
that which is *μᾶλλον φορτικὴ* is *χείρων* :
∴ *ἡ τραγικὴ μίμησις*, or *ἡ τραγωδία*, is *χείρων*.

Such is the duplex argument, which is perfectly sound as far as it goes. Aristotle meets it, not by denying its logical validity, but by showing the narrowness of its premisses: how, for instance, it takes no account of the fact that tragedy, far from 'imitating anything and everything,' can please, even when simply read, without the aid of gesture, or of any external form of *μίμησις*. His answer, therefore, practically amounts to denying the premiss in 61^b32—*ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδία τοιαύτη ἐστίν*. We forbear to institute a comparison between the works of Mr. Bywater and of Mr. Butcher. Their aims and functions are different. Each work is admirable in its own way. They supplement one another, and scholars will find both indispensable.

J. I. B.

A History of Classical Scholarship, from the sixth century B.C. to 1908, in three volumes, by JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, Litt.D., Fellow and Lecturer of St. John's College, and Public Orator in the University of Cambridge, Hon. Litt.D., Dublin. Cambridge, at the University Press, vol. i., 1903. Vols. ii. and iii., 1908.

ONE is tempted to wonder whether the popular belief that there are only twenty-four hours in the day holds in the case of Dr. Sandys. For when one looks through these three splendid volumes, and tries to imagine how one man could have collected such a mass of learning, and arranged it in such a systematic way, and made it so interesting—and that all, not in a lifetime, but in a comparatively small number of years—one is driven to some such desperate hypothesis as that suggested above. The remarkable thing about the book is not merely that it gives us an account of all the classical scholars from Solon to the lamented Mr. Walter Headlam (the works of living scholars are not discussed), arranged so clearly and with so many *subsīdia*, such as chronological tables, bibliography, very full indices, &c., that one can at once discover any matter of fact on which information may be required; but that Dr. Sandys has made his book such attractive reading that when the fact required has been ascertained one is lured on to read further and further, which is in one way delightful, but in another somewhat chastening, as you become so very conscious in comparison with Dr. Sandys' lavish wealth of learning *quam sit tibi curta supellex*. There is no book like it in English, or, in point of combined learning and attractiveness, in any other language, as far as the present writer knows. Of course, it is on the persons, the scholars themselves, and their works that he especially dwells, and in almost every case he gives an interesting picture. Take, for example, Eratosthenes, that all-round man whom his specialist colleagues in Alexandria dubbed *βῆτρα*, second-rate, though juster critics called him *πένταθλος*—

does he not recur in every University to-day? This Eratosthenes was no believer in the multifarious learning which oppressed the Alexandrine poets and their imitators, the Romans; for he laid it down ποιητῆς πᾶς στοχάζεται ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας: and is there any better word to express what a poet should be than ψυχαγωγικός? This is a mere illustration. On every page almost one finds similar interesting points which are not generally known. Thus, one could not have a better theory of poetry and its requirements than the suggestive passage of a poet called Simulus, quoted in vol. i., p. 56. In opposition to the school of Alexandria, Dr. Sandys gives a very full and sympathetic account of the school of Pergamon, of its rivalry with Alexandria, and its influence on Rome. In his account of Favorinus (p. 301) that author's long Oration to the Corinthians might perhaps have been mentioned. It is printed among the works of Dio Chrysostom (37), and can hardly be called a fragment.

There is a point in Dr. Sandys' general treatment to which exception may, perhaps, be taken; but, in our opinion, he has shown sound judgment in the line he has adopted. It may be urged, is it reasonable to give one page to Quintilian and two to Abelard, and, on the other hand, four to Ausonius, four to Macrobius, seven to Boethius, twelve to Cassiodorus, five to Synesius, five to John of Salisbury, nine to Roger Bacon? Surely it is. The sources on which information can be obtained of Quintilian and Abelard are easily accessible to any person of general education; but the other lesser-known men require learning such as that of Dr. Sandys to bring them into their proper position of importance in a History of Classical Scholarship. Men like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Dion Chrysostom, Plutarch, the author of the *περὶ ὕψους*, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, Sidonius, Alcuin, Johannes Scotus, Grosseteste, and others, obtain full justice and sympathetic treatment. We are greedy, we feel; but a little fuller account of Gerbert and Giraldus Cambrensis would have been welcome. But it is not merely individuals of whom Dr. Sandys gives illuminating accounts: no less attractive are his general disquisitions; e.g., not only does he give us excellent accounts of Photius, Psellus, Tzetzes, Eustathius, Planudes, but a really admirable résumé of Byzantine scholarship (p. 424 f.). As patriots we welcome the account of Greek learning in Ireland, which was so considerable (at least relatively speaking) that in the sixth century if anyone in the west was found to know Greek it was assumed that he came from Ireland.

A signal monument of erudition is chapter xxxii of the first volume, wherein Dr. Sandys gives us an account of the mediæval copyists, and a minute survey of the principal Latin Classics quoted or imitated in the Middle Ages, recorded in mediæval catalogues, and preserved in mediæval manuscripts. The great learning of

this survey is then succeeded by a most charming account of the conflict between the literary and grammatical school of Orleans and the logical school of Paris; and of d'Andely's *Battle of the Seven Arts*, the precursor of Swift's *Battle of the Books*.

In the second and third volumes Dr. Sandys continues the same course, giving adequate and often elaborate accounts of the principal scholars, from Petrarch down to our day, and interesting disquisitions, such, for example, as that on the pronunciation of Greek and Latin in England. The space at our disposal renders detailed examination impossible. But we wish to draw attention to the often artistic arrangement whereby the individualities of the scholars may be vividly grasped: thus beside the gentle school-master Vittorino is placed the bitter Filelfo, who "combined the accomplishments of a scholar with the insidiousness and the brutality of a brigand." Again, we must all be deeply grateful for the many, very many, portraits of scholars with which the second and third volumes are adorned. It delights us to see what a handsome man Joseph Scaliger was, and amuses us to see what a genial but unscholar-like face the learned Montfaucon had. The numerous specimens of manuscripts, from the fourth-century Sangallensis of Vergil down to those of the time of printing, which are spread throughout the book in each period, are calculated to excite an interest for palæography in the ordinary classical scholar. And we get interesting little pieces of purely literary information throughout the volumes. Thus we learn that many conceits in "Drink to me only with thine eyes" are taken from the love-letters of Philostratus. Pleasant anecdotes, too, are told about many of the learned scholars. Petrarch met the Englishman Richard of Bury, and was most anxious to know from a native the exact position of Thule. The Englishman neither knew nor cared. An English scholar talked Latin according to his pronunciation for a quarter of an hour to Joseph Scaliger, at the end of which time the latter confessed to an imperfect acquaintance with English. Budæus, when informed that his house was on fire, said, "Go and tell my wife: she looks after all the domestic affairs." Lobeck asks Meineke is he *really* going to Italy. "Why Italy, of all parts of the world? Simply to see a few statues with broken noses? NO! If I cannot visit Niagara, or the Mississippi, or Hekla, I prefer sitting here beside my own warm stove, reading GREEK SCHOLIASTS—which is, after all, the true end of the life of man." Thus is seasoned the feast of learning which is set before us in every page.

No review can really do justice to these volumes. They would require a Committee of Reviewers to treat them as they deserve; but we trust enough has been said to show the immense scope, the vast learning, and the great skill and judgment exhibited in this work. The volumes are pretty sure to lie on the study-table of most classical scholars, for daily and almost hourly consultation.

L. C. P.

Post-Augustan Poetry from Seneca to Juvenal. By H. E. BUTLER, Fellow of New College, Oxford. At the Clarendon Press, 1909.

THIS is a book of wise and judicious criticism. It treats of Roman poetry, from Seneca to Juvenal, as the author considers that no poetry after Juvenal approached the first rank—a judgment which is hard on Claudian. He traces the causes of the peculiar nature of Roman poetry in the first century to the decay of Roman character, and to the faulty nature of Roman education, which paid too much attention to style, and was too rhetorical; and rightly considers that the direct influence of the monarchy in causing the decay of literature was not important. He then proceeds to discuss with sound judgment the various poets and their works. He holds that Seneca was the author of the first seventy-three epigrams of the *Anthologia Latina*, and notices the 'trick-rhetoric' of some of these poems (e.g. 72). As to the tragedies, he supposes that they were composed by Seneca when just fresh from the schools; and he most admirably argues that they were intended for recitation and not for acting. The *Oclavia* is of course not by Seneca, but its thought and diction are never absurd—an extraordinary merit in a poet of the Silver Age. Mr. Butler quotes many passages from these tragedies which are of no little distinction; and it is always interesting to see what passages in authors whose merits lie rather in their parts than their wholes commend themselves to such a sound and thoughtful critic as he is; it leads us to look through our own marked books, and add to and subtract from our own previous preferences. He notices the 'angularity' (an excellent word) of Persius, which is well compensated by his sincerity and nobility of mind. He discusses interestingly a problem which we never thought of, where Lucan would have stopped if he had lived to complete his *Pharsalia*. He rightly notices vii. 454-9 as six lines of 'unsurpassed satire'; and well observes that the 'ponderosity' of Lucan, while ill suited to an epic as a whole, added force to those isolated lines and passages which are his greatest title to fame. The attractive chapter on Petronius as a poet brings into prominence the charming grace of that author, whom we associate with other qualities, and points out for us 'his highest achievement,' the poem *Lecto compositus*. He might have added the next one *Sit nox illa*, if only for the last two lines. Petronius, he holds, "writes not as one inspired, but as one steeped in the best literature." A similar emphasis of features not usually associated with poets is seen in the way Mr. Butler is glad to dwell on the love of the country in Martial ("These [Mart. x. 30] are surely the most beautiful *scasons* in the Roman tongue"), and also on his love of children (cp. v. 34 and 37). The chapter on Valerius Flaccus is perhaps the most interesting in the volume. This true poet has not the richness and passion of his model Apollonius, but

he has a tenderness, a power of description, a sense of colour, and a feeling for the mystery (p. 193) of nature that are remarkable. Mr. Butler well illustrates all these qualities, quoting the splendid line describing a sea-cave, *infelix domus et sonitu tremebunda profundi* (iv. 180). Statius is carefully, if severely, dealt with. He is credited with finish, dexterity, and fluency, but he has not learned the art of concealing his art. The beautiful and pathetic invocation of sleep (Silv. v. 4) gets its due meed of praise. Mr. Butler finds the third satire of Juvenal in orderly arrangement and execution the best of the satires; and it and the first in style and observation stand before the famous tenth. He is not too careful to defend Juvenal from the just charge of occasional treatment of impurity with unnecessary detail, and of lack of perspective in fixing in their proper places phases of moral delinquency: but no one can deny to Juvenal vividness and force.

But notwithstanding Mr. Butler's general relative depreciation of the post-Augustan poets, he does not neglect to emphasize their historical importance in that they kept the lamp of poetry alive in the darkness of the Middle Ages; and he notes the honour which Dante accords to Statius and Lucan.

In the case of all the poets, Mr. Butler speaks of their metrical merits and defects like a master in that art. He is severe on Lucan, considering that he has a poor ear for rhythm, but warm in his appreciation of the verse of Persius when at his noblest, whose "actual metre represents almost the high-water mark of the post-Vergilian hexameter." This makes one desire more of such criticism from the accomplished editor of Propertius. He occasionally gives 'modern instances,' such as the success of the *Enfant prodigue*, in illustration of the fascination the *pantomimus* exercised in Rome. He compares the parting of Pompey and Cornelia in Lucan with the parting of Paola and Francesca in Dante; and he gives as one reason for the obscurity of Persius that, like Browning, he brought the dramatic element into satire. We wish for more of these references to modern literature. Of course a writer on post-Augustan poetry must make epigrammatic judgments on his authors. Seneca from his own day to the present has been characterized in such a way. Mr. Butler adds his compressed criticism: "[Seneca] is a prose Ovid with the saving gift of moral fervour"; Seneca's verse has a "fatiguing terseness." Martial is superior to Statius, because "where the infinitely trivial is a theme for verse . . . perfect neatness vanquishes dexterous elaboration." Martial is "the laureate of triviality." "He has the gift of *felicitas* to the full, but it is not *curiosa*." These are all happy: less happy (as a mere epigrammatic judgment) is what is said of the lack of poetic imagination in the poet of the *Aetna*: "*Aetna*, not the poet, provides the fire."

On the whole, Mr. Butler's book is admirable, not only in its

learning but in its poetic feeling. It is one from which we look forward to receiving many an hour's quiet pleasure in re-reading chapters here and there. If, however, a critic must find some fault, it may be that which Mr. Butler has found in Statius: "He is not sufficiently the impressionist." But in his individual judgments it will be hard indeed to prove Mr. Butler in error. If we disagree with him on any point, it is only with a very increased feeling of our own fallibility.

L. C. P.

The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the Editorship of J. A. SMITH, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College; W. D. ROSS, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College. Volume VIII.: Metaphysics. By W. D. ROSS. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1908.

READERS of the *Metaphysics* who needed a translation had hitherto to be content with the versions of Schwegler and Bonitz, in comparison with which no others were worth counting. The English 'translation' in Bohn's series is a fearful and wonderful thing, the possibility of which and its admission into that generally creditable collection reveal the depth of ignorance which, until within the last few decades, prevailed in this country as to one of the greatest and most difficult works of Aristotle.

All this is changed now, thanks to the stimulus given by Jowett and the scholarship and acumen of Mr. W. D. Ross. We have read through nearly all his translation, with Bonitz's text and notes, and also with Bonitz's (posthumously published, though early written) translation beside us for reference; and testing it here and there—in fact, wherever anything seemingly unusual occurred in the English text—we have found it to be in a high degree deserving of the admiration and gratitude of scholars. It is an original and independent piece of work. The version is nearly always convincingly correct; and when one hesitates about it and looks for more light, he finds it hard to do any better with the text than Mr. Ross has done. Brief foot-notes call the reader's attention to the difficulty (from whatever cause) of some passages, or to the fact that the translator has chosen to follow some particular reading in his version; and sometimes a few words in a foot-note clear up the sense where Aristotle had expressed himself 'elliptically.' It would be pleasant to discourse freely and at large on the importance of Mr. Ross's work for all serious English students of Aristotle, and on the essential necessity of a knowledge of (not merely an acquaintance with) the *Metaphysics* for all who wish to obtain as far as possible the 'synoptic' view of the Master's architectonic lines of thought,

before tracing these in their ramifications downwards into his physics or psychology. But we cannot expatiate here in these pleasant paths.

An admirably full and well-arranged Index adds greatly to the value of this work, for which, indeed, scholars will probably have nothing but praise. A few points have presented themselves to us which we may as well jot down before concluding our short notice.

1025^b14:

φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς is rendered by Mr. Ross (who compares 1064^a8):—"It is obvious therefore from such a review of the sciences that there is no demonstration," &c.; and by Bonitz:—"Offenbar also ergibt sich aus einer solchen Induction kein Beweis," &c. Mr. Ross's version, if not also that of Bonitz, requires us to take ἐκ τῆς . . . ἐπαγωγῆς grammatically after φανερὸν, as after δῆλον in the other passage (1064^a8)—δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς. The meaning seems unaffected whichever of the two orders is adopted. Only a logical difference lies between 'it is plain that from the induction' and 'it is plain from the induction that.' Therefore it was scarcely worth while to do violence to the order of the Greek words in translating the earlier passage. If conformity were desirable, Mr. Ross might have rendered ἐπαγωγή similarly in both passages, whereas he renders it in the second by 'induction.'

1029^b25-28:

σκεπτόν ἄρ' ἔστι λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οἷον λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τί ἦν <εἶναι> λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Ἔστω δὲ ὄνομα αὐτῷ ἱμάτιον. Mr. Ross renders the last words, "let the compound be denoted by 'X,'" adding in a foot-note: "'X' Aristotle expresses by arbitrarily taking the word 'cloak.'" Though the English 'cloak'—the German 'Kleid' (Bonitz)—would, indeed, *per se* seem 'arbitrary,' yet we think that the Greek ἱμάτιον is not so. Is it not possible to get an adequate English substitute for ἱμάτιον, which for the Athenian reader connoted *whiteness*? The 'accidental' whiteness of the λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, whether the son of Cleon, or Callias, so often referred to, was due to his ἱμάτιον, which was usually, if not always, white, as worn by men at Athens. Here, as in 18^a19, ἱμάτιον is adopted not 'arbitrarily,' but as a short symbol for a man as he usually appeared at a distance. It is a colour-connoting symbol. It represents 'man' and 'white' in their customary association. It would be better, therefore, to find in English the name of some over-garment also connoting whiteness, and to render ἱμάτιον by it here, than to hide or lose part of the significance of this under the colourless symbol 'X.' But we cannot always translate κατ' εὐχὴν,

and our countrymen do not usually walk abroad clothed in white raiment (λευκὸν ἀμπεχόμενοι, ἡμφιεσμένοι *Ar. Ach.* 1024, *Thesm.* 840).

1032^b29:

The words of the foot-note here attract attention: "It would appear that warmth is treated as the matter which, when specialized in a particular way, becomes health. Yet Aristotle began by treating it as the *efficient* cause of health (l. 24); and he gives no warning of the transition, nor is matter elsewhere identified with efficient cause." It would be strange, indeed, if it were! Here certainly it is scarcely so, as will be seen if τὸ θερμαίνειν (l. 24) (the *act* of causing θερμότης by friction) is distinguished from θερμότης. The ultimate efficient cause is τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ [sc. τοῦ τεχνίτου] (^b23), but the physician's 'thinking' and 'making' together constitute Aristotle's present analysis of his empirical efficient causality. τὸ θερμαίνειν belongs to his 'making.' The θερμότης that results in the patient is a different thing and part of the 'matter' of health. It seems to us that this foot-note might as well have been omitted.

1040^b9:

οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅλον σωρὸς πρὶν ἢ πεφθῆ καὶ γένηται τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν is rendered by Mr. Ross: "For none of them is one, but they are like¹ a heap before it is fused by heat, and some one thing is made of the bits"; and by Bonitz, whose translation implies the reading ὀρρός for σωρός: "denn keiner von ihnen ist eine Einheit, sondern ist nur wie die Molken, ehe sie gekocht sind und aus ihnen eins geworden ist." This reading was in his edition abandoned by Bonitz for σωρός—why, is not obvious. It has good support from other quarters as well as from the "τινὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων" of Alexander, and the excellent interpretation which he supplies (τούτέστι πρὶν ἢ παγῇ ἢ ὅλως τυρωθῇ). Ὀρρός is not exactly = our word 'whey,' but used loosely for coagulable liquids, like soured milk, in which particles floating sporadically are curdled and consolidated by boiling. The multitude of particles dispersed through such liquids before boiling would after boiling seem formed into a single mass, suitably enough for the illustration here. With σωρός, however, we are forced to ask—a heap of what? for it is not every heap that lends itself to πέψις. χέω χυτός (like their cognates *fundo fusus*) are the proper Greek words for 'melt' and 'fusible' (see, e.g., Plato, *Timaeus*); whereas πέσσειν and its parts, when not used of boiling or otherwise 'cooking,' are generally used of some natural process akin to fermentation. Hence πέσσω,

¹ The use of the subj. πεφθῇ after πρὶν would seem to demand attention in the version to the implicit nega-

tivity of the ὅλον clause. We might render—"just as a σωρός is not a ἐν until," &c.

like *coquo*, is used of 'digestion.' What, then, is this 'σωρός' to consist of, so that *πεφθῆ* should be used of it properly, as it might be of *ὀρρός*? Alex. supposes *ψήγματα* of gold or bronze, but evidently does not feel at home with *πεφθῆ* applied to these, as his "*τήξη καί, ὡς εἰπεῖν, πέψη*," sufficiently shows (*Alex.* 535, 23, Hayduck). The German word 'Molken' (= 'whey') is good, in form, as representing the plural implicit in *ὀρρός* and explicit in the following *ἐξ αὐτῶν*; but 'whey,' strictly so called, when boiled does not coagulate. If *ὀρρός*, indeed, were necessarily confined to this, the word should be given up, whatever might be done with *σωρός* in the text.

1042^b14 :

Mr. Ross, here and in 985^b17, renders the well-known *διαθιγή* as Mullach (*Democr.*, p. 262, followed by Diels, Gomperz, and other leading authorities, so far as we know) did, viz. as if it contained the root of *θιγ-εῖν*. It would take up too much space to set out at length the objections that may be urged against this, as well as the considerations which convince us that the word is to be referred to the root of *διατίθημι*. Of the variations between *η* and *ι* in the spelling of the mss. of Aristotle, Suidas, and Sext. Emp., we may say that they are οὐκ ἐπὶ, though their precise significance is not so easy to determine. The Democritean *κακοθιγίη* shows the same variation. *Διαθιγγάνειν* is not found at all; *διαθιγγάνεσθαι* only once, in a sense utterly alien to that required here for analogy. An Abderite *διαθιγή* = *διαθήκη* = (in sense) *διάθεσις* (cf. *προσθήκη* used for *πρόσθεσις* = 'qualification') is not without plausibility, even if not directly provable. It must be remembered that Aristotle himself (1022^b1) explains *διάθεσις* as 'τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις,' while *διαθιγή*, he says, meant *τάξις*; whereas, on the other hand, 'inter-contact' (the term adopted by Mr. Ross, Diels' 'gegenseitige Berührung'), as a physical fact, is properly non-significant of *τάξις* ('Reihenfolge'), for which see Cat. 5^a28-37. 'Inter-contact' and 'order' may be independent of one another. Three marbles, A, B, C, in a triangle, or four, A, B, C, D, in a pyramid, might each one of them touch every other one, no matter what their order. Thus Mullach's words—"quum atomorum contactus ex earum situ et ordine pendeat, quia mutato ordine alia atque alia corpuscula individua se tangunt"—are not always true. On the other hand, a number of marbles, A, B, C, D, arranged in a row on a plane surface, could not all have 'inter-contact,' which could exist only between the members of each pair. A would touch B, but not C or D, and so on. The word chosen to denote 'order' should not be so capable of utterly missing this idea. How Diels could write "gegenseitige Berührung (d. h. Reihenfolge)" we cannot understand. Reference of *διαθιγή* to *διατιθέναι* would perfectly satisfy the theory of Leukippus. Hesychius' "*θηγή*·

θήκη, θέσις, τάξις," with certain analogies, settles half the matter; and the ι = η, as in *κακοθιγίη*, may be due merely to false derivation from *θιγείν*.

In conclusion, we beg to congratulate Mr. Ross on having accomplished, with brilliant success, an extremely useful and difficult piece of work.

J. I. B.

Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. By J. A. STEWART, M.A., White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1909.

IN this Essay the author of the well-known *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, while he recognizes Aristotle as the greatest of the Platonists, can never forgive him for starting the version of the Doctrine of Ideas according to which they must be 'Separate Things.' At no period, the Essay maintains, did Plato teach such a doctrine. The clue to what Plato did teach is to be found in present-day psychology. Plato was expressing a variety of experience which we ourselves still have. This experience is twofold—the experience of one who was both a great man of science and a great artist. The Essay is accordingly divided into the Doctrine of Ideas as contribution to Methodology, and the Doctrine of Ideas as expressing Aesthetic Experience. In the former respect the *εἰδη* are 'right points of view,' and, as such, have the permanence which is now-a-days ascribed to Laws of Nature. In the earlier as in the later Dialogues, this was Plato's meaning. The expression of his meaning varied according to the nature of the subjects discussed, varied also because Plato was a great dramatist. The neglect of one or both of these considerations is fatal to sound interpretation. Thus they are wrong who hold that in the earlier Dialogues the Platonic Idea does not yet meet us, as, on the other hand, Professor Henry Jackson is wrong, according to whom Plato ended by recognizing only Ideas of Natural Kinds. Further, minute inquiries detecting alterations, small and great, ignore the dominant consideration that Plato was a great dramatist. With all this it coheres that the Essay does not attach much importance to fixing a chronological order of the Dialogues. Among the few recent expositors who have rightly regarded the Doctrine as contribution to Methodology, prominence is given to the service rendered by Professor Natorp, who, however, assumes that this is the sole significance of the Doctrine. His psychological basis is not broad enough to take in the Experience which inspires Art and Religion. Here the Idea is not 'a point of view' taken by the mind in Discourse, but a 'real presence' confronting Contemplation.

In support of the thesis the Dialogues are examined one by

one. There are many excellent remarks of which space permits us to touch on only a few. When the *locus classicus* for Plato's *idéa ráγathou* is reached, emphasis is laid on the words *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, and the position of Socrates towards the Good is likened to that which Matthew Arnold recommends towards religious truth: we are to regard language as *thrown out at* an object of consciousness not fully grasped which inspires emotion. In the *Phaedrus* we have the abstraction of the concept, and it is from this that Aristotle's objection to the Ideas starts. Plato, according to Aristotle, makes the pure Forms separate Things. Aristotle, the Essay here says, had no sense of the metaphorical. The Idea here (and in the *Symposium*) is not the 'logical concept,' or 'scientific point of view,' or 'law of nature' of other Dialogues, but a Real Presence for ecstatic experience. The 'young Socrates' of the *Parmenides*, with his separate thing-like Ideas, is most likely a pupil of the Academy who took up the Master's Doctrine exactly as Aristotle did. In the *Sophistes* Plato dwells on the character of the Ideas as forms of Force, i.e. not quasi-material substances at rest somewhere, but modes of spiritual activity. The Idea as *δύναμις*—Dr. Horn does not exaggerate when he calls this one of the greatest achievements of the genius of Plato. The Essay adds, however, that it is no new doctrine with Plato: implicitly or explicitly it is found in earlier dialogues. The *γινόμενον* of the *Republic* is the world as not yet sufficiently explained. But there is no sharp opposition between *γινόμενον* and *ὄν*. Against such literal interpretation we may find a protest in the *Sophistes*. What is the relation of God in the *Timaeus* to the Idea of the Good? Professor Stewart's answer to this question puts well his whole position. "God and the Good belong to different regions of Plato's thought. As man of science Plato sets up the conception of the Good, the Universe of Natural Laws; as inspired by religious feeling he speaks of God. The two attitudes—the scientific and the religious—are not necessarily antagonistic. They are only different. . . . The religious conviction of the Existence of a Personal God—discontinuous and ecstatic, I think, rather than continuous and habitual, in Plato's mind—and the scientific conception of the reign of Natural Law interpenetrate each other. While Discourse moves on, tracing out the articulation of the Whole, Contemplation rests, filled with the vision of its vast contour."

In Part II Professor Stewart grapples with the psychology of Contemplation, and what he has to say of artistic and religious experience is full of interest. This experience is elusive and hard to express in words, but nevertheless it is most real. The beatific vision of the poet or the ecstatic can throw light upon the discourse of Diotima in the *Symposium*. After all, the perennial attractiveness of Platonism has its secret in the Ideas, not on their logical side, but rather as eternal archetypes of beauty, haunting this

world of daily work with their real presence. In the conclusion of his Essay Professor Stewart's outbursts of enthusiasm tempt us to break off the following lines from the great Ode of Wordsworth, and apply them to the Ideas of Plato:—

Those shadowy recollections,
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain-light of all our day,
Are yet a master-light of all our seeing;
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal Silence: truths that wake,
To perish never.

W. K.

M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Divinatio in Q. Caecilium. In C. Verrem; recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit GULIELMUS PETERSON, Rector Universitatis Magillianæ. Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1907.

THIS is a most important work. Not only has it directly used for the first time a manuscript little known, and of the highest value, but it has shown that a rearrangement must be made of the critical bases on which the speeches rest; and that whereas previously it was held that the criticism of the Verrines was tripartite,¹ one part relating to Div., Actio Prima and Actio Secunda I; another relating to II and III; and the third to IV and V, it is now possible to simplify the criticism of these speeches as a whole, and to reduce all the existing MSS. to two originally complete recensions.

The new MS. was discovered (at least its real value was discovered) by Dr. Peterson, who found it in Lord Leicester's Library at Holkham. The MS.—a ninth-century one—originally belonged to the celebrated Abbey of Cluni. It bears the library-mark of that venerable institution on the page which Dr. Peterson has photographed and prefixed to his *Anecdoton Oxoniense* ix., wherein he treats at length of the manuscript and all its contents. Here, however, he is only concerned with the Verrines. In the introduction to Act. II., lib. ii., of Baiter and Halm's edition (p. 177), we find references to three MSS.—(1) *Fabricianus* (F), which was sent by

¹ When the great corpus of the Verrines came to be broken up—whether this was due to chance or to the fact that ii and iii 'propter severitatem argumenti,' as Zumpt says, were

less in demand than the other parts—it resulted that the first and third parts were much more frequently copied than ii and iii.

Fr. Fabricius Marcoduranus (Franz Schmidt von Düren) to Lambinus some time after 1556, in which year Lambinus published his first edition, and of which he and subsequent editors speak with no little praise; (2) *Metellianus* (M) (it belonged to one Jean Matal), used by Gruter (in his edition of 1618), to whom various readings of that codex were communicated by Gulielmus. Gruter suspected that it and the Fabricianus were the same, and so did Zumpt; but the ears of scholars—even of Madvig—refused to hear; (3) *Nannianus* (N) “*praestantissimis adnumerandus*,” says Jordan. It was used by Pierre Nanning, Professor of Litterae Humaniores at Louvain, in his “*Scholia et Castigationes*,” which appeared in 1548, and which were adopted by Car. Stephanus in his edition of 1554. All these three mss. Dr. Peterson has proved in his *Anecdoton* (xxx–liii) to be one and the same, viz., the Holkham or Cluni Codex. Since those days it has become mutilated, having lost the whole of the third book and a considerable part of the second (it never had more than ii and iii): but enough remains to disclose to a careful and acute critic like Dr. Peterson the identities above indicated. This is a fine piece of critical work.

But the actual present contents of the Cluniacensis, with the additional notices to be obtained from the editions of Stephanus, Lambinus, and Gruter, would not show us the full value of the codex. But there is a codex in the Laurentian Library, Lagomarsinianus 42, which Jordan puts at the head of his ‘*meliores*,’ and which he describes as “*praestantissimus, qui cum ab initio ex optimo exemplari descriptus esset, postea ab homine imperito ad similitudinem deteriorum codicum corruptus est. Quamobrem prior manus accurate ubique commemoratur, quippe quae ad verum inveniendum unice pertineat*”—a point noticed by Leonardus Aretinus, and reiterated by Dr. Peterson. This ‘*optimum exemplar*’ is, as Dr. Peterson has proved, the Cluni ms. when in its perfect state. (See his *Anecdoton*, pp. xxiv–xxx). So the Cluniacensis is the same as the Nannianus, Fabricianus, and Metellianus, and is the parent of the first hand of Lag. 42, which thus has its already high value enhanced. To have established all this is a work requiring rare insight and patience, and shows that Dr. Peterson must be an especial favourite of the divinity who presides over Criticism, for he can (a rare gift) make full use of any *ἔρμηνειον* which Fortune may chance to present to him.

So far for 2 Verr. ii and iii. The Cluniacensis and Lag. 42 man. prim., called by Dr. Peterson O¹, are the principal bases, with, of course, the Vatican palimpsest (V), of which something will be said presently. Now the remaining books are to be considered.

Since Madvig in 1828, at the age of twenty-four, wrote his *Epistola Critica* to Orelli, it is agreed that the codices of the Verrines fall into two families, the Gallic (X) and Italian (Y), the

latter supplying originally and for a long time the ordinary texts—between which hover the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest (V). No member of X has the whole of the Verrines. The chief in this family is R (Parisinus 7774) of the ninth century, which contains iv and v; but it originally contained all the books, for iv commences with quaternion 26; and from the length of a page we can calculate that it would have taken exactly 25 quaternions to include them all. Beside R is to be placed S (Parisinus 7775) of the thirteenth century, which, though not copied from R, is copied from a ms. almost exactly like it: accordingly S is of virtually equal value with R. Now S contains not only iv and v, but also part of 2 Verr. i, viz, §§ 90–111. In § 111 it ends at *de istius singu-* in the middle of a word and at the end of the page—so we may conclude that the many other mss. which end this portion of the Verrines at this point, and not at the end of a page, have S as their parent. But it would seem that we cannot get very far, if we have only twenty-two sections to work on; but Dr. Peterson shows that we can with their help take a very important step forward; for a comparison of those sections in S with another Paris ms. 7823 (D), a fifteenth-century ms., shows that S and D agree *verbatim et literatim*—down even to points of minute detail. Now D contains the Div., Act I, Act II. i, §§ 1–111: so that we may fairly take D as representing in the earlier books the same excellent recension which appears in R and S for iv and v. Here, then, is a new basis (SD) for the earlier books, which enables us to dispense with the codices which have held such a high position among the ‘*meliores*’ in the editions of Jordan and Müller—even Nohl considers G 1 of great value—such as Guelferbytanus 2, Guelferbytanus 1 (which is later and worse than 2), and Leidensis. “*Illud pro certo est habendum*,” says Dr. Peterson, “*ubicunque hic et ceteri ab SD declinant semper in peiorem partem fieri.*” Indeed he considers an English ms., Harl. 4852 (Z), more worthy of consideration as adhering much more closely to D than the others, and one “from which it would have been possible, if everything else had perished, to construct an admirable text” (Journal of Philology, xxx, p. 182).

The chief representative of the Y family is Parisiensis 7776 (p) of the eleventh century. It contains the whole of the Verrines, and has been tolerably known—at least since the time of Zumpt. Dr. Peterson values it highly, though it here and there is interpolated. He has collated it from beginning to end. He says (Journal of Philology, xxx, p. 186): “A comparison of p with D, with the Cluniacensis, and with R ought to result in a more or less complete establishment of the true text.” It is also valuable in that it supplies many passages omitted in X; and indeed in some passages it exhibits the same sort of recension as that which lay before Quintilian. Very similar is Lagomarsinianus 29 (q), so much

valued by Zumpt. Another codex of the same class, and of equal or nearly equal value, Dr. Peterson has discovered in Harl. 2687, which Mr. Clark has already used for the Philippics. Indeed Dr. Peterson and Mr. Clark have done patriotic service in showing in many cases what valuable mss. are contained in English libraries. The codices *pqr*, which contain the whole of the Verrines, have such close agreement that Dr. Peterson generally signifies their consensus by π . The extracts from iii and iv in the celebrated Harl. 2682 (H)—which has been the parent of the Erfurdt (E)—agree closely with the Cluniacensis (as represented by N, F, and M) and R. Thus we have the Cluniacensis and Lag. 42 to found the text of ii and iii on; and SDR to establish the text both of the earlier books and of iv and v, with several other codices which, if judiciously used, supply help in doubtful cases.

But there is besides these the venerable Vatican palimpsest (V),¹ fragments of which are found throughout all the speeches. It belongs to the third or fourth century; and its great antiquity naturally led to its being held in high esteem; and so it was regarded until 1876, when Meusel wrote his Programm on it, and adjudged it to be a "fallacissimus auctor"; and C. F. W. Müller (p. xli) speaks of it as "foedissime interpolatus," and of the "seduli correctoris fraus mala fide sua pro Tullianis venditantis."² Dr. Peterson undertakes its defence, and declares that it has not only in many isolated cases been the sole means of restoring the true reading, but that it is an invaluable authority, taken in connexion with *p*, of that part of book i which is wanting in X, and is to be taken into account even where we have SD. It agrees with C and O in ii and iii, but with *p* rather than R in iv and v, though in doubtful cases it deserves as much consideration as R. But he acknowledges that the whole corpus of the Verrines, as it existed originally in V, had at different times and in different places been considerably corrected. It is to be noted that Quintilian seems to have had a recension like that of V before him: cp. v. 118 *Romanorum* V Quintil, 8, 4, 27, which is omitted by all the other mss. This Dr. Peterson has fully discussed in the American Journal of Philology, xxvi, pp. 409-436, and briefly summarized in the volume we are considering. But however much V agrees with the more reliable mss. in the earlier part and in ii and iii, it is only in the first part that it can be regarded as a valid touchstone to decide the order of words. However, this is an aspect which Dr. Peterson allows may, perhaps, require further materials before it can be conclusively presented. Dr. Peterson, of course, avails himself of the test afforded by Zielinski's laws of the Clause-Endings.

¹ On some points of its history, see Dr. Peterson in the *Cl. Rev.*, xvii, 461. are treated in detail by Dr. Peterson in American Journal of Philology, xxvi, p. 419.

² Müller's examples of interpolation

It would not be possible to present here the various emendations which Dr. Peterson has made by his own critical ingenuity in the whole volume. He has discussed most of these at length in the *Classical Review*, xvii. 198-202; xviii. 23-26, 208-212; xix. 160; xx. 256-257, so that they need not be dwelt on here. Thus it may be seen that this volume fulfils all the requirements of a new critical edition. The great services rendered to the criticism of Cicero's Orations by Dr. Peterson and his friend Mr. A. C. Clark mark a period in Ciceronian study, and have brought great honour on English learning and Oxford scholarship.

L. C. P.

The Acharnians of Aristophanes, with Introduction, English Prose Translation, Critical Notes, and Commentary, by W. J. M. STARKIE, M.A., HON. LITT.D., Dublin. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., St. Martin's Street, London, 1909.

THIS book, like the editor's *Vespae*, does more to elucidate the great Greek comic poet than could be done by all the efforts of mere grammarians. Dr. Starkie has the saving grace of humour. He has the faculty of seeing a joke and feeling it too, and of making those who read his notes see and feel it.

The way in which he uses Shakespeare as a medium through which to contemplate the real Aristophanes is altogether admirable. Shakespeare presents an immeasurably larger and fuller draught of human nature, even on its comic side; but Aristophanes paints in colours as vivid and realistic as those of Shakespeare. Differences between the external circumstances of Athenian life in the fifth century B.C. and of English life in the days of Elizabeth are in this comparison almost negligible. Having set them aside, there remains to us in each case human nature as we know it in some essential aspects, with its folly and pomposity, its weakness and presumption, its ever changing yet changeless play of hopes and fears, its vain desires and frustrated petty ambitions, and its other harmless absurdities. Looking into Aristophanes or Shakespeare we there behold men so like ourselves or our contemporaries that our sympathy or interest is at once arrested and held. We feel that, were we and our friends to live under the conditions imagined by either poet, we should probably discover ourselves in our hours of weakness behaving very much as some of the characters in Aristophanes or Shakespeare do; and, like them in this also, we should, in the midst of our pranks, with our foibles all too patent to lookers-on, imagine ourselves there the same fine fellows that we imagine ourselves here and now, and be laughed at for it by our friends exactly as we are now and here. The comic glass of Aristophanes was smaller, but not less clear and true, than that of Shakespeare. Dr. Starkie has been the first,

not, indeed, to recognise this, but to make practical use of it on a large scale for the illustration of Aristophanes. His notes, introduction, and translation have the merits that exact grammatical, historical, and literary knowledge imparts; but these merits are enhanced by the others to which we have referred—the ever ready and infective smile for the fun of Aristophanes, and the ever happy and illuminative Shakespearean parallel.

That an editor of Aristophanes ought to be a good scholar, a sound critic, widely read, and fertile in ideas as to the possible meanings of questionable words and passages, as well as acquainted with the history of Greek life and thought—goes without saying. But the ability to make the reader not only understand but love a really great writer is a higher qualification. Too often our love for an author, such as, e.g., Juvenal, is killed or crushed beneath the weight of an editor's mere learning or scholarship. Contrast the results produced by faithful and unselfish criticism. What lover of Shakespeare has not, after reading Dowden, loved Shakespeare the more? Who, on reading Raleigh's *Milton*, has not had his love and reverence for Milton quickened and increased? What the Classical authors perhaps need most at the present time is to be rescued from the ivy of scholiastic growth which has long been choking them. This is one of the objects kept steadily in view by Dr. Starkie. Hence we hail his edition of the *Acharnians* as good in itself, and as heralding, we hope, a better era for Classical studies generally. Assisted by him, ordinary readers are brought nearer to the actual life of Athens; they are enabled to understand as they never understood the mind and art of Aristophanes, and to participate in the carnival of wit and humour provided for the Athenians at the festivals of Dionysus 2300 years ago.

We cannot here give a detailed account of Dr. Starkie's *Acharnians*, but we may observe that he is among the warmest admirers of the codex *Ravennas*. He is conservative, but, while carefully recording and sifting ms. tradition and modern conjectures, he contributes some very important critical suggestions of his own. In this connexion we may call special attention to his notes on vv. 25–26, 95, 610, 1093.

His treatment of the metres and rhythms of the play commends itself to us as perfectly judicious. He frankly abandons certain recently developed theories as to the structure of Greek verse, and returns, with some of the most eminent modern scholars, to a standpoint nearer to that of the ancient grammarians. The movement in this direction propagated by Wilamowitz, Blass, and Otto Schroeder has, we are glad to see, met with his approval. In matters of Greek metrical theory it has become necessary to go back a long way—*reculer pour mieux sauter*.

J. I. B.

The *Hisperica Famina*, edited, with a short Introduction and Index Verborum, by FRANCIS JOHN HENRY JENKINSON, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, University Librarian. With three Facsimile Plates. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1908.

THE pleasant way in which Dr. Jenkinson minimizes what he has done himself in this volume must not lead us to suppose that his labours have not been very considerable. His aim sounds modest — "to provide a text as correct as I could make it, and easy to cite or refer to": but to do this required a collation of several manuscripts, of which accurate accounts are given, and no little thought and ingenuity to discover, as far as might be, the meaning of the words in this extraordinary 'Hesperic' jargon. Even Dr. Jenkinson acknowledges that he cannot construe it all. But he plainly can construe most of it; and such are the judgment and learning he has displayed in any side of the work which he has especially treated in this volume (take, for example, the connexion of the work with Gildas) that it remains a matter of some (we trust he will not consider unreasonable) regret that he did not give a translation, and add in his most valuable Index Verborum the meanings, as far as they have been ascertained, of the words in this oddest of vocabularies. Stowasser's edition is not readily available for the ordinary scholar; but if the desiderata which we have specified were forthcoming, Dr. Jenkinson's book would be a perfect treasure to every kind of reader. As the book now stands it is useful only to those who have otherwise attained to a knowledge of this fantastic but not wholly unalluring language. In accordance with the views of the late Mr. Henry Bradshaw, Dr. Jenkinson prints the work as metrical, and indicates clearly the assonances in the several lines. This is a most important feature, and no doubt will prove valuable to the student of assonance in Celtic literature. We do not know whether to be glad or sorry that Dr. Jenkinson, after Mr. Bradshaw, Stowasser, and Mai, has adjudged the work to an Irishman, or at least to Ireland, and rejects Zimmer's theory that the *Hisperica Famina*, as well as the *Lorica* and the *Alphabetical Hymn*, came from south-west Britain. These two last-named hymns, as well as one called *Rubisca* (not previously printed), are given by Dr. Jenkinson as partaking of the same abnormal style. Dr. Jenkinson deserves much gratitude for having done a hard piece of work in the reclaiming of this very bushy and tangled thicket of literature. But we fear we are becoming infected with the 'Hispericum famen' itself: so *manum de tabula*.

L. C. P.

The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic. By P. C. SANDS, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. The Thirlwall Prize, 1906. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1908.

THIS is a work of accurate, extensive, serried, and excellently arranged learning. It treats of one department of government, from which we may obtain an impression of the gradual development of Roman power; and it gives all the essential information which we require as to the several client princes who were gradually drawn into the net of Roman domination. That the important client princes, from being called simply *amici*, passed imperceptibly to being styled *socii et amici*, seems an indication that they came into a position of inferiority, Rome assuming that they would lend their aid if required, though Rome regarded herself as under no obligation to assist in turn. Mr. Sands shows with no little force the lofty pride and persistency with which the Romans secured that the 'Majesty of Rome' should be always observed, and, in an instructive way, illustrates the position in which Rome stood to the client princes by that of the position of Augustus to the Roman citizens, quoting Monumentum Ancyranum, "I surpassed all in dignity, but had no more power than those who were my colleagues in each office." Able, too, is the way in which Mr. Sands shows that "the Senate, like the Spartans (Thuc. v. 105, 4), tended to identify duty with utility" in its relations with the client princes, and that it lacked that moral force directed to ensure that the client princes governed their subjects according to the natural laws of justice and humanity—such a moral force as is exerted to-day by the British Government in India. It is remarkable in Mr. Sands's book how steadily he adheres to his subject. The authorities are all concentrated in two appendices, and the principal authorities quoted at length. The book is interesting to read; but it is also, on account of its well-arranged learning, one that every student of the later history of the Roman Republic must have for reference; and so clearly mapped out is the whole work, and so excellent the index, that the discovery of the reference one wants is as easy as possible. The book is to be recommended cordially.

L. C. P.

Neoplatonism in relation to Christianity. An Essay by CHARLES ELSEE, M.A., sometime Scholar and Naden Divinity Student at St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1908.

THE finding of Mr. Elsee's Essay is that, at least in the earlier stages of its history, Neoplatonism was of set purpose antagonistic to Christianity. Two earlier stages are distinguishable, in both of which the School adopted the position of apologists of paganism. In the first, Plotinus chose the more dignified method of ignoring the Christians altogether: in the second, Porphyry made a literary attack upon them, Hierocles supplemented the pen with the sword, while the Church was not loved by the Emperor Julian. After the death of the latter we reach a third stage, when a more academic dress is assumed, and the defence of paganism is not so prominent. The opening years of the fifth century saw a great revival of Neoplatonism, the centres of activity being the Universities of Alexandria and Athens. At Alexandria appeared two striking figures—Hypatia, whose fate is well known, and Synesius, who in becoming a bishop did not cease to be a philosopher. At Athens Proclus was the last great teacher of the School. Neoplatonism continued to be taught until 529 A.D., when Justinian's treatment of the philosophers was as drastic as that meted out to certain religious orders by recent French legislation. The seven Neoplatonists who "emigrated to Persia, hoping to find in the East the Utopia which they had sought in vain at Athens," reminded us of the quest of our own Pilgrim Fathers.

On the part of Christians there was for some time towards all philosophy a shyness to which the Gnostic extravagances may have contributed. But soon there arose at Alexandria the Catechetical School, "a denominational College by the side of a secular University." To it belonged Clement of Alexandria, and from him we may learn that the intellectual Christians even at Alexandria were in a minority. The minority was endeavouring to claim for Christianity the fruits of Greek speculation. This was in the years immediately before the rise of Neoplatonism. When we come down to Neoplatonism itself, conspicuous examples of Christians who were deeply imbued with it as a philosophic system are Origen, Eusebius, Athanasius, and Augustine. Often consciously, sometimes perhaps unconsciously, the Christian theologians were influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophers. Mr. Elsee adduces in detail the evidence both external and internal. Nor was the indebtedness all on one side. In reading the Essay we have put to ourselves the situation thus:—A Neoplatonist could no more have nothing to do with contemporary Christian teaching than now-a-days a philosopher

could have nothing to do with the professed beliefs of his neighbours.

In the early days of antagonism to Christianity, the strength of Neoplatonism lay in the power to summon to its aid all the forces of conservatism. In all its history the weakness of unaided Neoplatonism was the lack of a message for any but the intellectual few. At the end of his Essay, Mr. Elsee hints at the influence which Neoplatonism has continued to exert downwards through Boethius to Joannes Scotus Erigena, and even to modern times.

We have put together the above from the Essay as a whole. We make the following notes on separate parts. At page 30 Mr. Elsee seems to join in attributing to Plato, without any word of criticism, the version of the doctrine of Ideas according to which they had an independent existence, while Aristotle, the starter of this version, seems, in a slight degree, unduly praised at the expense of his master. On p. 96 there is a wrong full-stop, with the needless beginning of a new paragraph. On pp. 107-8 we read of Julian's edict, forbidding Christians to teach the Classics, that "it was doubtless intended to aid the side of paganism by giving a pagan bias to the whole of the higher education of the Empire, as well as by conferring a valuable monopoly upon pagan teachers." If we descended to politics, we might observe something analogous to this in certain English educational legislation, and say in turn to members of our political parties :—

mutato nomine de te

Fabula narratur.

On page 125 we read that at the beginning of the fourth century the majority of Western Christians knew Greek philosophy and theology only through the medium of Latin translations, and there was some uneasiness about the views ascribed to Origen. This reminded us of having seen somewhere that in the early days of the introduction of German thought to English readers the importation was all the more unsettling because so few knew German.

We hope we have implied throughout that we found this little book very interesting; and the care with which we read it is a measure of our respect for the author.

W. K.

Hymenaeus: a comedy acted in St. John's College, Cambridge. Now first printed, with an Introduction and notes by G. C. MOORE SMITH, Litt.D., Professor of English Language and Literature in the University of Sheffield. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1908.

THIS is a specimen of the kind of Latin plays which were written and acted at the Universities in the time of Elizabeth. Dr. Moore Smith, by a study of the status of the various actors, has assigned it to the Bachelors' Commencements of 1574. The plot is taken from the Decameron (Tenth Story of the Fourth Day), but is considerably altered, principally with the view of meeting the requirements of an English audience. The comedy is interesting as introducing an episode wherein the hero by mistake takes a dose of opium, which had been prepared for his father who had to undergo a surgical operation, and is supposed to be dead; and this situation gives a certain tragic note to a small portion of the work. The way the hero gets into his lady-love's house also reminds us of *Romeo and Juliet*. In details the author of the play shows a really considerable knowledge of Plautus and Terence. Most of the references are given by Dr. Moore Smith in his good but rather too brief notes: we would fain hope that they may be more numerous in the next play which he promises us. He might have mentioned Terence, Phormio 203, and Cicero, Tusc. 2.11, as giving exactly *fortes fortuna adiuvat*. Perhaps that gives a hint for the explanation of the mysterious "Tullius Terentius," which appears in the *Epigrammatum Delectus*, ed. 1682—a reference which Dr. Moore Smith quotes. In Act 2, sc. 2, not only are 103-107 imitated from the *Miles* of Plautus, but also 94-98 (cp. Mil. 38-44). The introduction of riddles, though in this play, owing to their nature, "a poor concession to clownery" (Introd., p. xiv), yet was occasionally found in serious stories, perhaps owing to the example set by the author of Apollonius of Tyre. Dr. Moore Smith's work is a scholarly edition of an interesting form of literature which combines the ancient and the modern.

L. C. P.

The Rhetoric of Aristotle. A Translation by SIR RICHARD CLAVELHOUSE JEBB, O.M., LITT.D., late Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. Edited, with an Introduction and with Supplementary Notes, by JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, LITT.D., Fellow of St. John's College, and Public Orator. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1909.

TWICE it has fallen to the lot of Dr. Sandys to prepare for the Press posthumous works connected with the *Rhetoric of Aristotle*. The writer of this short notice made, some years ago, a careful use of Mr. Cope's *Commentary*, revised and completed by Dr. Sandys, and retains a lasting impression of the greatness of Aristotle's treatise and the worth of Mr. Cope's *Commentary*. Sir Richard Jebb's *Translation* has the merits which are inseparably associated with his name. Aristotle, in one place in the *Rhetoric*, says:—"To complete imperfect things is pleasant; for at this point the work becomes one's own." These words may express the satisfaction of Dr. Sandys in being joined so intimately with Cope and Jebb in labour upon Aristotle. The extent and character of the editor's contributions can be best known to those who have used Cope's *Commentary*, and may now use this translation by Sir Richard Jebb. From memoranda found in the ms., it appears that the latter work, in its preparation, falls between the date of the translation of the *Characters of Theophrastus* (1870) and that of the publication of *The Attic Orators* (1876). As to the date of Aristotle's work itself, Dr. Sandys, in the introduction, has this to say:—"If 336 was the date of its completion, the author was then forty-eight years of age; and a new interest is added to his own statement that the mind is in its prime about the age of forty-nine."

Looking over the *Rhetoric* once more, the last chapter of the first book jars on us. Such a lesson in the art of chicanery sounds somewhat oddly after the careful morality of the first chapter of the same book. True, in that first chapter he said:—"One should be able to persuade, just as to reason strictly on both sides of the question—not with a view to using the twofold power—one must not be the advocate of evil—but in order, first, that we may know the whole state of the case; secondly, that, if anyone else argues dishonestly, we on our part may be able to refute him." But the chapter we have ventured to criticize seems to go farther than this in teaching us to argue as may suit us. *ἡ δὲ βούλησις* and its quest are so unscrupulously ignored that we say to ourselves:—"This was the kind of sophistry that stirred Plato to denounce Rhetoric as 'the artificer of persuasion.' In our admiration of Aristotle we might take refuge in the hypothesis that the work was prepared by a pupil from imperfect notes of his master's lectures. If this hypothesis is correct, Aristotle was not so fortunate in his editor as Cope and Jebb have been.

W K

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six. With Essays, Notes, and Translation by L. H. G. GREENWOOD, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Cambridge, at the Univ. Press, 1909.

WE can heartily commend Mr. Greenwood's presentation of *N.E.*, vi., sympathizing with his faith in its Aristotelean authorship, and admiring his ingenuity in defence of this. His introduction is good, especially the second section. His exposition of *φρόνησις* in general, and particularly of *προαίρεσις* and the practical syllogism, is excellent. The summary he gives of Aristotle's teaching (pp. 83, 84) as to the relation between happiness and 'intellectual goodness' shows that our editor realises the great and intimate influence still exercised, and likely to be long exercised, by the Stagirite on modern ethical thinking. Mr. Greenwood has a wide, if somewhat cursory, knowledge of the whole body of writings usually called 'Aristotelian,' and speaks about them with a fulness of confidence which we envy. Naturally he has to commit himself to much that would bear further discussion, as he himself knows. We have found little in his general statements with which to quarrel; and we actually fear to broach any of the larger questions which occur to us as we read what he writes (pages 28 et sqq.) on *ἐπαγωγή*, as Aristotle understood this, and the modern scientific conception of 'induction.' But we feel compelled to differ from him when he says (page 30)—"Fortunately this curious and unsatisfactory passage [68^b15-37] can be nearly neglected in trying to understand what Aristotle really meant by *ἐπαγωγή*: it certainly does not express what he means as a rule." The logical difficulty of scientific induction—its subtle lurking *petitio principii*—with our own persistent tendency to discover in the conception of *νοῦς ὁ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα* the common agency on which deduction and induction alike depend for their objective validity, makes us hesitate before dismissing as negligible the passage in which Aristotle's *ἐπαγωγή διὰ πάντων* shows him stumbling against the same dark mountain which for one perplexing moment revealed itself also to the over-confident John Stuart Mill. Mr. Greenwood's translation is one with which scholars will have little fault to find; but genuine scholars will hardly need it with the Greek before them. As for merely English-reading students, they must remain hopeless. No translation can protect them against the traps and pitfalls with which the path of Aristotle's thought is strewn when looked at in the light of even the best versions. We notice (p. 115) that Mr. Greenwood renders *λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μαθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις* by "we often give learning the name of judgment"; and he adds a foot-note, "The word *σύνεσις*, translated 'judgment,' can also mean 'intelligence' as here." What the merely 'English-reading' student will think of those who 'give learning the name of judgment' we find it hard

to say. "*Συνιέναι* is applied sometimes to *μανθάνειν*" because *μανθάνω* is often used in idiomatic Greek as we use the English expression 'I see,' when the essential point comes before the inward eye—when we succeed in 'putting this and that together,' and the meaning of the words, by which the speaker or writer would teach us, suddenly at last comes clearly and with proper definition before our minds. *Σύνεσις* and *συνιέναι* here denote this faculty or act of 'seeing'; and the word 'judgment,' whether used as in vulgar parlance, or as in the language of logic and epistemology, seems most unfortunately chosen to represent it. But we do not wish to criticise—still less to carp at—Mr. Greenwood's book. It is the work of a scholar who, we hope, will hereafter develop some of the many valuable germs of thought scattered through these pages, and give them to us in further publications.—J. I. B.

The Manuscripts of Westminster Abbey. By J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D., Dean of Westminster, and MONTAGUE RHODES JAMES, LITT.D., Provost of King's College, Cambridge.

Flete's History of Westminster Abbey. Edited by J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D., Dean of Westminster.

THESE two volumes are intended to inaugurate a series of studies bearing on the history of Westminster Abbey. The first volume deals with the MSS. in the Abbey, which, though not numerous, represent three distinct collections. The first was dispersed or destroyed at the time of the dissolution of the Abbey; and an attempt is here made at a list of works then in the library, a difficult task, as Westminster MSS. have no press-marks, and are identified only by definite inscriptions. The second collection, amounting to 2,000 MSS., the gift of Williams, who became dean in 1620, is now lost, having been destroyed by fire in 1699; of the age and value of the books comprised in it we cannot speak, but two "great folios of old English Poems" seem a real loss, while a Vergil and a Seneca are described as ancient. The third collection comprises all the works now extant in the library.

Other sections deal with the making and keeping of books, their cost, and the functions of the librarian; and a chapter is devoted to the Westminster Chartularies.

John Flete, a monk of the house from 1420 to 1465, wrote the History of the Abbey from its foundation in A.D. 184 up to the death of Nicholas Litlington, November 29, 1386—a work which deserves its new edition, seeing that it is the only medieval history of the Abbey. Sulcard's earlier work is mostly legendary; while Widmore, the standard historian, founded his work largely on Flete. The story is recorded "*ex diversis chronicis approbatis scriptisque*"

authenticis, chartis regum summorumque pontificum." Unlike most medieval historians, Flete refrains from guessing where he has no real evidence, and is remarkably scrupulous in copying out actual documents, and quoting parallel sources. In dealing with the lives of the abbots, Flete's dates are subjected to criticism by the Dean of Westminster, who gives a provisional list of his own. "The month and day are usually correct; it was apparently the year that was difficult to determine." Besides the lives of the abbots, the main portions of the work deal with the story of the foundation of the Abbey, the evidence of its privileges, and a list of relics and indulgences.

The reprint is edited by the Dean of Westminster, who gives brief notes on certain points, such as the authenticity of various royal charters and papal bulls quoted by Flete.—A. C. FARRAN.

Anthropology and the Classics: six lectures delivered before the University of Oxford. By ARTHUR J. EVANS, ANDREW LACY, GILBERT MURRAY, F. B. JEVONS, J. L. MYRES, W. WARD FOWLER. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, MCMVIII.

MR. EVANS lectured on "the European diffusion of pictography and its bearings on the origin of script." The lecture is illustrated by plates; and the whole paper is one of great interest. Mr. Lacy's lecture on "Homer and Anthropology" well repays perusal, though the subject is more familiar than that of Mr. Evans. Professor Murray's account of "Anthropology in the Greek Epic tradition outside of Homer" supplements Mr. Lacy's paper, and is written with its author's usual vigour and brilliancy. The lecture on "Græco-Italian magic" is attractive, both from its subject and from the width and variety of illustration bestowed upon it. Professor Myres' paper on "Herodotus and Anthropology" will need no commendation to those who know his valuable services both to classics and to anthropology. Breadth and accuracy, comprehensiveness and detail, many-sided acquaintance with the realities of Greek life, and with the speculations in physics and philosophy which kept pace with its development—all these, together with his faculty of interpreting Herodotus in his relationship to the evolution of the Hellenic race, impart to Mr. Myres' paper more than ordinary value. Mr. Ward Fowler's paper, which concludes the volume, draws attention to an aspect of 'lustratio' too often overlooked—the "stately processional movement" associated with it.—J. I. B.

The Trachinian Maidens of Sophocles: translated into English Verse by HUGO SHARPLEY, M.A. David Nutt. Price 1s. 6d. net.

THIS little work, the first instalment of a projected version of Sophocles, is, with the exception of about twenty passages, based on Professor Jebb's text. It is the work of a careful scholar, but suffers considerably from the inevitable comparison with Professor Murray's brilliant translations of Euripides. The iambic passages have been done into the rhyming non-heroic couplet, while in the choric parts "each song has been allowed to find a measure of its own." The versions of the choric odes are in many cases intolerably prosaic. It is not often that Mr. Sharpley rises as high as he does in the strophe—

"Wave upon wave o'er the face of the ocean rolleth by,
Sped by the strong south wind or the pitiless northern moil;
So is the Cadmus-born, now battered and now on high
Lifted amain by the waves of a Cretan sea of toil;
But a God upholdeth him evermore
And keepeth his feet from Hades' door."

We prefer Jebb's prose, for example, to—

"Mark, ye maids, how the stroke
Hath swiftly, swiftly descended
Which prescient wit portended,
As of old the prophet spoke:
When the years, 'twas said, with their sum
Of months unto twelve should come."

This savours very much of Gilbert, with a dash of Mother Shipton's—

"And the world to an end shall come
In eighteen hundred and eighty-one."

The rhymes are often poor—

"Are ye the same, the same that once did slay
The cattle pest that dwelt in Nemea?"

and again—

"This signet bezel-set, familiar
To his remembrance. Now 'tis time to fare."

The book is carefully printed; we have noticed only one mistake, "attempted" for "attempered" (?) on page 42.—H. C.

The Characters of Theophrastus: an English Translation from a revised text, with Introduction and Notes by R. C. JEBB, M.A.: a new edition edited by J. E. SANDYS, Litt.D. Macmillan & Co., London, 1909.

THIS new edition by Dr. Sandys of the work of the late Professor Jebb needs no commendation to the classical reader. All know how uniformly perfect Jebb's work was; and if any blemishes showed themselves in his *Theophrastus*, we may trust Dr. Sandys to have dealt faithfully with these. His function was indeed chiefly that of bringing Jebb's book up to date. It so happened that Professor Diels, of Berlin, and Dr. Sandys were engaged at the same time on *Theophrastus*, Dr. Diels preparing a text of the *Characteres* for the Oxford Press, and Dr. Sandys this new issue of Jebb's book. They were happily "enabled to arrange for communicating their proof-sheets to one another." Thus, while the Berlin Professor was put in possession of Jebb's opinions on the text, Dr. Sandys "had the advantage of obtaining accurate information as to the disputed readings in the two Paris MSS. and the Vatican MS., all three of which had been completely photographed with a view to the Oxford edition." This was fortunate, and has resulted in giving the new edition of Jebb's *Theophrastus* a critical completeness which advances it a long way beyond the old edition in its value for scholars and students.—J. I. B.

Livy, Book IX. Edited with introduction, notes, etc., by W. B. ANDERSON, M.A., Professor of Latin in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.

THIS little edition forms an attractive setting to one of the most interesting of Livy's extant books. It contains a brief historical introduction, an account of the authorities, and a critical estimation of Livy's value as an historian. In two appendices there is a discussion of the difficulties in which Livy's account of the affair of the Caudine Forks is entangled. The editor gives satisfactory grounds for his contention that Livy's authorities, in their eagerness to make revenge follow close on the heels of the Roman defeat, deliberately falsified the chronology of the succeeding six or seven years. In the editor's discussion of chapters 17-19, he puts forward an interesting theory to account for the absurd exaggerations, the puerile misstatements, the ignorance, geographical and tactical, of Livy, and the miserable nature of the arguments that he advances in support of his thesis that, if Alexander the Great and the Romans had met in conflict, the latter would have proved victorious. The editor sees in these chapters all the traits of a youthful rhetorical exercise afterwards incorporated, with dire results to Livy's reputation, in the History.—H. C.

Ionia and the East. By DAVID G. HOGARTH, Fellow of Magdalen College, Fellow of the British Academy. With a Map. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909.

A CLASSICAL scholar who desires to extend his knowledge beyond the limits within which imagination rules, and to acquire the faculty of seeing the Hellenes live and move as real beings, could hardly commence with a more interesting and profitable work—within its scope—than that before us. It may be said emphatically, in the first place, that Mr. Hogarth writes well. His English is distinguished by the classical quality which (alas, that it should be so!) too often forsakes the English of the learned anthropologist, and leaves his best work merely inchoate—something that awaits ‘translation’ before it can obtain a vogue. In the next place, Mr. Hogarth’s own personal experiences are his chief vouchers for his facts and deductions; and better vouchers none will desire. He aims at considering the circumstances under which Hellenic civilization properly so called came into being, and, in particular, examines “the origin of that brilliant Ionian Society which a French writer has named *le printemps de la Grèce*.” He investigates “the cultural equipment”—Danubian and Aegean—which the European migrants took with them to Asia; the archæological evidence—such as it is—which exists of “Ionia before the Ionians”; the overland routes, as well as the seaways of the Levant, by which the influences of inland Asia were conveyed to the Ionians; and at the close he gives us a fascinating sketch of the circumstances which appear to him to have “contributed to the rise of that local but most brilliant development of Hellenism which we call Ionian civilization.” We will not state his conclusions. Readers of HERMATHENA ought to possess this work of Mr. Hogarth’s.—J. I. B.

The Electra of Sophocles. With a commentary abridged from the larger edition of SIR R. C. JEBB, LITT.D., by GILBERT A. DAVIES, M.A.

THIS handy little work will be welcomed by junior students of Sophocles, as it contains as much of the larger work as they require. Mr. Davies has done his work very skilfully, and presented us with a clear introduction, concise notes, and a copious index. We suppose that it was not any part of Mr. Davies’ scheme to depart from either the text or the interpretation of the original editor. It is admitted, however, by most scholars that Professor Jebb was inclined to be somewhat dogmatic, and to prefer—naturally enough—his own interpretation to others that recommend themselves more to the lay mind. For example, *λόγοισι γενναία* is “reputed noble,” rather than “noble in her professions” (Jebb):

cp. Eur. *Hec.* 1572 ὁ τ'οὐκέτ' ὦν λόγοισι Μενέλεως πέλας. Again, in *Electra* 363, the reading τοῦμὲ μὴ λυποῦν, which makes excellent sense, and was read by the ancient scholiast, deserves recognition. Campbell's interpretation of 446 "conveys a deeper notion of indignity." In 606 it may be as much as a man's reputation is worth to defend *χρῆ*; it certainly makes a good sense: "Proclaim if you must." In 688, 689 Campbell's interpretation is at once simpler and in better agreement with the context: "I know not how to tell a few among many feats achieved by one so valiant." This gives the required antithesis to what follows. In 743-745, Jebb's elaborate mechanical theory may be dispensed with if we suppose the critical moment to be when the chariot, moving from *right to left*, has all but made the turn. In 976, δεξιῶσεται is rather to extend the right hand towards a person in token of honour. In 1085, the conjecture αἰῶν' ἄδικον merits attention from Mr. Davies. It is somewhat strange that Mr. Davies in 1473 prints Κλυταιμνήστρα in the teeth of the consistent spelling of the Laurentian Codex. The spelling of the Laurentian is supported also by the evidence of inscriptions and of Latin texts.—H. C.

The Euthyphro of Plato, with introduction and notes by ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Price 2s. 6d.

THIS book is designed as a companion volume to Mr. Stock's edition of the *Crito*. It is intended for students who have "grammar behind them and philosophy before." The text is that of Professor Burnet, from which Mr. Stock dissents in only five or six places. The introduction and notes are brief and to the point. Some of the notes, however, seem to presuppose a plane of knowledge beneath what we should have thought possible in students capable of approaching Plato.—H. C.

Thucydides, Histories, Book IV. Edited by T. R. MILLS, with a general introduction by H. STUART JONES. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, MCMIX.

MR. H. STUART JONES's general introduction, though only twenty pages or so in length, is a valuable piece of work, which replies in sober and weighty terms to certain recent attacks on the scientific character of the history of Thucydides, and also gives an account of the mss. on which the text is based. Mr. Mills adds a useful analysis of the contents of Book IV., dividing them into groups according to the various parts of Hellas in which the military operations described took place. His notes are full and well adapted to the needs of schoolboys. The book would have been the better for an index.

Ioannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Carnotensis Policratici sive de Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum Libri VIII. Recognovit et prolegomenis, apparatu critico, commentario, indicibus instruxit CLEMENS C. I. WEBB, A.M. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano. MCMIX.

THE six sections of the 'Prolegomena' give an account of the codices used for the constitution of the text; of the previous editions of the Policraticus; of the plan of this edition; of the Greek and Latin authors used by "John of Salisbury" in this work; of the title Policraticus; and of the esteem in which the work was held by subsequent writers. The Latin notes to the text of this quaint work are brief, but apposite and interesting. These two volumes will no doubt be welcomed by those interested in the state of learning in England in the twelfth century. The editor seems to have acquitted himself admirably; and the printing and binding are what we are accustomed to expect from the Clarendon Press.

Hesiod, the Poems and Fragments: done into English Prose. With introduction and appendices by A. W. MAIR, M.A. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1908.

PROFESSOR MAIR'S translation of Hesiod has evidently been a labour of love, which, given competent scholarship, is the surest pledge of good work. In fact, he has produced, in this version of Hesiod, with the introduction and addenda, a delightful little book. The addenda in particular deserve admiration, being full of matter valuable to the student, and interesting to many whose student days are long past, but who love their *Georgics*, and for Virgil's sake like Hesiod, his ancestor. The translation is very good—conceived in the right spirit, and executed with care and skill.

Theophrasti Characteres. Recensuit HERMANN DIELS. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

PROFESSOR DIELS in his *Praefatio* gives all the information that a scholar could desire of the history of the text of the "Characteres," so far as this can be ascertained. His accuracy and width of learning are famous; and he has the faculty of making what he writes interesting. His critical notes are unusually full, and the *index verborum* increases the usefulness of the edition.

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia cum Theopompi et Cratippi Fragmentis. Recognoverunt brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt BERNARDUS P. GRENFELL ET ARTURUS S. HUNT. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

STUDENTS of classics should be peculiarly grateful for this edition, which places some of the most valuable of the recent finds at Oxyrhynchus in their hands at little cost and under the editorship of the original discoverers themselves. The critical foot-notes give, with the editors' suggestions, those of many other scholars who have laboured for the emendation of the text. To these ample acknowledgment is made in the brief and interesting *Praefatio*. Students of ancient Greek history will find this a valuable addition to their libraries.

The Silvae of Statius. Translated, with introduction and notes, by D. A. SLATER, M.A. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1908.

THERE is little enthusiasm felt at present for the poems of Statius, and perhaps he is unjustly neglected. At all events this translation, with its appreciative introduction, will help students to cultivate a nearer acquaintance with "the most eminent poet of the silver age" of Latin. For the historian of Latin poetry he must always have a certain importance, even if the taste of our times forbids us to admire him as he was admired by Dante and Politian. Professor Slater has a difficult task in attempting to argue his readers back into that spirit of admiration. Its disappearance was the cause—not the effect—of that disparagement of Statius which he seems to resent in Macaulay. Each century has its own taste; and it is the privilege of few writers indeed, and only of the very greatest, to possess that happy quality—that kinship with τὸ καθόλου—which makes them favourites in every age.

Herodoti Historiae. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit CAROLUS HUDE, PH.D. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

THIS issue of Herodotus in two volumes, under the able editorship of Dr. Hude, provides English students with a text which represents the best they can expect to have for a long while. Dr. Hude gives in his short *Praefatio* an account of the principal codices, and a brief discussion of critical difficulties, with a statement of the principles by which he has himself been guided in editing a work which was written "in the Ionic dialect," but which (as he says) "ab tribus Iadis generibus quae testimoniis titulorum tradita extant, Asiatico, Cycladum, Euboico, in rebus et multis et gravibus ita differt, ut nullo singulari eorum usus esse videatur." His best hope is that, if he cannot here present us with the actual Herodotus, he may, at least, as far as possible, give us Herodotus "qualem habuerit antiquitas."

University of Liverpool Institute of Archaeology: Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology. Vol. I., Nos. 3 and 4; Vol. II., Nos. 1 and 2.

The contents are as follows:—

Dr. T. G. Pinches publishes twenty-three *Cappadocian Tablets* belonging to the *Liverpool Institute of Archaeology*, which nearly double the number of published examples of this class of documents. They are clay tablets, inscribed in cuneiform characters, with contracts, inventories, and correspondence on a variety of topics, in a dialect of Assyrian or Babylonian. The style of the handwriting suggests that they were written before 2000 B.C.; but the writers appear to have been Assyrians; and as Assyrian influence is not likely to have reached Cappadocia so early, it is possible that this old-fashioned style lasted on in Cappadocia until a rather late date.

Dr. Pinches also publishes a Babylonian tablet from Tel-loh in Southern Babylonia, inscribed with an inventory of food and drink. It probably belongs to a period about 2500 B.C.

Professor Sayce contributes a number of *Notes on Passages* in the Cappadocian Tablets, in which the extreme difficulty of the local dialect leaves the interpretation doubtful.

Mr. T. E. Peet's paper on the *Disputed Flints of Breonio Veronese* summarizes all the available evidence as to a remarkable find of curiously shaped flint implements and fantastic objects, which were found in 1876 in North Italy, and are now in the Verona Museum.

Professor Flinders Petrie comments further on an Egyptian honorary title, *Semer Uati*, and suggests that this title shows that when the Egyptian kingdom was first unified, the tribal chiefs of its old divisions were accepted as 'peers' or 'companions' of their overlord the King.

Preliminary Report by Professor John Garstang on his *Excavations on the Hittite Site at Sakje-Geusi in North Syria*, undertaken in the autumn of 1908. The present report includes a brief narrative of the expedition, a description of the geographical position of the site, a summary of the archaeological history of the fortified mound which was excavated this year, and a more detailed description of the fortification wall and the palatial portico within it. This portico has a number of the sculptured slabs of its façade still standing on either side of the principal entrance, and exhibits for the first time fresh and unweathered examples of Hittite art of vigorous design and a high degree of artistic skill. Their date lies within the period which succeeds the Assyrian

conquests of Assurnasirpal and precedes those of Tiglath-Pileser III. The report is illustrated by plans of the site, and photographs of the principal sculptures.

A separate section of the Report is devoted to the remarkable series of pre-Hittite pottery, which goes back to the Neolithic origins of the mound, and includes painted styles with Cappadocian, Assyrian, and even Elamite affinities.

Another paper, by Messrs. A. J. B. Wace, J. P. Droop, and M. S. Thompson, summarizes the present state of our knowledge of the *Early Civilisation of Northern Greece*, as revealed by recent excavations in Thessaly; and discusses the remarkable school of Neolithic culture which has thus been revealed, in its relations with the civilization of Southern Greece and Crete on the one hand, and Southern Italy and Sicily on the other. Examples of the principal styles of decoration are figured by way of illustration.

Volume II, parts 1 and 2, contains an account of the excavations of the Liverpool Committee for Excavations in Wales, and also of a prehistoric vase in the Museum of Spalato, by A. M. Woodward. Many of the articles are illustrated by plates.

Papers also appear on a *Bird Cult of the Old Kingdom of ancient Egypt*; on a *Recently Discovered Section of the Roman Wall at Chester*; on *Prehistoric Finds in South Italy*; and on some *Human Skulls from Sisma*, an ancient mining district near Iconium in Asia Minor.

BOOKS ALSO RECEIVED.

- Samson Agonistes and the Hellenic Drama.* By the late SIR R. C. JEBB, O.M. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. III. Frowde. London, 1909.
- The Value of Byzantine and Modern Greek in Hellenic Studies.* By SIMOS MENARDOS, D.PH., LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1909.
- The Book Division of Propertius.* B. L. ULLMAN. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1909.
- Trajan's Column.* By GIACOMO BONI. Frowde. London, 1909.
- The Erasmus Pronunciation of Greek and its Precursors.* By INGRAM BYWATER, M.A. Frowde. London, 1908.
- The Identification of the Manuscripts of Catullus cited in Statius' edition of 1566.* By B. L. ULLMAN. University of Chicago, 1908.
- Index to the Fragments of the Greek Elegiac and Iambic Poets.* Cornell Studies. No. XVIII. By MARY CORWIN LANE, A.B. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1908.
- A Study of Cn. Domitius Corbulo, as found in the Annals of Tacitus.* By DRAPER T. SCHOONOVER. University Press, Chicago. 1909.
- Additions and Corrections to C.I.L.* By B. L. ULLMAN. University Press, Chicago. 1909.
- Some Textual Criticisms on the eighth book of the de Vita Caesarum of Suetonius.* By WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER. Berkeley (Cal.). The University Press. 1908.
- Flaws in Classical Research.* By J. P. POSTGATE. Frowde. London, 1909.
- The Midland Septs and the Pale.* By F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK, M.A. Dublin: Sealy, Bryers, & Walker. 1908.
- The Annals of Mathematics* (Harvard University), 1909: London, Longmans, Green, & Co.
- Metaphysica Fratris Rogeri, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum de viciis contractis in studio theologie: fragmenta quae supersunt nunc primum edidit* ROBERT STEELE. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Liber Primus Communium Naturalium Fratris Rogeri: partes prima et secunda; edidit ROBERT STEELE. Oxonii, e Typographeo Clarendoniano.

The Ion of Plato, with Introduction and Notes by ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1909.

P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon, Liber III., with Introduction and Notes by M. CARTWRIGHT, M.A. (Wales). Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. MCMIX.

Q. Horati Flacci Saturarum, Liber II. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by JAMES GOW, LITT.D. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1909.

The Apologia and Florida of Apuleius of Madaura. Translated by H. E. BUTLER. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1909.

Lucian's Dialogues. Prepared for Schools, with short Notes in Greek, by W. H. D. ROUSE, M.A., LITT.D. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1909.

PROCEEDINGS

COLLEGE CLASSICAL SOCIETY, TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, 1908-9.

Nov. 6th, 1908.—Rev. Dr. Mahaffy in the chair. Rev. Professor Wilkins read a paper on "Hellenistic Greek, illustrated from inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca." Speakers: Mr. J. E. W. Flood, Professor Beare, and the Chairman.

Nov. 13th.—Professor Beare in the chair. Mr. C. B. Armstrong read a paper on "Phœnician Influence on Classical Greece." Speakers: Mr. J. G. Acheson, Dr. L. C. Purser, Messrs. Bennett and Flood, Rev. J. O'Driscoll, and the Chairman.

Nov. 20th.—Professor Smyly in the chair. Dr. Mahaffy gave a Lecture on "Domestic Architecture among the Greeks," illustrated by lantern slides. Speakers: Mr. J. Bennett and Professor Beare.

Nov. 27th.—Mr. Bennett in the chair. Mr. J. H. F. Leland read a paper on "Ancient Geographical Knowledge." Speakers: Messrs. Flood, Burd, Armstrong, Acheson, Bateman, Johnston, Boyd, and the Chairman.

Dec. 4th.—Mr. Bennett in the chair. Mr. H. M. W. Burd read a paper on "Euripides' Heroines." Speakers: Messrs. Flood and Norton, Professor Beare, and Messrs. Johnston, Acheson, Oulton, and the Chairman.

Dec. 11.—Rev. R. M. Gwynn in the chair. Mr. E. M. Norton read a paper on "Mr. Bury's View of Demosthenes." Speakers: Messrs. Beckett, Flood, Martin, Holmes, Livingston, Acheson, and Bennett.

Feb. 12th, 1909.—Mr. Bennett in the chair. Mr. J. E. W. Flood read a paper on "Aristophanes." Speakers: Messrs. Murphy, Davies, Boyd, and the Chairman.

Feb. 19th.—Dr. Purser in the chair. Mr. E. M. Bateman read a paper on "Greek Proper Names." Speakers: Messrs. Acheson, Flood, Browne, and the Chairman.

Feb. 26th.—Dr. Purser in the chair. Mr. R. F. Crook gave an Address, illustrated by lantern slides, on "Some Experiences in Greece." Speakers: Messrs. Leland and Bennett.

March 5th.—Dr. Purser in the chair. Mr. J. G. Acheson read a paper on “Hesiod.” Speakers: Messrs. Davies, Murphy, Leland, and the Chairman.

March 12th.—Mr. Bennett in the chair. Mr. S. M. Wright read a paper on “Magna Graecia.” Speakers: Mr. Armstrong, Dr. Purser, Rev. J. O’Driscoll, and Mr. Acheson.

March 19th.—Mr. Bennett in the chair. Mr. H. G. Livingston read a paper on “Education among the Greeks.” Speakers: Mr. Kennedy, Messrs. Flood, Leland, Acheson, Oulton, and the Chairman.

May 21st.—Nominations for Offices, &c.

May 28th.—Mr. Alton in the chair. Mr. Bennett read a paper on “Roman Society in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries.” Speakers: Mr. Scandrett, Dr. Purser, and the Chairman.

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